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Civil society organizations choose vastly different forms of collective action to try to 
influence European politics: everything from insider lobbying to disruptive protest, from public 
education to hunger strikes. Using network analysis and qualitative interviewing, my research 
emphasizes that patterns of inter-organizational relations influence organizational decisions to 
use one of these strategies. They do this by structuring the information and resources available to 
actors, as well as by diffusing strategies across connected actors. This is particularly true when 
networks are segmented into two distinct components, as I find in the European climate change 
network. In this network, organizations using contentious ‘outsider’ strategies are only loosely 
linked to those ‘insiders’ behaving conventionally in Brussels.  
These findings are policy relevant because current scholarship and policy 
recommendations tend to assume that increased civil society participation in transnational 
policy-making will increase democratic legitimacy. But my network data and qualitative 
interviews suggests that the emergence of a coalition of organizations engaging solely in 
contentious outsider action reflects the development and diffusion of a new and highly critical 
strand of climate change politics. I further argue that this type of contentious civil society 
‘spillover’ can actually slow the pace of development of climate change policy and of European 
integration more generally.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“The Most Serious Problem Facing the World”  
European citizens consistently rate climate change as one of the world’s most serious problems.  
In the March-April 2008 Eurobarometer public opinion survey, EU citizens ranked climate 
change as “the most serious problem facing the world as a whole,” prioritizing it above poverty, 
terrorism and a global economic crisis (see Figure 1.1).  It was considered one of the top three 
most serious problems in every one of the twenty seven member states.  These same data suggest 
that 55% of respondents think that the European Union is not doing enough to address it 
(Eurobarometer 69.2 2008).   
Figure 1.1: Public Opinion on Climate Change in the European Union, March-April 2008
 
Given this serious public concern, it is not surprising that during this time period many 
European civil society organizations made climate change a top priority and devoted important 
organizational resources towards campaigns on global warming.  This project seeks to answer 
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QB1a: In your opinion, which of the following do you consider to be the most 
serious problem facing the world as a whole? Firstly? 
Source: Eurobarometer 69.2, March-April 2008
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two key questions: how and why do European civil society organizations mobilize 
transnationally on the issue of climate change?  It specifically considers the critical time period 
of January 2008-December 2009.  This is an important phase of political decision-making 
because during these two years the European Union both developed its internal Climate and 
Energy Package and its external strategy for the United Nations Climate Change Summit in 
Copenhagen, Denmark.   
Civil society actors have a lot of incentives to organize transnational collective action on 
climate change in the European Union.  Climate change is a transboundary ‘commons’ problem 
that cannot be adequately addressed on a national scale (Ostrom et al 1999).  Accordingly, the 
EU has greater competencies than the member states in the area of climate change,1
But when civil society organizations want to work at the European level, what exactly do 
they do?  Previous scholarship has suggested that European civil society organizations working 
on the environment will tend to utilize a very narrow range of conventional and lobbying 
oriented tactics (Marks and McAdam 1996; Rucht 2001).  But my original research suggests that 
organizations working on climate change employ a much wider spectrum of tactics: everything 
from press releases to protests, letter writing to blockades.  This dissertation tries to explain this 
observable tactical diversity and its implications.   I will argue that organizational tactical 
decision-making is interdependent, and that organizations are influenced by the decisions of their 
peers when choosing their forms of collective action.  
 making it a 
highly desirable target for civil society activism (Greenwood 2007; Oberthür and Gehring 2006).    
Conventional and Contentious European Collective Action  
                                                          
1 An estimated 75-80% of environmental policy in general in EU member states originates in Brussels (Greenwood 
2007: 6), and the percentage is probably even higher for climate change policy.   
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When scholars and policy-makers talk about participation in EU politics, they usually mean the 
use of conventional action forms by professionalized interest organizations.  This is for good 
reason: previous work has suggested that there hasn’t been much European level protest (Imig 
and Tarrow 2001; Reising 1998; Rucht 2001) and that the openness of EU institutions to civil 
society actors make it unlikely that there ever will be (Lahusen 2004; Marks and McAdam 
1999).  In this context, scholars have focused with great detail and sophistication on the variety 
of conventional activities in which these actors engage, and on the importance of their behavior 
for European policy making (e.g. Beyers 2004; Coen 2007; Greenwood 2007; Mahoney 2008).  
My work on the climate change issue area partially confirms the findings of these previous 
studies by showing that many civil society actors do utilize these ‘insider’ and ‘professionalized’ 
strategies on the ‘Brussels route of influence’ vis-à-vis the EU (Greenwood 2007).   
However, my study also challenges conventional wisdom regarding the lack of 
contentious European collective action.  My data reveal that civil society organizations use a 
wide variety of action forms to contest climate change.  Table 1.2 gives an complete listing of 
forms of collective action I found employed during this time, which include both ‘conventional’ 
actions like lobbying and making press releases and more ‘contentious’ actions such as 
blockading and picketing.   
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Table 1.1 Types of European Collective Action on Climate Change, 2008-2009 
Conventional Contentious 
Conducting a workshop  
Electoral Campaigning 
Holding a Conference 
Issuing a Report 
Letter Writing  
Lobbying [Government Representatives] 
Petition/Signature Collection  
Press Release or Conference 
Public Advertising Campaign  
Public Opinion Poll 
 
Banner Hanging 
Blockading and Occupation 
Camping [Corporation, Power Plant, Government] 
Demonstration/Rally 
Event Crashing 
Flash Mobbing 
Head Shaving 
Holding a Vigil  
Hunger Striking  
Marching 
Picketing 
Property Damage [Power Plants]  
Sit-in 
Spilling Substances [‘Blood’, Coal, Oil] 
Street Theatre 
Symbolic Confrontations [Puppets, Ice Sculptures]  
Tree Sitting 
Website Hacking 
 
 
I argue that there are three primary reasons why previous research has not found much 
contentious European collective action.  First, contentious European collective action is a 
relatively new phenomenon of the last ten years (Balme and Chabanet 2008; Imig and Tarrow 
2001; Ubba and Uggla 2011).  Transnational collective action in general did not really take off 
until the late 1990s, and Europe is no exception to this trend (Pianta, Silva and Zola 2004; Bandy 
and Smith 2005; Tarrow 2005).  But recent campaigns on issues such as the Bolkestein 
Directive, the European Constitution and the European Ports Package demonstrate definitively 
that contentious European collective action does exist and is an important feature of 
contemporary European politics (Balme and Chabanet 2008; Bédoyan et al 2004; Gentile 2010; 
Lefébure 2002; Parks 2009).   
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Second, many previous studies of European collective action have been limited by their 
research designs.  These studies tend to be relentlessly ‘top down’: they consider issues on which 
the EU is making important decisions and then ask how civil society participates in that process 
(Baumgartner and Leech 1998).  This study begins from the ‘bottom up’ by considering what 
issues European care about, and then asking how they organize to exert political influence.  In 
other words, I deliberately select a case in which European citizens have significant grievances, 
rather than selecting a case where the European institutions have important competencies.   
Finally, many studies of European collective action have taken a highly restrictive view 
of what it means for collective action to be ‘European.’  I argue that for an action to be 
‘European’ it does not necessarily have to occur in Brussels, Strasbourg or Luxembourg.  
Instead, I follow the approach of Imig and Tarrow (2001) and define actions taken at the 
‘European level’ as those that target the European institutions and/or those that involve the use of 
transnational European coalitions to target national states or other actors. This makes my 
definition of organizations active ‘at the European level’ broader than the narrowly Brussels-
oriented work (e.g. Beyers 2004; Marks and McAdam 1999; Kriesi, Tresch and Jochum 2007). 
In adopting this approach my study also builds on recent work that looks at ‘Europeanization 
from Below’ in alternative arenas such as the European Social Forum  and considers the different 
pathways civil society actors use to organize at the European level (della Porta 2007; della Porta 
and Caini 2007).   
Argument Overview 
My research explains how organizations make structured and relatively consistent decisions 
among the tactical options available to them when they sponsor collective action on climate 
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change.  Previous literature has emphasized that organizational behavior is explained by a 
combination of contextual and organizational-level factors.  For political process theories 
emphasizing contextual factors, organizational behavior should respond to the external political 
opportunities for participation available (Eisinger 1973; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 
1989; Costain 1992).  In theories at the organizational level, organizational behavior should be 
the product of intra-organizational ideology, structure and resources (McCarthy and Zald 1977; 
Piven and Cloward 1977; Dalton 1994).  In both approaches, organizations make decisions 
independently and under conditions not of their own making.   
I argue that these assumptions are unrealistic given the importance of relationships, 
networks, alliances and coalitions in political life (e.g. Diani 1995; Diani and McAdam 2004; 
Klandermans 1990; Levi and Murphy 2006). My argument is that organizational decision-
making is fundamentally relational: it depends on the actions of other organizations working in 
the same field.  Drawing on the tradition of social network analysis, I emphasize that patterns of 
inter-organizational relations influence organizational strategic decisions.  They do this by 
structuring the information and resources available to actors, as well as by encouraging social 
influence across connected actors.  
In my empirical chapters, I find that those European organizations using contentious 
‘outsider’ strategies are only loosely linked to those ‘insiders’ behaving conventionally in 
Brussels.  While those in the ‘insider’ group respond to the available resources and political 
opportunities of the EU system, the ‘outsiders’ are a significant subgroup that behave 
contentiously.  Their choices in many ways subvert the expectations of the dominant theoretical 
approaches in interest group and social movement studies.  These findings have consequences 
for the way we approach the study of social movements, as well as for how scholars and policy-
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makers conceive of the role of ‘participation’ of civil society actors in European integration and 
climate change governance.  
Definitions 
At this point it is useful to briefly define four foundational concepts I use in my study:   
• Forms of Collective Action: Actors use a variety of specific action forms – protests, 
pickets, or petitions for example – to mobilize participants, which are hard to enumerate 
in advance because actors commonly innovate on them during cycles of contention 
(Tarrow 2011: 142). I argue that European actors choose their mobilization forms from 
an understood ‘repertoire of contention’: a limited set of action forms actors use to mount 
collective challenges (Tilly 1995: 41).    For this study, the key elements of collective 
action involve “episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their 
objects when … the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the 
claimants” (McAdam et al 2005).   
• Networks: I follow a common definition of networks as “regularities in patterns of 
relations among concrete entities” (White et al 1976).  ‘Networks’ are often used as 
metaphors, but less often employed as tools of analysis in political science (Diani 1995, 
Dowding 1995, Pappi and Henning 1998, Thatcher 1998).  This study employs a broad 
definition of a ‘network’ that is suitable for empirical analysis of a variety of possible 
relationships between the actors in the population.   
• Civil Society: Acknowledging the complexity of the terminological debate, I use the term 
‘civil society’ to denote a ‘self-organized citizenry’ that includes European social 
movements, trade unions and non-governmental organizations (Edwards, Foley and Diani 
2001).  The basis of this distinction is that ‘civil society’ is separate from both the sphere 
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of government and the sphere of the market, and itself constitutes a third sphere of social 
and political relations (Emirbayer and Sheller 1999).  
• Organizations: Organizations can be viewed as concrete social entities with describable 
locations, identities and attributes (Hannan and Freeman 1977; Scott 1992).  
Organizations are often defined by their purpose.  For my analysis, my population 
includes organizations that make “public interest claims” and “pursue social change” 
related to progressive action on the issue of climate change (Andrews and Edwards 
2004:486).  Though I require that such organizations must be sufficiently institutionalized 
to publically sponsor collective actions, I do not make an a priori distinction between 
‘non-governmental organizations’ and ‘social movement organizations’ (Marks and 
McAdam 1999), preferring instead to study the full range of variation in organizational 
forms.    
Why Europe?  
Why restrict my study of transnational collective action on climate change to the European 
Union?  I think there are at least four reasons why studying Europe makes sense given the goals 
of this research.   
First, as a result of popular concern on the part of EU citizens, the presence of important 
political decision-making moments, and the incentives for transnational organizing one should 
expect to see a great deal of European collective action on climate change from 2008-2009.  
Because of the high volume of action, this makes this an interesting arena in which to study 
collective action in all its forms.  
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Second, for methodological reasons, the European Union is the ideal research laboratory 
for this study.  Studies of transnational advocacy networks are difficult because organizations 
have limited resources with which to form contacts with other organizations.  Because of this 
hurdle to tie formation, we might tend to see geographically or linguistically distant actors 
working together less often.  Limiting this study to European organizations ameliorates this bias, 
because of the geographic proximity, organizing history and existing communication structures 
between actors in the EU.  In other words, limiting the network analysis to Europe bounds the 
network in a way that makes the assumption that all actors could potentially have ties with one 
another more reasonable.  
In addition, during the time period of this study, European actors were exposed to a 
number of different institutional contexts and political events.  In addition to the internal EU 
decision-making process, both the 2008 and 2009 UNFCCC climate change summits were held 
in Europe, meaning that European actors were geographically proximate to and had the ability to 
participate in many different institutional processes.  This variation in political opportunities is 
important for assessing alternative hypotheses in my study.   
Fourth, although the EU is only one case, I treat my study of civil society organizing in 
Europe as an advanced case of transnationalization of both civil society and political institutions. 
The European environmental movement is widely considered “the most globally conscious 
movement in the most highly developed supranational polity” (Rootes 2004).  Thus my findings 
about the way actors interact at the EU level may suggest patterns in the way transnational civil 
society is structured that could be profitably extended to other global issues, world regions, or 
international institutions. 
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Finally, my study sheds light on the determinants of civil society mobilization on an 
important environmental issue, in an important political arena during an important time period.  
The European focus on this study should be of particular interest to those who study 
environmental politics because the European Union is generally considered to be the world 
leader on both civil society consultation and climate change issues (Kelemen and Vogel 2010).   
In addition, the study directly considers the role of civil society participation in the 2009 
Copenhagen climate conference.  This is an important case of (non)decision-making, and as 
such, it should be inherently interesting for those who study civil society participation in 
environmental governance.  
Implications for Scholars of Collective Action 
This study makes an important contribution to the literature on collective action, interest groups 
and social movements for a number of reasons.  My research design is unusual in that it does not 
focus narrowly on NGOs or social movements, lobbying or protest.  Instead, I consider the full 
range of variation in organizations and tactical forms.  I use this unique perspective to try to 
answer perennial questions about why organizations behave contentiously or conventionally.    
The network theory I develop has several implications.  For organizational theorists, it 
suggests an interdependent view of organizational decisions.  I argue that network ties can be 
more important than attributes, and organizations are better understood in relation to one another 
than on their own.  This vantage point also suggests a new research agenda focusing on how 
organizational characteristics may lead to tie-formation or may condition the impact of ties on 
behavior.   
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For political process theorists, this approach helps to unpack the conditional effect of 
structure on agents.  The theory and findings of this study suggest that political structures do 
influence the forms of action that groups use when they contest climate change.  But the effect of 
this structure isn’t uniform, and some organizations systematically seem to ‘ignore’ political 
opportunities.  In other words, the results suggest that structure is important, but agency is real.   
How can we understand this complicated relationship?  I argue that by focusing on network 
structure we can better appreciate the channels through which agents can operate, help 
organizations overcome structural incentives and institutional norms, and generate resistance to 
dominant social and ecological paradigms.   
Implications for Political Participation in International Institutions 
The findings of this project should also complicate our understanding of the role of civil society 
participation in European integration and global environmental governance.  Civil society 
participation in international institutions – and in environmental governance in particular -- is 
often encouraged by policy-makers and scholars alike for the integrative and legitimizing effect 
these civil society actors can produce (e.g. Florini 2000; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Reinicke 2000; 
Sikkink 1999; Willets 1996). My research suggests that when the structure and content of 
relations among civil society actors are divided and competitive, this promise may not be 
fulfilled.  This argument has important consequences for global climate governance and scholars 
of European integration alike. 
Since the beginning of the European project, policy-makers and scholars have viewed the 
participation of European collective actors as essential for the development of European 
integration.  Moving economic (and eventually political) interests beyond the nation-state was 
considered a normative good in post-War Europe because it was seen as a means to prevent 
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inter-state conflict.  As a result, important founders of European politics such as Jean Monnet 
and Robert Schuman explicitly employed strategies to encourage collective actors to 
transnationalize their interests and behavior (Monnet 1978).     
The highly influential neofunctionalist approach to integration studies formalized these 
political strategies into academic language (Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963).  From a neofunctionalist 
perspective, the participation of collective actors in European politics should be one of the 
motors of integration in the absence of direct ‘citizen’ participation.  As Haas remarked in The 
Uniting of Europe, “perhaps the chief finding is that group pressure will spillover into the federal 
sphere and thereby add to the integrative pressure” (Haas 1958: xiii). For Haas, this ‘spillover’2
Neofunctionalist theorizing was subsequently challenged by inter-governmentalist 
approaches (Hoffmann 1966; Moravcsik 1993) and even declared ‘obsolescent’ by Haas himself 
(Haas 1975).  Yet, the scholarly preoccupation with civil society participation in EU politics 
remains.  Scholars working under the broad umbrella of the ‘governance’ approach generally 
consider the participation of civil society actors as one of the indicators of the level of 
development of integration (Majone 1996; Marks, Scharpf et al 1996; Hooghe and Marks 1999).  
Less state-centric views of inter-governmental theory also emphasize the importance of the 
participation of collective actors in encouraging intergovernmental bargaining and decision-
making (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997: 299-300).   
 
of civil society would result in attitude changes of the actors involved, and would eventually 
generate loyalty to the new, more efficient polity and increase pressure for further integration 
(Haas 1958: 287).   
                                                          
2 Haas uses ‘spillover’ to indicate shifts between issue areas of ‘low’ to ‘high’ saliency, from economics to politics, 
and from the national to the European level.  Here I am referring to the last usage.   
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Policy-makers in the European Union are committed to the idea of encouraging civil 
society participation.  As a result of the criticism about the ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU 
institutions – which concerns the lack of transparency and accountability in transnational policy-
making – EU reformers frequently propose increased ‘participation’ by civil society as a remedy 
(Héritier 1999; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2007; Lord and Beetham 2001; Schmitter 2000; 
Smismans 2006; Wessels 1999).  The Delors Commission in particular elaborated a wide range 
of policies to encourage participation by civil society in order to make policy-making more 
accessible and transparent (Kohler-Koch 1996).  The justification behind these policies is 
practical: civil society participation is meant to aid the European Union in achieving both input 
and output legitimacy vis-à-vis EU citizens (Scharpf 1999).   This means that the European 
Commission is procedurally committed to civil society dialogue, consultations, and use of expert 
groups in policy-making (European Commission 1997, 2001, 2002).  More abstractly, the 
European Institutions also rely on civil society groups to publicize and legitimate their actions in 
the member states and to generate pressure for the development of new EU competencies 
(Greenwood 2007: 200).   
But perhaps because of the neofunctionalist and technocratic legacy in most integration 
literature, very little attention has been paid to the effect of contentious participation on the 
integration process.  Scholars have generally assumed that European integration has benefited 
from a ‘permissive consensus’ and a low level of public contestation on European issues 
(Lindberg and Scheingold 1970).  When scholars have considered this question, they conclude 
that it will either be irrelevant or supportive of further integration (Haas 1958: 526; Schmitter 
1969: 166).    Similarly, scholars of ‘civil society participation’ in international institutions 
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generally draw on cases of conventional participation by non-governmental organizations, 
largely ignoring the impact of contentious transnational social movements.   
As European integration and climate change governance have become more politicized, 
contentious participation has become more frequent (Imig and Tarrow 2001; Uba and Uggla 
2010).  This project develops the idea that contentious ‘participation’ can be a double-edged 
sword for European integration and for global environmental governance more generally.  ‘Too 
much’ contentions participation can signal that a democracy is considered illegitimate and 
unstable; ‘too little’ can signal that citizens are uninterested or the regime is overly repressive.  
So how do we know if protest is positive or negative for integration?   I argue that assessing the 
impact of participation on integration and governance requires not only knowing what actors do, 
but with whom they do it.  On the one hand, an integrated network of civil society organizations 
attempting to influence policy through a variety of means may increase the perceived importance 
and legitimacy of these institutions.  But on the other hand, the existence of an isolated, 
contentious group of protestors who participate only indirectly in politics may do just the 
opposite.   
Data Collection and Research Strategy  
This study employs a multi-method research strategy, which combines social network analysis, 
quantitative historical analysis, and qualitative interviewing to support my central claims.  For 
this study, I gathered original quantitative and qualitative data, and spent eighteen months 
interviewing and observing organizations working on climate change policy in the European 
Union.  Appendix A details the data collection and coding procedures in much greater detail.   
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In order to gather systematic quantitative data on European collective action [ECA] on 
climate change, I conducted an electronic search on a variety of media outlets to identify relevant 
events.  Newspaper reports are frequently used in the tradition of protest event analysis in order 
to gather systematic information about the volume, timing and characteristics of contentious 
collective action (Davenport 2010; Earl et al 2004; Koopmans and Rucht 2002; McAdam 1982; 
Tarrow 1989; Tilly 1995).  My study uses a slightly modified protest event analysis approach.  
First, I want to measure the broadest possible spectrum of collective action, not just political 
protest (See Koopmans and Rucht 2002).  Second, I try to identify collective action that takes 
place at the European level, which is a challenge because media in Europe are still largely 
nationally rooted.  Given these two obstacles, I decided to rely on a combination of press sources 
with different target audiences and specialties rather than one single source.   
I use three different types of sources in this study.  These include: 1) two databases of 
newswire sources (Factiva and Lexis Nexis); 2) one EU-specific publication (Euractiv.com) that 
provides in-depth coverage of European policy-making and should contain information about 
most conventional actions by interest groups; and 3) two alternative press sources (Indymedia 
Climate and Rising Tide) that can be expected to capture more contentious events.  Since it was 
not possible to pre-specify a complete list of action types the search terms I used were very 
broad.  The preliminary searches turned up a massive number of news articles, and the reports 
had to be sorted by hand for those events that included relevant ECA.3
                                                          
3 The two searches performed (on the full article text) were: [(EU or EC or Europe*) AND (climate change or global 
warming)] and [(climate change or global warming) AND (protest* or strike* or demonstration*)]. The second 
search was added to capture collective action on climate change that may have a European mobilization dimension, 
without having the EU as a direct target.  In both searches, articles had to be sorted by hand for relevance.  For 
example, this search terms returned 11,588 hits for the years 2008-2009, from which 371 (3.2%) involved a relevant 
collective action, resulting in the selection of 262 unique events.   
  The advantage of 
combining multiple sources is that I was able to pick up on a lot of events that would have been 
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‘missed’ by relying on only one source.  For example, my search returned 371 reports of 262 
unique European collective actions, while the Reuters newswire used in the Imig and Tarrow 
(2001) study returned only 88 events (See also Uba and Uggla 2011).   
From the returned news items I was able to create a database of reported ECA.  I then 
conducted document research on each event, seeking out copies of joint press releases, lists of 
organizational event sponsors, and other primary source material.   These documents were 
obtained via two routes.  If specific organizations were identified, I sought out copies of the 
relevant documents on their websites.  When news reports were not specific enough, I conducted 
a search of different email list serves to which I was subscribed during the period of 2007-2009.  
During this period I was subscribed to the internal lists of the Climate Action Network 
International, Climate Action Network Europe, Climate Justice Now!, and the ‘climate youth’ 
(all with organizational consent), as well as a variety of public list serves related to the 
organization of the Copenhagen counter summit and the international climate camp network.  In 
total, I amassed approximately 10,000 emails from these lists, which provide me access to many 
primary source documents as well as insight into the dynamics of organizational decision-
making.   
  From this document analysis, I was able to gather more complete information on 
organizational event sponsors and more accurate descriptions of the events reported.  These 
events were then coded dichotomously as either contentious or conventional, and as taking place 
either at one of the European Institutions or in one of the member states.4
                                                          
4 See Appendix A for further description of the coding procedures.   
   I also use coding of 
organizational websites to identify important attributes (e.g. age, budget, etc.) of the 
organizations that sponsored these events.  These three data collection strategies led to the 
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creation of an original quantitative data set of collective actions on climate change, their 
sponsors and the attributes of those sponsors.  The first part of this dissertation employs 
quantitative historical analysis, network analysis and statistics to analyze this dataset.   
In addition to the quantitative data collection, I collected a vast amount of qualitative 
data, which I analyze primarily in the second part of this dissertation.  For my research I 
conducted approximately ninety interviews with civil society organizations working on climate 
change in the European Union.  These interviews were stratified by network location, so that 
more central organizations were deliberately oversampled, and more peripheral organizations 
were selected less frequently.  In total, I conducted interviews with approximately fifty 
organizations, meaning that in many complex organizations I interviewed more than one person 
or the same person at more than one time point.  In addition, I collected hundreds of internal 
documents detailing decision-making procedures related to tactical choices.   
Finally, I spent well over two hundred hours observing many of the organizations and 
events represented in my quantitative data.  On many occasions I was invited to attend closed-
door or members-only organizational or coalitional strategy meetings.  I also spent as much time 
as possible attending lobbying events, protests and social forums of which the organizations I’m 
interested in were sponsors.  From these observations I have generated field notes that give me 
additional insights into how and why organizations choose their forms of action.   
Project Outline  
Overall, this project aims to elaborate and illustrate the theoretical utility of a relational approach 
to collective action.  Chapter One outlines the historical context of the study, situating the 
particular time period in the larger framework of global and European climate change policy-
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making.  Chapter Two uses my event and organizational data to outline and assess the 
predictions of the two dominant approaches -- political process and organizational -- to my 
central question.  My sketch of the two alternative approaches should illustrate the need for 
further research and theorizing on this subject.   
Chapter Three explores further my argument that organizational decision-making is 
fundamentally relational.  Drawing on the tradition of social network analysis, my research 
emphasizes that patterns of inter-organizational relations influence organizational strategic 
decisions by structuring the information and resources available to actors, as well as by 
encouraging social influence across connected actors. I use this theoretical approach to examine 
my original dataset of organizations and European collective action, using event co-sponsorship 
as an indicator of network ties.  Based on my network analysis I argue that there are ‘two worlds 
of European collective action,’ and those organizations that use contentious action forms are 
largely distinct to those behaving conventionally in Brussels.   
Chapter Four uses statistical modeling of longitudinal network data to further support my 
contention that organizational decision-making is fundamentally relational.  I use an actor-
oriented approach to explain changes in organizational behavior from 2008-2009, accounting for 
network ties, changes in contextual factors and organizational attributes.  I demonstrate that an 
organization’s choice of collective action strategy is highly influenced by the choices of those 
organizations with which it is closely connected, even once political context and organizational 
traits are accounted for.  This analysis suggests that organizations harmonize their tactics as a 
result of forming network ties, and that contentious forms of action are particularly likely to 
diffuse through relational ties in the network.   
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Chapters Five and Six trace the development of conventional and contentious European 
collective action on climate change.  I use internal documents, participant observation and 
organizational interviews to establish the history of European-level climate change advocacy, 
from the early 1990s to present.  The chronology in Chapter Five details the development of an 
important inter-organizational climate change coalition: The Climate Action Network.  Through 
the Climate Action Network, European NGOs coordinate their political positions and action 
strategies. In doing so, organizations come to embrace conventional forms of action and to 
sustain them even as political opportunities become more closed.      
In Chapter Six, I also trace the development of contentious climate activism from 2005 to 
present, focusing on the creation of one key coalition: Climate Justice Action.  This coalition 
welded together a number of grassroots and autonomous organizations, many of whom had 
previous experience working together in the global justice movement, and led to tactical 
harmonization.  My research demonstrates that as a result of consensus decision-making 
procedures within the coalition, some organizations ‘radicalized’ significantly, while other 
organizations toned down their original action proposals. This coalition also popularized and 
diffused the repertoire of contentious action to many groups that were not previously mobilized 
on the issue of climate change.  
Chapter Seven considers how we might describe organizational-level tactical decision-
making processes more broadly as ‘mechanisms.’  Based on my interviews, I argue that 
relational processes of resource pooling, social influence and information sharing underlie 
decision-making in virtually all of the organizations studied.  However, some mechanisms tend 
to be present in some organizations and not others.  In particular, conventional organizations 
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seem to be much more strongly influenced by political opportunities than are contentious 
organizations.    
I discuss the policy implications of the diffusion of contentious forms of participation for 
climate change policy-making in Chapter Eight.  I particularly point to the importance of 
contentious political participation in encouraging radical states to block the Copenhagen accord 
in 2009 and in stimulating institutional reform within the UNFCCC.  I suggest that the 
experience of Copenhagen may encourage the UNFCCC to introduce restrictions on civil society 
participation in response to the politicization of civil society groups and their contentious 
engagement with the climate change issue.  
Chapter Eight also argues that the stark divisions between conventional and contentious 
groups had implications for their own success.  Conventional groups were particularly 
disadvantaged by the emergence of contentious outsiders in Copenhagen, while contentious 
groups were targets of repression due to their relative isolation.  This suggests that scholars and 
civil society groups themselves need to view the success of their tactics as partially dependent on 
the tactical choices of other groups working in the same arena.  
In my concluding chapter I argue that the ‘two worlds of European collective action’ I 
have documented in this dissertation represent different types of civil society spillovers to the 
European level: one from the national politics to European politics, and the other from global 
politics to European politics.  My network analysis suggests clear evidence of the existence of 
“fragmented spheres of action” in which anti-institutional, contentious organizations rarely cross 
paths with reformist and moderate organizations (Balme and Chabanet 2008).   
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I suggest that this segmentation (and lack of convergence) reflects a broader tendency in 
the European institutions towards emphasizing the ‘participation’ of civil society actors by 
channeling certain groups into the policy-making process while de-emphasizing or ignoring the 
voices of other (contentious) actors.  As a result, the ‘consultative’ role of civil society – in 
which civil society organizations serve to represent the interests of affected parties to policy-
makers – is not necessarily being fulfilled in EU policy-making, even in the context of increased 
participation.  Thus I argue, contrary to Haas and other EU scholars, that the spillover of civil 
society into contentious European collective action can actually delegitimize climate policy and 
stall the integration process when it is not linked to the institutional representation of civil 
society in the European institutions. 
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PART ONE:  
EXPLAINING CONTENTIOUS AND CONVENTIONAL COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Introduction 
On Wednesday, October 28, 2009 the European capital of Brussels was the site of three 
independent collective actions:   
• Around 6am, campaigners from Oxfam International began to install two hundred 
miniature tents on a square in front of the European Parliament to represent “climate 
refugee camps.” All day Oxfam volunteers and staff were on hand to distribute material 
claiming that climate change has already displaced twenty-six million people globally.  
The organization called on the EU to offer €35 billion in new public finance each year to 
help developing countries cope with the impacts of climate change.  The miniature 
refugee camps were timed to ratchet up pressure before the meeting of Heads of State at 
the European Council later in the week, during which leaders would have to decide how 
much funding the EU would offer to developing countries to adapt to the effects of 
climate change.  
• At the start of the business day, the Directorate General Environment of the European 
Commission found waiting an open letter from the pan-European association Transport 
and Environment [T&E].  The letter criticized the Commission’s recent decision to bow 
to industry pressure in relaxing the fuel efficiency standards for vans.  Coverage of the 
letter appeared in that morning’s Brussels media and in major international newswires the 
following day.  As T&E put it, "Europe is facing a climate and energy crisis that will 
have serious repercussions for decades to come… The EU is once again weakening 
 
 
23 
 
vehicle fuel efficiency standards, one of the most important tools for tackling carbon 
emissions and oil use." (T&E 2009).   
• Shortly before 9am, a group of activists known as Climate Alarm swooped into the 
European Commission’s Charlemagne Building and blockaded the entrance.  The 
Charlemagne Building was scheduled to host a meeting between the Confederation of 
European Business and the European Commission that morning regarding EU climate 
change policy.  Activists blockaded themselves inside the revolving doors with chains 
and glue, preventing delegates from entering.  Those inside released loud noisemakers 
attached to balloons, which quickly went to the ceiling of the large atrium.  As a 
spokesperson put it, "Corporate lobbyists are just there to try to obstruct real solutions – 
they just want to keep making profit off the carbon market.  They should have no role in 
resolving the climate crisis…  It just shows how close the EU institutions are to business 
when it comes to climate change." The building occupation lasted for two hours before 
the police finally managed to pry open the doors and dislodge the protestors using pepper 
spray (EU Observer 2009).   
These three events are similar in their timing, location and criticism of the European Union’s 
climate policy.  But they differ substantially in the degree to which they engage confrontationally 
with political elites.  The T&E action is an example of the kind of regularized, conventional 
interaction with the European Commission in which the organization has been engaged for 
twenty years.  Oxfam’s symbolic, media-friendly installation was aimed at educating morning 
commuters and the general public, and the material distributed framed the organization’s 
demands in terms of an appeal to the European Institutions.   
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But the third event was entirely different.  Not only did the Climate Alarm use 
confrontational language in framing its demands, but it also aimed to directly disrupt the 
business of the European Commission.  As the EU Observer (2009) noted: 
“The major environmental NGOs and development groups in Brussels regularly engage 
in showpiece stunts outside the EU buildings… The events are almost always carefully 
coordinated with police and building security. But the Climate Alarm action was not 
authorized by the Brussels police, which the campaigners believe is why the police took 
the unusual step of using pepper spray.”  
The activist’s interpretation is probably correct.  The blockade of the Charlemagne Building was 
a highly unusual event in my sample of European collective actions: over two years I recorded 
only two collective actions in Brussels that involved direct action and police repression.  Over 
this period virtually all collective actions in Brussels were either conventional (like the T&E 
open letter) or symbolic media stunts (like the Oxfam miniature camps).   
I don’t pretend that October 28, 2009 was a typical Wednesday in Brussels.  But despite 
being somewhat exceptional, the contrast between the day’s three collective actions highlights 
the wide range of tactics potentially available to civil society organizations active on climate 
change in Europe.  The first part on this dissertation will show how organizations make 
structured and relatively consistent decisions among the diverse tactical options available to 
them.   
As the introduction illustrated, civil society organizations attempting to influence climate 
change politics in Europe use different forms of action in different places and at different times.  
How can this variation be explained?  An influential body of scholarly work has suggested that 
the timing, amount and form of collective action can be explain by characteristics of the context 
in which these actions occur – the ‘political opportunity structure’ for collective action (Eisinger 
1973; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1989; Costain 1992; Walker, Martin and McCarthy 
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2008). Another important approach emphasizes that characteristics of an organizational itself – 
its internal structure, the resources it holds and its ideological profile – determine its overall 
action profile (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Piven and Cloward 1977; Dalton 1994).  My approach 
emphasizes that organizational decision-making is fundamentally relational, and that 
organizations are also influenced by the decisions of other organizations with which they are 
closely connected.   
The next four Chapters will employ my original event data to explore the characteristics 
of European collective action on climate change, and in doing so, to assess a variety of 
hypotheses from these different theories of collective action.  In Chapter 1, I situate this study 
historically by outlining the history of the European and international climate change policy 
process.  In Chapter 2, I present and assess hypotheses from the two traditional approaches to 
collective action: political process and organizational theory.  I will develop in Chapter 3 my 
own network theory of collective action and describe how this theory helps to explain some 
contradictions and overcome limitations of the earlier generation of theory.  The final Chapter 4 
will assess the three competing paradigms simultaneously, using statistical methods.   
The goal of these chapters is to explain how organizations – like Oxfam, Transport & 
Environment, and Climate Alarm – make decisions about what forms of action they use when 
they act collectively on climate change.  I argue that traditional approaches do well in explaining 
volume of collective action, but they do less well in explaining why collective action takes on 
certain forms. In other words, traditional approaches can explain why so many groups decided to 
do something on a particular Wednesday in October 2009, but they can’t explain what they chose 
to do.  A network theory of collective action provides unique insight into this question, as these 
next chapters will aim to demonstrate.    
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ACTIVISM 
The 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit attracted an enormous amount of attention in popular 
media and political debate.  As the New York Times summarized:  
The massive interest in the meeting seemed a measure of rising expectations that 
negotiators will find their way to some sort of agreement or set of agreements — even if 
it’s short of a treaty — that will render the meeting a success.  
“Within two weeks from Monday, governments must give their adequate response to the 
urgent challenge of climate change,” said the United Nations climate chief, Yvo de Boer, 
in a statement on Sunday. “Negotiators now have the clearest signal ever from world 
leaders to craft solid proposals to implement rapid action” (Zeller 2009).  
As this quote reveals, the time period of my study was one of intense political discussion on 
global warming.  It is an important period, but also admittedly an exceptional one in some 
respects.  Climate change, like many environmental issues, had been the focus of attention for 
scientists, activists and policy-makers for decades before its appearance on the top of the global 
political agenda in 2009.  This chapter will provide the background necessary to situate this time 
period in historical perspective.     
  My first goal is to provide a chronology of two important facets of the development of 
climate change politics: the elaboration of climate change policy at the European level, and the 
role of the European Union in negotiating climate change agreements on the international stage.  
My second goal is to outline the history of the engagement of civil society actors in the policy 
process. In particular, I will highlight how civil society participation expanded, diversified and 
radicalized during the time period of my study, situating the ideological and organizational 
origins of these changes in historical context.   
The Politics of Climate Change  
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Due to the nature of climate change as a global commons problem (Ostrom et al 1999), policy-
making on climate change has always involved complex interplay between the negotiation of 
international treaties and the development of nationally-based policy solutions. I see three main 
periods in the development of climate change policy:  
• Emergence (1988-1995): Entry of climate change onto the policy agenda and the 
establishment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
• The Kyoto Protocol (1995-2005): Negotiation, ratification and implementation of the 
Kyoto Protocol and the European Climate Change Programme.   
• Post-Kyoto (2007-Present): Negotiation of climate policy for the post-2012 period, 
including the Bali Action Plan, the European Climate and Energy Package, and the 
Copenhagen and Cancun Climate Summits.   
The next sections outline each of these periods in more detail, giving particular attention to the 
role of the European Union in each phase.   
The Emergence of Global Climate Change Politics (1988-1995)   
Climate change is an ecological process caused by an increase in the release of greenhouse gases 
into the atmosphere due to human activity such as burning fossil fuels and deforestation.  These 
greenhouse gases are heat-trapping, and as their density in the atmosphere increases, they warm 
the planet and cause changes in the climate.  Scientists suggest that resulting changes in the 
climate can have a number of harmful consequences, including drought, sea level rises, food 
shortages, increased severe weather, shortage of drinking water, and the extinction of a number 
of plant and animal species (IPCC 2007).   
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Climate change emerged as a political priority as the result of pressure exerted by 
concerned scientists.  By the mid-1980s, a growing number of scientists began to publicize 
findings that a buildup of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide could warm the earth’s 
climate.    In 1988 the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Program on 
the Environment organized the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] as a way to 
gather scientific evidence to fuel negotiations on policy solutions.  The first report of the IPCC 
revealed a wide scientific consensus that average global surface temperature was rising and 
would continue to do so without action to decrease greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions (IPCC 
1990).   
Formal negotiations began on an international climate framework convention in 1991.  
The European Community was one of the lead states in this process, offering to lower its CO2 
emissions to 1990 levels by 2000.  Other developed countries were also willing to commit to 
targets and timelines, but the United States insisted that the talks would only concern a 
framework convention and not a protocol with specific requirements.   EC member governments 
sent representatives to Washington to lobby the US government to adopt the EC’s 1990 
stabilization target, but President George H.W. Bush was not persuaded.  In the end, Bush and 
German Prime Minister Helmut Kohl reached an agreement whereby the EC dropped its demand 
for binding commitments on GHGs in exchange for Bush’s attending the 1992 Rio Earth 
Summit, where the UNFCC convention was signed.5
The text of the Convention commits developed countries to reducing their GHG 
emissions to ‘earlier levels’ – a phrasing that was interpreted by EC delegates to mean 1990 
levels.  It also established the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ between 
   
                                                          
5 This section mirrors Chasek, Downie and Brown 2010.  
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developed and developing countries.  But the Convention text (UNFCCC 1992), which entered 
into force in 1994 after ratification by 50 countries, did not commit countries to concrete 
emissions reduction goals.  The EC issued a statement on signing the Convention calling for the 
immediate start of negotiations for a protocol with binding targets and timetables.  But this effort 
was largely stalled by US and Russian opposition until the election of Bill Clinton in 1993.  With 
the support of the Clinton administration, talks began on a binding international agreement in 
1995.   
European Community Involvement in the Kyoto Protocol (1995-2005)  
The first Conference of Parties [COP] to the UNFCCC took place in Berlin in March, 1995.  In 
what was known as the ‘Berlin Mandate,’ delegates agreed to negotiate limits to GHG emissions 
for the post-2000 period.  In this first phase, developing countries would be exempt from such 
binding emissions targets.  The EU supported substantial reductions, but it faced opposition from 
the other developed countries (Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand).  
The EU proposal was that states should reduce their GHG emissions by at least 7.5% by 2005 
and 15% by 2010.  These cuts would be made domestically, and would be shared across EU 
members so that richer states would make deeper cuts.   
In contrast, the US proposed stabilization at 1990 levels by 2008-2010.  The US proposal 
also suggested that countries be allowed to meet their reduction targets through emissions trading 
with other parties to the agreement.  The EU and other developing countries expressed concern 
that giving emissions permits to Russia and former Soviet states would be nothing more than 
‘hot air’ because these states had already reduced emissions 30% below 1990 levels due to 
economic restructuring in these countries.  If countries were able to buy these ‘hot air’ emissions 
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reduction credits, rich countries could easily meet their targets on paper without reducing GHG 
emissions.   
By the 1997 Kyoto Summit it appeared as though the negotiations would fall apart.  The 
United States delegation challenged the EU proposal for equal reductions across developed 
countries, and began to call for differentiation to take into account the unequal costs of 
adjustment.  The US also demanded that developing countries take on binding emissions targets.  
As the UNFCCC process requires decision-making by consensus, sticking with this demand 
would have blocked the entire process.  The US delegation eventually withdrew this demand, but 
only in exchange for other concessions.  The final Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 1997) did mandate 
an average reduction in GHG emissions of 5.2% below 1990 levels by developed countries, but 
to be shared unequally.  The national targets under the Kyoto protocol ranged widely: the 
Protocol called for an 8% increase for Australia, stabilization at 1990 levels for Russia, a 7% 
reduction for the US and an 8% reduction for the EU.   
The Kyoto Protocol was the product of intense negotiation and compromise.  The EU 
took on the toughest target and also conceded on the issue of emissions trading.  The final Kyoto 
Protocol contained provisions not only for emissions trading, but also for ‘clean development 
mechanism’ and ‘joint implementation’ projects.  Both of these mechanisms allow developed 
countries to received emissions reduction credits for financing projects that reduce emissions in 
developing countries.  While the EU initially argued that these mechanisms would undermine the 
environmental integrity of the Protocol, it later became an ardent supporter of these provisions.  
Negotiating the Kyoto Protocol was only the first step.  The text of the Kyoto Protocol 
stipulated that it could only enter into force after ratification by 55 parties to the Convention, 
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which must represent at least 55% of CO2 emissions in 1990.  Thus while many developing 
countries ratified immediately (easily surpassing the 55 party threshold) many industrialized 
countries held out to try to negotiate more favorable conditions at subsequent COPs.  By the 7th 
COP in Marrakesh it appeared as though there had been considerable progress on the finer 
details of the Kyoto Protocol.  However, earlier in the year the US held an election, and newly 
elected US President George W. Bush announced that he would not seek U.S. ratification of the 
Protocol, claiming it would harm the US economy. 
Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was still mathematically possible without the US, but 
would require the participation of all members of the EU, Canada, Japan and Russia.  By 2004, 
countries representing 44% of the developed countries 1990 emissions had ratified.  If Russia – 
which represented 17.4% of 1990 emissions – ratified the treaty would come into effect.  As 
previously mentioned, most commentators agreed that Russia would actually stand to gain from 
the Protocol because emissions trading would allow it to sell its ‘hot air’ credits to other 
countries.  But ultimately, the EU had to cut a deal: it agreed to support the Russian bid to the 
World Trade Organization in exchange for the Russian ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.  Thus 
the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in February 2005 with strong European support but without 
the participation of the United States.    
The European Climate Change Programme and the European Emissions Trading System 
The European Commission launched the European Climate Change Programme [ECCP] 
in 2000 in order to develop a strategy for the implementation of its commitments under the 
Kyoto Protocol (European Commission 2000).  The Kyoto Protocol specified that the European 
Union collectively needed to reduce emissions of GHGs by 8% from 1990 levels by 2012.  The 
ECCP was responsible for coordinating the response of the member states, including the 
 
 
32 
 
distribution of national reduction targets, monitoring compliance with national allocation plans, 
and making recommendations for European policies to encourage their achievement.  The ECCP 
functions under a stakeholder structure where the Commission consults with both industry and 
civil society in developing cost-effective measures.   
The ECCP developed a European carbon market – the European Emissions Trading 
System [EU ETS] – as its main policy instrument.  The EU ETS is the largest carbon market in 
the world.  Under the ETS, a set number of emissions allowances are given to each member state 
to distribute to their covered installations.  Member states are primarily responsible for 
monitoring these installations and their net CO2 emissions.  Those that exceed their allowance 
must purchase additional credits.  The first phase of the EU ETS covered the period of 2005-
2007, while the second phase will cover the period from 2008-2012.   
The EU ETS was much criticized by civil society and industry actors in its first phase 
because of the over allocation of permits, the volatility of carbon prices, and the ability of 
industry to generate windfall profits from cashing in allowances and passing on cost increases to 
consumers (WWF 2005).  The second phase of the EU ETS tightened the cap on allocations 
(which are still free), resulting in an increase and stabilization of the price of carbon around €15 
for a ton of carbon dioxide.   
According to the European Environmental Agency, as of 2009 the EU appeared set to 
meet its Kyoto obligations.  The agency projected that the EU member states would collectively 
reduce emissions by 13% from 1990 levels by 2012, well beyond the 8% target (European 
Environmental Agency 2009).  However, actual emissions reductions would only total 6.9%, 
with the remainder to be made up by member states buying offset credits in the global carbon 
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market.   This report was used to establish EU credibility as a climate leader going into the next 
round of international negotiations.   
Post-Kyoto Action: The Bali Action Plan (2007) 
Almost as soon as Kyoto was ratified, states began to consider what would happen when 
it expired in 2012.  The first major step in this process was the development of the Bali Action 
Plan [BAP] at the 13th COP in 2007.  The BAP stipulated that delegates would negotiate a new 
treaty to succeed Kyoto within three years, at the 15th COP in Copenhagen.  It also stated that 
any new text would require developed countries to give substantial aid to developing countries to 
aid in their adaptation to and mitigation of the effects of climate change.    
The Copenhagen deadline was considered important because the Kyoto Protocol will 
expire in 2012, and it was estimated that states would need at minimum two years to ratify any 
new agreement.  Simultaneously, scientists began to emphatically trumpet the urgency of the 
problem.  The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, release in 2007, claimed not only that climate 
change was happening faster than expected, but that the consequences would be more severe 
(IPCC 2007).  The report also indicated an increased certainty amongst scientists that the causes 
of global warming are anthropogenic.  The convergence of the scientific and political factors 
made reaching an agreement in Copenhagen seem urgent to most actors.   
Post-Kyoto: The European Climate and Energy Package (2008) 
In parallel, the EU began to develop its own ‘domestic’ policy for the post-2012 period. In 
January 2007 the European Commission released a communication recommending that the EU 
commit itself to a ‘unilateral’ reduction of GHG emissions by 20% from 1990 levels by 2020 
(European Commission 2007).  This Communication also contained two other proposals for a 
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20% renewable energy target and 10% biofuels target by 2020.  In March 2007 the Spring 
Summit of the Council of the EU endorsed the proposal, and launched a two year plan to develop 
a common European energy policy (European Council 2007).  The Council also agreed to 
increase the EU emissions reduction target to 30% below 1990 levels by 2020 if other developed 
countries (chiefly the United States) would commit to comparable targets.   
Table 1.2 details the policy process for the European Climate and Energy Package.  The 
Commission released its full version of the package in January 2008.  This bundle of legislative 
proposals featured controversial new rules for CO2 emissions reduction ‘burden sharing’ among 
the member states, the allocation of permits under the EU ETS post-2013, revised EU state aid 
policies for environmental protection, restrictions on car emissions, new funding for carbon 
capture and storage facilities [CCS] and more support for developing renewable energies, 
including biofuels (European Commission 2008).  The Climate and Energy package came to be 
known as the 20-20-20 by 2020 proposal because it suggested 20% emissions reductions, 20% 
improvement in energy efficiency, and a 20% target for renewable energy by 2020.   
Table 1.2: EU Climate and Energy Package Policy-Making Timeline, 2008 
Date Event 
January 23, 2008 European Commission release of Climate and Energy Package Proposal 
March 14, 2008 European Council Heads of State Meeting 
September/October, 2008 European Parliament votes in Environment and Industry Committees 
December 1-12, 2008 UNFCCC Negotiations in Poznan, Poland [COP 14] 
December 11-12, 2008 European Council Heads of State Meeting 
December 13, 2008 Trialogue Negotiations 
December 17, 2008 European Parliament Plenary Vote 
 
The Spring Council in March 2008 agreed to adopt the Climate and Energy package by 
the end of the year, in preparation for the 14th COP, to be held in Poznan, Poland.  In September 
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and October of that same year the European Parliament’s Industry and Environment committees 
voted in favor of the different elements contained within the package.   
The final version of the Climate and Energy package was negotiated by the Council on 
December 11-12 (European Council 2008).  The major changes from the Commission’s original 
proposal were to postpone the auctioning of allowances under the EU ETS until after 2027, to 
provide more exemptions to heavily polluting industries (such as the power sector) and to 
increase the amount of emissions reductions that could be ‘offset’ abroad from 50 to 70% of the 
national target.  Certain states (in particular Poland) also got concessions in terms of their 
reducing their national allocation targets and increasing their promised state aid. EU leaders 
Angela Merkel, Nicholas Sarkozy and Gordon Brown all declared that the package was evidence 
of the EU’s global climate leadership and that it sent strong signals to the international process 
(Euractiv 2009a). But critics claimed the changes significantly undermined the environmental 
integrity of the deal.  The text was highly criticized by non-governmental organizations and 
Green Party Members of the European Parliament, who gave it their strongest possible statement 
of non-support (European Greens 2009; WWF 2009).  The final text was endorsed by the 
European Parliament (after Trialogue Negotiations) on December 17, 2008 (European 
Parliament 2009).   
Post-Kyoto: The EU and the Copenhagen Climate Summit (2009)  
Most of the EU’s climate change agenda for 2009 revolved around developing a strategy for 
COP 15 in Copenhagen.  In particular, a large part of the discussion concerned what kind of 
financing the EU would provide to developing countries to support their mitigation and 
adaptation activities.  In January 2009, the Commission released a new Communication detailing 
its blueprint for Copenhagen (European Commission 2009).  This Communication suggested the 
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creation of an OECD-wide carbon market and deviations from “business as usual” (reductions 
from a projected development trajectory) on the part of developing countries, including India and 
China.   
The EU was also simultaneously working in a variety of international policy processes.  
Under the UNFCCC process, regular inter-sessional meetings are held between COPs to work 
out technical details related to the international policy process.  In the year prior to Copenhagen, 
these discussions became much more frequent and important.  World leaders also began to 
discuss climate change policy as part of the agenda of international financial summits such as the 
G8 and the G20.  In 2009, important international gatherings took place nearly every month, as 
Table 1.3 shows.  Moreover, since most of these meetings took place in Europe, European 
governments and civil society were highly involved in planning for these international events.   
Table 1.3: The EU and International Policy-Making Timeline, 2009 
Date Event 
January 28, 2009 European Commission Communication on Copenhagen 
March 10, 2009 European Council Meeting delays decision of climate finance  
March 28 – April 2, 2009 First Round of UNFCCC Negotiations in Bonn, Germany 
April 2, 2009 G20 Meeting in London, England 
April 23-24, 2009 G8 Ministers Meeting in Syracuse, Italy 
June 1-12, 2009  Second Round of UNFCCC Negotiations in Bonn, Germany 
June 18-19, 2009 European Council delays decision on climate finance 
July 8-10, 2009 G8 Summit Meeting in L’Aquila, Italy 
September 10, 2009 European Commission Communication on climate finance  
September 28- October 9, 2009 Third Round of UNFCC Negotiations in Bangkok, Thailand 
October 29-30, 2009 European Council delays decision on climate finance 
November 2-6, 2009 UNFCCC Negotiations in Barcelona, Spain 
December 7-18, 2009 Copenhagen Climate Conference [COP 15]  
December 11, 2009 European Council agrees on climate finance proposal   
  
The schedule for 2009 involved a lot of meetings, but by the June UNFCCC inter-
sessional meeting it was clear that the talks were going badly.  Delegates were failing to make 
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progress on the issues of what actions developing countries would take on and what a finance 
package might look like.  Progress within the G8 was going slightly better, with leaders in this 
institution agreeing in principle to limit global emissions to a 2 degree Celsius increase and to 
halve their emissions by 2050.  
European Heads of States and Finance Ministers meet in March and June, but failed to 
agree on an aid package to take to Copenhagen.  The poorer countries in the EU, led by Poland, 
argued that they couldn’t afford to pay for environmental protection in a time of economic crisis.  
In an attempt to break the deadlock, the European Commission presented a blueprint for 
international climate funding in early September.  The Commission’s calculations suggest that 
the EU’s share of short-term climate mitigation and adaptation funding should be in the range of 
€ 2-15 billion per year.   
Yet despite this suggestion, the question of internal burden sharing remained intractable 
at the next European Summit in late October, when leaders only agreed in principle to short-term 
funding in the range of € 5-7 billion per year.  It was only during an emergency Council meeting 
during the Copenhagen Summit that EU leaders agreed to their final finance package: € 2.4 
billion per year (European Council 2009).  All states contributed to the fund, but big states 
contributed much more: almost half of this funding was promised by the French government, 
while smaller states made symbolic contributions (Bulgaria, for example, pledged €20,000) 
(Euractiv 2009b).  This offer was highly criticized by development groups for not representing 
new money but instead being a repackaging of existing overseas development aid (for example, 
Action Aid 2009). 
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Parallel to the intra-EU bickering, international negotiations in Copenhagen were also 
deteriorating.  Going into Copenhagen, the EU appeared determined not to repeat the mistakes of 
Kyoto.  The US decision not to ratify Kyoto had been one of the biggest sources of tension in the 
transatlantic relationship, and the EU was decided that this time any eventual deal would involve 
US participation.  The inauguration of Barack Obama had led many to believe that this was a real 
political possibility.  But by Copenhagen the mood had shifted.   The EU wanted to lead by 
example: its emissions reduction target of 20% reductions in GHG emissions from 1990 levels – 
with a conditional 30% increase in the context of a global agreement -- was by far the most 
ambitious offer on the table.  The US offer amounted to a 3-4% decrease in GHG emissions 
when calculated from 1990 levels, and major developing countries such as China and India still 
refused to accept any kind of binding commitment.   
With the talks in chaos, Heads of State arrived in Copenhagen on Thursday evening, 
December 17, 2009.  US President Barack Obama arrived in Copenhagen the next morning and 
immediately gave a speech to the UNFCCC plenary before meeting behind closed doors with a 
handful of world leaders.  An ‘accidental’ recording of their discussions released by Der Spiegel 
captured European leaders Angela Merkel, Gordon Brown and Nicholas Sarkozy trying to broker 
a deal between US, Chinese and Indian delegates on three main sticking points: emissions 
reduction targets for developing countries, financing, and monitoring of national actions (Rapp, 
Schwägerl and Traufetter 2010).  
However, the gulf between parties on developing country action remained too wide. 
Despite their attempts at brokerage, the EU leaders were ultimately sidelined as the US and 
Chinese Presidents met privately to try to work out their differences.  The outcome of their 
discussion was that there would be no legally binding agreement in Copenhagen, but that states 
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would set up an international register to monitor one another’s voluntary pledges.  The 
Copenhagen Accord also established a fund for short term financing for adaptation.  After 
announcing what he termed the ‘only possible solution,’ President Obama left Copenhagen, 
leaving European and other world leaders to decide if they would accept or reject the resulting 
Copenhagen Accord.   
The US delegation initially proposed that this text be adopted formally by the UNFCCC. 
After an all-night discussion in the plenary of the UNFCCC, the majority of states (including the 
EU) agreed to support the Copenhagen Accord.  But the states of Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, 
Tuvalu, Sudan and Venezuela objected to the weak nature of the text and the non-transparent 
manner in which they felt it was brokered.  Since the UNFCCC functions by unanimity and some 
of these countries blocked the proceedings, the Copenhagen Accord was not formally adopted 
and became simply a ‘noted’ document of the Convention.    
Most observers considered that the Copenhagen climate summit ended in bitter 
disappointment.  There was no legal agreement reached, no binding emissions reductions targets, 
and no firm commitments on long-term climate finance.  European Commission President José 
Manuel Barroso said the deal was "clearly below" the European Union's goal and that he would 
"not hide [his] disappointment.” As a result, Europe decided that the ‘trigger’ condition had not 
yet been met, and decided to keep its internal climate target at a 20% reduction until further 
discussion.   
Overall, the time period of my study captures a crucial period in the long-term 
development of climate change policy.  The years 2007-2009 were a period of great optimism on 
that part of many citizens and political leaders who believed that an ambitious successor to the 
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Kyoto Protocol was a real possibility.  As a result, expectations for the Copenhagen Summit 
were exceptionally high, and climate change became a major foreign policy issue on which 
Heads of State were deeply engaged.  The failure of the Copenhagen summit was a blow to the 
UNFCCC policy process from which delegates are still recovering.  After a few hectic years of 
political negotiating, the wide gulf remaining between countries involved in the negotiations has 
led many delegates to consider that any eventual successor to the Kyoto Protocol is still a long 
way off.  As the next section will argue, civil society groups were similarly engaged in the 
process during this time period, and were equally devastated by the outcome in Copenhagen.   
The History of Civil Society Participation  
Civil society actors have been involved in international climate change politics in all stages of 
regime development.  However, the extent and nature of this participation has evolved over time.  
I identify three changes in civil society participation that are particularly relevant for this study:     
• Expansion of Participation: Procedures for participation of civil society actors are 
formalized and more actors get involved.  
• Population Diversification: A more diverse group of actors representing a wider range of 
constituencies participate in climate change policy-making. 
• Tactical Radicalization: Organizations become more contentious in the forms of 
participation over time.   
The next sections detail these three trends in order to provide historical context for the time 
period of my study.   
Expansion of Participation  
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The rights of civil society observers to attend climate change negotiations are enshrined in the 
UNFCCC Convention: 
Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-
governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by the Convention, and which has 
informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of the 
Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present 
object (UNFCCC 1992).  
 
As the UNFCCC institutionalized and developed its own Secretariat, working procedures for 
accreditation and participation (including concrete issues of access to meetings and documents) 
became more regularized.  It is fair to say that by the development of the Kyoto Protocol, NGOs 
were understood to be an integral part of the policy process (Betsill 2008).  At the EU-level, a 
similar process of the expansion of participatory rights of civil society groups also took place 
throughout the 1990s, as Chapter Two will detail.  In both cases, the expansion and 
regularization of civil society participation was the result of the advocacy of early civil society 
participants and motivated reformers within these institutions. 
Over time, an increasing number of organizations have taken advantage of the 
opportunity to participate in climate change policy-making. Although EU records are not 
available on this subject, the UNFCCC participation report offers clear evidence of this trend.  
For example, as Figure 1.1 shows, the participation of non-governmental organizations has been 
steadily increasing from the first COP (1994) to COP 15 (2009).   Even within this long-term 
trend of participation expansion, there are major changes during the time period of my study. In 
particular, in the one year period from 2008 to 2009 there was dramatic growth in non-
governmental observers registered at the UNFCCC: from 952 organizations in 2008 to 1297 
organizations in 2009, a 36% increase (UNFCCC 2010).  If business groups, local governments 
and research institutions were subtracted from the total number of non-governmental observers, 
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these figures show that in 2009 there were 587 registered environment, development, indigenous 
peoples, trade union and youth groups present in Copenhagen.6
 
 
Figure 1.2: Number of Registered Observer Non-Governmental Organizations to the 
UNFCCC, COP 1-15 
 
 
 
Source: UNFCCC (2010) 
 
In addition, these organizations sent increasingly larger delegations to COPs, especially 
after 2007.  From 2006 to 2007, the number of individuals registered as non-governmental 
observers doubled from 2,533 to 4,993.  In Copenhagen in 2009, the number of registered 
individuals increased fourfold, with 20,611 individuals registered as representatives of non-
governmental organizations.   
 
                                                          
6 My calculations indicate that there were also 298 ‘research and independent’ organizations registered in 2009.  
Advocacy networks regularly involve the participation of research institutions.  However, it is my assessment that 
most of the organizations in this group were major research universities that did not contribute to the population of 
advocacy organizations in Copenhagen.   
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 
 
43 
 
Finally, there were an increasing number of participants in protests and collective actions 
outside the Copenhagen Summit.   By Fisher’s (2004: 184) calculations, there were 
approximately 5,000 protesters at the UNFCCC meeting in 2000; by 2009, as a result of 
tremendous organizational effort, there was a demonstration of 100,000 people in Copenhagen.  
Moreover, this demonstration was coordinated transnationally with other protests, which 
attracted 100,000 people in Australia (total), 50,000 in London, 15,000 in Brussels, 8,000 in 
Glasgow, and 2,000 in Paris.  There were also approximately 3,000 smaller actions in almost 
every country in the world.7
Population Diversification  
  Overall, the time period of my study captures an unprecedented 
explosion of organizational involvement and collective action in climate change politics.   
Not only did more actors get involved in climate change politics during the time period of my 
study, but the type of actors involved substantially diversified.  In particular, over the three main 
periods of policy-making the population of organizations working on climate change went from 
encompassing mainly environmental organizations to include development groups, youth, 
indigenous peoples, global justice organizations and anarchists. This will be closely connected to 
the diversification in the forms of employed forms of collective action, as I will show.   
Emergence of Climate Change Politics (1988-1995): At the outset, major environmental NGOs 
were the principle actors involved in climate change politics.  And as climate policy became 
increasingly formalized in the early 1990s, so did their cooperation.  The biggest and oldest 
transnational coalition on the issue of climate change is the Climate Action Network [CAN].  
CAN was founded in 1992  by three major transnational NGOs -- Friends of the Earth [FOE], 
                                                          
7 See Global Campaign for Climate Action ( www.globalclimatecampaign.org)  for more details about globally 
coordinated activities (accessed August 31, 2010).   
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Greenpeace and World Wildlife Federation [WWF] -- to facilitate coordination for the UNFCCC 
negotiations.  Initially CAN was composed of a number of regional nodes, but had no 
international secretariat.     
European civil society coordination preceded and helped to provide a template for the 
creation of the international CAN network.  The Climate Action Network Europe was originally 
founded as the Climate Network Europe [CNE] in 1989, and was the earliest CAN regional 
node.  CNE also involved the European-level coordination of FOE, Greenpeace and WWF.  It 
employed two staff members throughout the early 1990s, and up until 2004, the CNE office in 
Brussels also served as the de facto hub for coordinating all the regional nodes. Most of the 
policy work in Europe in this emergence stage was not very specific, and was primarily 
concerned with convincing the EC to put the climate issue on the international agenda – an 
objective that was basically achieved by 1995. 
The Kyoto Protocol (1995-2005): Just as parties to the UNFCCC had difficulty negotiating their 
differences, civil society cooperation became more strained during negotiations on the Kyoto 
Protocol.  Entering the Kyoto negotiations, environmental advocacy groups needed to develop 
much more specific policy positions on a number of controversial issues, chief among them, 
developing country targets and the use of carbon markets. At the time of the Kyoto negotiations, 
most of the major international environmental organizations were opposed to the use of carbon 
markets and ‘offsetting’ as a means to meet domestic emissions reduction targets.  However, by 
2004 when it appeared that Kyoto might actually stand a chance of entering into force, many of 
the major civil society groups changed their tune and supported the Protocol and its market-
based mechanisms.  This decision to support the EU’s push for Kyoto brought the CAN groups 
closer to the political realities of the international negotiations, but also sowed seeds of 
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discontent within the network. As a result, there developed within Europe a strand of critical 
opposition to the EU ETS that found a home in more radical think tanks and small NGOs.   
The CAN European node also underwent major changes during this time period.  In the 
Kyoto and post-Kyoto period, many political discussions within the CAN international network 
became more contentious. For this reason, CAN-E ceased its informal coordination role, yielding 
this role in 2004 to the new ‘impartial’ International Secretariat.  Things within the CAN-E 
network also became more complex.  As the climate policy portfolio expanded, CAN-E began to 
delve more deeply into policy specifics, and increased its staff to include a number of experts in 
specific issue areas.  In addition, the European CAN network merged with the CAN Eastern 
Europe network in 2004 following the accession of eight Central and European countries to the 
EU.  Not only did CAN-E incorporate a large number of new members with the merger, but the 
organizations from the new member states often had different policy priorities than those in the 
old member states, making coordination more complicated.   
Post-Kyoto: The Bali Action Plan (2007): Bali was a turning point in civil society coordination.  
Up until 2007, membership in both CAN-E and CAN International was growing steadily and 
coordination amongst the nodes was increasing.  However, post-Kyoto, a number of 
organizations were becoming more vocal about their dissatisfaction with the use of carbon 
markets in international climate change policy.  This created problems because this was a 
position that most CAN members had gradually come to accept.  
By the 2007 COP in Bali, this anti-market group had reached a critical mass.  In Bali 
these organizations formed a second policy-oriented coalition under the name Climate Justice 
Now! [CJN]. Some of these organizations split from CAN.  But many of these organizations had 
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a background in the global justice movement8
This division also reflected a difference in issue framing: CAN-E has generally diagnosed 
the climate crisis as primarily a scientific problem.  Its main call has been to ‘limit global 
warming to 2 degrees Celsius’ which is based on a scenario from the IPCC Report.    Both the 
content and the style of their materials emphasize technical knowledge and try to establish these 
actors as ‘experts.’ But these new actors coalesced around a new framing of the climate issue as 
“a fight for social, ecological and gender justice” (Climate Justice Now! 2009). While few of 
these organizations were based in Europe, but these changes at the international level were quick 
to reverberate in the European advocacy sphere.   
, not in traditional environmental politics. The new 
coalition included diverse groups such as La Via Campesina, the Indigenous Environmental 
Network, Gender and Climate Change, and Focus on the Global South.  .  
In response to this challenge from the CJN coalition and requests from many of the 
Southern groups within its membership, CAN International initiated a strategic review process of 
its political positions in early spring 2008.  In particular, CAN called for an ‘equity summit’ to 
be held with representatives from the coalition, which was hosted by CAN Southeast Asia.  The 
equity summit explored many of the issues that divide NGOs from developed and developing 
countries: climate financing, the status of developing country action in an eventual treaty, and 
procedural issues related to representation.  Representatives from CAN Europe attended this 
meeting along with representatives from CAN nodes in all the other regions.     
                                                          
8 8 The global justice movement can be defined as “a loose network of organizations…and other actors engaged in 
collective action of various kinds, on the basis of the shared goal of advancing the cause of justice (social, economic, 
political and environmental) among and between peoples across the globe” (della Porta 2007: 6).  The movement is 
known for its repertoire of summit protesting, perhaps best exemplified by the Seattle WTO protests in 1999 (Wood 
2007).   
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One big issue on the agenda at the Equity Summit was whether Friends of the Earth 
International [FOE-I] would stay inside the CAN coalition.  FOE-I had always been more critical 
of the use of carbon markets, and, over time, moved towards policy positions that diverged from 
those of a lot of the other coalition members.  After the Equity Summit and a complicated 
internal decision-making process, Friends of the Earth International [FOE-I] decided that it 
would withdraw from CAN in Fall 2008, announcing it would instead participate in CJN. In an 
email to CAN members, FOE-I listed policy disputes that had arisen in the last twelve months 
over carbon trading and developing country action as their primary reason for leaving the CAN 
coalition.  It also expressed concerns about the lack of representation of Southern countries in 
CAN leadership.  Despite the departure of FOE-I, not all member organizations of FOE-I 
withdrew from CAN.  This meant that a number of European members of FOE-I – like FOE 
Europe, FOE Germany and FOE UK – were curiously inside and outside both coalitions.  This 
complicated partitioning of the civil society coalitions would have important consequences for 
policy positioning and collective action in the years to come.   
Post-Kyoto: The European Climate and Energy Package (2008): The reform-oriented NGOs in 
the CAN-E coalition participated extensively in the development of the EU’s Climate and 
Energy Package, and were devastated by the final EU Summit in 2008.  Despite this setback, 
these groups renewed their energy for COP 15 in Copenhagen, only to again have their hopes 
dashed. But in parallel to their disappointment, a whole new group of actors were becoming 
involved in climate politics that had no faith in the policy process whatsoever. In September 
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2008, these actors coalesced around the creation of a new coalition: Climate Justice Action 
[CJA]9
CJA was founded in 2008 as a loose coalition of groups and organizations, and was 
designed to be a vehicle for transnational mobilization and civil disobedience before, during and 
after Copenhagen.  While theoretically international, in practice CJA is composed almost entirely 
of European groups.  The majority of participants in CJA tend to have come from a global 
justice, not environmental background, although the eco-anarchist tendency is also present in the 
coalition.  CJA draws on the Earth First! networks, the European Climate Camps (especially in 
the UK), a number of small, radical NGOs based in Amsterdam, and a number of 
autonomist/anarchist groups located mostly in Northern Europe.   
.   
CJA also had different ideological lineages and issue framing from the other coalitions. 
The main CJA slogan “System Change, Not Climate Change” is meant to accommodate the 
strong anti-capitalist tendency within the coalition.  It also was an attempt to frame climate 
change issues in a way that appeal to the layman, not only the policy-makers themselves.  CJA 
also often uses the CJN slogan “Climate Justice Now!” as a tool for mobilization. The 
introduction of this radical current added significant complexity to the already turbulent civil 
society coordination building up to Copenhagen.    
Post-Kyoto: The Copenhagen Summit (2009): By the beginning of 2009, it became clear that the 
Copenhagen summit was going to be a major venue for civil society organizing.  This meant that 
in addition to the groups previously mentioned, there was increased involvement of youth, 
                                                          
9 This coalition did not adopt the name ‘Climate Justice Action’ until March 2009, but for simplicity’s sake I will 
refer to it as such throughout.   
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development and internet-based mobilization groups, increasing the sheer number of 
organizations entering the issue area.   
In late 2008, another coalition developed to facilitate collective action around the 
Copenhagen Summit.  The Global Campaign for Climate Action [GCCA] was formed in 2008 
by a group of individuals closely connected to Oxfam and to the CAN coalition.  The aim of the 
coalition is to coordinate the actions of its members, as well as to provide resources for public 
mobilization in key countries at critical moments of decision-making.  The political demands of 
GCCA are generally taken from CAN policy positions.  GCCA itself does not aim to be a 
recognizable organization, but is mostly a behind-the-scenes workforce for the ‘branded’ 
mobilization of Greenpeace, WWF, Oxfam, Avaaz and 350.org.   
In summary, from 1992 to 2009 the world of climate change organizing became 
significantly more complex.  As Table 1.3 describes, while there was only one major coalition in 
1992, there were four major coalitions going into Copenhagen in 2009. 
Table 1.4: Transnational Climate Coalitions Present in Copenhagen, December 2009 
 Climate Action 
Network 
Global Campaign 
for Climate Action 
Climate Justice Now! Climate Justice 
Action 
Acronym CAN GCCA CJN CJA 
Founding 1992 2008 2007 2008 
Orientation Policy Action Policy Action 
Framing Science-based Science-based Climate justice Climate justice, 
Anti-capitalist 
Major 
Members 
Greenpeace, WWF, 
Oxfam 
Greenpeace, WWF, 
Oxfam, Christian 
Aid, Avaaz, 350.org 
Friends of the Earth 
International, La Via 
Campesina, Indigenous 
Environmental Network 
Climate Camps, 
European 
Autonomous Groups 
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As the types of actors involved in climate change politics changed, and the range of political 
opinions and issue framings expanded.  And as the next section details, the type of tactics used 
became significantly more radical as the Copenhagen summit approached.   
Tactical Radicalization  
Prior to 2008, the repertoire of transnational collective action employed by civil society 
organizations at the UNFCCC typically included lobbying of national delegates, making official 
interventions in conference plenaries, hosting ‘side events,’  and  providing information through 
reports and daily newspapers (Hoffman 2008).  As Chapter Two details, similar kinds of 
activities have become common practice in EU policy-making, along with official submissions 
and consultation with EU institutions (Greenwood 2007).  In addition, many of the larger NGOs 
(e.g. Greenpeace) typically supplement these activities with creative and media-friendly protest 
stunts, such as banner hanging, melting ice sculptures, or marches of people wearing polar bear 
costumes.   
In some ways, the 2008-2009 period continued this tradition. In the build-up to 
Copenhagen, non-governmental organizations devoted a massive amount of time to developing 
careful lobbying and media strategies both in Brussels and at the UN meetings.  In Copenhagen, 
on December 13th, 2009, there was an impressive non-violent march of one-hundred thousand 
people.  Once the march reached the conference center Desmond Tutu led a candlelight vigil that 
implored world leaders to reach an ambitious climate agreement.  The march was both reform-
oriented in its message and contained in its forms of action.   
But in other ways, this period was dramatically different.  Because many of the new 
organizations in Copenhagen came from a background in the global justice movement, they had 
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inherited a preference for the movement’s repertoire of the summit protest.  A ‘counter-summit 
protest’ involves using direct action and transgressive protest to try to shut down or otherwise 
severely disrupt the functioning of international summits (della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Reitan 
2007; Smith 2001). In preparation for Copenhagen, climate justice activists called for the use of 
the counter-summit protest repertoire against the UNFCCC for the first time.  These and other 
types of contentious actions became more common in the Fall of 2009, and were particularly 
noticeable in Copenhagen.  In particular, on December 16th, five thousand people marched to the 
conference center in an attempt to enter the premises, take over the conference and install a 
‘people’s assembly’ in its place. This marked a radical departure from the actions of the days 
(and years) before.   
There are two crucial differences between the transgressive protest at Copenhagen and 
the protest of earlier summits.10
The transgressive summit protests surrounding Copenhagen were organized by a distinct 
group of organizations affiliated with the CJA and CJN coalitions.  These summit protests were 
controversial because they fractured the activist community along the reformist-abolitionist 
divide (Levi and Murphy 2006; Smith 2001).  While the community of global justice movement 
activists is accustomed to protesting international financial institutions, before Copenhagen “few 
  First, protests at the UNFCCC have previously mobilized in 
support of strong policies being taken through international environmental regimes (Fisher 2004; 
Hoffman 2008).  Second, these protests have typically been sponsored by the same NGO 
activists who were organizing actions inside the UNFCCC, and functioned as a small 
complement to their work.  
                                                          
10There had been a few instances of activists trying to disrupt the functioning of the UNFCCC prior to Copenhagen, 
most notably in the Hague in 2000 (Revkin 2000).   
 
 
52 
 
groups ha[d] actively mobilized against the UN” (Smith 2008, 98; see also Fisher 2004, 179).  
The year 2009 marked a turning point in the number of organizations that were willing to 
mobilize transgressive, contentious action against the international climate change process.   
Radicalized tactics were met with increased institutional restrictions.  United Nations 
security in Copenhagen was concerned that these ‘outsider’ actors would try to enter the summit 
and compromise the security of the delegates.  This in turn contributed to UN security 
crackdown which virtually excluded civil society groups as a whole for the final day of 
Copenhagen.  Certainly, the exclusion of civil society groups was partially due to event logistics 
and poor planning on the part of the conference organizers who did not book a big enough venue 
for the massive number of participants.  But as Fisher (2010: 11) notes, ironically, “the massive 
expansion of civil society participation at Copenhagen was not only accompanied by civil 
society disenfranchisement, it actually contributed to it.”  As civil society groups were not 
allowed to participate actively in the final days of the Summit, organizations couldn’t lobby or 
provide information to the delegates on the inside. 
In addition to dismay over changes in the rules of participation, civil society groups in 
general were devastated by the political outcome in Copenhagen.  Reform-oriented NGOs took 
the opportunity to strongly condemn the Copenhagen Accord, and to ‘shame’ world leaders who 
they accused of taking the easy way out.11
                                                          
11 See the Climate Action Network International for examples: 
  Climate justice groups were similarly disgusted with 
the text of the Accord.  For these groups, the Copenhagen Summit was yet another example of 
why the UN political process does not work and will continue to discredit itself in the absence of 
http://www.climatenetwork.org/event/cop-15-2009 
(Accessed February 23, 2011).  
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real solutions.12
As this section detailed, civil society participation on the issue of climate change has 
become more extensive, more diverse, and more radical. This is particularly true of the time 
period of 2007-2009, during which this study takes place.  Prior to 2007, most participation in 
climate change politics took the form of conventional advocacy on the part of transnational non-
governmental organizations.  But during the post-2007 period, a new type of contentious 
transnational activism was directed towards the political process on the issue of climate change.  
The chapters that follow will further explain the development and diffusion of this radical strand 
of climate change politics, and the contentious repertoire of collective action with which it is 
associated.   
  Thus, by the end of the Summit, virtually all parties and observers to the 
UNFCCC agreed that despite their best efforts the Copenhagen Summit had dramatically failed 
to live up to expectations, leaving the future of global climate change negotiations in jeopardy.   
Conclusion 
Between 1988 and 2009, climate change moved from being a peripheral scientific issue to a topic 
of central concern in international affairs.  Throughout this process the European Union has been 
active in both pushing for international treaties and developing its own internal policy.  While the 
Copenhagen Summit did not produce a legally binding outcome, it drew global attention to the 
climate change issue, and attracted a great deal of political activism.  
As this chronology details, activism on climate change has deep roots.  Environmental 
NGOs have been working in Europe and internationally on the issue for decades.  But as climate 
change policy has matured, advocates have had to develop more detailed positions on 
                                                          
12 See Climate Justice Now for examples: http://www.climate-justice-now.org/category/media/press-releases/ 
(Accessed February 23, 2011).   
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controversial issues such as the use of carbon markets and the appropriate role of developing 
country action.  In turn, the population of civil society groups attempting to influence climate 
change policy has become more diverse ideologically and tactically, and more divided internally.  
My study particularly documents the emergence and consequences of a radical current of 
climate justice activism that has emerged in the European context in the last few years.  Not only 
did these new groups significantly politicize the often technocratic policy debates, but as I will 
show in the next three chapters, the involvement of these new radical actors had important 
consequences for the spread of contentious tactics in the network of civil society organizations 
mobilized on climate change in the European Union. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
EVENTS AND ACTORS: TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO COLLECTIVE ACTION 
The period of this study was a crucial moment in climate policy making.  The data show that 
during this time organizations employed vastly different strategies of influence.  Given the 
importance of this time and the wide range of options potentially available to organizations 
seeking action on climate change, I ask: What did organizations do when they sponsored 
collective actions on climate change in the years 2008-2009? Where did they do it?  What 
institutions did they target? When did they decide to act? And, most importantly, why did they 
choose to sponsor particular kinds of events in certain locations, targeting particular actors at 
specific times?  
To answer these questions, I gathered an extensive amount of data about collective action 
on climate change and its sponsors.  These data reveal – echoing the chronology in Chapter One 
– that there were major changes in the world of climate change activism during this two year 
period.  Specifically, collective action on climate change became much more contentious.   Not 
only was the number of contentious actions growing, but the number of organizations willing to 
sponsor contentious collective action13
What explains this growth in contentious actions and contentious organizations? This 
chapter starts to answer this question by developing the expectations of two major scholarly 
traditions in the study of social movements and interest groups.  Both groups of scholars point to 
two major sets of factors when accounting for the different strategies civil society groups use to 
 rapidly expanded in the span of two years. Figure 2.1 
shows to growth in contentious forms of action from 2008 to 2009.   
                                                          
13 13 Events are coded as ‘contentious’ when then involve an element of disruption, such as a demonstration, sit-in or 
blockade.   For a complete list of contentious forms of collective action, see Table 1.2.  For the complete event code 
book, see Appendix A.   
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pursue their objectives, emphasizing that organizational choice of particular forms of collective 
action is explained by a combination of external political context and organizational-level factors 
(Baumgartner and Leech 1998: 162; Berry 1977; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 17).  For theories emphasizing contextual factors, organizational 
behavior should be determined by the external political opportunities for participation available 
to them.  In theories at the organizational level, organizational behavior should be the product of 
intra-organizational dynamics, structure and resources.   
Figure 2.1: Growth in Contentious Actions and Contentious Actors, 2008-2009   
 
Both of these approaches have been repeatedly supported in social scientific work.  The 
aim of this chapter is to outline the general theory and specific hypotheses associated with the 
political process and organizational approaches as they apply to my particular case.  I then 
contrast the expectations of each approach with the findings from my data analysis, suggesting 
ways in which existing theory may be illuminating and ways in which it may be limited.   
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I evaluate traditional approaches to collective action in light of their ability to answer a 
number of questions about the timing, location and sponsors of contentious action.  Specifically, 
I will find that the political process approach does well in answering the ‘where’ and ‘when’ 
questions, and organization theory helps unravel a portion of the ‘who does what’ question.  But 
in order to get a more fine-grained picture of who does what, where, and when, we will need a 
theory that incorporates a relational element.  This discussion forms the basis for the 
development of my relational network approach in Chapter Three.   
The Political Process Approach 
A large and influential body of research suggests that characteristics of the political and 
institutional context in which an organizational is operating should have an influence on an 
organization’s strategic choices.  Within this field, scholars working in the political process 
tradition have used the concept of ‘political opportunities’ to explain aggregate amounts, timing, 
and forms of collective action (e.g. Tarrow 2011; Tilly 1978; Kitschelt 1986).  
Defining Political Opportunities 
Tarrow (2011: 85) describes political opportunities as “consistent – but not necessarily formal or 
permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to engage 
in collective action by affecting their expectations of success or failure.”  Within this broad 
definition, researchers have identified many different factors that comprise a ‘political 
opportunity’ including the characteristics of political institutions, demographics, and public 
policy (see Meyer 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004).   
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There are many potential ways to measure political opportunities. 14
Major Hypotheses  
 In this study, I following 
Marks and McAdam (1999) by suggesting that political opportunities are best measured as a 
combination of: a) formal institutional access (Joachim and Locher 2008); and b) policy 
responsiveness; and c) resources available from institutions to actors engaging in transnational 
action (see also Eisinger 1973 for a similar typology). This multi-dimensional measurement 
allows me to classify international institutions making decisions on climate change according to 
their relative openness or closure vis-à-vis one another.  
Political process scholars suggest that the political opportunities available in a given system 
influence both the volume and forms of action collective actors will employ.  Discussing EU-
level activism, Marks and McAdam (1999:107) state: “political opportunities do not merely 
serve to provide sets of incentives for groups to make claims in certain arenas, but they shape the 
way in which groups make claims.” From this standpoint, on issues where institutions are more 
‘open’ (such as EU environmental policy) we should expect to see more conventional action, and 
where institutions are more closed, actors should choose to use contentious tactics (see also 
Kitschelt 1986). 
A more dynamic approach suggests that political opportunities are not fixed: they vary 
systematically over the course of policy-cycle (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1989). Generally 
speaking, scholars taking this view characterize political opportunities on a continuum from 
‘open’ to ‘closed.’ Collective action is expected to have a curvilinear relationship with political 
                                                          
14 I specify political opportunities in a fairly narrow way that doesn’t incorporate other aspects that previous 
researchers have found to be important, including degree of repression, significant allies and partisan balance (see 
Meyer and Minkoff 2004).  However, this narrow specification is appropriate to my study, as it only concerns 
transnational collective action in the EU. 
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openness, peaking where opportunities are ‘mixed’ (partially open and partially closed) (Eisinger 
1973; Tilly 1978).  Additional research suggests that opportunities for protest specifically peak 
when opportunities move towards becoming more closed, generating incentives for protest 
(Meyer 1993; Schlozman and Tierney 1986).   
In addition to the political opportunities provided by political institutions, other scholars 
have emphasized that it is the characteristics of the target – which may or may not be a political 
institution – that influence the forms of collective action an organization is likely to use (Walker, 
Martin and McCarthy 2008: 70). Targets are thought to be a central factor in shaping forms of 
collective action because the likely response of the target drives the form of collective action.  As 
Walker, Martin and McCarthy put it, “each target’s vulnerabilities and its capabilities for 
response – repression, facilitation and routinization – [are] explanations for the degree of 
transgressive protest each target faces (Walker, Martin and McCarthy: 35). Thus, if one can 
assess the degree of openness of the target, one should also be able to predict the contentiousness 
of the forms of action challengers will use against it.     
Finally, political process research has also shown that ‘openness’ can expand and 
contract due to issue-specific opportunities, including issue attention cycles (McCammon et al 
2001).15
Classifying Political Opportunities in European and Global Climate Policy 
  Interest group scholars in particular highlight that the ‘salience’ of an issue to the 
general public – generally measured in terms of media coverage – increases the use of outsider 
strategies because individuals are more aware of the need to act (Kollman 1998: 58; Mahoney 
2008: 41).  
                                                          
15 A number of issue-level hypotheses won’t be discussed here because my focus on the single issue of climate 
change doesn’t allow me to consider them. 
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Climate change is a complicated issue area, in which many types of political opportunities are 
available to civil society groups.  Given this complexity, I will first establish the expectations 
drawn from the political process approach by outlining the opportunities available to actors 
organizing collective action on climate change in the two years prior to the Copenhagen Summit.  
As Chapter One detailed, five different international institutions had a role in decision-making on 
climate change in Europe during this time period.  Table 2.1 shows my classification of 
institutions and their relative ‘openness’ to civil society. I suggest that the European Commission 
and Parliament are characterized by high openness, while the European Council and the 
UNFCCC offer an intermediate amount of opportunities, and the G8/G20 are quite closed. 16
Table 2.1: Comparison of the Relative Openness of International Institutions  
    
 Access Responsiveness Resources Overall Openness 
European Commission High High High Highly 
European Parliament High High High High 
European Council Low Medium None Medium 
UNFCCC Medium Medium None Medium 
G8/G20 None Low None Low 
 
In this section I will explain my classification further, by first explaining variations in access in 
the various stages of the EU policy cycle, within in the UNFCCC process, and in the G8/G20.  I 
then briefly sketch the policy responsiveness of each of these institutions, and the resources they 
make available to civil society actors.  Finally, I discuss the event-specific opportunities of the 
Copenhagen Summit.   
Institutional Access  
                                                          
16 Tables 1.1 and 1.2 provide the dates of deliberation and decision-making on climate change of the different 
institutions for 2008-2009.   
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The European Union is a multi-level, fragmented system that should generally provide easy 
access for civil society groups (Greenwood 2007:23; Risse-Kappen 1995).  But the opportunities 
for participation expand and contract over the course of the policy cycle, and according to the 
political process approach, should create incentives for actors to use more or less conventional 
forms of political action when they target the European Commission, the European Parliament 
and the Council17
The European Commission is the initiator of most legislation, and is the most 
technocratic in mindset (Meyer 1999).  The European Commission has a very limited number of 
staff in comparison to most national policy-making agencies, and thus relies to a great extent on 
information from outside actors.  As a statement issued on civil society dialogue put it: 
 (See also Beyers 2004: 218-220).   
The Commission has always been an institution open to outside input.  The Commission 
believes this process to be fundamental to the development of its policies… Commission 
officials acknowledge the need for such outside input and welcome it. (European 
Commission 1992: 3).   
Since the 2001 White Paper on Governance (European Commission 2001), the Commission has 
been procedurally committed to consulting affected interests when drafting proposals. All new 
initiatives must be announced publically, must contain a consultation plan that meets minimum 
standards, and the final proposal must detail consultations and responses to civil society input.  
There is no official accreditation process or registry of civil society actors, but the Commission 
relies heavily on the ‘usual suspects’ of NGOs and trade union actors present in Brussels.  
Thus in general, the Commission is extremely open to conventional participation by civil 
society actors, providing access and resources for this sort of behavior.  Within the Commission, 
access is most open in the early drafting phases in the Directorates General [DGs], while the 
                                                          
17 There also exist opportunities in theory to target the European Court of Justice, although in this issue area this 
strategy has not been used very often.   
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higher the proposal goes within the Commission, the fewer opportunities there are for interest 
representation (Cini 1996).   
The European Parliament also provides ample opportunities for conventional 
participation.  Proposals from the Commission and from the Parliament itself pass first through 
standing committees in the Parliament, where both the Committee Secretariat and the Rapporteur 
can be targets of interest representation.  In the committee stage of representation, any political 
group can propose amendments through its representatives, so there are many access points to 
the process.  However, after the Committee has made a recommendation, the report is discussed 
in Plenary, where getting amendments adopted becomes more difficult.  At this stage, political 
opportunities are more closed, and civil society groups can either try to influence particular 
MEPs or political groupings through direct lobbying, or through outside actions and media stunts 
that draw attention to EP activities in the media.   
After the Parliament has agreed on a proposal, it is passed to the Council of the European 
Union.  As the Council is a venue for inter-governmental negotiating, the opportunities for civil 
society participation can be somewhat unpredictable.  There are no structured dialogues or 
consultation procedures at this phase, thus formal access is by far the most limited.  However, 
there is sometimes access between national civil servants in the working groups or the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives.  The amount of access can also vary depending of the 
preferences of the Council Presidency.  Thus, in general, opportunities to influence the European 
process are most closed at the Council phase.  As a result, the most contentious political actions 
in Brussels and in the Members States can be expected to take place when the Council is 
deliberating.   
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Parallel to the EU-level political process, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change has similar procedures for civil society participation to the European Council.  
The UNFCCC is structured around annual ‘Conferences of the Parties’ [COPs] held each 
December in a different world region (held in Europe in both 2008 and 2009), as well as semi-
regular intersessional meetings (often held at the Secretariat headquarters in Bonn, Germany). 
Over the course of the development of the UNFCCC, it has become understood that civil society 
groups are an important part of the policy-making process.  Civil society actors are organized in 
constituencies (e.g. environmental groups, trade unions, youth) which have the option to provide 
submissions, participate in workshops, host side events, attend plenary sessions, and occasionally 
make interventions in the plenary.  
But on balance, access to the UN is more limited than in the early stage of the EU policy 
process.  Following Joachim and Locher (2008: 8), I emphasize that the UN’s use of formal 
accreditation procedures limits civil society access more than in the EU.  In many ways, the UN 
is comparable to the Council, in that there are no formal procedures for consultation, and access 
depends to a great extent on the preferences of national delegations.  In addition, because the UN 
process takes place at the inter-state level and frequently involves the presence of Heads of State, 
security measures are much stricter than in the EU. For example, all public ‘actions’ or materials 
that will be distributed within COP venues have to be cleared in advance with the civil society 
liaison, and any groups whose members disobey this rule can be ejected from the premises.   
Within the UNFCCC, groups have to register, but there is no formal cap on admissions, 
and there are many opportunities to directly lobby national delegates (Hoffman 2008).  
Nevertheless, once policy-making moves to the UNFCC [especially at the COPs] access to 
policy-making is more limited.  This represents a closure in political opportunities, and political 
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process theorists would expect more contentious political action in this phase. This was 
particularly true for the last days of the Copenhagen Summit.  In the final three days of the 
conference, access to the COP was much more restricted as a result of security concerns and 
fears of radical activism.  This shift towards closure was unprecedented, and surprised many.  
Connie Hedegaard, the President of the Copenhagen Conference, expressed her surprise and 
reiterated a common self-conception of the UNFCCC as a highly participatory venue when she 
stated to protestors in Copenhagen: "You don't have to exert that kind of violence to be heard 
because this is a process where your views are very much included” (Ritter 2009). Given the 
exclusion of civil society groups from the process in the final days, political process theory 
would predict that there should be even more contentious action during this period. 
While access to the UNFCCC is more limited than to the EU, it is still more open than 
many of the international financial institutions (O’Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams 2000: 5). 
As I previously mentioned, the G8/G20 met to consider climate issues during this time period 
(mostly in 2009), but did not offer formal opportunities for participation.   Thus political process 
theorists should predict an increase in contention when the G8/G20 is meeting.   
Responsiveness 
These institutions also vary in the extent to which they were responsive to the policy concerns of 
civil society actors during this time period.  As the chronology of Chapter One detailed, the 
European Commission and Parliament were systematically the most responsive to the policy 
demands of civil society actors.  For example, the Commission proposed, and the Parliament 
approved, of the originally quite ambitious Climate and Energy Package in 2008.  The 
Commission also proposed a comprehensive climate finance package in 2009, in an effort to spur 
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action by other EU institutions.  Although civil society was quite critical of the EU’s actions of 
climate change, in comparison to other actors and institutions, the European Union was certainly 
among the most ambitious in its proposals on climate change (Kelemen and Bogel 2010).  
In contrast, the Council was much less responsive to the demands of civil society actors.  For 
example, the Council played the major role of watering down the Climate and Energy Package in 
2008, and continually delayed making decisions of climate finance in 2009.  Similarly, within 
the UNFCCC, both the outcomes of Poznan and Copenhagen were devastating to civil society 
groups, causing them to conclude that the UNFCCC was out of touch with their interests.  
Finally, although the G8/G20 did take some action on climate in 2009, these were 
environmentally weak agreements that did not respond to key civil society demands related to 
mitigation and climate finance.   
Resources  
International institutions also vary widely in the extent to which they offer resources to civil 
society organizations working on the issue of climate change.  As previously mentioned, the 
European Commission and Parliament provide extensive financial resources to these 
organizations to encourage their activities. In justifying the Commission’s budgetary 
expenditures in support of NGO activities, a joint decision of the European Parliament and 
Council explained:  
NGOs are essential to coordinate and channel … relevant information and views of the 
new and emerging perspectives, such as on nature protection and transboundary 
environmental problems (European Parliament and Council 2002). 
In contrast, the European Council, UNFCCC and G8/G20 do not offer resources to civil society 
actors in order to encourage their participation.  In many ways, this decision is common sense: 
 
 
66 
 
these institutions are not bureaucracies, and thus do not rely on civil society input in the same 
way as do the Parliament and the Commission.  Yet at the same time, because these institutions 
do not help organizations overcome the barrier to transnational organizing, we can consider there 
are fewer opportunities around these institutions.   
The Copenhagen Summit as an Opportunity 
Finally, over the two-year period of this study, the Copenhagen Conference itself represented an 
important political opportunity.  As I previously mentioned, the Copenhagen Summit was a 
major moment of political decision-making where many Heads of State would be present, and 
thus could be expected to be the target of a large amount of collective action (Tarrow 2005).   
The salience of the climate change issue to the general public also skyrocketed in the 
month of the Copenhagen Conference.  In order to measure ‘salience’ I recorded the total 
number of news articles from the Factiva database returned by a search for the terms “climate 
change” or “global warming” during this two year period.  From January 2008 to August 2009, 
the number of returned results per month generally fluctuated between 16,000 to 20,000.  But in 
the Fall 2009, this number rose to 25,000-30,000 articles per month, with a maximum of almost 
46,000 articles in December 2009.  Since there was so much media attention, interest group 
scholars would also expect that we should see a high volume of contentious collective action in 
Copenhagen.   
Characteristics of European Collective Action on Climate Change: 2008-2009 
As the previous section outlined, the two years preceding the Copenhagen Summit offered 
different kinds of opportunities to address climate change issues in Europe.  But what did groups 
actually do during this period?  My data show that over the two year period European collective 
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action on climate change became more frequent and more contentious.  I argue that the volume 
of European collective action is tied to key moments of European and international decision-
making, but that the forms of collective action are not fully explained by the political process 
approach.   
In some sense, political process explanations carry a heavy burden: if political 
opportunities affect all actors in the political system, why should we expect to see any variation 
at all in forms of action?  And yet, we observe persistent tactical variation among actors working 
on the same issue in the same political system. How can this be explained? One answer might be 
that a random portion of the population is not exposed to these opportunities or is not able to 
perceive them, accounting for some deviations.  But what this section emphasizes is that the 
variation in event characteristics and locations is not random, but is highly systematic.  This 
suggests that different social processes may be generating contentious and conventional events. 
The next chapter will explore this intuition further.   
My data analysis reveals a clear division: there is a strong tendency for conventional 
events to be organized at the EU Institutions, for contentious events to take place in the member 
states, and for the two to be largely temporally unrelated to one another.  The contentious events 
in particular seem much less tied to political opportunities, suggesting that they may be produced 
by a social process unrelated to political process theory.   
Types of Events  
What do organizations do when they organize collectively on climate change?  My data reveal a 
wide range of action forms.  My analysis of press sources identified 268 unique collective 
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actions during this two year period, in a variety of forms (See Methods Appendix A).  There 
were six types of action that were used most frequently:  
• Press releases: Civil society groups often issue (joint) press releases in order to publicize 
their opinions on the actions taken by European institutions or other actors.  My data 
show that organizations use this type of action at all stages of the policy cycle. 
• Reports: Many groups publish and submit reports on technical aspects of climate change 
policy.  In some cases these groups may write these reports themselves, while in other 
cases they are commissioned.  These reports tend to respond to pressing issues on the 
political agenda.   
• Media Stunts: A number of groups use ‘media stunts’ to draw attention to themselves and 
the issues about which they are passionate.  These types of action are more typical when 
the Parliament, European Council or UN are meeting, as in the Oxfam example used 
earlier.  Because these actions often involve colorful performances – hanging banners, 
making giant ice sculptures, dressing up like polar bears – they are often well-covered in 
the media.   
• Climate Camps: Climate camps are gatherings that last several days where participants 
will bring tents and camp outside a particular target, such as an airport, political 
institution, power plant or corporation.  These camps take place all over Europe, and 
usually happen in the summer. The exception to this was the climate camp that took place 
during the G20 in London in March, 2009. At the camps, individuals also typically 
organize affinity groups that break off and engage in direct action at surrounding sites.   
• Marches and Demonstrations: Organizations also often use marches and demonstrates to 
mobilize individuals and draw attention to their cause.  The largest demonstrations in my 
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data were mounted in Copenhagen: the global day of action and the Reclaim Power 
action.  The Global Day of Action also occurred in 2008, and is coordinated with similar 
marches all over the world.  Other notable demonstrations on climate change took place 
during the G8 and G20 meetings in the Spring and Summer of 2009, as well as on 
October 10, 2009, which is another annual day of action.    
• Occupations and Blockades: Throughout the time period of this study a number of 
organizations sponsored occupations and blockades targeting political institutions and 
corporations.  For example, the Climate Alarm action blocked the entrance of the EU 
Commission, another group blocked the entrance of the UN at the Conference in 
Barcelona, and Friends of the Earth occupied the lobby of the UN Conference in 
Copenhagen.  In addition to political targets, transnational activists have also targeted 
industry meetings of carbon traders and coal-fired power plants, coal mines and boats 
delivering coal throughout Europe.   
Volume of Events Tied to Key Moments of Political Decision-Making 
When do organizations choose to act collectively on climate change? My event data suggest that 
civil society groups were more active overall in 2009 than in 2008.  In 2008, I counted 103 total 
events based on my press source coding, whereas in 2009 I recorded 165 distinct events: a 
growth of 60%.  Moreover, there seemed to be a growing momentum in the time period under 
study.  By far the largest number of events appeared at the end of the time period, at the COP 15 
Copenhagen Climate Summit.  For sake of comparison, the number of events mounted by June 
2009 (the time of the second Bonn inter-sessional) was already equal to the number of events in 
all of 2008.   
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Looking at the timing of these events, the volume of events seems to reflect key moments 
of political decision-making.  Figure 2.2 displays the total number of collective actions, along 
with key moments in the policy cycle. 
Figure 2.2: Total European Collective Actions on Climate Change with Policy Events, 
2008-2009 
 
These findings seem to support a strong relationship between political opportunities and the 
volume of collective action. We see peaks in collective action in January, March, September, 
October and December of 2008, which corresponded to key moments in the policy-making 
process of the European Climate and Energy package.  We see a general decrease in collective 
action over the summer when political institutions are less active.  In 2009, collective action was 
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particularly elevated in March, June, October and December, around key moments in the 
international process. There was less collective action in February and May, when institutions 
are less active.  Since 2009 was a much more active policy year, we see a fairly high level of 
collective action during the summer.   But in both years we also see an increase in collective 
action in August when there was no particular political process underway, which is puzzling 
from a political process perspective.   
Issue salience and collective action are also positively related. The correlation between 
the number of Factiva articles in any given month and the number of reported collective actions 
in a month is 0.68.    With the exception of November 2009, when salience was high but 
collective action was relatively low, collective action and salience seem to co-vary.  Without 
commenting on the direction of the relationship at this point, it does appear as though media 
attention and collective action both increased in the build up to Copenhagen.  However, as in the 
previous example, August still stands out as a month in which there is a lot of collective action 
but not much media attention.  The next section explores this finding further.   
Increasingly Contentious Forms of Collective Action 
When do organizations choose to use contentious, rather than conventional, forms of action? The 
data reveal that between 2008 and 2009 collective action on climate change became much more 
contentious.  My sample of events contained 25% contentious events in 2008 and 34% 
contentious events in 2009.  By far the largest number of contentious events were mounted 
December 2009 around the Copenhagen Summit.  The second and third largest number of 
contentious events were organized in August of each year at the internationally-organized 
‘climate camps’ – independent venues for direct action and education about climate change.  The 
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fourth largest number took place in October of 2009, which was the time of the protests around 
the Barcelona UNFCCC meeting, the transntionally-coordinated day of action on ‘10/10’ and the 
EU Summit in Brussels.   
Although volume of ECA seems fairly well-explained by the presence of key political 
opportunities in the European or international policy-process (with a few exceptions), this data 
on action forms is harder to explain from a political process perspective.  Figure 2.3 represents 
the number of contentious and conventional ECA in each month.   
Figure 2.3: Conventional and Contentious European Collective Action, 2008-2009  
 
Political process theory should predict that as political opportunities move towards becoming 
more closed, collective actors will use more contentious forms of action.  Looking at Figure 2.3, 
we can see that there is a dramatic increase in contention over this time period.  But there are 
also big spikes in contentious action in August of every year, which reflect the timing of the 
transnational European climate camp movement.  These actions are deliberately scheduled for 
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August to coincide with summer holidays in Europe, and not with particular political 
opportunities.  Thus it is plausible to conclude that contentious collective action is linked to, but 
not fully determined by available political opportunities. 
Looking at conventional collective action, we see also that its volume is clearly linked to 
key moments of decision-making.  But it is also somewhat puzzling that conventional action also 
increases most when opportunities are closing (December 2008 and 2009).  Whereas political 
process theory would predict that collective actors should turn to contentious actions under these 
circumstances, it seems that they actually use more of both contentious and conventional forms.  
Even more puzzling from a political process perspective is that these data suggest that 
there is no relationship between the amount of conventional and contentious collective action in 
any given month for the year of 2008.  There is virtually no correlation (-.02) between 
conventional and contentious collective action in any given month for 2008.  If the same set of 
organizations were responding to political opportunities and changing their forms of action over 
the course of the policy period we would expect to find an inverse relationship18
This finding suggests that perhaps there are two distinct groups working with contentious 
and conventional collective action, not one group varying its tactics according to political 
opportunities.  Analysis of the data by location further supports this idea.   
 between the 
amount of conventional and contentious collective action.   
Action at the European Institutions vs. Action in the Member States 
                                                          
18 In 2009 the amount of contentious and conventional collective action in each month is positively correlated (.53), 
when we expect it should be negatively correlated if the same groups were varying their forms of action.     
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Since organizations in Europe have many options as to where they will act, where do they 
actually hold their events?  One clear change during this two year period is that far fewer 
collective actions took place at the European Institutions in 2009 than in 2008.  This trend is 
fairly dramatic: 69% of the ECA in 2008 took place in Brussels, Luxembourg or Strasbourg, 
where the main EU institutions are situated, while only 50% of ECA took place in one of these 
three cities in 2009.19
Figure 2.4: European Collective Action 2008-2009, by Location 
  This reflects a growing number of transnationally-organized actions at the 
sites of international policy-making events of the UNFCCC and the G8/G20 in 2009, including 
important events in London, Bonn, Barcelona and of course Copenhagen.   
 
Political process theory would also predict that as opportunities at the European level 
become more closed, ECA would likely move towards action in the member states, where civil 
                                                          
19 Although the coding schemes are somewhat different (this study only considers transnational collective action) 
this finding is somewhat similar to the percentage of ‘Europrotests’ identified in Imig and Tarrow (2001) at their end 
of the time period of their study (2001:35).  Uba and Uggla (2011: 386) also find that the number of protests 
‘directly targeting the EU’ is generally twice as large as the number of transnational protests.   
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society groups can also seek influence (Marks and McAdam 1999).  As reported in Figure 2.4, 
the data support this prediction.   
In 2008, virtually all conventional collective action was organized at the EU institutions, and 
almost all contentious ECA took place in the member states.  This division is quite dramatic: the 
correlation between an event taking place at the European institutions and being conventional 
was .97.  The correlation between an ECA being contentious and it taking place in the member 
states was .92.   
But in 2009, the story becomes slightly more complicated.  Contentious collective actions 
still mainly take place in the member states (the correlation between the two characteristics of an 
event is .96).  But more and more conventional collective actions were also organized in the 
member states, especially in the cities where the UNFCCC met in its inter-sessionals.  In 
addition, a small but growing number of contentious actions began to take place around the 
European Institutions.  In 2009, the correlation between an event being conventional and taking 
place at the European Institutions was only .83 – still high, but almost 15% lower than for 2008.  
Despite the differences in June and December of 2009, the data analysis clearly demonstrates the 
overall strong association between contentious events and the member states and conventional 
events and the European Institutions.  This data further suggest that maybe the sponsors of 
contentious actions are nationally-rooted and distinct from those organizing conventional actions 
in Brussels.20
Events by Target 
   
                                                          
20 This finding would fit with Marks and McAdam’s  (1999) argument that social movements that work in Brussels 
are likely to use institutionalized tactics because of the open opportunity structure of the European institutions, 
although the development of contentious transnational activism outside of the sphere of Brussels is something that 
the authors did not anticipate.   
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Actors make decisions not only about their forms of action, but also about which institutions they 
will target with their actions. This is particularly true in this issue area because many actors have 
a hand in determining policy outcomes on climate change. As Soule (2009) points out, activists 
do not only target state and international political institutions, but also frequently direct their 
claims towards corporations whose activities they wish to influence.  Which targets did 
organizations choose during this time period, and which forms of action did they use when 
challenging different institutions?  
The EU was by far the most frequent target for European collective action on climate 
change.  Organizations targeted the EU 65% of the time in 2008 and 55% of the time in 2009.  
After the EU, the UN was the next most common target overall (about 14%).  However, the UN 
accounted for only 3% of all event targets in 2008; this figure was closer to 20% in 2009.  
Organizations also frequently targeted corporations (about 11%) and the general public (8%) 
with their actions.  International financial institutions (2%) and national governments21
As predicted, different institutions do tend to attract varying degrees of contention.  
Figure 2.5 represents this data.  The most striking finding is that collective action that targets the 
EU is overwhelmingly conventional, while collective action that targets all other institutions, 
states and actors is more than 50% contentious (Marks and McAdam 1999).   
 (5%) 
were much less frequent targets.  These changes reflect that fact that the policy-process was 
much more international in 2009, and the EU Climate and Energy Package debate was concluded 
by December 2008. 
 
                                                          
21 Many national groups surely target their own governments, but they do not necessarily do so in European-level 
coalitions, and thus are not in my event sample.  The events I recorded involved actors from two or more states 
targeting a particular national government.  The most frequent target was the Polish government.   
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Figure 2.5: Contentious and Conventional Events by Target, 2008-2009 
 
At face value, it would then appear that target characteristics play a large role in 
determining the degree of contentiousness they face.  The EU is by far the most ‘open’ political 
institution, and most actions that target the EU are conventional; international financial 
institutions are the exact opposite.  But the observed correlations in the data are not necessarily 
causal.  For the logic of this approach to hold, organizations must make decisions about what 
tactics to use independently of their choice of target.  But how do we know that the relationship 
is not reversed?  Do organizations change their forms of action when they target different 
institutions?  Or do they ‘venue shop’ for an institution that is appropriate for their preferred 
tactical form?  While this question is difficult to answer relying on quantitative data alone, the 
qualitative data I gather (See Chapter Seven) suggest that contentious organizations sometimes 
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choose their targets and action forms simultaneously, making the logic of this approach less 
plausible.   
Summary 
The analysis of my event data in light of political process theory suggests two main findings: 
• The volume of events is well-explained by the political process approach, as is their 
location. 
• The form of these events is not as well-explained by variations in the opening and closure 
of political opportunities.   
The analysis of events by form and location suggest a possible common interpretation: there may 
be two different processes generating contentious events in the member states and conventional 
events at the European institutions.  The organizational data will help to shed light on this 
question.   
The Organizational Approach  
The other major approach to explaining organization choice of action forms focuses on factors 
specific to organizational populations or internal to organizations themselves.   
Major Hypotheses: Population Ecology 
This population ecology approach emphasizes that the characteristics of the field in which an 
organization is embedded influence its traits, behavior and even survival.  For example, Minkoff 
(1997) emphasizes that the density of an organizational population is an important determinant 
of social protest.  This is because organizations that adopt contentious tactics early can open up 
opportunities for later organizations, and help to expand resources available for protest.  
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However, at a certain point the population can become too dense, generating inter-organizational 
competition and actually decreasing the likelihood of engaging in contentious action.     
 Another variation of this approach suggests that organizations tend to specialize in certain 
tasks of types of action, and that there are perils to changing (Hannan and Freeman 1984).  Work 
in this tradition suggests that organizations have “socially enforceable” identities, and can be 
punished by both organizational insiders and those outside the organizations when they violate 
expectations as to how they will behave (Hannan et al 2006).  As a result, one would expect to 
see a great deal of organizational behavioral inertia.  Changes in the population should come 
from new entrants or the disappearance of older organizations, rather than through changes in the 
behavior of existing organizations (Haveman and Rao 1997; Scott et al 1999). 
Major Hypotheses: Intra-Organizational Factors 
At the organizational level, studies of intra-organizational factors tend to fall into three 
categories: life cycle approaches to organizational de-radicalization; resource mobilization 
approaches; and cultural/collective identity approaches.   
First, Michels’(1958) classic thesis of the iron law of oligarchy states that organizations 
move inevitably towards de-radicalization over time.  Starting from an individual case, Michels 
arrives at a general law: “He who says organization, says tendency towards oligarchy.”  (Michels 
1958: 37) For Michels the necessity to facilitate mobilization through hierarchy and to stabilize 
the movement through leadership, creates a natural life cycle of movements in the form of 
increasing institutionalization and de-radicalization.  Other scholars working in this tradition 
have similarly emphasized that with age organizations invariably become more professionalized 
and their radical goals become displaced (e.g. Offe 1990; Piven and Cloward 1977).   
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In a similar vein, the resource mobilization school argues that there is a trend towards the 
professionalization and institutionalization of social movement organizations (McCarthy and 
Zald 1987).  Scholars working in this school emphasize that the resources available to a 
movement should greatly influence its choice of form of mobilization.  In particular, those 
organizations with greater financial resources should tend towards professionalization and de-
radicalization while those without these resources may tend to use more contentious means or 
‘weapons of the weak’ (Piven and Cloward 1977; Lipsky 1968; Scott 1985).    The availability of 
certain kinds of resources such as access to individual members is also expected to increase the 
use of outsider tactics (Scholzman and Tierney 1986).  In addition, the source of resources 
should also matter: those organizations that are financially dependent on institutional actors may 
be less likely to employ contentious strategies (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).   
Finally, cultural and identity approaches suggest that the nature of the constituency that 
organizations try to mobilize may have an important influence on the types of collective action in 
which these organizations engage.  This is because organizations always have to appeal to their 
core constituents, and therefore need to design collective actions that recognize and appeal to 
participants’ set ideological preferences and pre-existing collective identities (Brulle 2000; 
Carmin and Balser 2002; Dalton 1994).  In this way the ‘symbolic life’ of social movements may 
constrain their ‘prognostic framing’ and ultimately the kinds of actions which seem desirable or 
appropriate (Snow and Benford 1988). 
The next section will examine these arguments in light of the descriptive evidence from 
my quantitative data.  I first examine the growth of the organizational population and its 
increasing contentiousness, pointing to the sources of radicalization and the marginal changes 
among existing actors.  I also present some preliminary evidence of the relationship between 
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organizational traits and their contentiousness, recognizing that this data will be need to be 
analyzed in a multivariate model in Chapter Four.   
Characteristics of Civil Society Organizations: 2008-2009 
The population of civil society organizations working on climate change is highly diverse and it 
evolved significantly during the time period of this study.  Organizations acting on climate 
change have a wide range of ideological positions, available resources, organizing structures, 
relationships with political institutions and previous action profiles.  This section describes the 
population of organizations, and both the growth in its size and its growing contentiousness.  But 
it also highlights that organizations in the population tended to be either contentious or 
conventional, and that there was a great deal of stability in tactical repertoires among 
organizations that were highly active in the population.   
This section contrasts the expectations of the organizational approach with the findings 
from my data.  In general, growth in the organizational population and predicted organizational 
traits do seem to be correlated with increased contentiousness. But the correlations are not that 
strong, and organizations do change their forms of action during the time period of my study.  
The tendency for organizations to specialize in either contentious or conventional forms of action 
suggests that there may be steep tradeoffs between choosing one form of action or the other.   
Describing the Organizational Population 
My study is unique in that it captures a diverse population of organizations all working in the 
same issue area.  Rather than make a priori distinctions between NGOs and social movement 
organizations, my research design allows me to capture the broadest possible spectrum of groups 
and to concretely measure their attributes and behavior. 
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For example, my population contains groups with vastly different resource profiles.  
While the average budget for a group in my sample was approximately 2.5 million Euros in 
2008, one quarter of groups had access to less than 50,000 Euros per year, while another quarter 
had between 5 million and 175 million.  Similarly, the average number of staff members was 35, 
but 17% of groups had no staff members, while the largest groups had over 200 full-time 
employees.  In general, the most resourced groups tend to be the large development NGOs, 
specifically Oxfam, Tearfund and the Catholic Overseas Development Agency.  The national 
offices of WWF UK, Germany and the Netherlands as well as Greenpeace Netherlands, 
Germany and International are also in this top bracket.  The EU offices of the major 
environmental groups tend to be fairly ‘average’ in the population: they have approximately 15-
20 staff, and budgets of about 1-3 million Euros per year.   
Most of the population in 2008 was composed of environmental groups, while only 14% 
of the organizations had a ‘radical’ ideology, meaning that it had an anti-capitalist or anti-
systemic rhetoric in its mission statement.  In 2008, 25% of the groups in the population received 
funding from the EU Commission or Parliament, while most did not.  Organizations also had 
different membership formats: 70% of the organizations had a structure that allows for 
individuals to join the group as a member, while 20% of groups were ‘umbrella’ organizations 
with structures that allowed for other organizations to join their own group.     
The groups in the population covered the entirety of Europe, with at least one 
organization in every member state of the EU, as well as in Norway and Switzerland.  However, 
it does appear as though the organizations in my population were more concentrated in Northern 
and Western Europe.  The United Kingdom had the highest number of organizations (21), 
followed by Belgium (15), Germany (15), and the Netherlands (14).  I believe that this reflects 
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the historically stronger development of the environmental movement in these countries, and not 
a data collection bias, for three reasons.  First, as discussed in the Methods Appendix A, I took a 
number of steps to correct for possible geographical bias in the press search I conducted.  
Second, my analysis of the membership lists of the Climate Action Network reveals a similar 
concentration of organizations in these areas.  Finally, previous research on the environmental 
movement in Europe (e.g. Dalton 1994; Rootes 2007) also suggests that environmental NGOs 
and social movements are more numerous in these areas than in Southern and Eastern Europe.   
Finally, the data on organizational traits suggests that the national offices of international 
NGOs (Greenpeace, WWF and Friends of the Earth) are independent actors with very different 
attributes.  For example, WWF Germany has a budget of approximately 40 million Euros and a 
staff of 130.  WWF Hungary had a budget of approximately 250,000 Euros and a staff of 20.  
Similar differences exist within Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth offices in terms of 
resources profiles.  These differences were also behavioral: already in 2008 some groups – 
Greenpeace Germany, Italy, WWF Germany, and Friends of the Poland – choose very different 
tactics than the other offices of their ‘type.’  The tactical diversity becomes even more 
pronounced in 2009.  As a result of this analysis, as well as my qualitative interviews with these 
groups, I argue that the diversity in attributes and behavior of these groups supports my coding 
decision to treat these organizations as separate units in my analysis.   
Population Growth: 2008-2009 
As climate change became a more important political issue, more and more European actors 
became involved in the issue area.  After extensive analysis of documents relating to the 
organization of European collective actions reported in press sources in 2008, I found that there 
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were 119 distinct organizations involved in European collective actions on climate change.  In 
2009, this same procedure suggested that there were 217 organizations in this population, which 
indicates a growth of 82%.   
It may seem incredible that I observed such a dramatic population increase in a one year 
period.  Nevertheless, I believe this rapid growth I found in my data accurately reflects the 
increasing salience of climate change to a broader range of civil society actors.  Probably due to 
high issue salience, a whole new crop of organizations became involved for the first time in 
transnational coordination around Copenhagen.  This was particularly, but not exclusively, true 
in Europe.  For example, the major transnational climate change advocacy coalition in Europe – 
the Climate Action Network Europe [CAN-E] – had such a dramatic demand for new 
membership that the organization put a freeze on new members for the year of 2009.  At the start 
of 2008, CAN-E had 110 members, and by the beginning of 2009 it had 129 members with 20 
pending applications.22
Most of the growth in CAN-E membership can be attributed to the increased interest of 
national environmental non-governmental organizations in transnational coordination in the issue 
area.  In addition, post-Bali, development organizations concerned about the affects of climate 
change on vulnerable states and the implications of global climate policy for development issues 
also became highly active on climate change.  For some of these groups, the switch to focus on 
climate policy came almost overnight, which made joining a transnational climate change 
coalition an attractive way to get information and compensate for lack of expertise in this area by 
their existing staff members.   
   
                                                          
22 Figures from CAN-E website (www.climnet.org), archived version of this site (www.archive.org), and internal 
membership documents.   
 
 
85 
 
Finally, two organizations known for internet mobilizations – 350.org and Avaaz.org – 
also became much more active in European climate politics during this period.  350.org started 
out as a US-based group that quickly went global and did massive outreach in Europe ahead of 
Copenhagen; Avaaz.org is a multi-issue group that shifted a large part of its focus to climate 
issues in the year of 2009.  Both groups had vast resources and drew on a large youth 
constituency, which allowed them to become big players in Europe in the run-up to Copenhagen.   
However, not all the growth in the organizational population can be attributed to these 
three sources.  One of the biggest changes between 2008 and 2009 was the growing strength of 
the transnational climate coalition Climate Justice Action [CJA].    CJA mobilized many new 
organizations formerly associated with the global justice movement, introducing them to the 
issue of climate change.   
A More Contentious Population  
Not only were there many more contentious events in 2009 in comparison to 2008, but the 
population of organizations involved also became on average much more contentious.  In 2008 
16% of organizations in my sample used more than 50% contentious actions23
                                                          
23 Although comparisons across studies are difficult, my findings are relatively similar to those of della Porta and 
Caini (2005), who find that 13% of national SMOs and NGOs report regularly using ‘mobilization’ in their EU level 
actions.  Dalton, Recchia and Rohrschneider (2003), who found that 19% of environmental organizations worldwide 
report using protests, demonstration and direct actions “very often.” These comparisons suggests again that my 
sample is probably not overly biased towards more ‘radical’ actors.   
; by 2009, 58% of 
the groups active in 2008 were using more than 50% contentious actions. As Figure 2.1 already 
showed, the number of organizations using at least one contentious action also increased 
dramatically between 2008 and 2009. But the number of organizations sponsoring more than one 
contentious event also increased.  In 2008, 12 organizations were involved in more than 2 
contentious events, compared to 55 in 2009.  
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It is important to note that although many organizations sponsored at least one 
contentious event during this time period, the use of contention never reached the entire 
population, peaking at about 70%.  This means that a substantial portion of the population never 
sponsored a contentious action, and many dabbled in contentious actions, while remaining 
primarily conventional.   
  Which organizations were the most contentious?  Much of the growth in contentiousness 
amongst organizations can be attributed to the new entrants to the population in 2009, 62% of 
which used more than 50% contentious actions.  But a significant portion of the contentious 
population in 2009 was made up of formerly conventional groups that became contentious for 
the first time in 2009, and finding that is not well-explained by organizational ecology 
approaches that emphasize the inertia of organizational repertoires.  How did groups become 
more radical?  The next section explains the growth of contention by pointing to three key 
stages.   
Stages of Radicalization  
Organizations didn’t become contentious all at once: they adopted these new tactics in three 
distinct waves.  Drawing on the literature on diffusion, I classify groups into three categories, 
based on the timing of their adoption:   
• Innovators: In 2008 (and in some cases prior) organizations such as Klimax, Earth First! 
The Climate Camps, Rising Tide, Campaign Against Climate Change, and Greenpeace 
International were already using contentious tactics.  As Chapter Six will detail, these 
organizations were early innovators that ‘exported’ their tactics to other organizations 
during this time period.   
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• Early Adopters: Early in 2009 many of the national Friends of the Earth offices became 
more regularly engaged in contentious European-level actions.  As the previous Chapter 
mentioned, FOE-I underwent major changes post-Bali and a number of their members 
organizations significantly radicalized as a result.  FOE offices in Belgium, France, 
Germany and the UK all became more contentious in the second time period. For 
example, these offices were involved in a number of transnationally-coordinated protest 
events, including global days of action in October and organizing to send members by 
bus to participate in the Human Flood protest in Copenhagen.  Some Greenpeace offices 
also underwent a transformation in their tactical repertoires, although these decisions 
seem to have been made independent of one another (See Chapter Seven).  
• Adopters: Finally, in the fall of 2009, the largest group of organizations adopted 
contentious tactics.  Some of these organizations were other Friends of the Earth offices 
or nationally-based development groups.  But the biggest growth came from members of 
CJA in 2008, such as Corporate European Observatory, Carbon Trade Watch, Focus on 
the Global South, Ecologistas en Acción, European Youth for Action and ASEED 
Europe, that became much more contentious in this last time period.   
This chronology mimics the processes described in Minkoff (1997) and in the literature on the 
diffusion of innovations (e.g. Rogers 1995).  It is important to note, however, that the use of 
contentious tactics never reached the total population.  The spread of contentiousness seems to 
be concentrated among new organizations and a few older groups that changed behavior between 
2008 and 2009.  So while overall contentiousness does seem to be correlated with population 
growth, it seems as though organizational-level changes cannot be fully explained from a 
population ecology perspective.   
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Marginal Changes Amongst Those Most Active  
While there were major changes at the population level, there was a great deal of tactical stability 
among the most active organizations.  While the new organizations entering the population 
dramatically changed its character, the most active organizations in the population did not 
change much between the two years.  Table 2.1 details the top ten organizations from each year 
and the characteristics of their actions, along with the mean for the organizational population in 
each year.  
In general, organizations sponsored more or less the same number of actions in 2008 and 
2009.  This makes sense because most organizations did not hire additional staff in 2009, so 
there was a limit on their capacity (and any increase in number of events was probably due to 
existing staff working harder in 2009).  Greenpeace EU Unit, WWF EPO, CAN-E, T&E and 
Birdlife all sponsored more or less the same number of events in each year.  In addition, there 
was a general decrease in the number of actions at the European institutions, which reflects the 
growing importance of the international process in 2009.   
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Table 2.2: Organizations and Their Actions, 2008 and 2009 
 2008 2009 
Organization Name Rank 
# 
Actions 
% 
Contentious 
% 
EU Rank 
# 
Actions 
% 
Contentious 
% 
Change 
from 
‘08 
% 
EU 
% 
Change 
from 
‘08 
Friends of the Earth Europe 1 24 0.04 1 4 20 0.17 .13 0.78 -.22 
Greenpeace European Unit 2 23 0.09 1 2 26 0.12 .03 0.85 -.15 
WWW European Policy Office 3 20 0.05 1 1 29 0.03 .02 0.79 -.21 
Camp for Climate Action UK 4 11 0.82 0 5 14 1 .18 0 0 
Climate Action Network Europe 5 10 0.10 1 6 14 0.14 .04 0.71 -.29 
Transport & Environment Europe 6 10 0 1 7 12 0 0 0.92 -.08 
Oxfam International 7 6 0 1 3 24 0.21 .21 0.71 -.29 
Rising Tide 8 6 0.83 0 19 5 1 .17 0 0 
Birdlife International 9 5 0 1 49 3 0 0 1 0 
Campaign Against Climate Change 10 5 0.60 0 13 6 0.83 .23 0 0 
Greenpeace International 12 4 1 0 8 10 0.60 -.40 0.2 .20 
ActionAid International 
    
9 8 0.25  0.12  
Avaaz.org 
    
10 7 0.71  0.14  
POPULATION MEAN 
 
2.25 .13 .70 
 
3.9 .45 .32 .18 -.05 
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There are a few exceptions to the observed stability.  First, Oxfam International went 
from sponsoring 6 actions in 2008 to 24 actions in 2009.  Much of this expansion is due to the 
increased importance Oxfam attached to climate change in the run up to Copenhagen.  Oxfam 
also hired a former CAN-E staff member in 2009 to run a new climate advocacy campaign, 
which meant that not only did Oxfam have staff capacity to sponsor a larger number of events – 
including an increased number of outsider media stunts -- but that it was also especially well-
positioned to participate in co-sponsored activities with other Brussels-based organizations.   
Second, some organizations change their action profiles without changing the number of 
events they sponsored.  Friends of the Earth Europe became the most contentious of all the major 
European NGO offices, although it still only used 17% contentious action forms.  Both Rising 
Tide and the Camp for Climate Action UK become entirely contentious, although they used 
some conventional actions in 2008.   
Third, two new organizations joined the top ten: ActionAid International and Avaaz.  
ActionAid opened an advocacy office in Brussels in 2009 (for only one year) in order to pressure 
the EU on its climate aid package.  Similarly, Avaaz opened a number of ‘action factories’ 
around Europe in order to facilitate young people getting involved in media-friendly stunts to 
draw attention to the international climate policy process.  These two new organizations 
displaced Birdlife International and Rising Tide, both of which were fairly consistent in their 
actions from 2008 to 2009, but did not devote new resources to the Copenhagen campaign.   
 Thus overall, it seems as though the evidence offers mixed support for the predictions 
from population ecology.  On the one hand, the increase in contention does seem to partially 
come from the entry of new organizations into the population.  However, some groups do change 
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their behavior between the two years, which is not expected.  In addition, the most active groups 
tend to be consistent in their choice of action forms between the two years, while the less active 
groups in 2008 are more susceptible to change in 2009.   
Either Contentious or Conventional  
Do organizations mix contentious and conventional forms of action?  Or do they tend to 
specialize in one or the other? The organizational data suggests that during this time period, 
organizations tended to engage in either contentious political action organized around summits 
and in the member states, or in conventional lobbying tied to the policy process.  
Figure 2.6 shows this in a histogram of the percentage of contentious actions used by 
organizations in my sample in 2008 and 2009. The vast majority of organizations have action 
profiles composed of either 0-20% contentious actions or 80-100% contentious actions.  This is 
true even when those organizations that only participate occasionally in climate change politics 
(only sponsor one event) are dropped from the analysis.  
Figure 2.6: Contentious Collective Action as Percentage of Total Actions, 2008 and 2009 
 
In 2008 there were virtually no organizations that combined insider and outsider actions.  
While in 2009 the majority of organizations tend to use either conventional or contentious 
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actions, there is a sizable constituency of organizations that combine the two.  Many of the 
organizations that fall in-between are nationally-rooted chapters of transnational environmental 
networks, including Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth.   Nevertheless, the vast majority of 
organizations still specialize almost exclusively in one form of action or the other, which is 
consistent with the prediction of population ecology theorists (Hannan et al 2006). .   
Organizational Traits and Action Forms 
What types of organizations are sponsoring contentious events? The organizational 
approach suggests a number of traits of organizations may be correlated with it choice of 
contentious action forms.  How well do these predictions hold up? Although I will later use a 
more sophisticated multivariate analysis, simple correlations between the proportion of 
contentious actions an organization uses and its other attributes already reveal some important 
trends. Table 2.3 represents this data for my sample of organizations.   
Table 2.3: Correlations between Organizational Attributes and Contentiousness 
 Correlation with Percentage of Contentious 
Actions  
Used by an Organization  
Sample 
Size 
Size of Budget -0.01 
(0.94) 
83 
Number of Staff -0.10 
(0.31) 
108 
Receives EU Funding  -0.20* 
(0.03) 
118 
Has Individual Members 0.10 
(0.29) 
115 
Has a Radical Ideology 0.42* 
(0.00) 
118 
Age  -0.19* 
(0.04) 
118 
Note: * p < 0.05 
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These correlations generally support theoretical expectations, although not as strongly as 
organizational theorists might wish.  For example, the size of the organization’s budget and 
number of staff are weakly correlated with a decrease in contention, while having a radical 
ideology is moderately correlated with an increase in contention.  Getting funding from the EU 
and the age of an organization are both negatively correlated with contention.  The presence of 
individual members is weakly correlated with an increase in contention.  Only receiving EU 
funding, having a radical ideology and age of the organization are statistically significant at the 
5% level.  
Although these coefficients generally follow theoretical expectations, the weak level of 
prediction suggests that organizational decision-making is highly complex.  For illustration, both 
Greenpeace International and Greenpeace EU Unit have vast amounts of resources, similar intra-
organizational structures, similar ideology and access to a similar constituency.  Yet the EU Unit 
uses less than 10% contentious forms of action, while the International office sponsors almost 
exclusively contentious European collective actions.  There also does not seem to be an 
necessary relationship between organizational ‘age’ and de-radicalization.  Not only is the EU 
Unit younger than Greenpeace International, but other organizations such as the Climate Action 
Network Europe and Earth First were both founded in Europe in 1991, but have opposite action 
profiles.  As a result, I would suspect that the hypotheses from the organizational tradition are 
indicative of trends, but far from determinative.   
Summary 
My analysis of the organizational data suggests two important conclusions: 
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• Growth in the organizational population is associated with increased contentiousness.  
But this change is not only due to new entries or ‘deaths’ in the organizational 
population; some organizations do change tactics over this time period, which is hard to 
explain from a population ecology perspective.   
• As expected, organizations tend not to mix contentious and conventional forms of action, 
but prefer to specialize in one or the other. 
• The predicted intra-organizational traits do seem to be correlated with contentiousness, 
but weakly.  
Again, these findings suggest a common interpretation: organizations using contentious 
collective action are distinct from those using conventional action.  Organizational approaches 
shed additional light on the question of who does what, but there seems to be additional 
systematic variation that they do not capture.  The next Chapter will pick up this theme.   
Conclusion 
The political process and organizational approaches help to explain a number of interesting 
characteristics of collective action on climate change during this time period.  My preliminary 
data analysis suggests that political opportunities may be most useful for explaining the volume 
of collective action at a particular time.  This analysis also suggests that particular organizational 
traits – especially receiving funding from the EU, age and having a radical ideology – are 
correlated with organizational contentiousness, although not highly.  But overall, the preliminary 
data analysis suggests that there may be more going on in organizational choice in action form 
than either of the traditional approaches can explain.   
I find that both the analysis at the event level and the organizational level suggest a 
common interpretation: there are two very different worlds of collective action on climate 
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change in Europe.  The event data, for example, shows that contentious events tend to take place 
in different locations than conventional events.  It also shows that there is no correlation between 
contentious and conventional events in a given month for the year 2008.  Both of these findings 
suggest that contentious and conventional events may be generated by different sponsors.  The 
organizational data support this interpretation by showing that organizations tend to organize 
either contentious or conventional events, and that very few actually vary their forms of action.   
These findings are not well-explained by existing theory. The next section will help to 
unravel this emerging puzzle by developing a relational approach and employing network 
analysis to explain why some organizations chose to engage in contentious forms of action while 
others did not.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE RELATIONAL NETWORK APPROACH 
Organizations do very different things when they organize collective action on climate change.  
How can we understand who does what, when, where and, especially, why? Existing theory gets 
us part of the way to answering these questions.  But both the political process and 
organizational approaches are limited in that they view organizations as isolated units and 
assume that they make strategic decisions independently of one another.  I argue that these 
assumptions are unrealistic given the importance of relationships, networks, alliances and 
coalitions in political life (e.g. Diani 1995; Klandermans 1990; Levi and Murphy 2006).  This 
chapter develops a relational network approach to collective action that pays explicit attention to 
inter-organizational relationships as an important determinant of choice of action forms.   
This approach to collective action builds on network research in four different traditions.  
First, it draws inspiration from the methods and conceptual work done in studies of policy 
networks (Broadbent 1998; Laumann and Pappi 1976), while narrowing the focus to 
relationships between civil society actors.  Second, it adds empirical depth to the concept of 
‘transnational advocacy network’ commonly used in literature on transnational activism and 
globalization (Keck and Sikkink 1998).  Third, it draws on many of the insights from the 
literature on the diffusion of innovations in networks (Rogers 1995).  And finally, it builds on 
existing work about the influence of networks on the mobilization of collective action (Diani and 
McAdam 2003).  In doing so, it responds to a call to collect and employ fine grained, 
longitudinal data to conduct detailed analysis of the influence of networks on actor behavior 
(Diani 2004).   
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In this section I will develop a relational approach to organizational decision-making that 
gives explicit attention to patterns of inter-organizational ties.  Drawing on the tradition of social 
network analysis, my research emphasizes that patterns of inter-organizational relations 
influence organizational strategic decisions by structuring the information and resources 
available to actors, as well as by diffusing strategies across connected actors.  I will first outline 
this theoretical approach in more detail.  I then develop its expectations for the data I collect on 
the inter-organizational network working on climate change in the European Union.  Finally I 
present the results from my social network analysis, and discuss the implications of my observed 
network structure for the spread of tactics.  
Relational Processes in the Mobilization of Collective Action  
Relational thinking differs from the traditional approaches to collective action in that it considers 
organizational decisions to be interdependent.  This means that knowing the structure of 
relationships between organizations can be as important as understanding the properties of 
organizations themselves or the characteristics of the political system in which they are 
embedded.   
The relational approach does not disregard the importance of organizational-level and 
contextual factors.  Rather, it conceives of relational processes as supplementing and sometimes 
intervening between these elements and the mobilization of collective action.  Figure 3.1 
represents how relational processes influence the mobilization of collective action.  Civil society 
organizations are subject to a number of influences in the mobilization of collective action.  For 
example, they encounter political opportunities in ways that affect their eventual choice of action 
form.  They also have certain traits that may predispose them towards conventional or 
contentious kinds of action.  But I argue that these organizations are also embedded in inter-
 98 
 
organizational networks that influence their choices in important ways.  This is because inter-
organizational relations can:  
• Structure the information to which actors have access;  
• Configure the resources available to actors; and/or  
• Spread social influence across connected actors.  
For example, the relational approach argues that it matters not only what kinds of resources 
are available to actors but also how they are distributed; not only what kind of political 
opportunities are available but how actors share information in order to perceive them.   All three 
of these processes make the harmonization of tactics among connected actors more likely, as 
organizations become more like those with whom they share information and resources and are 
influenced by those with whom they are connected. 
Figure 3.1: Relational Processes in the Mobilization of Collective Action 
 
Information Sharing  
 99 
 
As noted, political process theorists have demonstrated that the volume and form of popular 
contention correspond to the available political opportunities (e.g. Tilly 1995; Koopmans 1993, 
1995; Eisinger 1973).  But these theorists also recognize that it is not the presence of 
opportunities alone but the perception of these opportunities by actors that determines the 
mobilization of collective action (McAdam 1999: x).  I argue that the exchange of information 
about political processes and tactical choices should structure how organizations perceive 
opportunities, and should influence the forms of action they chose to use, for three distinct 
reasons.   
First, many organizations are not able to directly ‘read’ political opportunities off the 
political system itself.  The European political process, in particular, is highly complex and the 
‘opportunities’ are not necessarily apparent to the uninitiated.  Very few organizations have the 
capacity to follow the European political process on their own, and instead rely on their contacts 
with other organizations in order to get information about possible opportunities for influence.  
Thus one can expect that inter-organizational exchanges of information will be important in 
determining when, where and how organizations act (Ansel 2003; Rucht 1989).   
For example, a nationally-rooted advocacy organization may be interested in working on 
European politics, but only have a vague idea when the European Council meets and what kinds 
of actions would be influential in such a setting.  Inter-organizational information exchanges can 
thus compensate for lack of political and strategic knowledge within any given organization and 
can encourage conformity of behavior amongst those organizations sharing information.   
Second, political process theorists conceive of organizations as rational actors that choose 
their forms of action in order to minimize costs and maximize benefits within a particular 
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context.  But as Granovetter (1973) demonstrates, an organizations perception of costs and 
benefits partially depends on what it thinks other organizations are likely to do.  For example, an 
organization may perceive that in a closed political system it is unlikely to gain benefits and 
incur high costs (in the form of repression) if it engages in a confrontational protest action on its 
own.  However, if hundreds of other organizations are involved, the organization may perceive 
that the likelihood of success is greater, and that the costs will be lower. In other words, 
organizational calculations about the costs and benefits of collective action are interdependent, 
and organizational decisions should depend on the decisions of other organizations which whom 
they share information.  
Finally, a large literature emphasizes the importance of networks as a channel for 
learning and the successful diffusion of new practices (e.g. Davis and Greve 1997; Givan, 
Roberts, Soule 2010; Ingram 2002; McAdam 1995: 231). Organizations frequently learn about 
new forms of action – blockading, climate camping, etc. – from other groups with which they are 
connected.  So relational ties can structure the kinds of action that organizations know about 
when they are considering their tactical options.   
Resource Pooling  
At the organizational-level, resource mobilization theorists have demonstrated that collective 
action is consistently correlated with the greater presence of available organizational resources 
(e.g. Cress and Snow 1996; Snow et al 2005).  Yet these theorists have also recognized that it is 
the process of converting individually held resources into collective resources that is essential for 
facilitating their use in collective action (Edwards and McCarthy 2004: 116).  I argue that the 
dynamic of ‘resource pooling’ can be an important factor in the organizational selection of 
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particular forms of collective action because it can allow organizations to overcome their 
individual resource limitations when they act with others (Lin 2001).   
Transnational collective action is very frequently coordinated through inter-
organizational coalitions (McCammon and Van Dyke 2010).  Previous scholarship has identified 
inter-organizational coalitions as important conduits through which resources are shared (Levi 
and Murphy 2006).  Coalitions can be essential to organizational decision-making when they 
facilitate the exchange of resources in order to make certain types of action possible or less 
costly (Rucht 1989).   
For example, a small organization that does not on its own have the money or staff to 
produce reports and make the personal contacts necessary to lobby the European Union may be 
perfectly capable of engaging in this type of action through a coalition.  Similarly, an 
organization that lacks certain types of resources can engage in actions that require those 
resources when it acts with partners (e.g. a think tank that lacks individual members but 
nevertheless sponsors a protest as part of a coalition).   For this reason, the number and type of 
relationships in which an organization is engaged may be as important for its strategic decision-
making as its individually held resources, and may encourage conformity with its partners.   
Social Influence  
Inter-organizational networks can also be channels for the spread of influence because they alter 
how organizations learn about possible tactics, perceive their success and appropriateness, and 
interpret or renegotiate their own identities.  Network location determines the number and type 
of organizations – alters – to which an organization is exposed.  These alters can provide models 
for behavior, particularly under conditions of uncertainty (Rogers 1995).  
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As previously mentioned, coalitions are often venues for inter-organizational learning 
and the diffusion of new tactics (e.g. Davis and Greve 1997; Givan, Roberts, Soule 2010; 
McAdam 1995: 231).  Information-sharing interacts with social influence in these settings, and is 
more likely to produce tactical diffusion under two conditions.  First, organizations are more 
likely to imitate tactics they perceive to be successful (Rogers 1995).  But when success is not 
obvious at the outset, organizations often look to other socially proximate organizations in order 
to determine what kind of behavior is appropriate (Burt 1982).  As a result, inter-organizational 
tactical diffusion via social learning should be more likely when there is an attribution of 
similarity between two organizations (Soule 1997, 2004).  
Transnational organizing coalitions are in many ways ideal incubators for inter-
organizational learning and attribution of similarity. Coalition meetings often involve 
organizations recounting examples of their past successful actions or drawing on historical 
examples to make the case for the likely success of particular forms of action.  Coalition retreats 
may often involve ‘skill sharing’ workshops where organizations explicitly teach one another 
how to use certain tactics.  Finally, inter-organizational meetings often center on organizations 
coming towards a ‘common ground’ in terms of their political positions that may open each 
organization to the action style of the other, creating ideal conditions for inter-organizational 
tactical diffusion.   
Second, cultural approaches to organizational decision-making emphasize that social 
norms within organizations should make certain types of mobilization more desirable and 
appropriate than others (Zald 2000). In some versions of this argument, organizational collective 
identities are conceived of as fixed and  ‘exogenous’ to the mobilization of collective action, 
driving more ‘radical’ organizations towards ‘radical’ forms of collective action (Dalton 1994).  
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But I argue that in most instances, collective identities are defined and re-defined through the 
process of mobilization, making relational dynamics inherent in the cultural approach (Mische 
2003).  Therefore, paying attention to patterns of ties between organizations should shed light on 
how collective identity can be (re)defined in organizational fields.   
Generally speaking, transnational collective action involves the construction of new 
transnational collective identities.  Therefore, it is also possible that when actors work in new 
political arenas and with different partners they will redefine their idea of their own identity, and 
in turn the ‘appropriate’ tactics to use as a result of inter-organizational social influence (della 
Porta 2005; Diani 1995; Taylor and Whittier 1992).  This may be particularly true for climate 
change organizing in Europe.  First, climate change is not just an environmental issue, and the 
organizations working on climate change come from diverse movement backgrounds (e.g. the 
environmental movement, the global justice movement, trade unionism, anarchism, farmers’ 
movement) and need to construct a new collective identity to work together on climate.  Second, 
since participants are aware of the diversity and complexity of acting at the European level, they 
may even be particularly sensitive to the influence of their partners in ways they are not in more 
familiar settings (Dörr 2009).  For example, the construction of a highly diverse European 
climate coalition may induce some organizations to moderate their tactics, while it may 
‘radicalize’ others.  
Overall, attention to relational processes shows how inter-organizational processes can 
independently influence an organization’s choice of action form.  In addition, relational 
processes can intervene between political opportunities/organizational attributes and the 
mobilization of collective action.  This is because inter-organizational relationships structure the 
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information available to actors, configure the resources to which they have access and spread 
social influence across closely connected actors.  
Network Structure 
The previous sections outlined three mechanisms that help to explain why organizations would 
tend to use the same tactics as their local alters.  But the number and type of alters to which an 
organization will be exposed varies greatly depending on the structure of the network being 
studied.  Where organizations don’t interact at all (isolated units) or where they all cooperate 
uniformly (the centralized, well-connected network), I expect their behavior to be more easily 
explained by existing scholarly literature. But I argue that where networks are segmented, 
organizations can more easily sustain behavior that deviates from the predictions of scholarly 
literature (e.g. protesting when opportunities are open, or radicalizing with age).   
A relational approach emphasizes the importance of inter-organizational processes in 
determining political outcomes.  But ‘relationships’ cannot be used as the deus ex machine in 
social theorizing; relationships must be measured empirically in order to be theoretically useful 
(Diani 2003).  Social network analysis offers the toolkit to do just this (Scott 1991).   
In social network analysis, organizations are thought of as discrete ‘nodes’ in a network, 
and interactions between nodes are measured as ‘ties.’ The structure of ties between 
organizations can be conceived of as inter-organizational ‘networks.’ Networks can take on a 
wide variety of structures, which can be represented visually.  Figure 3.2 represents two ideal 
types of the ‘clique’ and ‘segmented’ network structures.  The ‘clique’ on the left represents a 
perfect cooperative field, in which all organizations work together and have strong ties to one 
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another.  The ‘segmented’ network structure represents a segregated field joined by one broker, 
in which organizations may only work with other organizations of their ‘type.’     
Figure 3.2: Sample Clique and Segmented Network Structures 
 
Knowing the overall network structure in which an organization operates matters for a 
number of reasons.  Organizational sociologists have long emphasized that organizational fields 
are often defined by competitive or cooperative behavior (Carroll and Hannan 2002).  Whether 
or not organizations share information, resources, or meaning can all be thought of as behavioral 
indicators of cooperation.  But too often political scientists have assumed that organizations will 
behave competitively (Cooley and Ron 2001) or cooperatively (Keck and Sikkink 1998) without 
measuring the characteristics and development of the network structure in which these 
organizations are embedded.  My approach to inter-organizational relationships will try to 
measure the influence of a particular, observable network structure on organizational behavior.  
In our case, network structure matters because it can help explain empirical irregularities 
in the structural and organizational approaches.  Where significant organizational subgroups 
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exist that share information, resources and meaning only amongst themselves (such as in the 
segmented network), we may see tactical choices that do not respond to political opportunities or 
the organizational imperatives of any individual organization.  This is because subgroups can 
support and encourage ‘deviant’ behavior amongst themselves.   
 In addition, the structure of a network has important implications for the speed at which 
collective action is likely to occur and the extent to which new practices are likely to be adopted.  
Previous research demonstrates, for example, that practices that start at the center of networks 
spread faster than those that start at the periphery (Burt 1982).  Simulations of network data 
suggest that centralized networks (as opposed to segmented ones) are better at overcoming the 
free-rider problem in order to facilitate the spread of collective action (Marwell and Oliver 
1993). Moreover, tactical innovations can spread quickly in a clique, but may be slower to spread 
to the rest of the network, depending on the structure of ties.  Networks need a minimum level of 
connectivity amongst cliques – weak ties in addition to strong ones – in order for innovations to 
spread throughout (Granovetter 1973).  Thus networks that are centralized and well-connected 
with innovations occurring in central actors are more likely to facilitate complete tactical 
harmonization, and those that are segmented and have important cliques may see isolated 
innovators.   
I expect that civil society organizations are usually involved in a complex web of 
relationships with one another, especially in transnational climate change politics.  Therefore, the 
goal of the next few sections is to map the structure of relationships between these organizations 
over time, and outline how I expect this structure to influence the behavior of actors located in 
this network.   
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Network Data and Analysis  
In order to map ties between organizations and measure the structure of an existing social 
network, it is necessary to gather data on the totality of the organizational population (or very 
close to it) (Marsden 1990).  Because of imperfect response rates (especially among radical 
groups) survey data would be inappropriate for this task.  Instead, I rely on press source data 
detailing organizational sponsorship of collective actions on climate change.  I employ rigorous 
data collection routines to ensure that I capture the maximum number of collective actions and 
correctly identify their sponsors (See Methods Appendix for more details).   
The boundaries of the network are determined by the selection of affiliations, not actors.  
As in Dahl’s study of New Haven (1961), I choose the events that meet certain definitional 
criteria and are objectively significant to the study, and then identify the affiliated organizations.  
This approach is superior to ‘positional’ or ‘reputational’ strategies because there are no accurate 
population rosters and participants cannot be expected to be fully aware of the other 
organizations in the population (Scott 1991: 57).   
In my data, the ties between organizations indicate that two organizations have co-
sponsored an event.  In the strict interpretation, this means that the two actors have both put their 
organizational ‘names’ on the same event, and may or may not be in direct contact.  In practice, I 
interpret event co-sponsorship more broadly, using it as an indicator of inter-organizational 
communication.  My field work suggests that this assumption is probably reasonable, as the 
population is small enough that most organizations are directly in contact with their partners.   
In addition, because this is a two-mode network (a network based on the affiliation of 
actors and events), I will analyze both of the modes separately in this chapter.  Although my 
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theoretical interest is in the relationships between organizations, the analysis of the relationship 
between events provides additional information that may be obscured in the inter-organizational 
network. Thus I begin by first presenting the inter-event network, then move on to a more 
detailed analysis of the inter-organizational network.   
The Inter-Event Network  
The previous chapter raised an interesting question: do contentious and conventional events have 
the same sponsors?  This question matters for theory because political process theorists assume 
that organizations vary their tactics to respond to changes in political opportunities.  This may 
also have policy relevance, because a protest sponsored by an organization that also engages in 
insider lobbying may be very different in its implications than a protest by a group that acts 
exclusively contentiously and outside the political system.   My network analysis suggests that 
groups don’t vary their tactics and that contentious and conventional events tend to have very 
different sponsors.   
To show this, I extracted a 1-mode network of events and their ties with one another 
based on shared organizational sponsors.24
                                                          
24 Appendix A has more details on this coding procedure and the conversion of the 2-mode network to two 1-mode 
networks.   
 Figure 3.3 represents this data.  In Figure 3.3, I have 
colored the contentious events dark grey, while the contentious events are white.   The lines 
between the nodes represent the fact that the events share at least one sponsor.  
 109 
 
Figure 3.3: Inter-Event Networks, 2008 and 2009
 
Note: Circles (nodes) represent events.  Events are connected by lines if they share one or more organizational 
sponsors.  Nodes are colored white if they are conventional and dark grey if they are contentious.  Layout of nodes is 
determined by spring embedding based on distances and node repulsion.   
2009 
2008 
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These visual representations show us a number of things.  First, contentious and 
conventional events (grey and white) tend to have different sponsors.  This suggests that 
organizations do not tend to work in coalitions where they collaborate with organizations using 
the opposite type of collective action.  As these diagrams show, there are two main clusters of 
events that share sponsors: a conventional cluster in the left of each diagram, and a contentious 
cluster to the right.25
 Looking first at the 2008 event networks, we see that on the right hand side of the 
diagram a cluster of contentious events, many of which take place in the member states of the 
European Union.  On the left hand side is a cluster of (mostly) conventional events that take 
place around the European Institutions.  In this diagram we can see that the four events 
sponsored solely by Greenpeace International show up as an unconnected component (top 
middle).  In addition, the 4-star of events in the top middle connected to the conventional cluster 
represents those events that take place in Germany; the four star on the bottom left connected to 
the conventional cluster represents those events that involve trade unions.  The few events that 
bridge the two clusters are press releases criticizing EU biofuels policy as a false solution to the 
climate crisis.   
  Although both clusters contain at least one ECA of the opposite type, each 
cluster is overwhelming of one type or the other.   
These events are virtually all reachable from one another, and yet there is a visible 
segmentation in this network between conventional and contentious events.  For example, while 
                                                          
25 The positioning of the conventional and contentious clusters on the left or the right is not meaningful.  However, 
the distance of the nodes from one another (and thus the overall structure of the network) is determined by a force-
based algorithm for graph drawing. A force-based algorithm treats the network as though it were a physical system, 
where edges are ‘springs’ and nodes are electrically charged particles. This is an iterative algorithm that applies 
forces to nodes until the system reaches equilibrium. Edges tend to be of the same length and their crossings are 
minimized.  Nodes that are not connected by an edge tend to be drawn further apart because of their repulsion.   This 
is implemented in all figures using the spring embedding based on node repulsion, which is an available feature in 
Netdraw Version 2.091 in the graph theoretic layout options.    
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the network density26 overall is high (0.24), the distance-based cohesion measure of 
‘compactness’27
In examining the 2009 event network, we can see that it exhibits a similar segmented 
structure.  On the right side there is (again) a cluster of contentious events, and on the left side a 
cluster of (mainly) conventional events.  For example, the ‘climate alarm’ protest mentioned 
earlier would fall into the cluster on the right, while the T&E press release would be a good 
example of typical conventional event from the cluster on the left.  The Oxfam mini refugee 
camp also falls into this cluster.  The events that bridge these two components are both 
conventional and contentious.  For example, one of the bridging events is an award ceremony for 
the “worst EU lobbying” presented by the Corporate European Observatory and Friends of the 
Earth Europe, among others.  Another example would be the opening ceremony of the 
Klimaforum – an alternative summit organized on the model of a social forum – held in 
Copenhagen and sponsored by a wide range of both NGO and social movement actors.   
 is only 0.441, which indicates a tendency towards bifurcation.   
The 2009 event network has a very similar formal structure.  The network is less dense 
(0.15) than the 2008 network, but it also has 1.6 times as many nodes.  If we assume that 
organizations can only sponsor so many events in any given year, it is normal to expect the 
density to fall as the population expands (Mayhew and Levinger 1976). The compactness 
measure is 0.436, which indicates a tendency towards segmentation, as in the 2008 network.   
What this network analysis tells us overall is that contentious and conventional events tend to 
have different sponsors.  The contentious (grey) events and the conventional (white) events are 
                                                          
26 The density of a binary network is the total number of ties divided by the total possible number of ties.  
27 Compactness is “the harmonic mean of the entries in the distance matrix (that is the normalized sum of the 
reciprocal of all the distances)…. This has a value of 1 when the network is a clique (everyone is adjacent) and zero 
when the network is entirely made up of isolates” (Borgatti et al 2002). 
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only very loosely linked.  The network data and the event data together suggest that 
organizations are not varying their tactics over time, and that there is a clique of events (far right 
in both diagrams) that has a highly distinct group of sponsors.  In other words, contentious events 
are produced by different processes than conventional ones.  This directly contradicts the idea 
inherent in the political opportunities approach that organizations shift their forms of action in 
order to respond to different political opportunities.   
But one key difference between these networks is that by 2009 the same actors that 
sponsored conventional events were also beginning to occasionally use contentious forms of 
collective action.  In the event cluster on the left side of the bottom figure, we see a number of 
dark grey nodes that represent (mostly) transnationally organized protest actions by 
environmental and development NGOs in the member states.  While we do see that some 
conventional groups on the left of the 2009 diagram begin to work with contentious groups, the 
same is not true for the right side of diagram, which remains overwhelmingly contentious.  In 
addition, there is a difference in the degree of ‘contentiousness’ of these organizations.  While 
NGOs may sometimes sponsor peaceful protests and marches on transnationally-coordinated 
days of action, many of the events in the cluster on the right are much more transgressive, 
including blockades, occupations, unauthorized demonstrations and event property damage.  And 
as this diagram shows, these two kinds of events are worlds apart.   
The Inter-Organizational Network 
The previous section shows that contentious and conventional events tend to have different 
sponsors.  This analysis suggests that European collective action on climate change is (primarily) 
divided between conventional actions at the European institutions and contentious actions in the 
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member states, which confirms the predictions developed in Chapter Two, and by Marks and 
McAdam.   
But the social network analysis raises another question: who works with whom?  What is 
the relationship between conventional and contentious groups?  Are they forming coalitions 
where organizations work with groups using the opposite tactics?  Or do organizations tend to 
work with others using similar tactics? 
In order to evaluate my argument about how networks influence organizational decision-
making, I will primarily need to examine the structure of relations between organizations: the 
inter-organizational network.  My analysis suggests that the inter-organizational network is 
similarly bifurcated into two principal components.   In particular, I find evidence of a significant 
subgroup of actors engaging almost exclusively with one another in 2008 and utilizing almost 
entirely contentious collective action in 2009.  
Visualizing the Climate Change Network  
In order to visualize the structure of ties between organizations, I extracted a 1-mode network of 
actors and their ties with one another based on event co-sponsorship.28
Figure 3.4 shows the inter-organizational networks for 2008 and 2009.  In Figure 3.4, 
inter-organizational ties (lines) represent events the two organizations co-sponsored, while the 
thickness of these lines represents how many events the organizations co-sponsored. The  
 This is a valued network, 
with the maximum number of co-sponsorship ties between any two organizations ranging from 0 
to 22.   
                                                          
28 Appendix A has more details on this coding procedure and the conversion of the 2-mode network to two 1-mode 
networks.   
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Figure 3.4: Inter-organizational Networks, 2008 and 2009 
 
                        
0% 1-9% 10-19% 20-29% 30-39% 40-49% 50-59% 60-69% 70-79% 80-89% 90-99% 100% 
Note: Inter-organizational ties (lines) in both figures represent events the two organizations co-sponsored.  
Thickness of lines represents how many events the organizations have co-sponsored. Organizational nodes (circles) 
are colored by the percentage of contentious actions the organization employed in 2008 and 2009, respectively. 
Layout of nodes is determined by spring embedding based on distances and node repulsion.   
2009 
2008 
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organizations are represented by circles, and are colored by the percentage of contentious actions 
the organization employed in 2008 and 2009, respectively.  
The 2008 network on the top of Figure 3.4 has several visible components.  Starting from the top 
left, we can see the national offices of the World Wildlife Federation, which are all linked to one 
another and to their European Policy Office.  The bottom left represents the Greenpeace cluster, 
which has a similar structure in which national offices are connected through the European 
office.  The middle left contains a 4-star of organizations that are densely connected.  These are 
the European offices of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, WWF and the Climate Action 
Network Europe.  These groups form the core of the organizations working conventionally on 
climate politics in Brussels. 
On the middle right of the top network in Figure 3.4 is another distinct cluster of 
organizations. This cluster contains many of the most contentious organizations, such as Klimax, 
Earth First, the Climate Camps and the Rising Tide Network.  The conventional groups in this 
cluster tend to be small, anti-capitalist European think tanks.  These organizations form the core 
of the contentious organizations working on European climate politics in the member states.   
This diagram also reveals that there are two main bridges in the network.  The cluster in 
the top middle represents the national offices of the Friends of the Earth network, which are 
joined both to the Friends of the Earth Europe office and to the more contentious cluster via 
Friends of the Earth UK and Denmark.  This accurately reflects what is generally known about 
the internal divisions within this organization.  The other major bridge is made up of critical 
think tanks and small NGOs working on EU policy.  While this cluster is somewhat diverse, 
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those closest to the contentious cluster tend to be those that work on EU agricultural policy, 
especially regarding biofuels and climate change.   
In the network from 2009 on the bottom, we also see a clearly segmented network 
structure that approximates the classic bicephalous structure (See Figure 3.2).  On the bottom left 
is a large group of mainly conventional groups, with a small sub-cluster of contentious 
organizations.  This cluster contains all the major Brussels-based NGOs.  It is made up of all the 
national offices of Greenpeace and WWF (which are now no longer only linked through their 
European offices), as well as the nationally-based development organizations.  Avvaz and 
350.org are the two contentious organizations on the middle left.  Most of the sub-cluster of 
contentious organizations are nationally-based development organizations that sponsored 
coordinated protest in European capitals on the global days of action and have ties to 
environmental NGOs in the same country.  
Moving to the far right of the diagram, we see a cluster of exclusively contentious 
organizations.  These are the organizations affiliated with the CJA actions in Copenhagen.  They 
are linked to a small cluster of conventional or middling-level contentious organizations that 
were involved in sponsoring the Klimaforum alternative summit in Copenhagen.  These 
organizations are in turn linked to the national Friends of the Earth offices, which again bridge 
the more conventional and contentious clusters.   
At first glance, it may be hard to determine a structure in the mess of ties present in the 
2009 network: as we saw earlier, this network contains 82% more actors and thus is much more 
complex.  In order to get a clearer view of its structure, I visualized the network again using only 
inter-organizational ties based on co-sponsorship of two or more events (the strong ties) 
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(Granovetter 1973).  Figure 3.5 shows the resulting network diagram, with labels attached to 
some organizations.   
As Figure 3.5 shows, the network in 2009 actually has a much more segmented structure 
than the 2008 network.  There is only a very tenuous connection between the contentious 
organizations and the conventional advocacy groups, based on only a few ties within the Friends 
of the Earth offices.  The additional bridge through organizations working on biofuels policy 
(present in 2008) disappears in 2009.   
Figure 3.5: Inter-organizational Network 2009, by Strong Ties  
 
                        
0% 1-9% 10-19% 20-29% 30-39% 40-49% 50-59% 60-69% 70-79% 80-89% 90-99% 100% 
Note: Inter-organizational ties (lines) represent events the two organizations co-sponsored. Thickness of 
lines represents how many events the organizations have co-sponsored. Only those organizations that 
sponsored more than two events together are pictured.   Organizations (circles) are colored by the 
percentage of contentious actions the organization employed in 2009.  
When the data from the two years are pooled in Figure 3.6, the overall network structure 
looks similar.  In Figure 3.6, the nodes are also sized according to the number of actions they 
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sponsored. In the top network, all ties are represented, and in the bottom network only those ties 
based on co-sponsorship of two or more events are represented.  In addition, in this Figure a 
Markov clustering algorithm29
The visual comparison of these two networks shows three things. First, the network based 
on strong ties is much more segmented than the one based on weak ties: it only has one main 
bridge through the Friends of the Earth.  Second, the sub-cluster of contentious national 
development NGOs is only weakly connected to those regularly engaging in conventional 
advocacy.  When only strong ties are included, very few of these contentious organizations are 
still included in the European-level network.  Third, organizations seem to be linked with 
organizations that use similar forms of action.  While the first cluster (circles) is mainly made up 
of organizations using less than 50% contentious actions, the second cluster (squares) contains 
most of the highly contentious organizations.  The visual inspection of this network suggests that 
the patterning of ties might be highly homophilous.  The next section explores some of these 
intuitions further.   
, was used to partition the graph into non-overlapping clusters.  
This procedure returned distinct three clusters (one of which was composed of isolates).  Those 
organizations that are in the first cluster are represented with circles; those in the second cluster 
are represented with squares.  This algorithm puts the groups associated with Climate Justice 
Action and Friends of the Earth into one cluster, and all the others into the second cluster.  
                                                          
29 A Markov clustering algorithm partitions a graph into non-overlapping clusters. It uses an iterative procedure to 
determine the appropriate number of clusters based on the structural properties of the graph. This procedure consists 
of applying two operations expansion and inflation, both of which are based on random walks.” See Borgatti et al 
2002 for technical details. In this case, I use the default UCINET settings of a Gamma inflation factor of 2.   
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Figure 3.6: Inter-Organizational Network 2008-2009, by All Ties and Strong Ties
 
                        
0% 1-9% 10-19% 20-29% 30-39% 40-49% 50-59% 60-69% 70-79% 80-89% 90-99% 100% 
Note: Inter-organizational ties (lines) in both figures represent events the two organizations co-sponsored.  The top 
diagram contains all ties, while the bottom has only ties between organizations where they have sponsored more 
than one event together.   Organizations (circles and squares) are colored by the percentage of contentious actions 
the organization employed from 2008-2009. Squares and circles indicate the Markov cluster to which the 
organization belongs.  The size of the shape represents the number of events the organization sponsored, 2008-2009.   
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Network Segmentation and Growing Homophily  
Visual examination of these networks suggests they have a segmented structure and that ties 
between organizations seem to be related to tactical choices.  My analysis of a variety of network 
distance measures confirms this suspicion.  These measures also suggest that there is significant 
and growing homophily within the European climate change network, where organizations are 
increasingly likely over time to work with others using similar forms of action.   
A variety of structural measures suggest that the inter-organizational network of climate 
change organizations is reasonably dense but segmented into two principal components.  Table 
2.3 shows these findings.     
Table 3.1: Network Measures, for 2008 and 2009 
 2008 2009 
Number of Organizations 119 217 
Network Density 0.16 0.20 
Average Distance 2.70 2.79 
Compactness 0.43 0.37 
Spatial Autocorrelation (Geary’s C) 0.38** 0.20** 
E-I Index -0.68* 
(expected -.46) 
-0.62* 
(expected -0.02) 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
In 2008 the overall network density30 is .16, and in 2009 it was .20.  This means that 20% 
of all possible ties are present in the 2009 network, which is quite high.  At the same time, the 
average distance measure31
                                                          
30 The density of a binary network is the total number of ties divided by the total possible number of ties. For a 
valued network, it is the total of all values divided by the number of possible ties.   
 indicates that it takes on average approximately 2.75 other 
31 For all of the distance measures (compactness and average distance), I employed the UCINET procedure 
constructs a distance or generalized distance matrix between all nodes of a graph using an algorithm to find the 
number of edges in the shortest path for each pair of nodes. Average distance is the mean of the number of edges on 
the shortest path for each pair of nodes.   
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organizations to link any two organizations in the network.  Similarly, the ‘compactness’32 of the 
network is approximately 0.4, on a scale where 1 indicates all organizations are connected and 0 
indicates they are all isolates.  In combination, these two distance-based measures support the 
idea that while the network is dense, it is also segmented.33
In addition to having a segmented network structure, the measures of homophily also 
suggest that network ties in both periods seem to be patterned by the action profiles of 
organizations.  A test for spatial autocorrelation indicated that organizations do indeed seem to 
be closer to those organizations that use similar forms of action.  Specifically Geary's C statistic 
was .38 in 2008 and .20 in 2009 (significant at the .01 level in both years) where values smaller 
than 1 indicate positive autocorrelation.
 
34  Given mutually exclusive groups, homophily can also 
be measured as the proportion of ‘in-group’ to ‘out-group’ ties.  I tested for this kind of 
homophily by using a dichotomous measure of whether an organization employed more or less 
than 50% contentious actions, and then calculating the overall E-I index for the network. 35
                                                          
32 Compactness is a distance based cohesion measure, calculated as the harmonic mean of the entries in the distance 
matrix (the normalized sum of the reciprocal of all the distances). It has a value of 1 when the network is a clique 
(everyone is adjacent) and zero when the network is entirely made up of isolates. (Borgatti et al 2002). 
 This 
measure also suggests that organizations are significantly more likely to work with organizations 
33 It is difficult to compare networks of different sizes in terms of density, average distance and compactness, 
therefore comparisons with the findings of other studies are often inappropriate.   What can be said, however, is that 
the results indicate more segmentation and density than would be expect in a randomly generate network.   
34 Geary’s C measures spatial autocorrelation.  In this case, it tests whether organizations that have similar action 
profiles are closer to one another in the actor-by-actor distance matrix.  Values of Geary’s C range from 0 to 2: a 
value of 1.0 indicates perfect independence, while values smaller than 1 represent positive spatial autocorrelation 
and values larger than 1 indicate negative spatial autocorrelation.  
35 The E-I index measures the tendency for actors to associate with those outside their group.  In this case, it 
measures whether actors who are contentious (use more than 50% contentious actions) work with those who are not 
and vice versa.  The procure can be implemented in UCINET: “Given a partition of a network into a number of 
mutually exclusive groups then the E-I index is the number of ties external to the groups minus the number of ties 
that are internal to the group divided by the total number of ties… A permutation test is performed to see whether 
the network E-I index is significantly higher or lower than expected.” (Borgatti et al 2002).  The E-I Index ranges in 
value from -1 to 1, with -1 indicating complete autocorrelation and 1 indicating perfect independence.   
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like themselves.   The E-I index was approximately -.65 in both years (significant at the .05 
level), on a scale from 1 to -1 where -1 indicates complete autocorrelation.  
Not only do both of these networks exhibit homophily, but this homophily seems to be 
growing over time.  The Geary’s C statistic indicates a significant growth in homophily between 
2008 and 2009.  The overall E-I index does not change as obviously, but the measure is much 
lower than expected in 2009.  This is because the E-I index is sensitive to the size of the 
population in each group.  The number of contentious organizations changed dramatically 
between 2008 and 2009 (from 16 to 58%), but since there was similar overall network density, 
we would expect in a random network that organizations would have more ties with those 
outside of their group.  What the network measures tells us is that we actually see an increasingly 
homophilous segmentation.   
Summary 
The network analysis suggests two primary findings: 
• The network of organizations working on climate change is segmented into two principal 
components. 
• The network exhibits homophily in terms of organizations and action forms, and it is 
growing more homophilous over time.   
Because the network has significant cliques and organizations are growing more like one another 
over time, it may be that organizations are harmonizing their tactics as a result of inter-
organizational contact.  Network theory would predict that contentious behavior should spread 
rapidly in a network like this within the boundaries of the clique, but may have difficulty 
reaching the whole network.  This explanation fits the patterns observed in the organizational 
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and event data.  But there remains the possibility that organizations may be self-selecting into 
relationship with similar groups.  The next chapter will deal with this issue further, accounting 
for potential confounders.   
Conclusion 
I argue that organizations are influenced by the tactical decisions of those organizations with 
which they are closely connected.   This means that ties between organizations should matter in 
determining the distribution and diffusion of tactics amongst organizations.  It also implies that 
explaining an organization’s tactical choices depends on knowing the structure of the broader 
network in which it is embedded.    
My network analysis offers preliminary support for this theoretical perspective.  First, 
both the inter-event and inter-organizational networks are segmented into two principal 
components, creating ideal conditions for the diffusion of tactics.  Contentious and conventional 
events have different sponsors, and contentious and conventional organizations do not tend to 
work with one another.  This becomes more the case over time, which potentially suggests a 
dynamic of inter-organizational harmonization.  The next Chapter will test this explanation 
against other possible explanations and will deal with potential confounders in the analysis.   
Overall, my perspective introduces relational complexity into how scholars think about 
organizational decision-making.  In doing so, it complicates our understanding of how 
organizational, contextual and inter-organizational factors all influence organizational decisions 
to employ particular forms of action.  But I argue that it also helps to explain the puzzle I began 
with: why Climate Alarm – a group which had only ties to contentious organizations based on 
the member states and not the Brussels-based NGOs – decided to attempt such an unusual 
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collective action in Brussels.  The next Chapter will further elaborate on the complex 
determinants of organizational choice of action forms.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MODELING CHOICE OF ACTION FORMS 
The previous two chapters have established three theoretical perspectives.  This Chapter tests the 
hypotheses of these perspectives simultaneously, trying to explain why organizations choose to 
use contentious forms of collective action.  I suggest that an organization’s decision to use a 
certain form of collective action is influenced by the decisions of the organizations with which it 
is connected. I further suggest that this dynamic is one of harmonization of action profiles, not of 
self-selection into relationships with organizations that use similar tactics. Thus my major 
hypothesis is that ties with contentious organizations in the previous time period should increase 
the likelihood that an organization will use contentious tactics in the second period. I test this 
hypothesis by analyzing a rich and unusual longitudinal dataset that combines information on 
inter-organizational relationships (networks) with data on the characteristics of the organizations 
themselves and the actions they sponsor. 
This chapter first outlines preliminary evidence suggesting that contentious forms of 
action may be spreading in my network over time.  It then outlines some potential confounders 
that make establishing the presence of contagion difficult in quantitative analysis.  After 
describing the variables I use in my analysis, I present the results from both a logistic regression 
and random intercept model.  My interpretation of these results suggests that an organization’s 
tie with a contentious organization in 2008 has a statistically significant and substantively 
meaningful effect on its choice to use contentious action forms in 2009, even after controlling for 
characteristics of the organization itself and the political context.   
Identifying Contagious Contention 
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While social network analysis tells us that the inter-organizational network is growing more 
homophilous over time, it does not adequately explain how the process works on the 
organizational level.  Previous literature demonstrates how tactics can diffuse between social 
movements (Givan, Roberts and Soule 2010).  This literature identifies ‘relational pathways’ 
(Tarrow 2005) as one of the key avenues by which diffusion of tactics occurs, although diffusion 
can also take place via non-relational pathways such as common media exposure.  In my 
analysis, I find descriptive evidence that organizations are diffusing their contentious tactics 
through relational ties in inter-organizational networks.   
My event data show that contentious behavior was much more common in 2009 than in 
2008.  Organizational data show that only some groups engage in contention, and a large portion 
do not.  Social network analysis shows that the growth in contentious behavior is concentrated in 
a certain portion of the network.  Figure 4.1 shows the expansion of contention in the 
organizational population between the two time periods. In Figure 4.1, the ties between 
organizations are held constant between the two time periods, while the coloring of the nodes 
changes based on the percentage of contentious action the organization used in that year.   
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Figure 4.1: Inter-Organizational Network 2008, by Percentage of Contentious Actions 2008 and 2009
 
                        
0% 1-9% 10-19% 20-29% 30-39% 40-49% 50-59% 60-69% 70-79% 80-89% 90-99% 100% 
Note: Inter-organizational ties (lines) in both figures represent events the two organizations co-sponsored in 2008.  
Lines thickness represents the number of events two organizations co-sponsored in 2008.  Organizations (circles) are 
colored by the percentage of contentious actions the organization employed in 2008 and 2009, respectively (not 
shown when inactive in 2009).  
2009 
2008 
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As this Figure shows, contention does not spread uniformly across the network, nor does 
it spread randomly.  This Figure suggests that contentious behavior is spreading along relational 
ties. As we can see, between 2008 and 2009, contentious behavior becomes much more common 
on the right side of the network, while the left side remains primarily conventional (with some 
exceptions).  This suggests that contentious organizations on the right of the figure are 
potentially transmitting their contention to others in their cluster.   
Network theories also suggest that practices that start at the periphery may be slower to 
spread than those that start at the center (Burt 1982).  This is particularly true in segmented 
networks, like the ones present in this area.  Figure 4.1 supports this interpretation, by showing 
how contentiousness spreads rapidly within the clique on the right, but fails to reach the whole 
network.36
Second, organizations adopt contentious behavior at a rate that suggests a process of 
diffusion may be taking place.  Studies of diffusion have documented a characteristic ‘S-shaped 
curve’ in the adoption of innovations (Soule 2004), where innovations start off slowly, then 
expand rapidly in a population, only to peak where the population is saturated and adoption can’t 
grow any further.  My data mimic this pattern, without ever reaching complete adoption.  
 
As can be seen in Figure 4.2, the percentage of organizations using contentious action 
increases fairly steadily throughout 2008.  In early January 2009, only 16% of organizations had 
previously engaged in a contentious action.  This figure rises and eventually stabilizes around 
26% from March to September, and then suddenly takes off, peaking at 62% in December 2009.  
While the adoption of contentious behavior never reaches 100% of the population, the dramatic 
                                                          
36 Research also suggests that characteristics of the innovation – for example whether it is perceived as likely to be 
successful, whether there are clear benefits of adoptions -- should influence the speed of adoption.  The qualitative 
chapters of this dissertation will consider these explanations in more detail.   
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spread of contentious tactics in the last half of 2009 suggests that a critical mass of organizations 
may have adopted by this point, facilitating rapid diffusion in November and especially 
December.  Thus overall, both the network and organizational-level data suggest there may be an 
important diffusion process underlying the spread of contention.   
 
Figure 4.2: Organizational Adoption of Contentious Tactics, January 2008 -December 2009 
 
 
 
 
Potential Confounders 
 
While there is plausible descriptive evidence that tactics are diffusing through the inter-
organizational network from 2008 to 2009, I am aware that there are a number of potential 
confounders that make this process difficult to document and distinguish from other 
explanations.  In this section, I will describe three problems in particular that can complicate 
causality in social networks: homophily, self-selection and shared environment. 
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One of the biggest problems in measuring the effect of network ties on organizational behavior is 
that organizations tend to have ties with organizations that are similar to themselves (McPherson, 
Smith-Lovin and Cook 1998).  The social movement literature confirms the seriousness of this 
problem, as most studies suggest that organizations do tend to collaborate more with similar 
organizations (McCammon and Campbell 2002; Van Dyke 2003; Clemens and Minkoff 2004).    
Thus it is difficult to know if organizations are influenced by one another, or whether their 
common traits are driving similar behavioral outcomes. As previously mentioned, my network – 
like virtually all real-life social networks – does display significant homophily.   
 
I adopt two strategies to deal with the homophily bias in my data.  First, I collected data 
on a wide variety of organizational traits that I expect to influence the behavior of the 
organizations in my sample.  By controlling for these traits in my statistical model, I hope to be 
able to estimate their effects vis-à-vis network ties.  Second, homophily is less of a problem in 
my study than in many network studies because I do not observe ties and behavior 
simultaneously.  Specifically, I use network ties from the previous time period to predict 
behavior in the second time period, which is particularly necessary where ties are based on event 
co-sponsorship.   
Self-Selection 
Another common bias in network studies is caused by self-selection.  This bias takes two forms.  
First, organizations that collaborate may differ systematically from those that do not collaborate.  
It is also possible that organizations that collaborate frequently may be different from those that 
collaborate infrequently.  Although I observe very few (3) isolates in my data set, the second 
form of bias may be an issue in my data, as the number of ties ranges widely from 0 to 22. The 
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second kind of selection bias in my data has to do with the process by which organizations 
choose their partners.  In other words, if organizations that select into relationships with 
contentious organizations are systematically different than those that don’t, the results of the 
statistical analysis may be biased by the fact that assignment to the ‘treatment’ is non-random.   
I acknowledge that self-selection bias is a plausible problem for my analysis, and I tackle 
it using two strategies.  First, because my statistical analysis relies on panel data of organizations 
and events over time, I am able to exploit this data structure to estimate the effect of possible 
unobserved variables.  Specifically, I use a random intercepts model to try to measure the extent 
to which my data exhibit significant inter-class correlations that might suggest unobserved, 
organization-specific variables not present in the model.  If I find significant inter-class 
correlation, this would suggest that there may be an unmeasured variable that accounts for 
selection into contentious relationships and is correlated with the outcome.  In addition, the 
second half of this dissertation will employ qualitative interview evidence about how 
organizations choose their partners to bolster my claims about the causal sequencing.   
Shared Environment  
Finally, studies of diffusion and behavioral change in networks have to take into account the fact 
that the actors in the population are sharing a common environment, which exposes them to 
common exogenous pressures.  Two varieties of this problem are present in my data, which 
concerns a small population of organizations in Europe.  First, these organizations all have 
access to the same media, which means that contentious tactics may be diffusing in this 
population through indirect channels in addition to (or instead of) relational channels.  Second, 
these organizations all share a common institutional environment, and are exposed to the same 
changes in political opportunities.  Therefore, their behaviors may change uniformly as a result 
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of this common exposure.  I attempt to deal with both of these potential biases by including 
variables measuring indirect diffusion through media and changes in political opportunities in 
my final statistical model.     
Dependent Variable 
For my analysis I collected data from press sources and documents on 110 organizations active 
in both 2008 and 2009.  These organizations sponsor 165 unique collective actions on climate 
change in 2009, 35% of which were coded as contentious actions.   
The dependent variable in this study is the choice of an organization to employ a 
contentious action.  The model predicts the probability that an organization will employ a 
contentious action, and includes actor, network and event covariates.  Many of the actions 
reported in my data are co-sponsored, yielding 405 unique event-by-actor combinations in 2009, 
45% of which are contentious.  Thus this analysis does weight events unequally: events with 
more than one sponsor ‘count’ for one decision on the part of each organization involved.  This 
choice not only reflects the analytic goals of the study, but it also reflects the fact that co-
sponsored events are often bigger and more substantively significant.   
Explanatory Variables 
In addition to the network data, I also collected data on organizational attributes from 
organizational websites, documents, and available institutional registers.  I match these data on 
event sponsors with information about and event characteristics from press sources (see Methods 
Appendix).   
Key Independent Variable 
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My main independent variable in my analysis is the amount of exposure an organizational has to 
contentious organizations in the previous time periods.  I measure this as the number of ties an 
organization has with contentious organizations in 2008.37  Contentious organizations38
A simple example should illustrate how the coding of this variable works in practice.  
Table 4.1 has a hypothetical example of what the data structure might look like.  The data I 
collected have an event-by-actor structure in which I have data on the characteristics of events 
and their sponsors.  In this example, there are three events and three actors.   Events 2 and 3 are 
contentious, while Event 1 is not.   
 are 
defined as those that use more than 50% contentious actions in their overall action profile (e.g. 2 
contentious actions out of 3 total actions).   
Table 4.1: Example of Data Structure 
 Contentious Event (Y=1) Actor A Sponsors Actor B Sponsors Actor C Sponsors 
Event 1 0 1 1 1 
Event 2 1 1 0 0 
Event 3 1 1 0 1 
 
I use this event-by-sponsor data to construct my key independent variable.  For example, 
Actor B sponsors 0/3 contentious events, thus is not contentious.  But Actor B co-sponsors Event 
1 with Actor A.  Actor A sponsors 2/3 contentious events, and thus is coded as a contentious 
organization.  Thus Actor B is coded as having 1 tie with a contentious organization in 2008, 
despite never having previously employed contentious tactics (Table 4.2).   
                                                          
37 It would also be possible to include a measure of an organization’s coalition memberships in 2008 in addition to 
its direct co-sponsorship ties with other organizations.  At this moment, I do not have complete coalition 
membership data in order to do this.  However, I am attempting to collect this data, and hope to include this variable 
in later specifications.   
38 Theoretically, I do not consider organizations inherently ‘contentious’ or ‘conventional,’ and acknowledge that an 
organization’s tactics are a product of choices, not innate character.  But for the purpose of this analysis, I define 
groups that are already using contentious forms of collective action most of the time in 2008 as ‘contentious’ 
because of their pattern of choices, not because of their inherent traits.  Doing so allows me to emphasize their 
ability to act as innovators and to spread new tactics in the climate change network.   
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Table 4.2: Example of Data Structure, By Actor 
 Percentage of Contentious 
Actions in 2008 
Contentious Organization 
in 2008 (Y=1) 
Number of Ties to Contentious 
Organizations in 2008 
Actor A 0.66 1  0 
Actor B 0.00 0  1 
Actor C 0.33 0  2 
 
My hypothesis is that Actor B and C should be more likely to be contentious in 2009, 
because they both have ties with Actor A, which is contentious in 2008. Since Actor C has 2 ties 
to Actor A, it should be even more likely to be contentious than Actor B.  I also control for 
previous behavior by an organization in the final model.  For example, I account for the fact that 
not only do network ties vary, but Actor B has an action profile in 2008 that is 0% contentious in 
2008, and Actor C’s profile is 33% contentious in 2008, which may indicate a predisposition 
towards contention. 
I use a measure of ties with contentious organizations in 2008 to predict behavior in 
2009.  Lagging the dependent variable is important because my network ties are based on event 
co-sponsorship, so I observe not only the ties but also the behavior of actors at the same moment.  
Therefore, I would naturally observe a good deal of harmonization between organizations if I 
included both the ties and behavior from the same period.   
Other Variables  
I also introduce a number of variables in the model to account for alternative hypotheses and 
potential confounders, which are outlined in greater detail in Chapter Two.   
I use a scale variable to capture the extent to which the political environment provided 
organizations with opportunities for formal participation.   I analyzed a variety of institutional 
documents and secondary academic sources in order to get a picture of the available 
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opportunities for civil society participation in the policy-making process during this time period.  
Based on these sources, I constructed a scale variable that measures the variation in available 
political opportunities during the time period of the study (see Chapter 2).  I coded each day of 
2009 according to whether it was within one week of decision-making by a relevant international 
institution.  Actions that took place within one week of decision-making by the European 
Commission or Parliament were assigned a 3 on the scale, actions around the UNFCCC or the 
European Council received a 2, actions within a week of a summit of an international financial 
institution received a 1, and all others scored 0.   In some specifications of the model I also 
include a dummy variable to indicate whether an action targeted a particular institution.   
In addition to my measure of direct exposure to contention via inter-organizational ties, I 
also measure ‘indirect exposure’ to contentious behavior through popular media.  I measure this 
by the number of reports of contentious actions reported in my press sample in the previous 
month.  This measure is meant to capture the possibility that organizations are ‘imitating’ 
strategies that appear successful.  
Finally, in order to deal with hypotheses from the organizational literature and help to 
account for possible homophily effects, I include a number of measures of organizational traits.  
The majority of these traits are measured by website coding: having a radical ideology; having 
individual members; number of full-time staff; and age.  I take the measure of number of staff as 
a proxy for the size of an organization’s budget.  I tried to collect data directly on the size of 
organization’s budgets, but encountered too much missing data to use this variable in the final 
analysis.  The two variables are highly correlated for the cases on which I have data (.87).  
Finally, I pooled institutional records from the European Commission and European Parliament 
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to determine whether an organization received funding from the European Union.  Table 4.3 
summarizes the variables used in the analysis.   
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis  
Variable Mean SD Description 
    
Number of Contentious Ties in 
2008 
1.77 2.16 Total number of ties an organization had with 
contentious organizations (those using >50% 
contentious actions) in 2008.  
Number of Contentious Actions 
in 2008 
1.03 2.01 Total number of contentious collective 
actions the organization sponsored in 2008.   
Political Opportunities 1.23 1.00 Coded on the basis of researcher judgment of 
available opportunities for civil society 
participation in formal institutions during the 
2009 policy-cycle (see Chapter 2). 
3=Decision-making by European 
Commission or European Parliament within a 
week of the date of the action 2= Decision-
making by European Council or UN within a 
week; 1= Meeting of an International 
Financial Institution within a week; 0= no 
decision-making.  
Number of Contentious Events 
Reported in the Previous 
Month 
8.63 6.26 Total number of contentious events reported 
in press sample in the previous month/ 1000.   
Action Target 2.45 1.67 Based on coding of primary target of 
collective action as either: EU; UN; National 
Government; General Public; Corporation; 
International Financial Institutions; or Other 
(Yes=1).  
Radical Ideology .155 .362 Yes = 1.  Coded for the presence of anti-
capitalist or anti-systemic ideology on the 
organization’s website.   
Receives EU Funding 0.34 0.47 Yes=1.  Based on coding of whether the 
organization appears in the register of the 
European Commission and the European 
Parliament as receiving funding for the year 
2009.   
Has Individual Members 0.57 0.50 Yes=1.  Based on the coding of websites and 
organizational charters to see if the 
organization permits individuals to join as 
members.   
Number of Full-Time Staff 36.97 67.57 Number of full-time staff employed by the 
organization in 2009.  
Age 21.64 12.87 Age of the organization in 2009 (i.e. 2009 - 
founding date).  
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Methods  
To assess my network explanation vis-à-vis the other theoretical approaches, I estimated a model 
predicting the probability of a contentious event in 2009, taking into account both characteristics 
of the event itself and the organization that sponsors it.  I implement this by using both a logistic 
regression model with clustering on organizations (Table 4.4) and a logistic regression with 
random intercepts (Table 4.5).   
Logistic regression is appropriate for situations in which we observe a single, 
dichotomous response and observations can be assumed to be independent.  In my data, I 
observe multiple ‘responses’ (events) for the same organization.  Therefore the events observed 
may not be independent from other events that are sponsored by the same organization.  This is a 
problem because non-independence can cause clustering, and this can cause the usual standard 
errors to be incorrect (usually too liberal) (See Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000: 308-33).  
I use two methods to correct for this.  First, I estimate a logistic regression model with 
clustering on organizations, in order to generate cluster-robust standard errors (Long and Freese 
2006: 86).  Second, I use a random intercept model which takes into account the hierarchical 
nature of the data in estimating both coefficients and the extent of intra-class correlation.  In 
essence, the random intercept model allows the intercept to vary for each cluster while 
estimating a common slope.  Thus random intercept models are useful for capturing the 
distinction between effects of covariates that are within-cluster from those that are between-
cluster.  As there is no a priori reason to prefer either estimation method (UCLA 2011), I employ 
and compare the results of both.   
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In addition, my use of a random intercept model can help control for unobserved 
variables that are group-specific.  Because I am concerned that my results may be affected by 
selection bias, the use of the random intercept model increases my confidence in the estimated 
coefficients, assuming that these unobserved determinants of selection are time-invariant 
(Winship and Mare 1992: 346-347).   
Results 
Model Estimation and Specification  
Table 4.4 shows the coefficients from various stages of the model estimation. A comparison of 
model 5 (full) and model 6 (no network) shows that the effect of my network measure is 
consistently significant, and that it helps to explain additional variation not captured in the other 
two approaches.  A difference of 6.341 in Bayesian information criterion provides strong support 
for the full model as compared to the ‘no network’ model (Long and Freese (2006:113).   
Including the network variable particularly decreases the size of the estimated coefficient 
for the ‘radical ideology’ variable, suggesting being radical is a less important predictor of 
contentiousness once exposure to contentious organizations is included.  The Wald test of the 
equality of the two coefficients indicates that we can safely reject the hypothesis that two 
coefficients for the ‘radical’ variable are equal (chi2 = 6.12, p =.01).  While it is not significant 
in the model, the coefficient for having individual members also decreases significantly from 
model 6 (network) to model 5 (full), suggesting that this resource is much less important once 
inter-organizational ties have been accounted for (chi2 = 3.8, p = .05).   
A comparison of the estimated coefficients from the logistic regression with clusters and 
the logistic regression with random intercepts (Table 4.5) shows that the direction, magnitude 
and significance of the effect are consistent.  The results from the random intercepts model also 
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suggest that the inter-class correlation is fairly limited (.082).  The likelihood-ratio test that rho is 
equal to zero suggests that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the between-cluster variance 
is zero. The lack of strong intra-cluster correlation can also make us more confident that the 
results are not overly biased by self-selection into the treatment.   
Estimated Coefficients and Interpretation  
My results from Table 3.1 (logistic regression with organizational clustering) suggest that an 
increase in the number of ties an organization has with contentious organizations in 2008 does 
increase the propensity of an organization to sponsor contentious events in 2009.  The effect is 
also substantively meaningful: when other variables are at their mean, if the organization 
sponsoring the event goes from the minimum (0) to maximum (9) number of ties with 
contentious organizations in 2008, it is 55% more likely to sponsor a contentious event in 2009.  
Increasing the number of ties by one standard deviation (about 2) increases the probability of 
sponsoring a contentious event by 18%. Moreover, the number of contentious events an 
organization sponsored in 2008 is not a statistically significant predictor of behavior in 2009.   
For example, an old organization with a lot of resources, that receives money from the 
EU, that does not have a radical ideology and that is planning an event during the most open 
period of decision-making, has a 38% likelihood of sponsoring a contentious event in 2009 if the 
organization had the average number of ties to contentious organizations in 2008.  For an 
organization that has the same characteristics but had the maximum number of ties to contentious 
organizations in 2008, the predicted probability of sponsoring a contentious event in 2009 is 
88%.  If the organization had no ties to contentious organizations in 2008, the predicted 
probability of it sponsoring a contentious event in this time period is 27%.  
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Indirect diffusion via mass media is also important, although the effect is much smaller.  
A one standard deviation increase in the number of articles reporting contentious events in the 
previous month (about 6) increases the likelihood of an organization sponsoring a contentious 
event by 8%.  This effect is, however, distinct from the effect of direct contact.  This suggests 
that contentiousness is diffusing via both relational and non-relational means during this time 
period.   
 141 
 
Table 4.4: Logistic Regression Predicting the Probability of a Contentious Event in 2009, with Organizational Clustering 
 (1)Network (2)Opportunities (3) Targets (4) Org 
 
(5) Full (6) No Network 
Number of Ties with Contentious  .625*** .585*** .523*** .414*** .337*** 
 Organizations in 2008 (0.121) 
 
(.131) (.120) (.130) (.122) 
 Political Opportunities Scale  .906***   
.830*** .835*** 
  
(.167)  
 
(.192) (.191) 
Reports of Protest in Previous Month  .038* 
 
-.045 
 
.054** .071*** 
  
(.021) (.038) 
 
(.022) (.021) 
Target  
 
 
   EU   
-2.00*** 
      
(.447) 
   UN   
1.22** 
      
(.624) 
   National Government   
-.143 
      
.573 
   General Public    
-1.22** 
      
(.605) 
   Corporation   
1.29* 
      
(.701) 
   Number of Contentious Actions in 2008 
  
 .112 .050 .060 
   
 (.185) (.141) (.141) 
Has Radical Ideology 
  
 3.71** 3.69*** 4.98*** 
   
 (1.59) (1.41) (1.53) 
Has Individual Members 
  
 .500 .369 .703 
   
 (.501) (.448) (.420) 
Receives EU Funding 
  
 -.468 -.272 -.150 
   
 (.436) (.418) (.360) 
Number of Full-Time Staff 
  
 -.000 .000 -.000 
   
 (.003) (.003) (.003) 
Age 
  
 .016 .019 .010 
 
 
 
 
  
 (.017) (.016) (.014) 
 
 
 142 
 
Constant -1.08***  -3.12*** 
 
-.541 -1.47*** -3.69*** -3.49*** 
 (.241) (.421) (.354) (.493) (.668) (.589) 
Pseudo R2 .20 .27 .38 .26 .32 .28 
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4.5: Comparison of Logistic Regression with Organizational Clustering and Logistic 
Regression with Random Intercepts 
 (1) Logit with 
Clustering 
(2) Logit with Random 
Intercepts 
Number of Ties with Contentious  .337*** .346*** 
Organizations in 2008 (.122) (.121) 
Political Opportunities 
  Scale (1-3) .830*** 
  (.192)  Scale = 2 
 
1.86*** 
 
 
(.413) 
Scale = 3 
 
1.78*** 
 
 
(.476) 
Reports of Protest in Previous Month .054** .058** 
 
(.022) (.028) 
Number of Contentious Actions in 2008 .112 .127 
 
(.185) (.145) 
Has Radical Ideology 3.71*** 3.81*** 
 
(1.59) (1.26) 
Has Individual Members .500 .468 
 
(.501) (.450) 
Receives EU Funding -.468 -.159 
 
(.436) (.401) 
Number of Full-Time Staff -.000 -.000 
 
(.003) (.003) 
Age .016 .018 
 
(.017) (.017) 
Constant -3.70*** -3.62*** 
 
(.668) (.681) 
Sigma_u  .543 
  (.290) 
rho  .082 
  (.080) 
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My results suggest that both the political opportunity and organizational approaches have 
merit.  Changing the timing of the event from a period of completely open or completely closed 
to a mixed opportunity period increases the probability of the event being contentious by 15% 
(when other variables are held at their mean). 
Several of the ‘target’ measures are also statistically significant and substantively 
meaningful.  Most dramatically, targeting the EU vastly decreases the probability of an event 
being contentious, while targeting the UN or a corporation increases the probability of an event 
being contentious.  However, these strong results make me wonder if the causal relationship 
might not be reversed. Since climate change is an issue on which many different institutions have 
authority, groups often don’t have fixed targets when they decide on their tactics.  As my 
qualitative chapters will illustrate further, I suspect that organizations sometimes decide what 
tactics they want to use and then decide which institutions they will target (venue shopping), 
reversing the causal relationship underlying this correlation. 
My results suggest that most organizational characteristics are not significant predictors 
of contention.  Neither age, number of staff, receiving EU funding nor having individual 
members is a significant predictors of contention.   However, having a radical ideology is a 
significant predictor of using contentious tactics.  When other variables are held at their mean, 
adopting a radical ideology increases the probability of being contentious by 59%.  This effect is 
particularly dramatic where organizations have few ties to contentious organizations.  But as 
Figure 4.3 shows, the gap between the predicted probabilities of contention for ‘radical’ and 
‘non-radical’ organizations grows smaller as organizations acquire contacts with other 
organizations using contentious tactics.  
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Figure 4.3: Predicted Probability of Contention by Number of Contentious Ties in 2008, for 
Radical and Non-Radical Groups 
 
Illustrative Examples  
A few examples from the dataset should help to illustrate the relationship between the variables 
in the model.  Organizations that have similar traits and share a common environment can be 
embedded in very different portions of the network.  As a result, they are exposed to dramatically 
different organizational alters, and their behavior can be substantially different.   
For example, Transport and Environment Europe and Gender and Climate Change are 
both NGOs with non-radical ideologies that combine the issue of climate change policy with 
another substantive topic.  Both organizations had an action profile in 2008 that was 0% 
contentious, but with a very different pattern of ties.  As Figure 4.4 illustrates, T&E’s network of 
ties with other organizations in 2008 included no contentious organizations; Gender and Climate 
Change’s network included 6 ties to contentious organizations.  Thus while T&E was exposed 
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primarily to the NGO world of conventional Brussels activism, Gender and Climate Change was 
making contacts in 2008 with a number of contentious organizations that could influence its 
choice of action forms.   
Similarly, both Friends of the Earth Europe and Friends of the Earth Denmark have 
reform environmentalist ideologies, and have regular ties to one another and other FOE offices.  
FOE Europe used 4% contentious actions in 2008, while FOE Denmark used exclusively 
conventional forms of action.  However, these organizations differed substantially in the ties they 
had to other organizations.  While Friends of the Earth Europe was embedded in the Brussels 
NGO world, Friends of the Earth Denmark was already connected in 2008 to the emerging world 
of contentious climate activism.   
As Figure 4.4 illustrates, the world of climate change organizing in 2008 looks very 
different from these different vantage points. Some organizations – like Gender and Climate 
Change and FOE Denmark – were already exposed to contentious organizing at this stage.   
These organizations were engaged in collaborative behavior with contentious organizations, and 
were likely sharing information, resources and ideas with one another.  And as a result, Gender 
and Climate Change used 100% contentious actions in 2009 and Friends of the Earth Denmark 
used 66%.  In contrast, organizations that lacked exposure did not radicalize in the same way.  
Friends of the Earth Europe used only 12% contentious actions in 2009, while T&E did not use 
any.   
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 Figure 4.4: Egonets for Selected Organizations, 2008 
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Conclusion  
The results of my statistical analysis take apart the various influences on organizational choice to 
sponsor contentious action.  My analysis suggests the utility of a relational network approach to 
collective action.  The political process and organizational approaches help to explain a portion 
of the puzzle as to why organizations choose different forms of collective action, but the results 
suggest that the network approach explains additional variation. Moreover, the magnitude of the 
effect is meaningful: small changes in the composition of an organization’s network can have a 
big effect on its behavior. These results raise interesting questions: why do network ties matter in 
organizational choice of action forms?  How can a relational theory help explain harmonization 
of action repertoires?   
The second part of this dissertation will shed light on these questions by exploring the 
mechanisms underpinning the relationship between exposure to contention and adoption of 
contentious behavior.  These chapters will rely primarily on my qualitative data gathered from 
interviews, documents and participant observation. I will highlight the three main mechanisms 
from Chapter Three -- information sharing, resource pooling, and social influence – linking 
network ties to choice of action forms, and I will illustrate how they are important in organizing 
both contentious and conventional collective action.   
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PART TWO 
TWO WORLDS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
Introduction 
Late in the evening on December 18, 2009, several hundred people clustered around a wood 
burning stove in a former army barracks in Copenhagen, bundled up and struggling to keep 
warm in the bitter Danish winter.  In one corner, a communal kitchen had been established to 
serve vegan pasta dishes at the price of a few Kroner.  In another corner, a group of young 
people had set up a boom box to play mellow reggae music.  Individuals were seated on the floor 
in small groupings, deeply engaged in political discussions on the central question: what 
happened to the Copenhagen Summit?  How should they respond?  After consulting in small 
groups, the discussion moved upstairs for a broader group discussion, in which everyone spoke 
and all positions were debated.  The meeting lasted until late into the evening without reaching 
any ultimate resolution.  After reconvening the next morning, it was finally decided to hold a 
protest the next day in support of those protestors arrested in previous demonstrations.    The 
non-violent march through the streets of Copenhagen attracted approximately 1,000 people, and 
was coordinated with similar actions in London and Milan.   
Hours earlier on December 18th, a much more orderly scene took place in a large meeting 
hall in Central Copenhagen.   Individuals representing a wide variety of non-governmental 
organizations – having been kicked out of the official conference venue several days earlier – set 
up an impromptu meeting space in a former train station in which to hold their own strategy 
session.  Although outside the UN perimeter, access to this space was restricted by the organizers 
to only those holding official conference badges.  Although there were rows of seats to hold 
several hundred people, this meeting was standing room only.  One topic of discussion was how 
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to continue to influence the Copenhagen summit from outside the venue itself.  In general, 
individuals supported the idea of continuing ‘business as usual’: working with the media and 
trying to lobbying delegates as best possible without direct access.  While the idea of protest or 
civil disobedience was raised, it was defeated in the plenary vote, with only roughly 20 out of 
400 votes in support.   
Two different forms of action are evident here.  On the one hand, groups organize 
symbolic and confrontational protests across the national boundaries of EU member states.  On 
the other hand, they engage in regularized, professional lobbying and consultations with 
European and international political institutions.  Broadly speaking, these forms of action can be 
characterized as ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ strategies of collective action.   
My network analysis demonstrates that the ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ spheres are largely 
disconnected.  In Part Two of this dissertation, I use qualitative data to help answer two 
outstanding questions from the quantitative analysis: 1) Where do the inter-organizational ties I 
observe in 2008 come from?; and 2) How exactly do these ties influence organizational choice of 
action forms? 
To answer the first question, the chapters that follow will document in greater detail these 
two very different worlds of collective action on climate change, focusing on the question of how 
organizations get involved in one or the other.  Specifically, in Chapters Five and Six, I use my 
qualitative data to discuss how the network I observe in the first part of this study came into 
being. In each chapter, I outline the genesis of the most important inter-organizational coalitions 
and the development of their preferred action strategies.   
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My statistical analysis suggested that contact with a contentious organization increases 
the probability that an organization will itself employ contentious forms of action.  The second 
part of this dissertation, and in particular Chapter Seven, also aims to explain why I observe this 
relationship in the quantitative data.  I particularly focus on how different patterns of ties 
influence an organization’s decision to employ contentious or conventional forms of collective 
action.  In some cases – like Gender and Climate Change or Friends of the Earth Denmark – 
contact with contentious organizations leads these organizations to radicalize their forms of 
action during the time period of this study.  In other cases – like Friends of the Earth Europe or 
Transport and Environment Europe – having ties with conventional organizations encourages 
these groups to engage in conventional forms of action and not to radicalize, even during the 
heady final days of the Copenhagen Summit.   
Part Two of this dissertation should be of particular interest to scholars of social 
movement organizations and coalitions.  In these chapters, I am responding to a longstanding call 
for more qualitative fieldwork on the meso-level dynamics of collective action.  As McAdam, 
McCarthy and Zald summarized my motivating questions:  
How do macro and micro propensities get translated into specific mobilization attempts? 
What are the actual dynamics by which movement activists reach decisions regarding 
goals and tactics?.. To answer these questions, what is needed is more systematic, 
qualitative fieldwork into the dynamics of collective action at the meso level. We remain 
convinced that it is the level at which most movement action occurs and of which we 
know the least (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988: 729). 
 
As a result, Part Two relies extensively on my original qualitative data. To collect this qualitative 
data I conducted eighteen months of fieldwork, interviewing, observing and gathering documents 
from organizations active in organizing transnational collective action on climate change in 
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Europe.  I reconstruct this period by relying on three main data sources: 1) transcripts from 
interviews with over 80 organizational representatives; 2) field notes from roughly 250 hours of 
participant observation at organizational meetings and actions; and 3) internal and public 
organizational documents, including emails from internal and inter-organizational list serves.  
While I do not comprehensively detail all of the documents I consulted in writing the text (which 
total more than 10,000 emails and hundreds of other types of documents), a description of the 
most important sources appears in Appendix Two. 
The chapters that follow will both introduce additional qualitative evidence and evaluate 
the implications of the findings of my study as a whole.  Specifically, Chapters Five and Six 
explore the processes by which conventional and contentious collective action are organized, 
respectively. Chapter Seven outlines the different combinations of mechanisms that underpin 
strategic decision-making in contentious and conventional organizations.  And finally, Chapter 
Eight considers the consequences of different forms of activism – and the relationship between 
them -- for climate change governance and for civil society itself.  
   
 
  
 153 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
CONVENTIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE ADVOCACY 
This chapter deals with the portion of the inter-organizational network engaging in conventional 
climate change advocacy in the period of 2007-2009.  Climate activists in this sphere were 
tireless in their advocacy during these years.  As one described the experience of being at COP 
14 in Poznan: 
I’ve been up since 7am, every day, because I’ve had to meet with the coordination group 
in the morning.  I do media, I meet with my working group.  Then I have to go to the 
CAN coordination meetings – two of them every day of course.  I’m, of course, really 
here to meet with delegates and discuss our issues. Sometimes it’s hard to remember that.  
Getting intelligence, feeding it back to the working groups, writing statements, sending 
them to the media.  I barely eat - I don’t have the time.  Last night I was up until 2am 
because I was working on an article for [the NGO newsletter].  It’s completely 
exhausting.  But I just keep asking myself, if we didn’t do it, who would? You know that 
the business groups are working twice as hard, so we have to be here too.  (Interview 18, 
Climate Action Network Europe) 
The kinds of activities described – lobbying, working with the media, writing articles – are all 
well-established routines on the Climate Action Network [CAN].  By the start of this study, 
transnational cooperation was already formalized in this coalition.  Through joining CAN, 
organizations gained access to key information about the policy process and the actions of other 
organizations.  But as I will argue here, by joining this coalition they also came to adopt similar 
forms of collective action.  Specifically, groups working in CAN harmonized their activities, 
adopting a conventional and professional style of advocacy vis-à-vis institutional elites.  
Additionally, they were encouraged to resist radicalization, even when conventional strategies 
were less obviously useful.   
I will begin this chapter by first detailing the history of environmental advocacy in 
Europe, focusing on the two important processes of Euopeanization and professionalization that 
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pre-date the start of this study and affect choice of action forms in many of these organizations.  I 
particularly detail the development of Climate Action Network prior to 2007, which accounts for 
many of the inter-organizational ties between conventional organizations.  Finally, I document 
the coalition’s influence on its members’ decisions to use conventional forms of action and to 
resist radicalization at various points in the policy cycle.  I end by discussing the special case of 
the Friends of the Earth, as it was for many reasons unique in the inter-organizational network.   
History of Environmental Advocacy in Europe 
Europe has a long history of environmental activism.  In order to situate my study in the longer 
time period, I will first briefly outline the history of environmental advocacy.  I particularly 
focus on the ideological, organizational and tactical divisions between the three biggest actors in 
the issue area: WWF, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace.   
Key Initial Actors 
Though the environmental movement has always contained a diverse set of actors, the core of the 
environmental movement39
• WWF: The World Wildlife Fund was established in London in 1961.  The founders of the 
organization were government insiders, and were closely affiliated with the International 
Union for the Conversation of Nature.  WWF quickly adopted an international structure, 
and developed branches in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain and Switzerland by the end of the 1960s.  The organization’s original campaigns 
focused on the fate of endangered species, such as the black rhino.   
 in Europe is composed of three organizations: 
                                                          
39 For accounts of the origins of these three groups, see Dalton 1994; Hunter 1979; Rootes 2003; Pearce 1991; 
Weston 1989.  
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• Friends of the Earth [FOE]: Friends of the Earth was founded in 1969 in the United 
States as a confrontational splinter group from the Sierra Club.  FOE was from the 
beginning conceived of as an international organization, and by 1971 there were FOE 
Chapters in Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK.  Early campaigns of 
FOE focused on the fur trade and whaling.   
• Greenpeace: Greenpeace was founded as the “Don’t Make a Wave Committee” in 
Vancouver, Canada in 1969.  The early organizers were a mixture of pacifist Quakers and 
former Sierra Club members. Their early actions focused on opposition to underground 
nuclear testing.  Later, the organization became well-known for its anti-whaling 
campaigns.  Greenpeace was slower to establish chapters in Europe, opening its first 
offices in London and Paris in 1977, and then in Amsterdam and Geneva in 1978.   
These three organizations differ in their approach to environmental issues.  Ideologically, WWF 
was devoted to the cause of nature conservation and the protection of wildlife.  Friends of the 
Earth and Greenpeace were both founded in the “new environmental wave” of the late 1960s 
(Dalton 1994: 35), and adopted a more ecologist ideology.  This perspective emphasizes the 
environmental problems associated with industrial societies (acid rain, air pollution, toxic 
chemicals, water quality, etc.) and challenged the dominant paradigm of capitalist economic 
growth.  Thus, WWF is often thought of as being a ‘light green’ organization, whereas FOE and 
Greenpeace are ‘medium-dark’ green (Greenwood 2007: 137).40
These groups also differ in their organizational structures.  In the 1980s, Greenpeace 
grew from a loose and unruly bunch of activists to a highly centralized and fairly top-down 
  
                                                          
40 The ‘shades of green’ metaphor is used to categorize environmental groups along a continuum from light to dark 
green based on the depth of their commitment to the environmental cause, with more radical groups being ‘darker.’   
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organization.  In Greenpeace, the international office in the Netherlands generally sets the issue 
agenda for the national organizations.  To become ‘Greenpeace’ offices, national organizations 
must agree to cooperate with other offices on priority issues, so there is a great deal of 
consistency in what issues they pursue.  
WWF functions somewhat similarly to Greenpeace, in that there is a strategic process at 
the international level to determine priority issues.  However, unlike in Greenpeace, national 
groups are theoretically allowed to dissent from these issues and focus on different topics. In 
contrast, decision-making at FOE has over time become largely ‘bottom up’ in style. Within the 
Friends of the Earth network there is more variation in what issues are prioritized, as are 
internationally priorities designated for three year periods, but organizations are encouraged to 
adapt international priorities to local environments.41
While all chapters of FOE, Greenpeace and WWF retain tactical independence, these 
organizational ‘brands’ are traditionally associated with different forms of action.  WWF, 
perhaps owing the governmental background of its founders, has a reputation of being the most 
tactically moderate.  WWF is known for lobbying, issuing reports, doing media work, 
fundraising for conversation issues, and lending its logo to corporations that undertake green 
efforts.  Because of their overlap with the student movement of the late sixties, FOE and 
Greenpeace are associated with more confrontational tactics.  Greenpeace is known for the 
Quaker tactic of ‘bearing witness’ and non-violent direct action, which it has used extensively in 
its opposition to nuclear testing and whaling.  Early members of Friends of the Earth were 
 Nevertheless, all three groups adopted 
climate change as their key priority during the time period of this study.   
                                                          
41 One example might be that “Friend of the Earth” groups tend to all use different (non-English) names at the 
national level, while Greenpeace keeps the same “brand” in every country.   
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influenced by Ralph Nader’s consumer movement to adopt the citizen-oriented advocacy 
campaigns for which FOE became well-known.   
History of International Coordination  
Groups in Europe have been coordinating transnationally on environmental issues for a long 
time.  Most obviously, WWF, Greenpeace and FOE are all international organizations that have 
chapters in almost every country in Europe.  These national chapters often meet one another in 
regionally-focused coordination meetings.  But there are also a number of opportunities for 
cross-organizational cooperation.  Transnational cooperation in the environmental issue area has 
mainly taken four forms:  
• Peak-level associations: The European Environmental Bureau [EEB], founded in 
Brussels in 1974, was the original peak-level organization for environmental interests.   
The EEB was originally intended to inform its members of developments at the EU level 
and to coordinate their participation in the process.  Many of the original members of the 
EEB were national WWF, Greenpeace and FOE offices. 
• European Policy Offices: FOE, WWF and Greenpeace themselves began to open 
Brussels-based offices in the late eighties in order to follow the EU policy process and 
coordinate the actions of their members.   
• Sector-wide coalitions: International NGOs based in Brussels have also formed a sector-
wide advocacy coalition, the Green 10, which unites all these groups and the EEB.  
Members of the Green 10 include: the EEB, WWF, FOE, Greenpeace, Transport and 
Environment [T&E], Birdlife International, Friends of Nature International, the Health 
and Environment Alliance, CEE Bankwatch Network and the Climate Action Network 
Europe. 
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• Issue-specific coalitions: On the issue of climate change, coordination among Brussels-
based NGOs and national groups is facilitated by the Climate Action Network Europe.  
The structure of this group will be discussed in greater detail in the subsequent section.   
The existence of these four separate coordinating bodies means that cooperation in Brussels is 
complex on paper.42
The relative importance of these different forms of coordination has changed over time. 
Originally, the EEB was the most important actor in Brussels.  But since the EU has expanded its 
competencies in environmental issues: a) national groups have established stronger cross-
national coalitions in certain issues (like CAN Europe) and; b) international organizations have 
consolidated more power in European-level advocacy offices (like Greenpeace EU Unit, WWF 
European Policy Office, and FOE Europe).  As a result, the EEB and the Green 10 have become 
less central avenues for coordination over time.   
  But due to small number of individuals involved, coordination is usually 
not terribly difficult.   
It also worth noting that the environmental movement in Western Europe has historically 
been divided between groups in Eastern Europe and those in Western Europe.  Greenpeace 
groups, for example, originally refused to cooperate with local environmental groups in Eastern 
Europe (Pearce 2000: 41).  Friends of the Earth were more open to groups from Eastern Europe, 
and included the Polish Ecological Club as a member in 1980.  WWF still has few members in 
Eastern Europe.  While these ties are strengthening post-accession, it is fair to say that the 
                                                          
42 Membership in these different coalitions and associations is overlapping and uneven.  None of the European 
policy offices are members of the EEB, but a lot of their national members are.  The European policy offices work 
with EEB in the Green 10 and in CAN, and some of their national members are also members of CAN directly.  
This complexity can sometimes lead to confusion and redundancies in action planning. 
 159 
 
environmental movement is stronger and more internationally-coordinated in Western and 
Northern Europe.   
Building the Climate Action Network Europe [1989-2006]  
International coordination on the issue of climate change has mostly been coordinated through 
the Climate Action Network [CAN].  CAN Europe [CAN-E] is the original node of CAN 
International, and was founded by the three major transnational NGOs -- Friends of the Earth 
[FOE], Greenpeace and World Wildlife Federation [WWF] -- to facilitate coordination for the 
European groups in the UNFCCC negotiations. When CAN Europe was founded in 1989, it was 
originally called “Climate Network Europe” – a separate “Climate Network Eastern Europe” was 
founded several years later.  After a decade of European integration, these two regional 
coalitions did merge in 2004.  But the population of groups working on climate change remains 
more developed and more integrated in Western Europe than in the East. 
The original membership in CAN-E came from three main sources:   
• National affiliates of WWF, FOE, and Greenpeace, that joined CAN to complement the 
work of their EU advocacy offices.      
• Big environmental groups in the member states (e.g. Deutscher Naturschutzring in 
Germany, Legambiente in Italy, Stichting Natuur en Milieu in the Netherlands and 
Danmarks Naturfredningsforening in Denmark) that independently recognized the 
importance of working transnationally and sought out alliances at the European level.   
• Smaller environmental groups in the newer members states, that joined CAN as a result 
of targeted outreach on the part of the CAN Secretariat (Duwe 2001: 182).   
 160 
 
Coordinating action through CAN was politically expedient, but was not without challenges and 
risks.  From the outset, these groups realized that it would be useful to divide tasks related to 
European and international advocacy. At the same time, groups had to be careful in forming 
CAN not to allow  their independent identities to be subsumed by the coalition.  As one 
participant put it: 
Yes, we work together quite a lot.  But we know that we all represent different brands, so 
we have to be careful to give the appearance of not working together all the time 
(Interview 15, WWF European Policy Office).    
Not only did the founders of CAN resist working together all the time, but they also tried to keep 
the coalition from developing a strong independent profile.  As one observer put it: 
They intentionally created something in Brussels that wasn’t a well-known brand ...  This 
was largely because there was a lot of policy coming from Brussels and it was extremely 
technical.  It wasn’t ‘save the whales’ and it wasn’t at all sexy; it was technical and 
boring stuff.  And they needed someone to help them with it, but not to compete with 
their own efforts. (Interview 16, Transport and Environment Europe)  
As a result, CAN is less-well known than its major members.  But the development of CAN was 
crucial for the coordination of climate change activism in the changed political environment of 
the early nineties.  Groups working in this time period were dealing with two important trends -- 
Europeanization and professionalization – that made coordination in CAN even more attractive.  
The next section details the two most important aspects of these two processes.   
Europeanization and Professionalization  
Environmental groups in Europe have been affected by two big trends since the early days of the 
1970s: Europeanization and professionalization.  These two trends are related, as the EU has 
provided some of the stimulus for the professionalization of these groups.  As European 
integration has progressed, nationally-based groups have gradually come to ‘Europeanize’ their 
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interests, shifting their efforts to target the European Union, in addition to or instead of their 
national governments.  And there is ample evidence that groups have also adopted a more 
professional style in doing so, as I will outline in the following sections.   
Europeanization  
As the previous section suggests, European environmental advocacy groups have had a long 
history of international cooperation.  This coordination became particularly important after the 
introduction of the Single European Act in 1986 which dramatically increased EU competencies 
in the field of the environment.  Europeanization in the field of environmental advocacy took two 
main forms: 
First, groups coordinate transnationally in order to gather information about the EU 
political process and to seek influence at the EU level by working through the policy process.  
But because of the ‘pro-environmental’ reputation of the EU, and particularly the European 
Commission, these groups tend to use conventional strategies of influence (Rootes 2003: 250).    
In addition, European politics increasingly influences how organizations behave 
domestically.  In some cases, groups may try to use EU regulation against their national 
governments.  For example, in the United Kingdom, domestic environmental groups sometimes 
use non-compliance with EU law as a basis for bringing complaints again the national 
government.  Groups may also recognize their government’s role in the EU process, and target 
their national government when they ‘stall’ the process at the EU-level.  For example, Polish and 
Italian environmental groups often target their national leaders for obstructing the development 
of environmental policy at the Council phase of decision-making.     
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Cross-national research in Western Europe has identified a trend of general 
Europeanization among environmental advocacy groups, pointing to both increased EU-level 
work and the domestication of EU issues (Grant, Matthews and Newell 2000; Sbragia 2000).  
But the effect may be uneven across the new and old member states.    Many groups located in 
Eastern Europe still complain of a lack of resources and local support for the kinds of 
‘participatory’ action that are commonplace among Western NGOs.  As one Polish 
representative put it:  
I think the political culture is still in transition.  NGOs are not seen as the voice of civil 
society.  But maybe this is justified, because most people don’t actually agree with us, 
and aren’t happy with what we do.  The EU obliges certain participation standards, but 
these are really imposed from the outside, they have no roots in society. And this 
obviously makes it hard for us (Interview 71, Polish Ecological Club)   
Because of these limitations, transnational coalitions often work to promote the work and 
participation of environmental groups in the new member states, to provide them with additional 
resources to encourage them to engage in transnational action. 
Professionalization  
Environmental groups in Europe have also become increasingly professionalized since their 
early days of the 1970s.  This is particularly true of Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, both of 
which have gone from small upstarts to huge, financially well-off organizations. We can observe 
this trend towards professionalization in three ways: 
• Expansion of support and resources: Greenpeace was originally made up of a few 
activists and a boat.  Greenpeace International had an annual budget of about 50 million 
 163 
 
euros in 2009; WWF International had more than 100 million euros in the same year.43
• Integration into the policy-making process: Environmental groups have also gone from 
‘outsiders’ to ‘insiders’ in the policy process, although the nature and extent of the policy 
access of green groups varies depending on the state.  In the Netherlands, Germany, 
Nordic Countries (and to some extent UK), environmental groups have regular and 
formalized access to the policy-process.  In other countries, such as Belgium and France, 
these groups have strong ties to Green parties.  
  
The chapters of Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth in the UK, Netherlands and 
Germany often have budgets that are even larger, with hundreds of staff members.  These 
groups have also dramatically expanded their membership over the past forty years.  
Collectively, the NGOs participating in the Green 10 are estimated to represent 5 million 
European citizens.  
• Improved quality of scientific information: Perhaps reflecting their changed role, 
environmental NGOs have improved the quality of the scientific information they use to 
make their claims.  For example, Greenpeace International today has its own science 
office with over 100 staff members.  The practice of using independent experts, 
producing independent reports and using in-house staff to re-analyze government reports 
is now standard in the environmental community. Groups that are not able to do this on 
their own often report relying on allies to get access to this kind of information.   
The professionalization of these groups can limit the forms of action they can use.  For a lot of 
groups, there is a need to balance maintaining grassroots support with outside action and having 
                                                          
43 As a point of reference, the annual budget of the UNFCCC Secretariat was about 55 million US dollars for 2008-
2009 (See http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/sbi/eng/02.pdf ).  Greenpeace International regularly rents an office 
at the UNFCCC negotiations that is as large as the office for the entire US Delegation.   
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access to policy-makers, both of which are necessary to keep the organization financially viable.  
As these groups grow and gain financial assets, they can also become the targets of legal action, 
as both Greenpeace and FOE have experienced after attempting anti-corporate campaigns 
(Rootes 2003: 5).  This may make these groups more conservative about sponsoring actions that 
may get them into legal trouble.44
Working in Brussels  
   
The dual processes of professionalization and Europeanization are particularly evident among 
environmental groups that work at the European level. These processes generate two main 
outcomes: the development of reformist and moderate demands, and the selection of EU-level 
targets for advocacy.   
The positions the major environmental groups in Brussels tend to be moderate and 
reform-oriented.  Because these groups usually work in coalitions, they also try to coordinate 
their demands.  This means that they develop joint programs with demands that are slightly 
beyond what they feel can be reasonably achieved in the next policy-cycle.  Most of their work is 
concerned with advocating for these proposals and fending off criticism from other actors (e.g. 
industry representatives or laggard states).   
Staff members in Brussels repeatedly state that they have to put forward positions that are 
‘politically possible’ in order to be taken seriously by decision-makers.  As one participant put it:  
The main job is to push for the most ambitious proposal.  But in reality, that often means 
working to prevent getting something worse. We spend a lot of time defending ourselves 
                                                          
44 Based on cross-national protest event analysis, Rootes and his colleagues report that groups in Northern Europe 
have tended to use less protest actions since the late eighties.  However, the trend seems to be reversed in Southern 
Europe, where groups rely on protest to a greater extent and have less policy access (Rootes 2003: 247).   
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against reactionaries, and this means going for what is politically possible (Interview 3, 
European Environmental Bureau).   
Environmental activists in Brussels are certainly aware that their political positioning is close to 
that of the European institutions.  But they interpret this as a sign that they hold influence in the 
process.  As a CAN-E staff member puts it:  
When people criticize us for being too close to DG Environment, I tell them that we’re 
not close to them, they’re close to us (Interview 7, Climate Action Network Europe)  
Environmental groups working in Brussels are also highly attuned to the stages of the EU policy 
process.  These organizations overwhelmingly follow the “Brussels route of interest 
representation” through the various stages of policy-making (Greenwood 2007:30).45
We identify issues to take up on the basis of the Commission’s work plan.  We know 
from experience what are the likely country positions and controversies.  Then we move 
up the ladder of people to talk to, starting with desk offices, then unit heads, then to the 
DG, and eventually to all the DGs.  If there is one particular Commissioner who is posing 
a problem, we sometimes take the issue to the Greenpeace chapter in their home country.  
This strategy works particularly well if the Commissioner is well known, and if there is 
some sensitivity to environmental issues already in that country.  The idea is to leak the 
Commissioner’s position to the press, so as to embarrass them publicly (Interview 14, 
Greenpeace EU Unit). 
  Practically 
speaking, a ‘Brussels strategy’ has several components, which can combine actions in Brussels 
and in the member states (see also Long and Lörinczi 2009).  The process generally starts with 
the European Commission.  A respondent from Greenpeace described the process like this: 
All organizations report a great deal of success in influencing the Commission, and generally 
consider this institution to be the most favorable to their interests.  Representatives of CAN-E, 
for example, reports that they have excellent ties inside DG environment, and can often ‘see their 
language’ in the proposals of the Commission (Interview 7, Climate Action Network Europe).   
                                                          
45 The European Court of Justice is not a regular target for these groups, although they have in the past brought suit 
on issues of non-compliance by member states.   
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After the Commission, the proposal goes to the Parliament.  Here environmental groups 
focus on talking to the Rapporteur, as well as to the parties that support the legislation.  They 
suggest specific language and send questions through sympathetic Members of the European 
Parliament [MEPs].  They also prepare voting lists, and will divide up MEPs with the other 
environmental groups so that they can lobby individually all 700+ members.  On important 
pieces of legislation, they may also choose to bring in campaigners from national level groups.  
At this stage in policy making, these organizations consider ‘public-facing’ strategies of 
influence to be more appropriate, given the democratic character of the Parliament.  Thus they 
focus a lot of their attention on doing joint and individual media work and reacting to votes and 
decisions in the Parliament.   
After the Parliament has taken action on a proposal, it generally goes to the European 
Council.  These organizations consider that they have much less access to this institution.  As 
FOE-E puts it, “The Council portrays itself as an institution where no lobbying takes place; the 
secretariat keeps no listing of lobbyists and takes the position that all contact with lobbyists and 
NGOs is handled with the European Commission” (Interview 28, Friends of the Earth Europe).   
This means that: 
In light in this lack of access, we pursue three strategies.  The first is to pursue the 
attachés.  The second is to develop a good working relationship with the Presidency.  
And the third focuses on working through national groups to influence their home 
countries.  This is done primarily through lobbying and information sharing.  Before 
important environmental conferences the [European Environmental Bureau] will send out 
a report to the ministers, informing them of the demands of the organization.  Ministers 
have come to expect and rely on these reports, particularly those in new member states 
who have little access to information.  If we are a week late sending these reports we will 
get calls asking for them. (Interview 3, European Environmental Bureau)  
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Information leaks present groups in Brussels with an opportunity to target those countries that 
are ‘being difficult.’ But because of the lack of access to the Council, these groups often choose 
to work through national channels.  This often means calling on national member organizations 
to lobby or protest against their home governments.  However, this approach can also be difficult 
to implement. For one thing, it requires close communication with national groups.  Also, the 
effectiveness of these kinds of actions also depends on the political situation of the target 
country.  In climate change policy, national governments may or may not be more vulnerable in 
their home countries, as most of the decisions are being taken by foreign ministries, which are 
also somewhat ‘off limits’ to civil society groups.    
Becoming Stakeholders  
Groups that follow the Brussels process have even more incentives to professionalize and 
institutionalize than those working at the national level.  This is true for at least three reasons: a) 
the European Commission provides more access to groups that are more professional; b) the 
Commission provides a great deal of funding to most of the organizations working in Brussels; 
and c) the nature of policy-making in Brussels tends to be technical and information-driven.  As 
a result, these groups also tend to be very moderate in the forms of action they employ.   
Environmental groups in Brussels continually point to the importance of having a good 
relationship with the European Commission as a motivation for wanting to appear professional.  
The Commission is particularly important to these groups because it is the arena where NGOs 
consider they can have the most influence, provided that they have ‘politically useful’ 
information.  Moreover, all of these organizations, except Greenpeace, get a large portion of their 
annual budget from the Commission (European Commission 2011).   
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The Commission itself reiterates the importance of these same ‘professional’ criteria:  
NGOs work to establish their credibility with the institutions so that they can get 
resources and have influence.  This credibility is established through the size of the 
organization (how many people it represents), its representativeness, and the quality of 
the work that it does.  The institutions favor actors who provide them with information 
that is politically useful, or can provide them with a specific service. It seems, however, 
that this is a difficult question to answer, because in almost every policy sector the 
credible actors are already established.  (Interview 4, DG Environment)  
Among the organizations working in Brussels, there seems to be a consensus that 
conventional ‘lobbying’ actions have the greatest possibility of success.  Thus although protest 
action and strong criticism may be a theoretical possibility, or even a logical choice for these 
groups at various points, there seems to be a strong norm that this type of thing is not done. 
Moreover, the evidence suggests that this moderation in action forms is not only driven by 
budget concerns.  Even Greenpeace EU Unit, which does not take funding from the Commission, 
uses primarily conventional tactics.  Evidence suggests that the EU Unit is unusual within the 
Greenpeace network.  As an internal newsletter describes the Director of the EU Unit:  
You won't have seen pictures of her handcuffed to an anchor chain or hanging a banner 
from a smokestack. As a Greenpeace climate and energy policy advisor stationed in 
Brussels, she's more likely to be decked out in a smart suit than a wetsuit, working the 
corridors of the European Parliament (Greenpeace International, 2005). 
Greenpeace International does, however, very occasionally sponsor protest actions in Brussels.  
Interestingly, when these actions take place, they are coordinated by the International office, and 
not the Brussels office (Interview 21, Greenpeace International).  Campaigners are ‘imported’ 
from Amsterdam for such actions, not pulled from the locally-based staff.   
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Nationally-based Greenpeace groups are also encouraged to be professional when they 
target the EU as well.  The very contentious Greenpeace Italy described their decision to occupy 
coal-fired power plants during the G8 summit like this:  
During the G8 it was a big moment of decision-making, so we needed a confrontation... 
So we wanted to do something to confront the government in a big dramatic way, to 
make a show on the outside too (Interview 75, Greenpeace Italy)  
But when it comes to working with the EU, the same group reports using primarily conventional 
actions – such as lobbying for a directive on energy efficient light bulbs – in cooperation with the 
EU Unit.   
Professionalization doesn’t only affect long-time groups in Brussels.  The fact that the 
‘credible actors are already established’ can create favoritism in Brussels policy-making.  As a 
participant from the Parliament notes, ‘breaking in’ to Brussels politics can be difficult, because 
the big groups tend to act as gate keepers:  
It’s a good question how organizations establish credibility with us. Generally speaking, 
if a new NGO comes forward, I’d ask the big groups what their opinion is of that group.  
But this is all done through personal networks, and it’s very small.  (Interview 6, 
European Parliament)  
This means that groups that want to work in Brussels often need to gain the support of the 
already-established actors.  And in climate change policy, this usually means joining or 
coordinating with the Climate Action Network.   
The Climate Action Network Europe [2007-2009]  
The time period of this study – 2007 to 2009 – comes after more than two decades of 
Europeanization and professionalization.  Transnational cooperation through the Climate Action 
Network was already well-established from the outset of my research.  
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CAN-E wasn’t new; its routines had been tried and tested in the previous decade.  But the 
2007-2009 time period was unique, for two reasons.  First, during this time the membership of 
CAN-E dramatically expanded and diversified, bringing in actors from new issue areas and with 
different tactical histories.  Second, Copenhagen was a major political moment for these groups, 
who viewed COP 15 as ‘the most important meeting of our lives’ and ‘a moment that will 
determine the fate of humanity.’  For both these reasons, this time period might have been a 
moment of transformation for the coalition and its members.   
CAN-E was a vehicle for the harmonization of political positions and tactics among a 
large and diverse group of organizations, many of whom were new to the issue area. 
Participating in CAN-E also encouraged groups to adopt conventional tactics, and to continue to 
use them even when such forms of action became less obviously useful.  In joining CAN-E, new 
actors were exposed to the influence of moderate gate-keepers that used their influence over 
others to convince them to adopt a moderate, professional style of advocacy and to actively resist 
radicalizing their tactics. This section focuses on how CAN-E functions and how it develops 
joint positions among its diverse members.  The next section focuses on how the coalition 
coordinates action plans and helps members to resist radicalization.     
Membership Expansion  
In advance of the Copenhagen summit, the number of organizations working on climate change 
dramatically increased.  This is reflected in the quantitative data I discuss in the first half of this 
dissertation, but it can also be seen in the increase in the number of groups that participated in 
the CAN coalition.  Membership in CAN Europe dramatically expanded during a very short time 
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period.  In 2000 CAN-E had 75 organizational members, and by 2007 it had grown to 100 
organizational members.  By 2008, this figure had jumped to 129 (See Figure 5.1). 46
Figure 5.1: Growth in Membership in the Climate Action Network Europe
 
   
Not all organizations that requested to join CAN become members.  By 2009, the number 
of demands to join CAN-E was so high that the Secretariat placed a freeze on most new 
memberships.  The membership freeze was based on the concern that these new organizations 
might want to join ‘opportunistically’ for the Copenhagen summit and not stay active afterwards.   
The rationale for freezing membership requests illustrates an important element about 
how CAN functions.  Though the stated reason for the freeze was that adding more members 
would make it hard to reach a quorum for voting, a lot of the concern voiced privately was that 
there wasn’t enough time to build common positions and trust with new organizations in order to 
make joint action and information exchange profitable.  CAN wanted to be a coalition in which 
extensive coordination took place, and new members could not commit ‘lightly’ to participation, 
                                                          
46 Membership figures are drawn from internal organizational records provided to the author.   
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nor should they benefit too easily from the common goods.  Essentially, coalition members 
feared that new members might not be adequately socialized into the coalition in the limited 
amount of time, or might be able to ‘free ride’ on the actions of others without true participation.   
Most of the growth in approved CAN membership from 2007-2009 can be attributed to 
the increased interest of national environmental non-governmental organizations in transnational 
coordination.  Virtually all environmental groups wanted to work on climate change during this 
time period, because for these groups “climate has become our meta-frame” (Interview, Danish 
92 Group).  In addition to environmental groups, development organizations concerned about the 
effects of climate change on vulnerable states and the implications of global climate policy for 
development issues also formed a large component of the new CAN membership.  
The new members increased complexity in CAN-E coordination.  In the early days, the 
entire network of CAN Europe consisted of about 30 people; by Copenhagen, a CAN Europe 
meeting could easily have 250 people.  This meant that the informal norms of the coalition had to 
become increasingly formalized as operating procedures.   
Operating Procedures 
Responding to the growth in its membership, CAN-E developed more formalized membership 
agreements, a code of conduct, and standard operating procedures for the development of policy 
papers and related action strategies.  Becoming a member of CAN-E means agreeing to three 
essential rules:  
1) Refraining from criticism of the positions of the coalition or other members;  
2) Keeping internal communications confidential47
                                                          
47 This rule makes research on the CAN-E coalition more difficult than within more radical coalitions, which were 
(perhaps ironically) more open to observers.  During the time period of my research I had exceptional access: I spent 
approximately one day per week observing meetings of the Climate Action Network Europe in Brussels and daily 
; and  
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3) Respecting the procedure that the coalition releases its joint press release before any 
individual organization.   
Members in CAN also agree to contribute funding to the Secretariat.  This membership fee is 
based on a sliding scale, in which organizations with bigger budgets pay more.  The Secretariat 
uses this money to pay the staff that produces the analysis and policy updates that are distributed 
to members.  In addition, a portion of the money that is contributed to CAN is redistributed to 
member organizations in ‘outreach countries’ – mainly in Eastern Europe – to help these 
organizations attend meetings in Brussels and at the UN.   
CAN also formalized procedures for coordinating policy development. On paper, CAN 
functions according to ‘consensus’ procedures.  But, as the organization acknowledges, the 
positions on which participants are invited to contribute are often ‘premeditated’ by the big 
member groups.  This means that the international NGOs in CAN – FOE, WWF, Oxfam, and 
Greenpeace – are extensively consulted before proposals are drafted.  Once these groups have 
given their line-by-line critiques of the document, the proposal is then circulated to the entire 
membership via an email list for an ‘up-or-down’ vote.  Member groups are given a deadline to 
submit comments on the proposal, although extensive revisions are unusual.   
When the UNFCCC meetings are in session, CAN operating procedures are somewhat 
different.  CAN-E works as a regional node within the CAN International network, and a lot of 
the positions it takes are broader than its work in Europe.  Action or policy proposals in this 
setting are arrived at by a modified consensus procedure.  Proposals are first discussed in topic-
based working groups, which are open to all participants.  They are then taken up in a Political 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
during COPs at the UNFCCC, had many informal chats with participants, and was subscribed to several of their 
internal mailing lists. These observations inform my understanding of how the coalition operates, and helped me to 
develop better interview questions.  But as per my agreement with CAN participants, I do not report directly on 
internal communications unless they have been discussed with me in on-the-record interviews.   
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Coordination Group that consists of representatives of all the regional nodes, working group 
chairs and representatives of the international NGOs.  Then the proposals are taken to the daily 
meeting, where individuals are asked to vote on whether or not they support the initiative.  
Generally speaking, proposals tend to pass at this stage. In practice, ‘consensus’ at this stage 
means that no more than 5% of members (and none of the big groups) disapprove of the 
proposal.   
During the time period of this study, CAN-E was active in two main areas: 1) the EU’s 
Climate and Energy Package; and 2) the coordination of action for the UNFCCC summit in 
Copenhagen (Climate Action Network Europe, Document 17).  This meant developing both 
policy positions and action strategies on these topics.  The next sections illustrate how these 
procedures operate concretely.   
Developing Reform-Oriented Aims  
Through the process of affiliating with CAN, organizations agree to contribute to the 
development of joint positions.  This coordination is the core of CAN’s work: most NGOs 
believe that by coordinating their activities and ‘speaking with one voice’ they increase their 
chance of influencing the policy process.  
Regardless of the specific issue, CAN joint positions share a science-based, reformist and 
professional character.  This style is evident in the position papers and joint programs CAN 
produces for the international negotiations, which tend to use technical language and draw on 
environmental science as a justification for government action.   
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Both the content and the style of CAN materials emphasize technical knowledge and try 
to establish these actors as ‘experts.’  For example, the 2009 joint program of the Climate Action 
Network for the Copenhagen negotiations stated that: 
The new science also shows that with any delay in action the costs of mitigation and 
adaptation increase significantly. Delaying significant actions by even 5-10 years 
undermines our ability to stay well below 2°C and severely undermines the effectiveness 
of long-term adaptation action (Climate Action Network 2009, Document 42). 
The language here frames the climate issue in a scientific manner, addressing its proposals to 
existing policy tracks within the UNFCCC, and draws on scientific research to justify its policy 
prescriptions.  
It is important to note that the ‘science-based’ frame does not ignore justice issues such 
as the issue of north-south equity, adaptation or finance – but it frames these issues in a technical 
manner.  The same joint program also stated on its first page:  
 Efforts to address climate change must adequately reflect the right to sustainable 
development and also the principles of historical responsibility and common but 
differentiated responsibilities and capabilities as enshrined in the Convention (Climate 
Action Network 2009, Document 42).  
By using the awkward language of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (which comes 
directly from the UNFCCC) CAN appeals to an insider constituency of experts, while not 
framing issues in terms of broader systemic issues or social consequences.   
Organizations within CAN tend to adopt this same moderate and reform-oriented 
approach in their individual activities, for two reasons.  First, organizations within CAN get 
access to similar kinds of information, which can lead them to develop similar analyses.  The 
benefits of working within CAN include gaining access to list-serves on which developments in 
the policy process are reported and discussed, and participating in workshops in which groups 
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develop their analyses and recommendations.  This is particularly important for small groups that 
do not have independent access to information about the policy process, or the new non-
environmental groups that do not know the issue area well.   
Second, the operating procedures of the coalition make it so that the process of 
developing joint positions tends towards the ‘least common denominator’ political position.  For 
example, in the discussion of which targets for emissions reductions CAN-E should ask for 
during the Climate and Energy Package, group’s positions ranged from 30-45%.  The official 
position of CAN-E called for emissions reductions of ‘at least 30%’ in order to accommodate the 
demands of least ambitious groups (Climate Action Network, Document 42).  Thus in practice, 
the positions of the network tend to be fairly close to those of WWF, which many consider the 
‘lightest’ of the green groups. Thus more radical groups (like Friends of the Earth) have to 
moderate their demands to a fairly large extent when they work within CAN.   
Finally, the general position within CAN-E is to avoid making joint decisions on 
controversial issues if they are ‘non-essential’ to the coalition’s core advocacy goals. Important 
fault lines exist between members on issues such as the use of carbon markets, biofuels, and 
carbon capture and storage technology.  These divisions have been dealt with by either not taking 
joint positions on these issues or by being intentionally vague about the coalition’s positions.   
Coordinating Collective Action in CAN   
In addition to influencing the kinds of aims organizations develop, CAN also has a strong 
influence on the forms of collective action that its members use.  Members of CAN tend employ 
conventional forms of lobbying when they work at the transnational level.   This continued to be 
true even after a variety of development groups with social justice backgrounds joined the 
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coalition in 2007-2009.  This section details why organizations within CAN tend to be – and 
remain – conventional in their forms of action.   
Advocacy and Lobbying 
As the previous sections outlined, the large environmental organizations in Europe have been 
influenced by processes of Europeanization and professionalization for decades prior to 
Copenhagen.  The structure and operating procedures of the CAN coalition make these groups de 
facto ‘gate keepers’ controlling the access of new members to international institutions, and 
policy, and strategic information. As a result, CAN is mainly a vehicle for the coordination of 
contained forms of advocacy.  
  For example, CAN-E was tireless in coordinating member activities during the 
development of the European Climate and Energy Package.  As part of its strategic work plan, 
CAN distributed to member organizations in early 2008 a calendar with all the anticipated dates 
of European decision-making on climate change.48
This conventional and regularized style of advocacy is sometimes a bit odd for 
nationally-based groups that are used to a more confrontational style of activism.  For example, 
  For each of these moments, CAN-E drafted 
an action strategy, which included coordinated demands, writing joint letters, and making plans 
for dividing up the work of lobbying national and European delegates (Climate Action Network 
Europe, Document 17).  CAN-E participated in stakeholder conferences, held briefings at the 
Parliament, and worked with the media to publicize their demands during this crucial time 
period.   National members of CAN-E and the big NGOs also got involved directly during the 
Council phase, particularly those coming from Germany and Poland.   
                                                          
48 This likely explains the findings from Chapter Two that conventional forms of collective action are closely linked 
to major moments in the policy-making cycle.   
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the stakeholder consultation at the European Commission on the Climate and Energy Package in 
fall 2008 included a number of representatives making fairly technical speeches, followed by 
comments invited from the floor.  Afterwards, participants were invited to a buffet lunch that 
included gourmet food, wine and champagne.  As one participant unaccustomed to Brussels-style 
politics commented, “This is all pretty weird for me.  I mean we’re environmentalists! Why are 
we drinking champagne? Shouldn’t we be out on the streets or something?”  
This same style of advocacy pervades within the UNFCCC.  These work routines are 
well-established, and the 2008 and 2009 COPs followed a familiar pattern of conventional 
advocacy (See Betsill 2008; Fisher 2004; Hoffman 2008; Mori 2004).  CAN activities in Poznan 
and Copenhagen included lobbying national and EU delegates, making official interventions in 
conference plenaries, hosting ‘side events,’  and  providing information through reports.  CAN 
also produces a daily newspaper – ECO – that provides a humorous and informative overview of 
the coalition’s political positions and objectives.  As Figure 5.2 shows, the first issue for 
Copenhagen translated the joint program into a ‘checklist’ that delegates could use to assess the 
outcome of the COP.  CAN-E’s work also consists of making joint statements, holding press 
conferences, and being interviewed for European and international media.   
Organizations learn how to engage in these kinds of activities from their peers.  For example, 
prior to every COP, CAN holds a weekend ‘strategy session’ for member organizations.  At 
these sessions, organizations come together to finalize their plans for the COP and to gain 
political intelligence from one another.   
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Figure 5.2: ECO Newsletter on the FAB Essentials, December 2009
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But these sessions are also a crucial venue for groups new to the process to learn the work 
routines of CAN. 49
It seems like in CAN a lot of the large groups set the tune, and we all tend to follow that.  
But when we work at home, we can’t always sell that, so we might do different things 
(Interview 67, Greenpeace Germany). 
  Every strategy session includes at least one breakout group on ‘how to work 
within the UNFCCC’ and another that outlines ‘a typical day in the life of a climate campaigner 
at the COP.’ As another participant put it, CAN has a large influence on the kinds of strategies 
organizations choose to use, which often differ from the things they do in national settings: 
The institutionalization of NGO activities within the UNFCCC has not gone unnoticed by the 
institution.  For example, prior to Copenhagen Yvo de Boer, the Executive Secretary of the 
UNFCCC at the time, commented informally to development NGOs during a meeting the UK 
that he was ‘surprised at how bureaucratized NGOs are in the climate negotiations, wearing suits 
and negotiating instead of slinging bricks through the windows.’  Similarly, in Copenhagen 
Lumumba Da-Ping, lead negotiator for the G7750
I’ll say this to our colleagues from Western civil society: you have become instruments of 
your governments.  Whether you say it’s tactically shrewd or not, it’s an error that you 
should not continue to make.    
, stated much more critically in a public 
briefing with civil society during COP 15: 
NGO representatives were well-aware of these critiques of their ‘insider’ strategies.  But, for the 
most part these groups tended to interpret these comments as calls to not ‘be captured by low 
ambitions of political leaders’ and have not necessarily taken them as a comments on their tactics 
themselves.   
                                                          
49 Wang and Soule 2011 find that tactics tend to diffuse from larger to smaller groups.  My study of the CAN 
coalition supports the idea that inter-organizational coalitions can also be venues for learning and the diffusion of 
tactics, and that the dominance of large groups within coalitions means that smaller groups tend to imitate the larger 
ones.   
50 The G77 is a negotiating block that grew out of the non-aligned movement, and includes most developing 
countries within the UNFCCC.   
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Global Days of Action and Media Stunts 
Despite the extensive use of conventional forms of action, NGOs do not work exclusively in the 
hallways. Many of the larger NGOs typically supplement these activities with creative and 
media-friendly protest stunts, such as banner hanging, melting ice sculptures, or marches of 
people wearing polar bear costumes. Although these actions constitute a small percentage of 
their overall action profile, these types of action can be important in keeping the support of 
members who may be attached to the radical images of these groups.   
For example, during the 2008 Climate and Energy Package, FOE, Greenpeace, WWF and 
CAN-E worked together to organize the ‘Time to Lead Campaign.’  The goal of this campaign 
was to draw media attention to the need for the EU to develop a strong climate policy in order to 
lead the international negotiations.  As part of this campaign, groups organized a phone bank 
outside the European Parliament where individuals could call their representatives to tell them 
‘it’s time to lead.’  They also did a number of other media-friendly stunts, such as placing a 
block of melting ice outside the Parliament to represent ‘the EU’s melting ambition’ and staging 
a skit in Poznan where Santa Claus arrived to give different ‘industry representatives’ and ‘key 
countries’ a ‘very special climate package’ as an early Christmas present.     
Publicity stunts such as these became much more frequent in 2009.  One of the reasons 
for this was the development of the Global Campaign for Climate Action [GCCA].  The GCCA 
was intended to be the public action arm behind CAN positions, and was a coalition of many of 
the same groups (Greenpeace, WWF and Oxfam).  The GCCA was not branded as a high profile 
organization in its own right, but worked to complement the insider lobbying strategies of the big 
NGOs.  For example, the GCCA sponsored a ‘rapid response’ team in the Spring of 2009 to react 
to EU-level decisions related to the development of the Copenhagen strategy.  These ‘responses’ 
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were closely coordinated with CAN, and included placing advertisements criticizing key 
governments and doing media stunts to draw attention to key moments in decision-making. 
Non-violent marches and demonstrations are understood to be part of the repertoire of 
contention about the UNFCCC.  The main activity of the GCCA was to sponsor a non-violent 
climate march during the Copenhagen summit.  Since 2005, these marches have been sponsored 
by a small organization out of London calling itself the Global Campaign Against Climate 
Change.  In Poznan, this march attracted a few thousand people, and was coordinated with 
similar marches throughout the world.  As the organizers explained it:  
We envision ourselves as the public protest that stands behind the CAN positions.  And a 
big part of our task is just to show that such a movement exists (Interview 20, Global 
Campaign Against Climate Change) 
Copenhagen continued this tradition, but on a much larger scale.  By reaching out to (mainly) 
CAN members and local Danes and Swedes, the GCCA mobilized an impressive non-violent 
march of one-hundred thousand people from the center of Copenhagen to the conference venue, 
according to media reports.  Once the march reached the conference center, Desmond Tutu led a 
candlelight vigil that implored world leaders to reach an ambitious climate agreement.    The 
march was both reform-oriented in its messaging and contained in its forms of action.  
Authorities did not hassle the protestors, and the demonstration was even broadcast to those 
inside of the conference center.   
Resisting Radicalization   
Groups within CAN not only encouraged one another to use conventional forms of action; they 
actively resisted processes of radicalization.  Groups adopt conventional tactics because they 
genuinely believe in the power of their own influence.  While they are aware of the potential 
 183 
 
dangers of being co-opted, conventional groups knowingly decide to accept restrictions on their 
behavior in exchange for the opportunity for influence (Willetts 1999).  As one put it: 
Do we get played by them? Of course we do.  But at a certain point you have to decide 
that it’s worth it to try and have an influence on the outcome (Interview 29, WWF 
European Policy Office 2009).   
This doesn’t mean that the NGOs always support the decisions of institutional actors.  On the 
contrary, European officials frequently complain that no matter what they do, the NGOs will tell 
them that it’s not good enough.51
We’re hard in the sense that they know that we’re not just going to roll over when they 
suggest something dodgy.  But they also know that we’re not going to propose something 
off the wall either. (Interview 32, WWF UK)  
  But the European groups also have developed good working 
relationships with these institutions that allow them to be outwardly critical, while still 
constructive.  As one puts it:  
Here the exception proves the rule.  After the release of the Council conclusions on the 
EU Climate and Energy Package in December 2009, this group of NGOs decided to issue a very 
strongly worded joint press statement, criticizing the package and asking the Parliament to reject 
it unless it was improved.52
Officials from DG Environment were furious that the NGOs had criticized ‘their’ 
package, and expressed their disapproval to the leaders of these groups through private channels.  
This censure seemed to work, as, almost immediately, these organizations told me that they 
   This was done at a joint press conference in Poznan, and was 
picked up as a new story in a number of major media outlets.   
                                                          
51 In doing so, European leaders frequently complain that environmental groups in the United States are much more 
supportive of Democratic administrations, and that the European groups are overly critical in comparison.  The 
divide between European and American groups is one of the biggest tensions within the international CAN coalition.   
52 This may seem mundane, but this is probably the strongest statement of non-support the NGO community can 
make.  In calling for the Parliament to reject the package they essentially argued that they would rather have nothing 
than what had been proposed.   
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began to worry that they may have gone too far and damaged their credibility with the 
Commission. In the New Year, there was still talk about doing something positive ‘for the 
Commission’ to repair the relationship. 
There is another reason to resist radicalization: groups can face serious institutional 
sanctions within the UNFCCC if they deviate from contained forms of collective action.    
Groups that receive accreditation to attend UNFCCC negotiations have to agree to a code of 
conduct which limits the scope of their potential actions.  If a member of a group engages in a 
non-authorized action, the entire group risks exclusion.  Thus groups that wish to participate 
inside the UNFCCC need to monitor the behavior of their members.  Prior to and during COP 
15, CAN representatives repeatedly reminded members of the ‘code of conduct’ they had agreed 
to,  specifying the clause about ‘no un-authorized demonstrations.’  Groups within CAN were 
made very aware that a decision to use contentious action in the conference center could result in 
the exclusion of other members of their delegation.   
More broadly, because civil society groups work in coalitions, they fear that the status of 
civil society as a whole may be threatened if they appear ‘irresponsible.’ Therefore, groups also 
try to rein in other groups that may be considering deviating from contained forms of advocacy 
in order to protect their own interests.  One example of this was the inter-organizational 
negotiations that took place before the GCCA’s Global Day of Action in Copenhagen.  The 
GCCA had billed the event as a ‘family-friendly climate walk’ and had held many meetings with 
police to ensure them that it would be entirely non-violent.  However, once the GCCA 
representatives got word that there would be a large number of anarchists and radical protesters 
in town at the same time, they became highly concerned that these groups would hijack their 
march and engage in property damage or civil disobedience.  This kind of violence – it was 
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thought – would damage the reputation of civil society as a whole.  As a result of this concern, 
the GCCA sent representatives to a meeting of more radical groups [Climate Justice Action] to 
try to convince them not to engage in radical forms of protest.  Although the GCCA 
representatives did not convince them to give up their own action plans, the CJA did eventually 
agree not to disrupt the plans for the Saturday march, which went as scheduled.   
CAN leaders were also important in restraining protest actions by other organizations.   
For example, once it became clear that only 90 civil society representatives would be allowed to 
be present during the high-level segment of the negotiations, some individuals and groups within 
CAN began calling for a mass protest, and others began circulating plans to refuse to leave the 
venue.  In this context, prominent CAN members sent emails urging their colleagues to leave the 
venue when instructed, warning that any resistance could result in all civil society accreditation 
being revoked.  Youth delegates to the COP, for example, reported that big groups were 
important in exerting behind-the-scenes pressure to get them to give up their protest plans.   
In the end, there was no organized resistance to leaving the conference center.  The next 
day CAN members met in a new meeting space outside the venue, where they continued their 
normal procedures of sharing information and drafting statements more or less as usual.  While 
this decision was broadly accepted, some groups were outraged by the lack of action by the 
coalition.  One prominent member raised the point that the decision to comply with the 
UNFCCC’s decision had been too pragmatic – the issue raised core issues of the legitimacy of 
the process.  Another participant reported that an enraged reporter had informed him that he 
could easily bring 100 journalists to cover a protest sponsored by NGOs to highlight their 
exclusion.  But nevertheless, neither of these proposals seemed to carry much weight within the 
coalition, and because of the ‘consensus’ procedures, the dissenting groups were obligated to go 
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along.  By and large, groups in CAN stuck with their original game plan and encourage one 
another to resist radicalization, even once political opportunities had more or less completely 
closed.   
Outcome  
The outcome of the Copenhagen Summit was politically devastating for conventional advocacy 
groups.  After years of developing careful policy based on what they believed were politically 
possible scenarios, the ultimate agreement fell dramatically short of what they felt was fair, 
ambitious and binding.   
Not only were groups devastated by the outcome, but they were crushed that they had 
been almost completely sidelined in the final hours of the negotiations.  They felt betrayed by 
their leaders, and were completely unwilling to accept the emerging Copenhagen Accord, which 
was eventually supported by the EU.  As a result, the experience in Copenhagen made many of 
these groups believe that the UNFCCC should not be the only venue for international action on 
climate change.  This had important policy consequences, as Chapter Eight will demonstrate.   
Friends of the Earth 
Because of its unique position in the climate change network, the Friends of the Earth require a 
bit of additional explanation.  Because FOE transitions during the time of this study from being a 
conventional to more contentious group, it does not fit easily in either category.  Therefore, I will 
discuss FOE separately in both this chapter and the next, highlighting its overlap with both 
contentious and conventional groups, and the reasons for its distinctiveness.   
As this chapter notes, FOE started around the same time as Greenpeace, and was 
originally associated with confrontational public campaigns.  The organization underwent a 
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similar process of professionalization and Europeanization in the 1980s and 1990s, and at the 
start of this study was still primarily involved in conventional actions when acting at the 
European level.   
But Friends of the Earth underwent major changes during the time period of this study.  
First, as previously noted, FOE International had decided in 2007 to join the emerging Climate 
Justice Now! coalition, and in 2008 had withdrawn from CAN, in what observers called a ‘no 
fault divorce.’  This meant that FOE adopted a climate justice frame in its mobilization materials, 
and was taking more radical positions than in the past.  
Within Europe, many FOE organizations opted to stay within CAN, largely because FOE 
Europe still had close working relations with the other Brussels NGOs.  FOE-E worked through 
the CAN process, and did work in Brussels on the Climate and Energy Package and climate 
financing for Copenhagen.  This meant that FOE groups were divided and in a pivotal position in 
the inter-organizational network, as Chapter Three demonstrated.   
The procedure for organizing campaigns within FOE also changed during the 2007-2009 
period.  While it used to be that FOE-E developed materials and proposed them to national 
offices, during this time period national groups within FOE increasingly began to coordinate 
directly, diffusing strategies from the bottom up.  One example of this was the ‘Big Ask 
Campaign’ which pushed for national climate bills. This campaign was developed in the UK and 
imitated by FOE offices all over Europe.  Another example was the Human Flood action, in 
which participants dress in blue and march through the streets, simulating what a climate-
induced flood might produce.  This action was developed by FOE Finland, and eventually 
became the core of FOE’s action plan for Copenhagen.   
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FOE groups thus gradually came to learn from one another more than from their 
European office.   There were a number of key venues in which this learning took place.  One 
was that FOE groups used a practice of ‘twin-ing’ in which bigger offices were paired with 
smaller ones in order to share skills.  FOE groups also engaged in extensive skills trainings at 
their European-wide meetings.  During this time period FOE also developed a European Youth 
organization that was (typically) much more interested in engaging in contentious actions, and 
had more ties to radical left groups.   
Because of its position between CJN and CAN, FOE also learned about the early 
planning meetings for more radical actions, and was the only major environmental NGO to send 
representatives to the early meetings of the radical coalition CJA.  At the national level, groups 
in France and Scandinavia also reported that they began to develop new alliances with more 
radical groups in 2008, which they believed to be common in the network.   
Building these new alliances created both opportunities and difficulties for FOE.  While 
they theoretically could benefit from having new allies, staff reported that they were often worn 
thin by having to balance the different meetings and messaging.  A lot of participants also noted 
that there were drawbacks to taking part in more than one coalition.  As one put it:  
I think this is a strong position because we are able to link two different things that 
otherwise would be unconnected.  We get a lot of info from both sides...  At the same 
time, it makes our identity more complicated.  People feel like we’re never 100% their 
allies.  We’re always the ones that don’t quite belong, and we get looked at suspiciously 
sometimes because of that (Interview 48, FOE France). 
Other interviews also established the fact that being the ‘bridge’ between the two sides of the 
network created additional challenges for FOE.  For example, FOE representatives did not find 
that it was profitable to share information between coalitions.  As one explained:  
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[JH: BUND [FOE Germany] is in both CAN and CJN, right?  So do you ever help share 
information between the two coalitions?] R: No, we don’t do that.  Because they’re 
different networks, and we keep them separate. [JH: Why’s that?] R: We don’t really see 
that the two can mix well.  Bringing things from one to the other only creates conflict, 
and it makes people think that we are representing the opposite side instead of being fully 
their allies. (Interview 87, Friends of the Earth Germany)   
The sentiment wasn’t only in the heads of FOE members.  Individuals involved in more radical 
actions repeatedly mentioned that FOE was ‘on the fence’ about its alliances, and as a result, 
couldn’t be fully involved in CJA coordination.  CAN members also began to notice the change 
in FOE.  As one put it (anonymously), “now they only have negative positions – ‘no offsetting’ -
- but aren’t participating constructively in discussions.” 
All this goes to show that starting in 2008, FOE underwent major organizational changes 
that distanced the organization from CAN and drew it a lot closer to the world of contentious 
activism.  The next Chapters will detail more specifically what that change in orientation meant 
for the organization’s choice of action forms.   
Conclusion  
Environmental groups in Europe have gone from radical upstarts to professionalized 
powerhouses in the span of thirty years. In particular, WWF, Greenpeace and Friends of the 
Earth have increased their membership, financial resources, scientific expertise, and in turn, 
access to the policy process.  This is especially true at the EU-level, where the major 
environmental groups have regularized ties to the European Institutions, and engage in 
conventional advocacy in the European policy process.   
The build up to the Copenhagen summit was a turbulent time for groups working on 
climate change.  As this chapter detailed, because COP 15 was a major moment of decision-
making, the population of groups working on the issue rapidly expanded.  As a result, the size of 
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the Climate Action Network grew and diversified, even though the long-time member Friends of 
the Earth International withdrew.  Debates within the coalition became much more heated during 
this time, although consensus decision-making meant that official positions generally represented 
the ‘lowest common denominator.’   
For individuals who dedicate their lives to climate advocacy, this was an incredibly 
stressful period.  As one anonymous participant explained to me: 
I think the problem is that for those of us working on this now, we weren’t around in the 
60s and 70s.  We don’t know what it feels like to win big victories.  And I’m fatigued – 
honestly, I just don’t know if I can keep doing this.  Every time we get close to 
something, the NGOs decide they’d rather fight with each other than to push for big 
change...  And it’s going to happen again in Copenhagen, I just know it.  It’s going to be 
a circus, and I’m dreading it. 
In a lot of ways, Copenhagen was a circus.  Conventional groups that wanted to use their well-
established professionalized advocacy routines were, for the first time, challenged by an 
explosion of new groups working on the issue area, many of which wanted to use more 
contentious tactics.  The long-time participants were not only irritated by the newcomers, they 
were fearful that the use of radical tactics would result in security restrictions for all participants.  
As a result, many of the big groups within CAN worked hard to rein in their members, and to 
persuade them not to radicalize their tactics in the final days of Copenhagen.   
NGOs are not anti-protest – Greenpeace, CAN, Oxfam and WWF were of course the 
main organizers behind the massive ‘family friendly’ march on December 12th, 2009.  But 
because of their ties with international institutions, NGOs face tough choices.  They are 
particularly penalized for trying to combine insider and outsider action strategies, as the 
experience of Friends of the Earth demonstrates.   Thus it should not be surprising that the 
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contentious challenge in Copenhagen does not come from the world of CAN, but that it 
originates in a separate sphere, as the next chapter will document.    
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONTENTIOUS CLIMATE CHANGE ACTIVISM 
In the weeks preceding Copenhagen, it became clear that COP 15 was going to attract a different 
kind of activism than a normal UN summit.  This was particularly troubling to police forces in 
the city of Copenhagen.  In early December, the head of the Police Intelligence Service in 
Copenhagen made a public statement claiming that "violent extremists will try to abuse and get a 
free ride on the peaceful activist involvement in the climate debate" (Van der Zee 2009). The 
fear of violence during COP 15 led to aggressive police action.  As one participant described a 
raid on activist sleeping quarters:  
Last night at about 2:30am we were all sleeping [in the warehouse] and the fucking cops 
came and woke us all up. They locked us in, and then they raided our supply room.  I 
guess we should have seen it coming – they just came in and raided us.  [JH: What did 
they take?] Like, the riot shields we had been making, some stuff they said could be used 
to help us get over the fence or in ‘violent’ activities.  They were harassing us too – they 
handcuffed some people and were telling us that we didn’t have a permit to be there.  But 
they fucking know that we do, they were just trying to scare us.  A lot of people were 
really frightened and alarmed.  And it makes me wonder what we can expect when the go 
out in the streets on Wednesday (Interview 79, Climate Justice Action).    
This quote makes it clear that despite being in the same city for the same event, contentious 
organizations operate in a very different world than conventional groups.  In Copenhagen, 
individuals participating in contentious groups spent most of their time planning protest 
strategies, making banners, props and supplies, attending alternative climate forums, speaking to 
the press and making contacts with similar individuals from all over Europe.  And as this quote 
illustrates, not only does the repertoire of collective action these groups employ differ 
dramatically from the advocacy of conventional groups, but they are also engaged in a highly 
conflictual relationship with political authorities that gives their activism a very different 
character.  
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This chapter explores similar questions to the previous one: where do inter-organizational 
networks come from?  What influence do they have on individual organizations working within 
them?  Here I argue that much of the structure of the contentious portion of the 2008 network 
reflects the regularized interactions of organizations participating in a new organizing coalition: 
Climate Justice Action [CJA].   When CJA appeared on the scene of climate change organizing 
in 2008, it brought new actors to the issue area of climate change, while at the same time 
disrupting the pattern of ties of organizations previously engaged in the issue area.  
In this chapter I will first explore the origins of radical climate change politics in the 
European context.  I then focus on the organizational and political lineages of the ‘climate 
justice’ organizing frame.  My main focus is the development of CJA, including its 
organizational and intellectual heritage, its operating procedures, and its outreach strategy.  The 
final section covers the evolution of strategic discussions within the coalition and the influence 
of CJA on the development and diffusion of contentious forms of action on climate change in 
advance of the Copenhagen summit.  I conclude by discussing the relationship between CJA and 
Friends of the Earth, and CJA’s influence on FOE’s action strategies in Copenhagen.  
Radical Climate Organizations (2005-2008)  
Prior to the formation of Climate Justice Action in September 2008, there were relatively few 
organizations working on climate change from a radical perspective.  But these organizations 
shared common views on tactics and targets that made coordination between them possible and 
profitable.  And starting in 2007, they began to link internationally in order to form the basis of 
the radical CJA coalition.     
Profiles of Key Actors 
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Prior to 2007, there were four main types of actors in the sphere of radical European climate 
change politics: 
• Climate Camps: The first Camp for Climate Action grew out of the Eco-village that was 
built at the Gleneagles G8 summit in Scotland in 2005.53
• Germans from the Radical Left: German groups involved in alter-global or radical left 
protest were also interested in the issue of climate change as early as 2007.  These groups 
were already mobilizing on the issue of climate change at the G8 Summit in 
Heiligendamm, but felt that they had failed to get this message across to the media.  
Around one thousand committed activists could be found in this sphere, mainly in Berlin 
and Hamburg.   
  Climate camps are temporary 
sites that are put up for several days and exist as autonomous living communities.  They 
are usually committed to direct action against the root causes of climate change (such as 
airports and coal-fired power plants) and educating the public about the climate crisis.    
Since 2006, activists have organized climate camps in England, Ireland, Scotland, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Sweden and Denmark.  These camps have 
also evolved into well-developed organizations when camp is not in session, with 
national and regional organizing structures and complex decision-making procedures.  
An estimated 10-15,000 people have participated in one of the European climate camps, 
with the UK Camps being the largest and most developed.   
• Danish Anarchists, Squatters and Radical Left Groups: Much of the local support for 
CJA came from a relatively small group of young activists associated with the anarchist 
and squatter movement in Copenhagen.  The chief organization involved was named 
                                                          
53 The tradition of ‘camping’ as a form of contentious action in the UK grew out of the Greenham Common 
Women’s Peace Camp, which was organized as a protest against nuclear weapons.     
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KlimaX.  KlimaX was founded in 2007 in Denmark, and is composed of young activists 
who have been involved in a number of anti-summit protests, mainly in Sweden and 
Germany.  At the outset, this group comprised less than one hundred participants, 
although it grew rapidly as the Copenhagen Summit approached.  
• Eco-Anarchists: The original mix of radical climate activists also involved a substantial 
number of individuals with eco-anarchist backgrounds.  For example, there were several 
British, Dutch, and German activists with backgrounds in Earth First! groups.  The first 
European branch of Earth First! was founded in the early nineties in the UK, and then 
spread chapters all over the continent.  Its original struggles tended to focus on logging, 
road building, and genetic crops.  Recently, many more of its actions have focused on 
climate change and biofuels.  An important spin-off organization -- Rising Tide -- was 
founded in 2000, by a group of Earth First! activists who wanted to work more on climate 
change issues and interact more regularly in coalitions.  The two organizations overlap in 
membership and approach, although Rising Tide tends to see itself as more open to 
working with other organizations.  The number of participants in these groups is hard to 
estimate, but is probably less than 1,000 across the continent.   
These four groups of organizations have a lot in common: they are non-hierarchical, 
decentralized, and consensus-based in their structures.  But there exists a certain amount of 
diversity within each of these organizations as to their ‘aims.’ In general, one can say that all of 
these organizations approach the climate change issue from a social justice viewpoint, which is 
very much informed by the principles of the global justice movement.  As one climate camper 
puts is: “Some people see Climate Camp as the environmental end of the anti-globalization 
movement, or the anti-globalization end of the environmental movement” (Interview 22, Camp 
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for Climate Action UK). Moreover, Rising Tide explicitly adopts this social justice perspective 
by organizing itself around the charter of the Peoples’ Global Assembly, an important global 
justice movement document.  Earth First! is the most ideologically pure of all of these 
organizations, and its members are united by a “deep ecology” view point that is somewhat more 
narrow than the other organizations.54
I think we can say the political frame-work of the Climate Camp tends to be very much 
inspired by anarchism. It’s not to say it’s an anarchist movement at all… [but] there is 
trust in people’s capacity to self-manage and that will be the path to addressing climate 
change (Interview 22, Camp for Climate Action UK). 
  To a greater or lesser extent, all these organizations also 
tend to have a do-it-yourself or anarchist inspired philosophy. As a Climate Camper puts it:  
Targets and Tactics  
The original founders of CJA also had similar ideas about the appropriate targets and tactics of 
collective action on climate change.  For these organizers, this is “a battle for the hearts and 
minds of individuals” more than an exercise in political influence on decision-makers (Interview 
22, Camp for Climate Action UK).  These organizations are skeptical about conventional actions 
that target decision-makers because, as Rising Tide puts it: “lobbying our so-called leaders can 
have no major impact on the biased and undemocratic institutions they run, in which profit is the 
only real policymaker” (Interview 23, Rising Tide UK).  From a deeper ecological perspective, 
Earth First! actions are meant to “directly -- not symbolically -- stop environmental destruction” 
and at the same time raise awareness about the issues involved through media coverage 
(Interview 57, Earth First! BE/NL).  As KlimaX puts it, the EU institutions are not much of a 
draw either, as “the EU is just a bunch of old guys shaking hands inside glass palaces.  They 
                                                          
54 The most controversial issue for these organizations is whether or not they are explicitly anti-capitalist.  While 
these organizations are all anti-corporate, Earth First!, KlimaX and Rising Tide position themselves as explicitly 
anti-capitalist, while the Climate Camp is more diverse, focusing more on “economic failures” than anti-capitalism. 
But this is a hugely divisive ideological and strategic issue both within and among these groups.   
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aren’t going to help us…” (Interview 11, KlimaX Denmark). Thus because these organizations 
do not recognize the legitimacy of their political institutions and government, they tend not to 
have direct political targets.   
But despite their professed ambivalence about the efficacy of political targets, 
international summits are a major draw for these organizations.  Certainly within the German 
radical left, this had been the major focus on their activism prior to 2008.  Within the more 
anarchist groups, the question of whether or not to target the Copenhagen Summit was a hugely 
divisive issue.  Many consider that targeting summits has natural advantages: there are great 
media opportunities, world leaders are present, and it is an opportunity to reach out across 
Europe and form new alliances.  But for those on the anarchist end of the political spectrum, 
there is concern that by making “demands vis-à-vis the summit we run the risk that we legitimize 
them, when really they can’t solve our problems” (Interview 19, Earth First! UK). Moreover, 
others consider that playing the summit game increases the chances of the co-optation of the 
message of the movement.   
Target choices are crucial because these founding group have strong preferences about 
their ‘tactics’: all of these groups were formed explicitly to facilitate grassroots direct action by 
individuals.  In its statement, Rising Tide “rejects lobbying and calls for a confrontational 
attitude,” the Climate Camp has ‘direct action’ as one its four organizational pillars, and Earth 
First! is organized on the “general principle… of the use of direct action.” The rejection of the 
conventional tactics of NGOs is another frequently cited reason for forming these types of 
organizations.55
                                                          
55 From Earth First! recruitment materials: Are you tired of namby-pamby environmental groups? Are you tired of 
overpaid corporate environmentalists who suck up to bureaucrats and industry? Have you become disempowered by 
the reductionist approach of environmental professionals and scientists?  
 Training guides for activists in these circles tend to advise activists to “make 
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your tactics match your message.”56  For some in the movement this commitment to these tactics 
is a strategic effort to connect to previous movements and gather public support, while for others 
it is the result of personal commitment to these methods.57
Consideration of media coverage also plays a big role in action planning.  For example, 
the Great Rebel Raft Regatta – in which activists at the Climate Camp tried to go by boat to the 
site of the Kingsnorth power plant in England -- was almost certainly not going to yield results in 
terms of entry to the plant, but was mostly devised for its visual appeal.  For most actions, broad 
organizations like Rising Tide and Climate Camp try to combine elements that are both “fluffy 
and spiky” to appeal to different constituencies.  Even Earth First! And KlimaX have organized 
‘banner drops’ that are meant to make good photo opportunities.   
   
Overall, these organizations share a critique of climate change as a problem rooted in 
limitations of the capitalist economic system.  They are all strongly anti-corporate, and choose a 
variety of governmental, summit, corporate, and non-governmental targets.  Their direct action 
tactics form a large part of their organizational identities, and they tend to see themselves 
fighting for influence at the grassroots level more than changing the opinions of decision-makers, 
who they tend to view as illegitimate.   
The Origins of Climate Justice Politics 
During the time period of this study, radical climate change organizations began to approach the 
problem of climate change in a new way.  Radical climate change organizations, along with 
                                                          
56 From movement materials “Direct Action: A Handbook.” Author and Publisher unknown.   
57 Additionally, Earth First! is often associated with the tactic of ‘mokeywrenching’ (acts of vandalism or violence 
in the name of environmentalism), although at the organizational-level, there is no official position on this. 
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global justice movement58 groups, self-consciously pieced together issues in order to develop a 
new and innovative frame around which to mobilize. Specifically, these new actors adopted a 
‘climate justice’ collective action frame59 for the first time in 2007. The ‘climate justice’ frame 
established a diagnosis of the origins of the climate crisis as the logical outcome of unjust global 
trade, agriculture and production system.  In emphasizing these new conceptual linkages, 
activists engaged in deliberate frame bridging60
Radical Insiders Reach Out   
 with the issues of the global justice movement in 
order to broaden their mobilization.  This new frame was also extremely successful, and was 
adopted rapidly by organizations in the time period of 2007-2009, resulting in a ‘framing 
cascade’ (Byrd 2010).    
The origins of the ‘climate justice’ frame can be traced back to the vigorous inter-organizational 
debates around the development of the Kyoto protocol.  At the time, many big transnational 
NGOs had been opposed to the inclusion of carbon markets in an eventual climate change treaty.  
However, once it became clear that the Kyoto protocol had a chance to succeed, these same 
groups reluctantly decided to support the idea of carbon markets.  This decision caused a split 
between these transnational NGOs and other, more radical NGOs that strongly rejected carbon 
markets.  The strongest statement of this rejection was the ‘Durban Declaration’ issued by a 
group of organizations in 2004, which introduced the term “climate justice.”  
                                                          
58 The global justice movement can be defined as “a loose network of organizations…and other actors engaged in 
collective action of various kinds, on the basis of the shared goal of advancing the cause of justice (social, economic, 
political and environmental) among and between peoples across the globe” (della Porta 2007: 6).  The movement is 
known for its repertoire of summit protesting, perhaps best exemplified by the Seattle WTO protests in 1999 (Wood 
2007).   
59 The ‘framing perspective’ on collective action holds that grievances are abundant, but that interpretative processes 
are important in establishing things that might otherwise be ‘annoyances’ or ‘inconveniences’ as conditions for 
collective action (see Snow 2004: 380-384 for an excellent summary).  Collective action frames are purposely 
constructed to “mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize 
antagonists” (Snow and Benford 1988: 198).   
60 ‘Frame bridging’ is the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames 
regarding a particular issue or problem (See Benford and Snow 2000). 
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Following the Durban Declaration, many groups within the UNFCCC recognized that 
they had a common critical view that was not well represented inside the CAN coalition at the 
time.  Their next step was the creation of the Climate Justice Now! coalition at the 2007 
UNFCCC conference in Bali.  Climate Justice Now! framed its work both in layman’s terms 
(e.g., “fighting for social, ecological and gender justice”) and in terms appropriate for submission 
to the UNFCCC (e.g. “We ask Annex I countries to agree to ambitious emission reductions in 
future commitment periods in the Kyoto Protocol that will unlock LCA discussions about non 
Annex I actions based on the availability of appropriate financing”)61
In addition, Climate Justice Now! framed its diagnosis of the climate crisis in ways that 
would make linkages to trade, agricultural and gender issues.  In doing so, it tried to develop a 
broader systemic critique that distinguished them from the narrow and pragmatic approach of 
most NGOs.   As one participant put it:  
 (Climate Justice Now! 
2009).  
It was a strategic mistake of the environmental movement in the past to work on issues 
separately, rather than to make a systemic critique. But it’s hard because we need to come 
up with something that trade unions, farmers and indigenous peoples can all agree on and 
that will make these different groups understand the importance of climate change.  We 
have to build bridges between all of these different movements.  The environmental 
movement has been too isolated for too long.  (Interview 80, Climate Justice Now! 2009).   
This approach seemed to work, and it quickly gained favor amongst radical groups within the 
UNFCCC as well as in a new constituency: European alter-global and autonomous groups that 
were becoming interested in mobilizing around new issues.   
The Global Justice Movement Looks to Redefine Itself 
                                                          
61 In layman’s terms, this means that CJN! is calling on developed countries to commit to ambitious emissions 
reductions targets and provide funding for developed countries to take on similar actions after the expiration of the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
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At the same time as a more radical group of organizations was breaking off from the reformist 
framing of transnational NGOs, a group of global justice movement activists were becoming 
increasingly frustrated with their own invisibility in public discourse.  This was particularly true 
in the UK and Germany, where the movement had been strong since the 2000s, and where 
tension between disruptive and institutionalized groups had been growing (della Porta 2007: 27).   
In the UK, global justice movement activists commonly perceived that their movement 
had been in decline since their disastrous experience with the 2005 Gleneagles G8 Summit and 
the Labour government sponsored ‘Make Poverty History’ campaign.   A lot of their self-
criticism focused on their inability to unite as a movement with a common and positive political 
agenda to challenge the co-optation of their issues by government agencies and more mainstream 
civil society groups.   
For UK activists, the climate change issue offered them the opportunity to build a 
coherent, radical narrative and start to put forward concrete political demands.  One of the most 
direct outcomes of the Gleneagles protests was the creation of the ‘climate camps.’ The climate 
camps had important direct action, sustainable living and public education components.  The 
philosophy of these camps was also a direct bridge between global justice and climate change 
issues.  For example, one of their ‘welcome guides’ to the camp complains about “market driven 
approaches” that “deny those most severely affected that opportunity to speak up for climate 
justice” (Climate Camp UK, Document 35, 2009).    
The German global justice movement went through a remarkably similar process of 
critical self-reflection after the anti-G8 Heiligendamm mobilization in 2007.   These groups were 
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similarly frustrated, and latched onto the climate change issue for strategic reasons.  As one 
prominent activist put it: 
It was like, in Heiligendamm we kept talking about neoliberalism and [the leaders] had 
already moved on.  In a lot of ways, neoliberalism was already dead at that point – they 
were even saying that in the Financial Times... And [the leaders] were saying, ‘look at all 
the great stuff we do, we’re for the environment, we’re such good guys.’ And we didn’t 
have any way to counter that because we weren’t where things were happening.  So we 
started looking around… And as much as we were a movement without a story at that 
point, there was also a story without a movement: climate change. (Interview 84, Climate 
Justice Action 2009).   
Frame Bridging  
As a result of the growing dissatisfaction within the global justice community in both countries, 
activists in Germany and the UK independently began to conceptually link global justice issues 
such as global finance, debt, food and militarism to climate change.  One of the ways they did 
this was by distributing texts online and in print.  For example, activists associated with coalition 
Climate Justice Action! printed and distributed  pamphlets entitled “Why Climate Change is not 
an Environmental Issue.”  The introduction stated that:  
This pamphlet looks at climate change from the angles of capitalism, militarism, nuclear 
energy, gender, migration, labour & class, and food production. Climate change is not 
just an environmental issue. It is but one symptom of a system ravaging our planet and 
destroying our communities (X-Y Solidarity Fund 2009). 
 
By diagnosing the climate problem from each of these angles, this document deliberately framed 
the problem as both “not environmental” and as an issue that would appeal to as many 
constituencies as possible.   
 
Injustice Frames  
 
 203 
 
Previous research has shown that the use of “injustice” frames can be a successful way to 
broaden mobilization (Cable and Shriver 1995; Capek 1993; Gamson 1992: 112; Sherman 2004). 
Climate justice movement activists self-consciously engaged in exactly this kind of frame 
bridging in order to broaden their movement.  As one activist put it:  
 
Obviously we want to make the movement as broad as possible.  And it’s kind of 
inspiring to see how much and how many movements can fit under this umbrella of 
climate justice now.  So it has the urgency of direct action, it has the ‘justice’ aspect 
where you can fit quite a lot of different approaches under this umbrella, and it’s about 
climate but it’s about more than climate.  I mean, everybody knows that climate justice is 
also social justice.  And it’s really comprising quite a lot of different aspects (Interview 
77, Climate Justice Caravan 2009).  
Moreover, many activists with a history of global justice movement involvement explicitly 
mention broad frames or ‘umbrellas’ as one of the keys to movement success.  As one long-time 
activist put it:   
And also [summit protests] are a kind of an umbrella… In order to unite a movement you 
need something that is catching all the movements like ‘another world is possible’ or ‘ya 
basta!’ So you share the rejection, but there are many yeses.    And you don’t have this if 
you just have campaigns on single issues.  And this is one strength that you get from 
these kinds of protests – it always worked really well for us to do it this way.  [JH: So do 
you think that ‘climate justice’ is such an umbrella?] Exactly. It’s just that (Interview 78, 
Peoples’ Global Action 2009).  
These activists use the frame of ‘climate justice’ to bridge the global justice and climate justice 
movements.  In doing so they developed a systemic diagnosis of the climate change problem that 
made it possible to mobilize a new constituency on the issue of climate change.   
Using Movement Symbols 
In addition, climate justice activists also deliberately linked the mobilizations in Copenhagen to 
previous global justice movement events in order to broaden their appeal. They particularly drew 
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on the historical precedent of the Seattle WTO protests, which was all the more important 
because the Copenhagen Summit was originally scheduled to open on November 30th 2009: the 
tenth anniversary of the Seattle WTO shutdown.  As prominent global justice movement thinker 
Naomi Klein wrote prior to the Copenhagen Summit: 
There is certainly a Seattle quality to the Copenhagen mobilization: the huge range of 
groups that will be there; the diverse tactics that will be on display; and the developing-
country governments ready to bring activist demands into the summit....If Seattle was the 
coming out party, this should be the coming of age party…  The Seattle activists' coming 
of age in Copenhagen will be very disobedient (Klein 2009).  
Thus climate justice activists developed a new frame that bridged the radical environmental 
community and the global justice movement in an attempt to make Copenhagen into ‘the new 
Seattle.’  In doing so, they mobilized new types of actors and brought them together with actors 
with whom they had not worked previously.  But implicitly, their use of this issue frame also 
sowed the seeds for a new type of mobilization: the climate change summit protest.  The next 
sections detail each of these developments.   
Building Climate Justice Action (2008)  
Initial Contact 
Starting in 2007, the few organizations working in the sphere of radical climate change politics 
began to come into contact with one another, spread ideas about climate justice, and exchange 
ideas for mobilization.  The UK Climate Camp was something of a beacon in this original 
organizing effort.  Many young German leftists attended the climate camps in 2006 and 2007, 
and found the process very exciting and inspiring.  As a result, they decided to hold a similar 
camp in Hamburg in 2008.  As one participant put it, “a few of us had been to the climate camp 
in the UK, and we thought it was brilliant.  So basically we just took the idea – we copied it 
directly from them” (Interview 63, German Climate Camp).  The German climate camp in 2008 
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was broader than the UK camp in that it attempted to unite the radical German left, by also 
focusing on other issues such as militarism, immigration policy and racism.   
At the time, similar discussions were going on in Germany and the UK about possibly 
mobilizing on the issue of climate change.  But these groups might have remained nationally-
rooted had it not been for the organizing efforts of a small but enterprising group of young 
Danes.  The original Danish organizers were motivated to organize the mobilization for a 
number of reasons.  Locally in Copenhagen, there had been disputes between these groups and 
their government about a squatted youth center.  Some of these activists felt the government had 
mistreated them in this struggle, and wanted to embarrass Danish leaders on the international 
stage.  But more importantly, many of these activists were interested in honoring the anniversary 
of the Seattle WTO shutdown with their own radical mobilization.  And in order to do that, they 
wanted to make the mobilization as large, broad and radical as possible.  
These individuals (most of whom were already involved in KlimaX) travelled around 
Europe to the various climate camps and organizational meetings in the summer of 2008 to try 
and convince people and organizations to participate in an international meeting on the 
Copenhagen Summit in September 2008, in Copenhagen.  Invitations to this meeting were also 
distributed widely across activist list serves and websites.  In addition, the meeting was 
organized to take place two days before the European Social Forum [ESF] across the border in 
Malmö, Sweden.  The ESF itself was expected to attract 80,000 participants from a wide variety 
of leftist backgrounds, so the timing of the event was aimed at attracting the broadest possible 
spectrum of groups. The next section details how these linkages were established. 
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The first meeting of the coalition that would become CJA was organized by a group of 
individuals from the climate camps, from radical left and from eco-anarchist groups.  As one 
observer quipped, it was, “a small group of European professional activists – all the usual 
suspects really.”     
The first meeting of CJA set the tone for those that would come.  The meeting was 
organized over two days in the cafeteria of an alternative school in Copenhagen.  The Danish 
groups took care of the meeting logistics, and the agenda was set by a small organizing 
committee and facilitators. Approximately 100 people attended the first meeting, all of whom 
were engaged in the participatory meeting process.  My informal count of the stated backgrounds 
of participants suggested that one half of the meeting consisted of environmental activists and the 
other half of participants with a background in anti-summit organizing.   
Operating Procedures   
Because CJA had its roots in the global justice movement, it adopted many of the operating 
procedures associated with this movement.  Most importantly, it functioned (without any 
discussion of the matter) according to procedures of consensus decision-making. In order to take 
a decision by consensus, a specific process has to be followed for considering every individual’s 
opinions.  Generally speaking, proposed meeting agendas are circulated in advance via email, 
and individuals are given the opportunity to contribute.  At the face-to-face meetings, designated 
facilitators raise the agenda items, and ask for feedback on the items (See Figure 6.1).  After 
discussion, during which hand signaling is often used to communicate agreement or dissent with 
other people’s opinions, the facilitator tests the group for consent.  At this stage, individuals can 
propose a ‘block’ of the decision, which means that if the decision went forward they would 
leave the group.  If this happens, the group returns to discussion.  The process repeats itself until 
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agreement has been reached (or until it has been decided not to take a decision), and can often be 
quite time-intensive – most CJA meetings lasted several days, and often decisions were not 
reached on the most divisive issues.  
For larger groups a ‘spokescouncil’ format was used (See also Figure 6.1).62
Figure 6.1: Consensus Decision-Making in Large Groups
  In a 
spokescouncil, each consensus group nominates one person (a ‘spoke’) to speak on its behalf to 
the larger gathering.  These consensus groupings can be based on geographical affiliation, 
ideological affiliation, working group membership, or language usage.  The spoke has the task of 
taking proposals from the larger group back to the smaller group, and vice-versa.  This procedure 
is used to make decisions in groups up to six hundred people, although it is often even more 
time-consuming.   
63
                                                          
62 This is a common organizing format in the global justice movement, and was used most notably to organize the 
Direct Action Network prior to the Seattle WTO protests.   
 
 
63 Taken from, Climate Camp UK “How Our Meetings Work”: http://www.climatecamp.org.uk/node/485 (May 28, 
2009).  Similar material is widely used in other organizations for training meeting facilitators.   
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Consensus procedures meant that participants in CJA had to come to full agreement on 
every joint statement or action proposal.  This had important consequences: consensus decision-
making procedures were a vehicle for tactical harmonization amongst participating 
organizations.  The next sections illustrate how this procedure operated in practice, focusing on 
the first crucial CJA task: writing the ‘Call to Action.’   
Legitimacy Debates  
Summit protests have always been controversial because they have the potential to fracture the 
activist community along the reformist-abolitionist divide (Levi and Murphy 2006; Smith 2001).  
This tension was evident in the preparations for Copenhagen.  While the community of alter-
global activists is accustomed to protesting international financial institutions, before 
Copenhagen “few groups ha[d] actively mobilized against the UN” (Smith 2008: 98, c.f. Fisher 
2004: 179). Given this tension, the fundamental question of the CJA coalition was how to 
position their actions vis-à-vis the UNFCCC.   
Given the complexity of the issue, on the first day of the meeting the entire afternoon was 
spent discussing the question ‘does COP 15 have any legitimacy?’ Since individuals came from a 
broad range of backgrounds, there was a full spectrum of opinion on this.  Based on my 
observation, I would place the responses in three categories64
• Legitimate: “The best way to influence the outcomes of Copenhagen as a whole would be 
for the movement to make demands on the UN and ask the UN to accept certain 
demands: this is what we want out of a treaty, they need to accept this.  I think this would 
: 
                                                          
64 These quotes are drawn from my field notes from these early meetings.  As per my agreement with the 
participants, I do not identify individuals or their organizations.   
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be legitimsing the UN, but they could still come up with a good treaty this way.  We have 
to note the differences between the UN, WTO and this summit.” 
• Intermediate: “Our processes should be to change the balance of forces inside the 
negotiations, to support countries pushing for immediate reductions, to support the 
Global South.  I see the potential for the breakdown of the negotiations with divisions 
between north and south, and this could be a good thing for us.  But it would be bad for 
us to start off by saying that the UN is illegitimate because it could play into the hands of 
climate deniers and people trying to ignore climate change.”  
• Not legitimate: “The UNFCCC is illegitimate.  Period. At root it has good intentions, but 
these have been completely co-opted.  UNFCCC is more like the WTO, in coercing 
southern countries to go along with market mechanisms, etc. We need to look at this as 
more of a WTO or G8 meeting than a UN meeting.  I don’t think these people can come 
up with a good deal for us – they’re voices of money and accumulation and power.” 
My informal count suggests that the original participants were fairly evenly divided amongst 
these three positions.  To generalize broadly, those supporting the legitimacy of the UNFCCC 
tended to come from a background in environmental advocacy, those from other kinds of 
international NGOs mostly supported the intermediate position, and those global justice 
movement groups with autonomous or direct action heritage supported the final interpretation.  
Despite extensive discussion, there was no final consensus on this issue at the first meeting.   
Writing the Call 
Despite having no resolution on the ‘legitimacy’ debate, the first CJA meeting needed to produce 
a mobilization document, mainly for practical purposes.  In this spirit, the second day of the first 
CJA meeting was devoted to synthesizing the legitimacy debate and producing the coalition’s 
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‘Call to Action.’  The Call was a key document for this coalition, because it needed to 
summarize the ideology behind the movement and attract others to participate.  Because this 
document needed to reflect the ideological diversity of the initial participants, the text went 
through a number of iterations and was subject to agreement by consensus.  Figure 6.2 shows a 
draft version of this call on the left, along with the final version on the right.   
The first version on the text was prepared by an organizing group that consisted of mainly of 
individuals who considered the COP illegitimate and wanted to engage in direct action.  But 
consensus was only reached by modifying the text along a number of dimensions.  I would 
particularly emphasize three axes of change:   
• Targets: The original text contained only references to corporate action targets and the 
inadequacy of ‘so-called leaders’ to solve the problem.  The final version of the text 
scratches both of these elements, retains the language of ‘acting on the root causes of 
climate change,’ but adds a section on targeting ‘the key agents responsible.’   In other 
words, the final text bridges the gap between different constituencies by being vague 
about the targets of any eventual action. 
• Tactics: The proposed version of the text suggests the coalition will sponsor ‘direct 
action’ – this is removed in the final version (it is changed to simply ‘action’). In fact, the 
final text explicitly mentions that the plans for the mobilization are not set, and invites 
groups to participate with their own ideas.  This change is also the result of compromise 
among diverse groups present at the first meeting.   
• Outreach: The final version of the text incorporates text to try to reach out to a broader 
constituency by referencing affected peoples (women, indigenous people, poor people 
and farmers).  It also drops the term ‘civil society,’ because it was felt that this phrase has 
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different connotations in different places.  Finally, it adds a reference to the Seattle WTO 
anniversary, in an attempt to reach out to global justice movement groups.   
In summary, the text of the CJA ‘Call to Action’ became less of an autonomous, direct 
action-oriented document and transformed into something much broader as a result of group 
discussion. The point of discussing this example is to emphasize that participating in CJA was 
initially an agreement in principle to work together more than an agreement on specific 
ideological positions or tactics. Despite strong preferences of some within the group, neither the 
ideology nor the action proposals in the group were pre-set, and both were subject to continuing 
re-negotiation.  Organizations came to cooperate in CJA (by affiliating and formally endorsing 
the Call) without necessarily knowing what the final outcome of the mobilization would be.   
   
 212 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Draft of the ‘Call to Action’ Put Out by Climate Justice Action,  
September 2008 
 
  
 213 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Final Version of the Call to Action Put out by Climate Justice Action, 
September 2008
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This meant that within the group there was room for a great deal of compromise and influence in 
the ongoing consensus procedure, and that the process involved a strong element of deliberation, 
rather than simply diffusion of certain groups’ preferences. 
CJA Outreach 
As the modifications to the text also reveal, CJA was concerned from the beginning with 
questions of how to build the biggest mobilization possible.  In general, most of the groups that 
got involved with the coalition had been targets of outreach by earlier members. Having a vague 
call helped to broaden the potential appeal, but it also made recruitment difficult in some ways.  
Early organizations had to join the coalition without necessarily knowing what the ultimate 
action proposal would look like.  As one CJA participant complained, “it’s pretty hard to build a 
movement before we know what it’s about.”  
One main venue for recruiting potential participants and organizational sponsors was the 
European Social Forum in 2008.  Although CJA representatives did also hold a meeting at the 
World Social Forum in Belém in 2009, the scope of the mobilization for Copenhagen was mostly 
European.  The purpose of the Belém meeting was mostly to get the input of Southern groups, 
but it was generally not expected that they would participate in joint actions.   
Within Europe, CJA organized a regional structure in which organizations participating 
in the coalition took the lead in recruiting other organizations in their area.  This often took place 
by holding regional organizing meetings that fed into the international CJA meetings.  This 
regional organizing structure also facilitated the coordination of many contentious actions in the 
build-up to Copenhagen.  For example, Dutch-speaking groups formed their own CJA coalition 
in the Spring of 2009, and organized a number of actions in Amsterdam and Antwerp.   
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CJA also did significant outreach at the COP 14 UNFCCC meeting in Poznan, Poland.  
The coalition sent representatives to this meeting, and managed to attract a number of groups that 
were not part of the ‘usual suspects.’  The space for this meeting was itself rented by a Brussels-
based advocacy organization – IBON International -- and included a number of small think tanks 
and NGOs.  A second meeting, focused more on strategy, took place at the Rozbrat squat in 
Poznan, and attracted more individuals from the Polish autonomous community.   
CJA particularly targeted groups associated with the CJN coalition.  This was natural 
because some of the original members of CJA were also active within CJN.  However, few of the 
members of CJN were based in Europe, so this effort was important to CJA mostly for symbolic 
(not practical) reasons.  In particular, CJA was interested in gaining the support of La Via 
Campesina, (which has a European advocacy office) and the Indigenous Environmental Network 
(which includes members from a number of Arctic countries).  It was felt that without the 
support of these groups, actions taken on ‘their behalf’ would lack legitimacy.  This becomes 
particularly important once CJA begins to discuss the possibility of holding a major summit 
protest in Copenhagen.   
Meeting at the Fence: The Evolution of the CJA Action Concept  
As my discussion of the CJA ‘Call to Action’ illustrated, the tactics of the coalition were not pre-
set at the time of its formation.  The CJA action concept was hotly debated within the coalition, 
and as the result of consensus procedures, evolved significantly over time.   
The Repertoire of Summit Protesting 
The conveners of the first CJA meeting clearly intended that the group would organize a classic 
summit protest.  The summit protest is perhaps the most visible performance in the repertoire of 
the global justice movement (Bennett 2004; della Porta 2007; della Porta and Tarrow 2005; 
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Reitan 2007; Smith2001; Smith 2009). In preparation for Copenhagen, climate justice activists 
called for the use of the Seattle-style summit protest repertoire against the UNFCCC for the first 
time.  As one early and influential mobilizing document put it:  
 
Where do the strengths of the radical global movements lie both in comparison to our 
enemies and to our more moderate allies? Answer: in the organisation of large-scale, 
disruptive summit mobilisations. It is precisely in summit mobilisations that we have 
developed something that could be called ‘best practice’, where we have before achieved 
a substantial political effect... Forget Kyoto – Shut down Copenhagen 2009! (Müller 
2008).   
Most of the founders of CJA were committed to this type of action from the outset.  But because 
of the diversity of participants, ‘shutting down the summit’ was by far the most controversial 
topic of discussion within the CJA coalition.   
Towards Consensus  
Much like the discussion on the ‘Call to Action,’ groups within CJA did not originally agree on 
what kinds of tactics they wanted to use: there was a fundamental tension between more 
autonomous and more reformist positions.  This diversity was clear from an exercise facilitators 
organized at the first meeting.  People were asked to engage in discussions with their neighbors 
about what kind of action they would like to see used to fight climate change, and then to 
physically arrange themselves along a continuum from most radical to least radical forms of 
action.  On the one end of the room, some organizations wanted to use a friendly mass march 
that would appeal to leaders in the UN to act on climate and complement inside lobbying. A 
proposal in the middle of the room called for groups to hold ‘tribunals for climate criminals’ 
outside the venue.  On the far end of the room, it was clear that many organizations were very 
committed to the idea of a Seattle-style shut down.  Because of the lack of consensus, the first 
meeting evaded making a decision on this issue.   
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The Poznan meeting changed the balance of positions because it brought in more people 
to CJA from NGO backgrounds, and many of the autonomous groups from the first meeting did 
not attend.    The Poznan groups were concerned about the idea of shutting down the UNFCCC 
because they felt that the institution could still come up with valid solutions. The groups present 
at the Poznan meeting floated a number of ideas on the CJA listserve about possible ‘inside-
outside’ actions that would be designed to link mass action outside the conference to 
strengthening the position of progressive delegations inside it.  As one advocate put it:  
 The action has to be strong enough to show what we need – it can’t just be a classic 
demonstration.  At the same time, this isn’t just a direct action movement, and we need to 
use our diversity. 
This was hotly debated at meetings and on the list-serve, re-activating the original tensions 
within CJA about the extent to which the coalition would be more radical or more reformist. 
Given the heated nature of the debate, the March meeting of CJA was designated as the 
crucial meeting for tactical discussions and designing the action strategy of the coalition.  In 
advance of the meeting, the facilitators invited different organizations to write up and submit 
their proposals for an action strategy.  These were included in the Handbook for the March 
meeting, and participants were asked to come prepared to discuss the proposals and make 
decisions for their group.65
• The German COP 15 network and the UK Climate Camp proposed the ‘shut it down’ 
strategy. 
  In particular:  
                                                          
65 Two other issues were proposed before this meeting. Some groups associated with CJN insisted that the type of 
action didn’t matter as much as the date (had to be in the second week once heads of state arrived).  Another German 
autonomous group proposed that the coalition had to function so that groups could not criticize or disassociate from 
other groups using confrontational tactics (a common operating procedure in the global justice movement).  Both 
proposals were adopted by consensus at the March meeting.   
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• The Danish groups preferred the ‘shut them in’ or ‘take it over’ strategy.   
• A few international NGOs proposed a mass march and demonstration to call on UN 
leaders as an ‘insider/outsider action.’   
• A number of NGOs in CJN suggested an ‘Ecological Debt Tribunal’ outside the 
conference venue.   
• A number of eco-anarchists supported a strategy of targeting lobbyists and problematic 
delegates to prevent them from entering the venue.   
• An anonymous participant (who identified himself only as ‘from Geneva’) suggested a 
strategy of participants forcing their way into the venue while some inside come out to 
meet them.   
Despite its lack of strong organizational sponsors, the final proposal seemed to gain ground 
quickly at the March meeting.  For a variety of reasons, this strategy seemed to be a way out of 
the tactical debates that plagued the group.  As one participant put it: 
At the March CJA meeting there was consensus that we would organize one central 
action, so the discussion then became what should we do?  The Danes were very attached 
to the shut in idea.  But at the strategic level, such an action involved an appeal to the UN 
to do something.  And that’s not we wanted at all ...  Not to mention that at the tactical 
level it was never going to work: how are you going to shut people in when you have to 
stay on the streets of Copenhagen for two or three days in the winter?  It just wasn’t 
going to happen.  So the next idea was the shut out, which is kind of the classic summit 
action.  But Via Campesina didn’t want that, with a bunch of Northern activists storming 
the summit, so we agreed to take it off the table.  On the list there was a guy from Geneva 
who had proposed a kind of inside-outside action, and at the meeting we called this the 
‘meet at the fence’ idea.  It was still a bit fuzzy, but that was the general idea. And it just 
sort of took off from there. (Interview 79, Climate Justice Action) 
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Thus by the end of the March meeting, the members of CJA had already begun to compromise 
on the kind of action they would sponsor in Copenhagen.  In this environment, the idea of the 
ultimate action – called Reclaim Power – started to take hold in CJA.   
Designing ‘Reclaim Power’  
Reclaim Power was designed as an interesting compromise strategy on the part of the various 
groups present in CJA.  As developed in the June and October CJA meetings, the official action 
concept for Reclaim Power involved four components:  
1) A disruptive outside action;  
2) An inside disruption;  
3) A walk out from the conference center; and  
4) A People’s Assembly ‘in the area of the conference center.’  
Taken in order, the disruptive outside action was the biggest component of the action.  The 
concept for the outside disruption was a combination of the German ‘five fingers’ tactic used in 
Heiligendamm, the UK Climate Camp tactic of converging blocs, and the Danish ‘pushing’ 
tactic.66
                                                          
66 The ‘converging blocs’ tactics involves multiple autonomous groups that take different routes to arrive at the same 
site at the same time.  The ‘five fingers’  tactic is similar, but involves having multiple moving blocs that engage in 
blockades at different locations.  Finally, the ‘pushing’ tactics simply involves activists forming solid blocs and 
pushing up against the police until they give ground.   
  Participants organized in blocs would take different routes and means of travel to 
converge at the fence of the conference center at the same time.  Once they reached the 
conference center, they would form a mass that tried to push past the police to enter the area 
inside the fence.  Simultaneously, participants inside the conference center would cause 
disruptions and staged a walk out from the venue.  The two groups would meet outside the 
conference center and stage a “Peoples’ Assembly” to discuss their own solutions to the climate 
crisis.   
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The action itself was a significant innovation on the summit protest repertoire for several 
reasons.  While utilizing tactics such as jail solidarity, protest puppetry, affinity groups, and 
(limited) blockading (Wood 20007), activists decided against a ‘shut down’ approach to the 
summit, which would have alienated some influential groups within the coalition.  Instead, 
climate justice activists designed an action that would highlight their own solutions to the 
problem while at the same time delegitimizing the official international process.  In addition, this 
action made explicit linkages between radical social movements, critical NGOs, and progressive 
country delegations in the negotiations.   
But already by June it was clear that there was tension within CJA because the action was 
not autonomous enough.  While most of these groups agreed to go along with the action, they did 
express reservations, and decided to organize other actions for Copenhagen that were more direct 
action oriented.  As one participants noted:  
Targeting summits works well because you are interrupting their show.  And you know 
that they will notice that too.  But the message here is really complex -- no deal is better 
than a bad deal – I think there’s a big possibility that we will be misunderstood. 
(Interview 64, Climate Camp Germany) 
As a result, while agreeing to Reclaim Power, some groups within CJA also started to proliferate 
their own more autonomous action plans.  These included an action called ‘Hit the Production’ 
where groups targeted corporations in the Copenhagen Harbor and ‘Our Climate, Not Your 
Business!’ which targeted corporate delegates to the COP process. But by the June meeting of 
CJA, it was clear that the central action was not going to be autonomous enough for some 
participants, and a small group did break off to form another (much smaller) organization, calling 
themselves ‘Never Trust a COP’ [NTAC].   
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Once the outline of Reclaim Power was set, CJA started to call on groups to go back to 
their regions to mobilize and organize similar actions.  These actions become much more 
frequent in the summer and fall of 2009, as groups took these kinds of ideas for contentious 
action back to their own cities and began to practice them at home.67
On the other end of the spectrum, some moderate groups also began to feel 
uncomfortable about the design of the central action for CJA.  In particular, Friends of the Earth 
International ultimately decided to pull out once it felt that it could not control the direction of 
decision-making within CJA. This meant that CJA ultimately lost groups on both sides of the 
political spectrum.  As a participant summarizes:   
   
At the CJA meeting in October, FOE and some CJN people did a pitch to ‘liberalize’ 
Reclaim Power and take out the civil disobedience.  This was rejected, and FOE 
withdrew from CJA.  After the March meeting there were also some old school 
autonomous groups that realizes that CJA wasn’t going to organize militant actions.  So 
they withdrew to form NTAC [Never Trust A COP]… But basically Reclaim Power was 
aimed at the middle, and that meant losing groups on the right and on the left.  
Both NTAC and FOE-I did leave CJA, although they continued to send representatives to the 
meetings.  As I detail in the next section, both groups ultimately decided to sponsor separate 
(contentious) actions before and during the Copenhagen summit.   
Since Reclaim Power was ‘aimed at the middle’, CJA tried to reached out to individuals 
within the NGO community in order to get them to participate in the ‘walk out’ portion of the 
action. This includes distributing a flyer within the meetings of CAN inside the Bella Center.  As 
Figure 6.4 shows, CJA significantly moderated its messaging to appeal to this constituency and  
 
                                                          
67 This partially accounts for the growth of contentious actions in the member states in the Fall of 2009, as reported 
in Chapter Two.   
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Figure 6.4: Reclaim Power Outreach Flyer for Distribution Inside the Bella Center 
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make the ultimate mobilization as broad as possible.  Despite this effort, the flyer seemed to be 
ignored by most moderate groups.   
Friends of the Earth  
For FOE, the decision to leave CJA was difficult for a number of reasons.  FOE had been present 
since the founding of the coalition, and had participated actively in the meetings.  As a result, 
national groups within FOE had also changed their orientation, and were starting to work with 
different partners than they had before, altering the structure of the inter-organizational network 
in important ways.   
But at a strategic level, FOE groups seemed to suspect that they would be able to sway 
groups within CJA towards their own action proposal. The fundamental sticking point between 
FOE and more radical groups was the issue of non-violence, which FOE strongly supports and 
some CJA members felt they could not guarantee.  A participant characterized the break 
strongly:  
FOE can’t be involved in CJA, because of the big question: where will it all end?  There 
is no question that the mainstream of CJA is non-violent, but who knows what will 
happen when they get on the streets.  Diversity of tactics68
Because FOE had strong pre-existing positions against property damage, most leaders felt that 
the organization could not participate in Reclaim Power.  Representatives also mentioned that 
 is a bullshit British idea.  The 
anarchists love it, and they love using it because that means no one can tell them not to 
do what they want to do… The whole rhetoric is to ‘not water down’ what others do.  But 
as FOE Sweden, we did want to water it down.  I don’t mind saying that. And we don’t 
support the closing of discussion on it either...  We needed them to be strong on non-
violence and against property damage (Interview 69, Friends of the Earth Sweden) 
                                                          
68 ‘Diversity of tactics’ is a principle strongly associated with organizing in the global justice movement.  The idea is 
that groups agree not to condemn one another’s tactics, which may range from purely non-violent (peaceful protest) 
to the more ‘violent’ end of the spectrum (usually meaning property damage).   
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FOE does work within the UNFCCC process, and would be at serious risk of expulsion if the 
organization were to sponsor this kind of action.   
Friends of the Earth Denmark particularly “went into turmoil” over the Reclaim Power 
Action.  Originally, the organization wanted to support the action, and had been meeting 
frequently with CJA supporters in the local context.  But ultimately, the organization also pulled 
their support for it, mostly as a result of pressure from the international FOE network (Interview 
59, FOE Denmark).  Because FOE was counting on the Danish group to help host them in 
Demark and liaise with the Danish government (which was chairing the COP), the organization 
ultimately decided it would not be able to be involved in CJA.  But at the same time, FOE 
Denmark did engage in an increased number of contentious actions in 2009, although not with 
the more radical CJA groups.   
Ultimately, European groups in FOE decided to do an independent demonstration in 
Copenhagen, along the Finnish model of a human flood.  As one described the goals of the 
action:  
We want to use the march to make a strong statement about off-setting.  The afternoon 
march is going to be organized by CAN and GCCA, so we won’t be a part of it. FOE 
feels like it wants to make its positions known independently, and we have the members 
and money to do so (Interview 48, FOE France). 
Despite the official withdrawal from the CJA action, FOE insiders also commented that they 
were surprised at how widespread the dissatisfaction with the UNFCCC had become in the 
organization.  On the individual level, anecdotal evidence suggests that many FOE staff 
members still supported Reclaim Power.  This could be a problem, FOE leaders feared, because 
the staff of FOE are ‘very undisciplined.’  Ultimately, FOE was forced to take the position that 
staff members could attend the Reclaim Power action as individuals, provided that they did not 
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carry their conference badges (which would note their FOE affiliation) to the demonstration.  
This decision put FOE in a particularly difficult position vis-à-vis the UNFCCC, as Chapter 
Eight will show.   
Outcome 
After fifteen months of debate and planning, the Reclaim Power was held on December 16th, 
2009.  The outside action attracted approximately 5,000 participants.  In addition, there were 
disruptions on the official UN plenary and 200-300 participants from groups affiliated with CJN 
and official delegates from countries of Bolivia and Venezuela tried to leave the conference 
venue in order to join the protesters outside. Once the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ components met, 
these delegates tried to meet to stage a ‘people’s assembly’ in which participants would discuss 
“the real solutions to the climate crisis.”   
Activists involved in Reclaim Power faced overwhelming police repression.  CJA leaders 
were targeted and taken to jail before the action even occurred.  Participants in the walk out were 
beaten by police and prevented from meeting the ‘outside’ group.  On the morning of the 16th, 
various groups thought to be ‘sympathizers’ with the action (including Friends of the Earth) had 
their accreditation for the Bella Center revoked.  The ‘outside’ group did make a deal with the 
police to go ahead with their people’s assembly, but the process only lasted for 20-30 minutes.  
Given the horizontal, consensus-based nature of the process, this was much less time than most 
people felt was needed.   
Many organizers of Reclaim Power were bitterly disappointed.  After the fact, many 
activists complained that the people’s assembly was far too rushed, and that the media had 
completely misunderstood the intention of their actions.  However, judging by the swift and 
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aggressive response of UN security to the protesters it is clear that Reclaim Power did represent a 
significant threat to the UNFCCC in ways that the ‘global day of action’ sponsored by GCCA 
did not.  Moreover, the messaging of the protest as being ‘against the UNFCCC’ did resonate 
with some critical delegates, mainly from Bolivia, Venezuela and Tuvalu, as Chapter Eight will 
document.  Thus on the political level, most of CJA considered their actions to be a moderate 
success.  At the time of writing, CJA still holds regular meetings and plans actions all over 
Europe.   
Conclusion 
This chapter draws on qualitative data to explain the emergence of radical climate change 
politics and contentious activism on climate change in the build up to COP 15 in Copenhagen.  
Prior to 2008 there were relatively few radical groups working on climate change politics in 
Europe.  But in 2008 these groups began to link internationally to discuss the possibility of 
organizing a large-scale disruptive action for the Copenhagen climate summit. 
COP 15 was appealing to these groups because it overlapped with the 10th anniversary of 
the WTO protests in Seattle.  And given that many of these groups were coming from 
backgrounds in the global justice movement, and not in environmental politics, this was an 
important stimulus for mobilization.  Key individuals from radical climate change organizations 
were particularly instrumental in developing a novel ‘climate justice’ frame that linked the issues 
of the global justice movement to the emerging climate justice movement.   
The combination of these elements resulted in the formation of a key organizing 
coalition: Climate Justice Action.  CJA engaged in broad outreach, bringing in new organizations 
to the issue of climate change and disrupting the pattern of ties for some existing organizations. 
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As my document analysis, participant observation and interviews should demonstrate, CJA did 
not emerge with pre-set tactics.  On the contrary, organizations within CJA came to harmonize 
their tactics, meaning that some radicalized while others significantly moderated.   
The Reclaim Power action in particular emerged from inter-organizational bargaining and 
persuasion among diverse groups.  The ultimate consensus was difficult for some groups, in 
particular those from an autonomous background that did not support targeting the summit itself.  
As one describes it: 
I feel that the movement is both hopeful and hopeless: we don’t believe our leaders can solve 
the crisis.  But we also don’t totally believe in the movement yet either.  We are working 
within the frame given to us by the Copenhagen summit because we are desperate.  And I 
worry that that means we are not dealing with the climate crisis, but we are dealing with how 
the climate crisis is dealt with (Interview 63, Climate Camp Germany).   
As this quote reveals, despite the success of CJA at spreading contentious tactics around COP 
15, the coalition was extremely broad, and, potentially fragile.  The defection of Friends of the 
Earth particularly illustrates the volatility of the negotiations within CJA, and the seriousness 
with which organizations weigh their tactical options.  This observation raises another question: 
how do the organizations within coalitions like CJA or CAN make decisions about their forms of 
action?  The next chapter will try to answer this question by exploring the dynamics of tactical 
decision-making at the organizational level.    
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
MECHANISMS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION-MAKING 
Chapter Four established that co-sponsoring an event with a contentious organization increases 
the likelihood that an organization will itself use contentious forms of action in the future.  This 
chapter sheds light on why we observe this relationship in the quantitative data.  My goal is to 
supplement the quantitative analysis of the first half of this dissertation with an intra-
organizational qualitative analysis that focuses on the mechanisms that underpin tactical 
decision-making.  In doing so, it draws on a new research agenda in the study of contentious 
politics (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001), and exploits a mixed methods research strategy to 
better establish my major claims.   
This chapter takes a much finer-grained view of the organizations in my study in order to 
offer additional insight into organizational decision-making.  To complement the variable-based 
approach, I look for evidence of organizational-level mechanisms that could support the three 
theoretical approaches – political process, organizational, and relational network – that I explore 
in  Part One.  In doing so, I  introduce different kinds of qualitative evidence, including 
observations, documents, email exchanges and  organizational interviews, to gain additional 
insight into the question of how organizations make decisions about what kinds of collection 
actions they will sponsor when they act on climate change.  I also draw on the histories of the 
two coalitions I detail in Chapters Fix and Six in order to better support my claims.   
My major finding is that the relational mechanisms of information sharing, resource 
pooling and social influence drove organizations in both the contentious and the conventional 
sphere to harmonize their forms of action in advance of the Copenhagen Climate Summit. The 
coalitions discussed in the previous two chapters were particularly important venues for the 
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formation of ties and the spread of tactics.  Mechanisms associated with the political process and 
organizational approaches operate unevenly.  In particular, I emphasize that the choices of 
contentious organizations are not as well-explained by political process and organizational 
approaches as are the choices of conventional organizations.   
I will begin by first briefly reviewing the mechanism approach to the study of contentious 
politics.  I then define and discuss examples of the mechanisms I expect to be associated with the 
three main theoretical traditions.  After providing an overview of the interview evidence, I then 
discuss the different combination of mechanisms that underpins decision-making in conventional 
and contentious organizations.  The final section discusses the implications of my findings for 
the literature on social movements.   
Defining and Measuring Mechanisms  
The McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) book Dynamics of Contention outlined and popularized 
the approach to the study of mechanisms in contentious politics that I employ in this chapter.  
Dynamics of Contention called for the study of mechanisms as a complement to or even 
substitute for the variable-based approach.  The authors define mechanisms as “changes that alter 
relations among specified sets of elements” or “events that link effects to causes” (McAdam et al 
2008: 307).  My approach also draws on developments in the field of qualitative methods in 
political science, especially as regards techniques for qualitative process-tracing (e.g. George and 
Bennett 2005).   The McAdam et al definition overlaps to a great extent with Gerring’s proposal 
that a mechanism be defined as “the pathway or process by which an effect is produced or a 
purpose is accomplished” (Gerring 2007: 178).69
                                                          
69 There is an open debate in the methodological literature on whether mechanisms should conceived of as 
unobserved entities that when activated are sufficient to alter outcomes, or whether mechanisms should thought of as 
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In my study, I introduce a number of mechanisms in order to better understand the 
linkages between network ties, organizational attributes, political opportunities, and the choice of 
action form in an organization.  My measurement of the presence or absence of different 
mechanisms is based on my coding of interview transcripts.70
The next section will sketch the key mechanisms of interest and how they can be 
expected to operate.  It is important to keep in mind that the outcome produced by a mechanism 
can vary depending on its co-occurrence with other mechanisms and the context in which it 
occurs (Staggenborg 2008; Lichbach 2008).  But in my study, I see remarkable similarity in the 
combination of mechanisms present in contentious and conventional organizations, respectively.  
Therefore, I argue that organizational decision-making in these two different spheres follows 
remarkably similar patterns.  It also follows that in similar contexts of divided networks, we 
might expect to see these mechanisms operating in similar ways.   
  These data were produced in 
organizational interviews in which respondents were asked to respond to open-ended questions 
about how their organization chose its tactics.  I code these interviews in order to both be able to 
say something about the relative frequency of different mechanisms and to provide illustrative 
examples of how these mechanisms operate.   
 
Mechanisms and Choice of Action Forms  
In order to code my interview data, I identified in advance a number of potential mechanisms 
that might characterize how organizations make decisions about their forms of action based on 
my review of the literature on social movements and interest groups.  While existing literature is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
processes that intervene between independent and dependent variables (see Mahoney 2001; Hedström and Swedberg 
1998).  My strategy in this chapter is closer to the latter approach.   
70 See the Methods Appendix for more detail on interview sample selection and the interview protocol.   
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infrequently explicit in specifying the mechanisms operating at the organizational level, I was 
able to identify a number of mechanisms that implicitly inform the broader theoretical traditions 
I considered earlier in Chapter Two and Chapter Three.  
I am interested in the mechanisms that link the three main explanatory factors from Part 
One to the choice of action form.  I often identified multiple causal mechanisms that could be 
associated with the hypotheses used in the quantitative analysis.  In the sections that follow, I 
explain each of the mechanisms associated with each theoretical tradition, and explore how they 
might be expected to operate in this context.   
Political Process Approach 
The literature in the political process tradition argues that organizations vary their forms of 
collective action in response to available political opportunities.  A variable-based approach to 
social science might tell us that we observe a positive correlation between open political 
opportunities and aggregate levels of social protest.  But this could be the case for a number of 
distinct reasons, and the mechanism approach has the advantage of telling us why this 
relationship might hold. I suggest that there are three potential mechanisms that may explain the 
relationship between political opportunities and forms of collective action:    
• Rational Evaluation: Most studies in the political process traditional implicitly assume 
that organizations make rational evaluations of political opportunities and vary their 
tactics in order to maximize the probability of achieving their desired ends.  When a 
mechanism of rational evaluation is present in an organization, tactics are tools that are 
deliberately selected to achieve the efficient realization of an organization’s goals.  
Groups that choose their action forms according to rational evaluation should also respond 
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to institutional incentives.  As Tarrow explains, “Sensible people do not often attack well-
fortified opponents when opportunities are closed; gaining some access to participation 
can provide them with such incentives” (Tarrow 2011: 165).  Researchers have also 
adopted this perspective to analyze the EU.  Marks and McAdam (1999:107) state: 
“political opportunities do not merely serve to provide sets of incentives for groups to 
make claims in certain arenas, but they shape the way in which groups make claims.” As a 
result, they expect that civil society groups will rationally evaluate the (open) structure of 
opportunities at the European level and decide: a) to target the EU; and b) to employ 
conventional tactics (Marks and McAdam 1999).  
• Institutional Capture: It is also possible to explain the predominant use of conventional 
tactics used around ‘open’ institutions with the familiar concept of ‘institutional capture.’ 
‘Capture’ is a commonly-used concept used in the policy studies literature. As Sabatier 
explains “when the policy preferences of regulator and regulated attain coincidence, the 
agency is said to be ‘captured by its clientele” (Sabatier 1974: 303).  In the case of the EU 
we would expect the direction of capture to be reversed: ‘open’ institutions may over time 
‘capture’ civil society groups by offering them resources and access in exchange for the 
moderation in their positions and forms of action.  Some scholars have argued that the 
European Commission in particular encourage the growth of organizations that are able to 
adopt the role of responsible ‘stakeholders’ in the policy-making process, and are willing 
to moderate their actions and ‘join the cocktail circuit’ (Lahusen 2004).  
• Venue shopping: organizations may vary their targets more than their tactics through a 
process of venue shopping.  Venue shopping is a political strategy whereby an 
organization looks for a decision-making setting that will maximize the likelihood that it 
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will achieve its political goals using its preferred tactics.  Scholars who have documented 
venue shopping show that targets for mobilization are not fixed, and can be selected 
strategically in order to maximize the probability of success (e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1998).  
This matters for my study because when the mechanism of venue shopping is present, 
organizational tactics influence targets, and not vice versa. In other words, organizations 
may specialize in certain types of collective action and then ‘venue shop,’ choosing 
targets for which their preferred form of action is likely to be successful.  For example, 
Mazey and Richardson (2006) demonstrate that interest groups in the EU often target the 
institutions that they believe will be most receptive to their lobbying strategies.   
Each of these mechanisms suggests a different view of the organization.  If organizations 
rationally evaluate opportunities and alter their behavior accordingly, they should respond to 
incentives provided by institutional actors.  However, if organizations specialize in tactics and 
shop for different venues in which to use them, ‘opening’ opportunities in one institution could 
simply cause protest to gravitate to a new institution.  Therefore understanding which mechanism 
is operating at the organizational level is very important for understanding how political systems 
might respond to the challenge of contentious groups.   
 
Organizational Approach 
 
The organizational approach suggests that organizations have certain attributes that predispose 
them towards certain forms of action.  I particularly look at three types of attributes – resources, 
structure, and ideology – that are hypothesized to have a strong effect on the forms of action that 
organizations employ.  Though I am somewhat oversimplifying a rich tradition of work in this 
area, I identify three key mechanisms that are expected to operate at the organizational level:  
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• Resource dependence: When a mechanism of resource dependence is present, an 
organization’s tactical choices are driven by the supply of resources at its disposal. For 
example, organizations may be limited in their choice of forms of action, due to 
constraints in access to needed supplies such as money, information, or constituents. As 
Edwards and McCarthy (2004: 136) summarize, “means of resource access… constrain 
the choice of forms of collective action.” On the other hand, an abundance of resources 
can facilitate certain kinds of collective action.  For example, the availability of funding 
to moderate groups helped expand the use of moderate tactics within the civil rights 
movement (Jenkins and Eckert 1986).  Overall, the resource dependence perspective 
supports the idea that resource availability ‘channels’ groups towards certain forms of 
action, and suggests that while protest is useful for groups that lack financial resources, 
groups with more resources will be able to work through institutional channels (Lipsky 
1968). 
• Professionalization: Organizations may also develop internal structures or work routines 
that impede or prevent them from using contentious forms of collective action (e.g. Piven 
and Cloward 1977; McCarthy and Zald 1973; Staggenborg 1988). McCarthy and Zald 
(1973:26) argue that professional social movement organizations can "diffus(e) the radical 
possibilities of dissent . . . by applying large amounts of resources . . . in ameliorative 
directions." For example, looking at the pro-choice movement, Staggenborg (1988) argues 
that the professionalization and formalization of organizations led to their adoption of 
more institutionalized tactics because ‘activists’ were replaced by ‘professionals’ who 
wanted to sustain the organization over the long term in order to protect their careers.  
Another perspective on professionalization suggests that directing limited resources 
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towards creating professional organizations directly subtracts from the resources available 
for protest action (Piven and Cloward 1977).71
• Ideological commitment: Organizations may also be limited in the choice of forms of 
action by the ideological preferences of their leaders or core constituency (e.g. Dalton 
1994; Rucht 1990). Groups need to maintain their support among their members or 
sponsors, which often entails maintaining their image as either ‘radical’ or ‘pragmatists.’ 
As Dalton (1994: 201) argues, “conservation and ecology groups will adopt different 
political tactics that can be traced back to their underlying political identities.” This leads 
directly to the predication that “Greenpeace will act like Greenpeace, whether it is in 
Britain or Italy” because of the fixed ideology of the organization and the radical tactics it 
implies (Dalton 1994: 209).  
  
Understanding the pathways by which organizations make decisions can help explain how 
organizational structures, resources and ideology can channel groups into certain forms of 
collective action.  In many respects, the organizational-level variables used in the quantitative 
portion of the study link closely to the mechanisms I study qualitatively.  Thus in this instance, 
the qualitative data help provide a greater level of detail into why exactly ideology is an 
important predictor of contention, while resources seem to be much less of a constraint.   
In addition, population ecology approaches emphasize that characteristics of the overall 
organizational population can also affect tactical decisions.  In particular, the density of the 
population can encourage groups to compete with one another.  Therefore, I also look for 
evidence of:  
 
                                                          
71 This perspective has been subject to extensive debate.  McCarthy and Zald’s general perspective actually suggests 
that professionalized movement organizations will support the development and spread of protest.   Staggenborg 
(1991) also argues that professional groups do not necessarily impede protest, but can under certain conditions.   
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• Competition:  Organizations may also choose to adopt the forms of collective action that 
will give them a comparative advantage vis-à-vis other rival groups (e.g. McAdam 1982; 
Minkof 1994) In a competitive setting, groups vary their strategies strategically taking into 
account the behavior of other groups in order to attract the most benefits from third parties 
(the media, governments, etc.).  For example, Minkoff (1994) argues that the rise of 
organizations with protest strategies in the women’s and minority rights issue areas fueled 
the legitimacy of the ‘advocacy’ organization, channeling activities into a more moderate 
direction due to resource competition.   
In this context, I look for evidence that organizations might reference other organizations and 
position themselves and their actions as an alternative to the actions of others.  As such, the 
competition mechanism is partially relational, but not cooperative (like the other relational 
mechanisms I employ).  My qualitative analysis is particularly useful because it allows me to 
explain how organizations come to understand other organizations are ‘competitors’ or ‘allies’ – 
a level of detail that is often lacking in quantitative studies.   
 
Relational Network Approach 
 
Finally, the relational approach I outlined in Chapter Three implies a different set of 
mechanisms. Networks may influence an organization’s choice of action form because they can 
encourage tactical harmonization between closely connected groups.  Thus groups that have ties 
with one another would be expected to behave in similar ways.  This can take three specific 
forms: 
• Information Sharing: We can recognize ‘information sharing’ as the communication of 
knowledge or perceptions between two groups. Networks structure an organization’s 
relationships with other organizations, and thus can facilitate the flow of information.  As 
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a result, an organization’s position in a network may provide it with information about 
opportunities or choices about which it otherwise might not be aware (Ansell 2003). 
Likewise, information sharing can also produce inter-organization learning about tactics 
(Wang and Soule 2011) that leads to the adoption of new forms of action. Finally, 
information sharing can function to spread information about the planned tactics of other 
organizations, which can help organizations figure out whether a particular collective 
action proposal will meet the threshold at which it is likely to be successful (Granovetter 
1978).  To provide just one example, Wang and Soule (2011) argue that as a result of 
collaboration on a joint protest event, the Black Panthers learned how to use a number of 
new tactics from the Students for a Democratic Society.   
• Resource Pooling: Resource pooling is the sharing of supplies needed for collective action 
– individuals, money, facilities, etc. – between two or more organizations.  Resource 
pooling is important because it can help overcome an organization’s individual resource 
limitations. Through resource pooling an organization can draw on not only one’s own 
resources but the resources of others for purposive action (Lin 2001: 43). Organizational 
coalitions are often created as permanent vehicles for resource pooling between 
participants (see Bandy and Smith 2005; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). For example, 
Diani, Lindsay and Purdue (2010: 220) find that coalitions in Bristol and Glasgow share 
material and symbolic resources, regardless of the type of collective action they organize.   
• Social influence: Groups may also persuade one another of the utility or desirability of 
using certain tactics.  This influence can function directly, by convincing others to change 
their plans for action as a result of negotiation or discussion.  Or it can function indirectly, 
by convincing organizations to change their underlying identities, which may then come 
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to imply different forms of collective action.  For example, drawing on the history of the 
lesbian feminist movement, Taylor and Whittier (1992: 118) suggest that “groups 
negotiate new ways of thinking and acting” which can change both the forms of action 
and the identities of the participants. 
Understanding if and how relational mechanisms operate is important for developing a more 
complete knowledge of the dynamics of collective action.  My documentation of the operation of 
relational mechanisms helps to establish that ties precede and produce tactical harmonization, 
buttressing my claims about the direction of causality.  I also argue that relational mechanisms 
matter because they directly affect the choice of action form and affect the operation of other 
mechanisms, as the next section will develop.  
 
Combining Mechanisms  
 
Mechanisms are context dependent.  Although my organizations all operate in the same general 
political context, they have different network positions that particularly alter the ways in which 
relational mechanisms operate.  In other words, network position defines the relational context of 
the organization.  And as a result, it also alters the political content of relational mechanisms 
(e.g. the kind of information or influence to which actors are exposed). For example, the effect of 
‘information sharing’ in the contentious and conventional portions of the network can encourage 
opposite kinds of collective action.   
Studying mechanisms is difficult because mechanisms can co-occur in ways that radically 
alter their outcomes (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2008b: 363). I argue that relational 
mechanisms have direct effects on the choice of action forms, as well as effects on other 
mechanisms. Figure 7.1 describes the relationship between the three main approaches and their 
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associated mechanisms.  Given this complexity, I particularly specify that relational mechanisms 
matter because: 
• They have an independent effect on what organizations will do (e.g. social influence). 
• They intervene and change the way political opportunity and organization explanations 
work (e.g. by altering how opportunities are perceived or what type of resources are 
available).   
Figure 7.1: Mechanisms of Decision-Making and Theories of Collective Action  
 
 
For example, the effect of the relational mechanisms of information sharing on an 
organization’s tactical decisions can be both direct and indirect.  Organizations may get 
information from their peers about how to engage in certain kinds of collective action, such as 
building a camp or using a certain kinds of materials to construct a blockade.  This kind of 
learning could directly influence the kind of actions that organization might be able to sponsor.  
By organizations may also get information from their peers that lead them to perceive political 
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opportunities in similar ways, thus encouraging certain kinds of collective action.  For example, 
they may also be more likely to join a protest because they receive information through their 
social networks that the target is closed to conventional participation.  In this case the operation 
of the relational mechanism has an indirect effect, by encouraging them towards outsider action 
based on a rational analysis of (perceived) opportunities.  My qualitative analysis will try to tease 
apart these various pathways by which relational mechanisms might operate. 
Establishing that relational mechanisms underpin decision-making in organizations – 
both contentious and conventional – will be important in understanding why inter-organizational 
networks are so important in the quantitative analysis.  As a result, the goal of the next two 
sections is to specify which of these ten mechanisms – or what combinations of them – are 
operating in the contentious and conventional organizations in my study.    
Overview of Interview Evidence 
Based on my interviews, I find that the mechanisms posited by the literature occur with different 
frequency in conventional and contentious organizations.  Table 7.1 summarizes the results.   
Tactical decision-making within conventional organizations is often driven by 
mechanisms of rational evaluation of political opportunities, institutional capture and 
professionalization.  These organizations do not seem to venue shop is choosing their targets, nor 
are they ideologically committed to pre-set tactics.  Organizations in certain countries do 
sometimes report that resource limitations influence their choice of action forms.  These 
organizations are driven by a number of relational mechanisms, including information sharing, 
resource pooling and social influence, but less so by competition.   
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The contentious organizations I studied make tactical decisions in ways that are strikingly 
different than conventional organizations.  Contentious organizations are much less influenced 
by political opportunities when choosing their tactics, and do not report resource limitations or 
professionalization.  A segment of these groups are committed to certain tactics due to 
ideological constraints, and some do to some extent ‘venue shop’ in selecting their targets.  But 
for a large portion of these organizations, the ultimate choice to use contentious tactics was 
driven by relational processes.  Decision-making in contentious organizations operates via the 
mechanisms of information sharing, resource pooling and social influence.  These organizations 
are also driven by a mechanism of competition – not with one another, but with more moderate 
organizations.   
Table 7.1: Frequency of Reported Mechanisms of Organizational Decision-Making 
 Frequency with which Mechanism is Reported 
Contentious Groups Conventional Groups 
Political Process Approach   
Rational Evaluation Low High 
Institutional Capture  Low  High  
Venue Shopping Medium Low 
Organizational Approach   
Resource Dependence Low Medium 
Professionalization Low High 
Ideological Constraint Medium Low 
Competition  High Low 
Relational Approach   
Information Sharing High High 
Resource Pooling High High  
Social Influence High Medium 
 
The following sections present qualitative evidence of how these mechanisms operate at 
the organizational-level in contentious and conventional organizations.  I also rely on examples 
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from the history of the two main organizing coalitions, as detailed in the previous chapters, to 
illustrate my argument when appropriate.   
Conventional Organizations  
In general, conventional organizations are much more influenced by political opportunities than 
are contentious organizations.  Conventional organizations use decision-making processes that 
closely resemble mechanisms of rational evaluation, and are often subject to institutional capture 
and professionalization.  Relational mechanisms are also very important, and frequently operate 
in the context of the CAN coalition.  
Rational Evaluation  
Officially, tactical decision-making in conventional organizations follows remarkably rational 
procedures.  Interestingly, both the descriptions of this process and the campaigner training 
materials I consulted seem to be remarkably similar across Greenpeace, WWF and FOE.   
These organizations teach their campaigners to indentify political opportunities and alter 
their tactics to fit the situation.  FOE staff, for example, employ a ‘SWOT’ analysis technique – 
identifying strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats – for the achievement of their aims. 
Campaigners tend to brainstorm along these guidelines to come up with actions that respond to 
these criteria.  Figure 7.2 shows some training material used by Friends of the Earth to encourage 
the development of campaigns along the ‘SWOT’ guidelines.  
Within Greenpeace, this technique is called ‘power analysis,’ and is typically taught to 
new campaigners in organizational trainings.  As one campaigner described it:  
We do a power analysis to see what kind of pressure the politicians are susceptible to.  
Are they susceptible to mobilization?  Are they scared of Greenpeace? Can we use the 
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media?  Is it better to work through other organizations? We consider questions like this 
when we decide which tactics are best.  (Interview 83, Greenpeace Nordic)  
Thus in principle, most environmental NGOs are trained to recognize the opportunities available 
in a given political environment, and are theoretically open to altering their tactics to make the 
achievement of their aims more likely. 72
Figure 7.2: Excerpts from Friends of the Earth Bulletin “How to: Campaign Strategise”  
    
 
 
Institutional Capture  
But despite the training in rational evaluation of political opportunities, the perception of the 
‘opportunities’ available to groups working at the EU-level is strongly influenced by their desire 
to appear ‘professional’ and ‘responsible,’ and to maintain a strong relationship with the political 
institutions, especially the European Commission.  As Chapter Five established, there is strong 
                                                          
72 The Friends of the Earth Bulletin “How to: Campaign Strategise.” Issue 39, February/March 2003, p. 3-4 is a 
good example.  Chris Rose, who has worked as a consultant for FOE, Greenpeace and WWF, popularized the 
“SWOT” analysis technique in this NGO community.  His approach is explicitly taught in both FOE and 
Greenpeace trainings.  The WWF approach follows similar guidelines.   
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overlap between the political positions of CAN and those of the European Commission, which 
might constitute evidence of capture.   
The desire to maintain relationships with political institutions can have important 
consequences for tactical choices.  For example, when these groups in CAN deviated from their 
moderate messaging at the close of the European Climate and Energy Package, they were 
privately sanctioned by institutional representatives.  As a result, they became highly concerned 
about damaging their relationship with Commission officials, and tried to moderate in the next 
policy cycle.   
While conventional groups do use some forms of protest, the types of action they engage 
in are usually carefully coordinated media stunts, and not highly confrontational actions.  This is 
overwhelmingly true of the groups that work in Brussels.  Because of the importance of the 
relationship with EU institutions, ‘protest’ actions are generally considered off limits for these 
groups in the Brussels context.  
Despite theoretically being open to using a wide range of tactics, groups that work at the 
European level often experience an especially strong pull towards conventional forms of action. 
This remains true even when political opportunities close almost completely, as they did in the 
last few days of the Copenhagen Summit.  Because of their strong relationship with the 
UNFCCC, these groups were unwilling to tactically radicalize, and continued their conventional 
actions even in the face of severe limits of their participation.   
As Chapter Five also detailed, groups that work within the EU and the UNFCCC are not 
being ‘fooled’ by the institutions.  These organizations make these tactical decisions consciously, 
and share a consensus that it is worthwhile to trade tactical moderation for the opportunity for 
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influence in the political process.  As a result of this push from Commission, groups tend to use 
conventional action to push reformist ends.   As one respondent commented about the NGO 
community in Brussels: 
We play by the rules of the game because there aren’t that many options.  In the end, we 
all cook with water. (Interview 29, WWF European Policy Office).   
Organizational mechanisms operate differently across conventional and contentious groups.  
Many conventional organizations are highly professionalized in their structure, and report that 
this has a strong influence on their use of conventional forms of collective action.  Conventional 
groups in some countries also report that resource limitations drive them to behave in 
conventional ways.  But ideologically, most of these groups are in principle open to a wide range 
of action.   
Professionalization 
Within conventional organizations, there is ample evidence to document the importance of 
professionalization.  As Chapter Five previously outlined, this professionalization of European 
environmental groups can be observed in three main forms. First, environmental groups have 
expanded their budgets and number of supporters.  Second, these groups have developed 
increasingly sophisticated scientific capabilities.  Third, these groups have gained more 
significant and regularized access to the policy-making process, particularly in countries in 
Northern Europe. 
In countries where these trends have been pronounced, there has also been a significant 
institutionalization of the movement and its forms of action (Rootes 2004: 247).  My interviews 
suggest that this dynamic is also powerful when groups work at the transnational level, where 
they try to be seen as ‘professionals’ and not as ‘activists.’ As the Greenpeace EU puts it: 
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We don’t want to be seen as a bunch of environmental Nazis who like to hang ourselves 
from things.  We want to be seen as professional, responsible people who understand 
what is politically possible and are experts in our field (Interview 1, Greenpeace EU 
Unit).  
As another puts it: 
Our space is the expertise: the impact assessments, the policy evaluations, the nitty gritty 
of the political process… We’re the specialists in Brussels, and to some extent our job 
includes telling our members where the agenda lies (Interview 16, Transport and 
Environment Europe).  
Big, professional NGOs are provided lots of access to international institutions, partially because 
of the useful kinds of information they provide these actors.  This is one of the main reasons that 
transnational coalitions, like CAN-E, tend to rely on scientific issue framing when they make 
their claims.  Although not all groups have been affected by the dynamic of professionalization, 
a significant section of the population has experienced this change in organizational structure.  
And as the next section shows, these groups also have a great deal of influence over other 
organizations, spreading tactical moderation even further in the population. 
Most conventional organizations do not have ideologies that constrain their choice of 
action forms.  Because of their radical origins, the vast majority of organizations working in the 
field of climate change politics are at least in principle open to using contentious tactics as a 
method to achieve their aims.   
Resource Dependence 
Contrary to theoretical expectations, most groups did not mention being limited in their selection 
of forms of action by the availability of resources.  Because many of these groups work in 
coalitions they often were able to overcome their individual resource limitations by working 
together, as the next section documents. 
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There were two notable exceptions to this.  First, groups that work in countries with weak 
environmental movements reported that they were more likely to use conventional forms of 
action.  This was particularly true for groups located in Eastern Europe, that often reported 
needing to adopt conventional actions (like making reports) because these are the kinds of things 
they can get paid for (Interview 71, Polish Ecological Club).  Despite using the language of 
‘opportunities’ to a much greater extent, these kinds of limitations also affected groups located in 
France.  As one puts it: 
We try to indentify and act on strategic points.  This means working with the 
opportunities we are provided.  [JH: What kind of opportunities are you talking about?] 
Well, that essentially means we respond to subjects coming from the media and 
government agenda.  Our actions are also largely subject to funding opportunities – what 
kind of project we can get money for. (Interview 49, RAC France)  
But for the most part, groups seemed to recognize the importance of evaluating opportunities and 
trying to act on them, even when they were somewhat limited by their resources. 
Second, groups with lots of resources seemed to be less constrained by the need to 
cooperate with others, and thus more flexible in their forms of action.  This seemed to be 
particularly the case with Friends of the Earth, and Chapter Six documented.  Part of the reasons 
FOE chose to sponsor independent collective actions was undoubtedly that the organization had 
the members and money in order to pull off independent events.  Smaller groups would be 
unable to sponsor these kinds of action without working in a coalition, and may have been more 
subject to influence.     
Information Sharing 
In conventional organizations, the ability of groups to evaluate political opportunities is limited 
by the information that they receive about the political system.  National groups don’t necessary 
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have the ability to follow the European or international policy process, and frequently rely on 
one another to get information about when and how to act.   Most obviously, organizations get 
information from coalitions – often through CAN or through the EU offices of their parent 
organization.  As the Greenpeace EU Unit explains:  
Once the decision is made, the EU office provides strategy, analysis and timeline to the 
offices.  Generally speaking, the EU office is in charge of the Commission and the 
Parliament, while the national offices are in charge of the Council.  The ‘method’ by 
which the national offices try to influence their governments is up to them.  But when 
they act in Brussels, campaigners in the European offices get lobby trainings, and 
sometimes also are brought in to target the Parliament.  (Interview 14, Greenpeace EU 
Unit)  
As Chapter Five explained, CAN provides information to their members that encourages them to 
get involved in conventional advocacy at the European level and within the UNFCCC.  Many 
small groups report that without CAN emails and list-serve discussions, they would not know 
when to act, and would not understand the ‘possibilities for influence in the European political 
process’ (Interview 72, Polish Green Network).   
Information sharing influences not only the targets organizations choose, but also the 
kinds of tactics they know how to employ.  Conventional groups teach one another how to 
engage in lobbying at workshops, through newsletters and via conference calls.  These kinds of 
informational exchanges were regularly reported through CAN-E, and also through the inter-
organizational contacts in the big NGO families.  Greenpeace and WWF offices frequently report 
learning new tactics from their European or international offices.  In FOE, however, more effort 
is put into developing non-hierarchical information exchanges.  The FOE Europe office has less 
of a coordinating role, and FOE offices are frequently paired with one another directly to spread 
tactical innovation across national borders.  Thus a FOE office is much more likely to get 
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information about new forms of contentious action than would a Greenpeace or WWF office in 
the same country.   
Resource Pooling 
When working at the European level, conventional organizations pool their resources in order to 
overcome lack of funding or staff.  Most obviously, many organizations cannot afford the staff or 
office space they need in order to adequately follow the EU policy process.  By building 
coalitions with other groups, they can engage in forms of action that they might not be able to do 
otherwise.  As one explains: 
At the European level we work with T&E, Birdlife and the EEB.  We can’t afford an 
office in Brussels, so we basically work through these representatives.  We give our 
partners the technical information, and then they take it to meetings.  Our main asset is 
our technical knowledge.  And we tend to work with more campaign-oriented groups to 
complement that.  (Interview 73, Wetlands International)  
These inter-organizational relationships are important because groups that have a particular niche 
(technical expertise) may not have the resources to target the European process independently.  
But this kind of group can work with groups with other kinds expertise (lobbying) in order to 
coordinate actions and to more effectively target the institutions.   
This dynamic also plays out within the big NGOs.  The European advocacy offices are 
critical in helping the national offices keep up with what is going on within the EU.   As FOE 
France explains: 
AdT [FOE France] uses FOE Europe press releases.  And honestly, often we just translate 
them and add our own name.  Lots of offices do this… because this kind of lobbying 
requires so many resources – staff, travel budgets, technical knowledge – most national 
offices just can’t do this.  But being in Brussels is an important strategic position for the 
whole network, and I am glad we are able to take advantage of that (Interview 48, Friends 
of the Earth France).    
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Working with other organizations allows a lot of nationally-based NGOs to engage in EU-level 
lobbying that they might not be able to do otherwise. Members of CAN-E also report receiving 
similar kinds of benefits from engaging in coalition work.   This is one of the major reasons that 
groups within CAN are willing to contribute a portion of their funds to the budget of the CAN-E 
Secretariat every year.   
Social Influence 
As the history of CAN should illustrate, conventional organizations support one another in using 
conventional tactics.  The big NGOs in CAN serve as moderate gatekeepers, and have influence 
on the kinds of demands groups make as well as the types of actions in which they engage.  
Because of the structure of decision-making within the coalition, the big groups hold a veto over 
any strategic initiative of CAN, which leads to the adoption of ‘least common denominator’ 
positions among the groups.  In practice, this means that the most moderate groups tend to 
restrain those that want to be more radical.  Those desiring more radical action are often faced 
with the option of moderating their plans or quitting the coalition all together, which can result in 
loss of significant resources associated with participation.   
As a result, the leaders of CAN exerted a lot of influence to keep other organizations 
from radicalizing tactically, even when political opportunities closed.  And because many CAN 
groups had worked together for so long (and planned to do so again in the future) influence could 
flow between them fairly easily.  For example, on the final days of Copenhagen, CAN leaders 
were important in convincing most accredited organizations not to radicalize their forms of 
action once they were excluded from the summit. Thus not only does CAN encourage 
conventional action, it actively discourages contentious behavior. 
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Competition  
It is worth noting that while I find ample evidence of the operation of relational mechanisms, 
conventional groups working transnationally do not report much competition with one another.  
This may be because in Brussels and in the UNFCCC, the circle of people involved in regular 
advocacy activities is quite small, and it has developed into a tight knit community of 
individuals.  As one observer notes: “there is almost zero competition within Brussels amongst 
NGOs.”  A second reason for the lack of competition might be that these groups have effectively 
built a low profile coalition – CAN – in order to serve as a (fairly) neutral broker of compromises 
between their various positions.  While the groups do disagree, they have developed regular 
procedures for arriving at joint positions and ensuring cooperation with one another.   
This transnational cooperative spirit is not a reflection of harmonious relations between 
conventional groups at the domestic level.  Based on interviews, it seems that some countries 
have very cooperative relations between their major NGOs (e.g. the UK) while others have much 
more competitive relations (e.g. Germany).  My data show that when organizations act at the 
EU-level, they tend to do so much more often with organizations of their same ‘brand’ (e.g. 
Greenpeace with Greenpeace) than with other NGOs in the same country, which may also help 
to explain why behavior at the transnational level is more cooperative.   
Contentious Organizations 
Relational mechanisms are particularly important in organizing contentious collective action.  In 
addition to the mechanisms that lead to tactical harmonization with local alters, contentious 
groups often select their tactics to deliberately compete with more moderate groups.  In addition, 
a few groups are tactically constrained by the radical identities, and some report that they do 
venue shop in selecting their targets.   
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Information Sharing  
Information sharing is also very important for contentious organizations.  Most of the original 
organizations involved in the coalition knew very little about climate change, and even less about 
the UNFCCC.  As a result, part of the goal of these early meetings was to explain the political 
process and how (badly) it worked.  As a result of getting information from a common source, 
these organizations developed a common perception of the workings of political institutions and 
the opportunities for access in them which were not necessarily accurate or comprehensive.  
These organizations were often less aware of the potential range of targets of their actions 
and the opportunities for participation they afforded.  As one member of Rising Tide put it, the 
perception of opportunities matters a lot in the selection of targets for action within these groups, 
but the process by identifying opportunities is not very systematic:  
In general, we tend to come and go with the opportunities that are available to us.  So we 
might know that there is a shareholder meeting coming up, or an election, or a day of 
action and we would want to do something for that.  But there’s not always the greatest 
coherence to it - it tends to be kind of ad hoc.  And it’s really based on how much 
individuals know about what is going on and what they bring to the table. (Interview 86, 
Rising Tide UK) 
Contentious groups commonly discussed in interviews that they find out about ‘opportunities’ 
from their peers.  For example, a number of organizations that met at the CJA meetings began to 
follow the practices of the major energy company Vattenfall in Spring 2009 – these 
organizations planned a number of transnational collective actions to target this company by 
sharing information about the timing of the company’s public events and demonstration projects.  
The ‘Climate Alarm’ event mentioned previously was organized after information about the 
Commission’s meeting with Business Europe representatives was published on a CJA affiliated 
list serve (Interview 55, Climate Alarm). In general, these groups were not nearly as informed as 
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their conventional counterparts about the operating of the EU or UN system, making them less 
likely to perceived political opportunities available there.   
Contentious organizations also often reported learning about new forms of collective 
action from their peers.  The climate camps were crucial for this kind of tactical diffusion.  Not 
only was the climate camp model itself imitated all over the continent, but many of the practical 
skills associated with organizing blockades, occupations, and non-violent civil disobedience 
were taught to activists at these camps.  For example, at the UK Climate Camp in the summer of 
2009, activists assembled in a field to practice marching in various formations to avoid police 
maneuvers (i.e. kettles) that might stop them on their way.  Activists attending the Dutch/Belgian 
climate camp could learn how to assemble tripods, how to use concrete lock-ons effectively, or 
how to scale a fence.  Some sessions at all the camps focused on how to do political research on 
corporations and their lobbying practices.  Individuals trained at these sessions could then – and 
often reported that they did – bring this information back to their own organizations, expanding 
that group’s tactical repertoire.   
Finally, inter-organizational contacts were important for learning what other 
organizations planned to do.  This was particularly important going into Copenhagen, which was 
the highest stakes moment for these groups.  As organizations learned that others intended to use 
contentious protest action, this in some ways lowered the costs of using the same action and 
made ‘bandwagoning’ more appealing.  As one group put it: 
We look to alliances to build momentum.  These can be temporal – some are for one 
event, some for one month, one year, whatever.  It depends a lot on the situation.  But in 
principle, we don’t want to be out on the streets alone [laughs] – we want to be out there 
with our allies, so they can’t ignore us! (Interview 81, Ecologistas en Acción)  
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Organizations didn’t have to sponsor CJA actions in order to be influenced by them.  For 
example, representatives from Friends of the Earth and Attac attended CJA meetings regularly 
from the beginning of the process.  As one participant described it, “in some sense, CJA was also 
a space for conversation” (Interview 48, Friends of the Earth France).  Knowing that there would 
be a big confrontational demo may have changed the action plans of these organizations as well 
– both ended up significantly radicalizing their earlier plans.  This exposure to information about 
CJA may have been critical to this decision, as they did not want to seem too ‘tame’ in the eyes 
of their members of the media.   
The experience of FOE was also in many ways different than that of most of the 
conventional NGOs.  Most NGOs did not seem to know that confrontational actions were being 
planned until late November 2009, when their plans were already set.  In this way, the core of the 
conventional groups tended to be somewhat myopic: knowing only about their own plans and not 
those of the contentious groups.  And as I established earlier, though FOE groups theoretically 
could have spread information between the two coalitions, most of these groups found that it was 
not profitable to do so because it raised suspicion about their own allegiances.   
Resource Pooling  
In organizing contentious collective action, organizations also did not seem to be held back by 
their individually-held resources.  In fact, organizations very frequently pooled their resources in 
order to create larger events and different kinds of actions than they may be able to do alone.   
Coordinating logistics for Copenhagen was one of the reasons for creating CJA in the first place.  
Local Danish groups like KlimaX and the Climate Collective took on a lot of responsibility for 
finding places for activists to sleep in warehouses, army barracks, schools and people’s homes.  
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They also organized communal kitchens and legal aid services.  All of these things made it more 
attractive for non-Danish groups to come to Copenhagen for the ultimate event.  Groups from 
other regions also pooled their resources to sponsor buses to the protest itself.  In general, the 
structure of support for these services was based on ‘pledging’ – organizations that had more 
funding paid more, and poor organizations that could contribute otherwise (either through 
bringing lots of individuals or by donating services like copies or translation) paid much less, if 
anything.   
Organizations particularly recognized the importance of ties and resources in convincing 
them to join the mobilization.  For example, one participant explained the importance of the 
‘Climate Justice Caravan’ – a cross-Europe tour of speaking engagements and protest actions 
leading up to the Copenhagen Summit – in the decision of La Via Campesina to get involved:  
 Our organization is quite new in Europe, so primarily we are working on building our 
profile and on building a lobbying strategy.  It’s difficult for us because our capacity for 
mobilization is much less than it is in Latin America or Asia...  This is why alliances are 
so important for us – what we’re doing here is building social movements, and building 
support for the farmers whose livelihoods are at stake…  And our partners help not only 
with our analysis, but also to support large scale public mobilizations like 
[Copenhagen]… [The Copenhagen protest] was a mobilization in particular by groups 
who tried to discuss the climate issues as being more or less about trade… So when we 
knew that people we worked with would be going, and we knew that they would organize 
a caravan to get there, we started to think that maybe we should get involved too. 
(Interview 82, La Via Campesina Europe)  
Also as a result of resource pooling, organizations that might not otherwise been able to sponsor 
a protest were able to get involved.  A great example of this is that a few small think tanks 
became sponsors of protest actions leading up to the Copenhagen Summit, including climate 
camps, actions targeting corporations and Reclaim Power.  These organizations were sought out 
in the coalition because they provided much needed political analysis; they themselves were 
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interested in participating because it gave them access to the membership of other organizations.  
As one think tank staff member put it, talking to others convinced the organization that 
contentious action wasn’t outside the realm of possibility for them:  
It was hard because for some groups they had never worked on this issue area before...  
But we had been doing stuff on this for years, you know, making reports and the like.  So 
for us, when people starting talking to us about this movement and the action we thought, 
this is our chance to take it to the next level, yeah?  And so maybe there is something we 
can contribute after all.  (Interview 56, The Transnational Institute)  
Social Influence 
As the experience of organizing CJA clearly demonstrates, organizations can also be influenced 
and persuaded by their peers to adopt contentious forms of collective action.  These ties can help 
to change opinions as to what constitutes desirable and appropriate kinds of behavior given the 
circumstances.  And as a result, organizational identity can change or be in flux when patterns of 
ties are disrupted.      
It was clear that influence went both ways within CJA: some organizations became more 
moderate than their original proposals, and others became more radical.  The ultimate result was 
a harmonization of tactics, with many organizations adopting contentious forms of action for the 
first time, and using them before, during and after Copenhagen.  As one participant put it:    
At the CJA meeting in June… some people were still uncomfortable about the direct 
action component.  But at that point, a lot of Germans -- mostly people who were 
formerly involved in the Peoples Global Action network and the G8 network73
                                                          
73 Both the PGA Network and the G8 network are associated with organizing anti-summit protests, and are 
important organizing vehicles in the European global justice movement.   
 -- pushed 
and gained dominance within CJA, and they convinced other people to go along with this 
idea.  And so some of us really changed our plans. (Interview 54, European Youth for 
Action)  
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A lot of organizations were convinced by the lobbying efforts of the global justice groups 
that direct action was the way to go.  But even among those organizations that were fully 
comfortable with contentious action from the outset, there was still a process of influence 
operating within the coalition that convinced them to moderate their earlier proposals.74
For about half a year me and German colleagues tried to get CJA to have a position to 
shut down the COP.  But once Via Campesina got involved they said that CJA couldn’t 
shut down the COP altogether – it would also be shutting down all the conversations that 
happen on the inside.  And Via Campesina, I mean you know, they are one of the most 
democratic and legitimate organizations in the world.  So from that point on we knew that 
it had to be something different. So I think that was one really good thing about the CJA 
mobilization – there was a lot of discussion, a lot of mutual learning.  We couldn’t just 
say ‘all institutions are the same, all governments suck.’ And because of that, for a lot of 
us on the radical left, it pushed us out of our comfort zone. (Interview 63, Climate Camp 
Germany)    
  
Specifically, these groups gradually gave up the part of the action that actually involved shutting 
down the summit itself.  As one activist described the process:  
As this quote also reveals, some organizations seemed to hold more sway in the coalition 
than others.  My observation at a lot of CJA meetings was that more experienced activists (who 
often had a background of summit protesting) held a higher status in the group, and thus were 
capable of being more influential. Consensus decision-making privileges skills of persuasion75
                                                          
74 The exception to this is the more autonomous group NTAC [Never Trust a COP] that broke off from CJA in order 
to organize more contentious actions.  This suggests that some groups do have important intra-organizational 
identities that cannot be pushed too far.  But this seems to constitute the exception in my study.   
, 
and those with more experience knew how to use the process to their benefit.   Organizations 
capable of mobilizing large numbers of people were also closely listened to.  And ultimately, 
many organizations deferred to the opinions of groups representing the global south – such as La 
Via Campesina – because they felt that these organizations had a greater claim to legitimacy in 
75 It also seemed clear that those who were best able to communicate in English (not necessarily native speakers) 
held an advantage in the process.   
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the political discussion. As representative from Attac puts it, persuasion was very important in 
CJA:   
We didn’t decide not to lobby, we just didn’t decide to do it. At the beginning it was clear 
that we wanted to do something together, but we just didn’t know what...  And many 
people in the coalition have a long experience with demonstrations and believe in the 
power of them.  So I guess they were able to convince the others that that’s what we 
should do… It is a strength that the coalition is so broad.  [Attac is] radical in our 
ideology, but that doesn’t necessarily imply that we will be radical in our methods. 
(Interview, Attac France). 
This quote illustrates that CJA was a vehicle for social influence, and that ideologically ‘radical’ 
groups were not necessarily constrained in their tactical choices.   
Even organizations that were not sponsors of CJA actions were influenced by the 
political discussions taking place among organizations at the time.  One prime example of this 
would be Friends of the Earth.  Staff members particularly describe how the organization felt 
‘pushed’ by others to radicalize their actions in advance of Copenhagen:   
So FOE has always been about protest, but it’s something maybe we’ve grown too far 
away from in the past few years…  So when everyone starting talking about [the 
Copenhagen mobilization] it was almost like we were being pushed from all sides.  And 
some our staff got really jazzed about it and I think it really made a big difference, 
because FOE is really democratic in its structure (Interview 59, Friends of the Earth 
Denmark)  
However, there seem to be limits to this influence.  When leaders of GCCA tried to get CJA to 
cancel their Reclaim Power! action, they were remarkably less successful.  This is likely driven 
by the fact that these organizations did not have previously established ties that might become 
the basis for influence.     
Competition  
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Contentious groups are also mostly cooperative with one another, as the history of CJA 
illustrates.  But in addition to cooperating with local alters, contentious organizations also 
organize their contentious actions to compete with conventional organizations.  Because the 
conventional organizations were older and more established, a lot of these groups felt that they 
needed to be more radical in order to ‘take over their political space.’ As one put it:  
The big NGOs are totally unable to react to the most important political issues of the 
COP...  We showed them that we really want change, we aren’t just going to wait behind 
our stands and give out leaflets and hold stupid side events.  And I think that should scare 
them.  And it makes us re-evaluate what kinds of relationships we might want to have 
with them. (Interview 81, Ecologistas en Acción)  
As my previous discussion mentioned, some of these groups (in particular eco-anarchist groups) 
were explicitly founded in order to compete with NGOs.  The Climate Justice Now! coalition 
was formed in order to compete with the more moderate demands of the Climate Action 
Network, and over time came to also support more confrontational forms of collective action.76
CJA members took their relationship and positioning vis-à-vis moderate groups much 
more seriously.  As previously mentioned, representatives of the GCCA scheduled a presentation 
of the December 12th march to CJA at its October meeting.  In this presentation, GCCA implored 
CJA not to cause disruptions or violence at the march, which they were billing as ‘family 
friendly.’  The response shouted from a CJA participant said it all: “But you are the reason we 
have to be so radical!” Another example is that fact that WWF – an organization known for its 
history of working with large corporations on green initiatives -- became a particular target for 
   
                                                          
76 But this isn’t to say that groups of both sides did not try to reach out to one another.  CJA activists did distribute 
flyers to CAN members, asking them to attend their walk out on the 16th.  But this action seemed largely ignored by 
CAN members at the time, who did not seem to feel threatened by the radical upstarts.  GCCA representatives went 
to one CJA meeting, but were not successful in influencing the actions of this coalition.   
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some contentious groups, and in fact sometimes faced protest by more radical green groups 
outside their headquarters in Geneva.   
I don’t want to overstate the animosity between these two groups.  But it is important to 
note that contentious groups were always well-aware that they were acting in a political space 
that was populated by more moderate groups as well, and in many ways framed their actions to 
compete with them.  In this sense, they did not at all intend their actions as ‘complements’ to the 
inside efforts, but as something that challenged those efforts in both content and form.   
Ideological Constraint 
However, my interviews suggest that a segment of the contentious population is constrained in 
their choice of action form by prior ideological commitments.  While I do not find that this is 
true for most groups, I specifically find that groups coming from eco-anarchist backgrounds tend 
to be categorically opposed to lobbying actions, as Chapter Six documents.  As one Rising Tide 
member put it: 
One of our defining features is that we don’t do lobbying.  So others will do an 
occupation of a government office or another target, and we won’t even do that.  We try 
to focus on corporate targets instead, and particularly big oil.  [JH: Why don’t you do 
lobbying?] Well, I guess it all comes back to our underlying autonomous philosophy.  We 
believe that the government doesn’t have the power to make real changes because they 
are beholden to corporate interests.  So we try to focus on the real source of the problem. 
(Interview 86, Rising Tide UK)  
I particularly want to emphasize that ideological constraint is not an important 
mechanism for every group that ended up using contentious forms of action.  But a significant 
subgroup of organizations did have strong preferences for contentious action.  As the next 
sections will outline, these groups engaged in significant outreach to others in order to popularize 
their own approach, and in the process altered their original proposals as well.   
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Venue Shopping  
Conventional groups tend to follow all phases of the policy process, and do not engage in much 
‘venue shopping’ when considering how to select their targets.  However, ‘venue shopping’ does 
seem to be important in organizing contentious collective action.  My interviews suggest that 
contentious organizations like to target summits because they feel that meetings of heads of state 
are clearly illegitimate (making them good targets), and that they offer the opportunity for them 
to showcase their more radical demands in the media.   
Because of the logic of venue shopping, we see that organizations will choose more 
‘closed’ targets in order to use their preferred tactics.  A quote from the Dutch/Belgian Climate 
Camp illustrates this logic:  
The camp was set with a view of the [Antwerp] harbor.  And all of the axis of evil was 
there: the big corporations, the polluters, the nuclear, the coal.  It was like being a kid in a 
candy shop – we could take our pick of which ones we wanted. There was a general idea 
to target one of these evils, but the whole idea was for things to not be decided 
beforehand, for it to develop organically at the camp.  And that did happen.  People 
developed affinity groups and did autonomous actions at grocery stores, at the power 
stations, at corporations, and of course at the harbor. And I guess they picked what they 
wanted to hit depending on how autonomous and how radical they wanted to be.  And 
there was a lot of training for people to learn skills, and lots of space for them to discuss 
how to do things. (Interview 53, Climate Camp Belgium/Netherlands)  
The mechanism of venue shopping does seem to operate for a number of longstanding groups in 
the contentious population, especially among those from the eco-anarchist tradition. And if this 
mechanism operates in conjunction with information sharing, these groups may disseminate 
information about potential targets to other groups, making venue shopping a more important 
dynamic over time.   
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This finding complicates the approach of Walker, Martin and McCarthy (2008), who 
argue that characteristics of the target determine the extent of contentious collective action it will 
face.  The logic of this argument is that since institutions – political, educational or economic – 
use different degrees of ‘facilitation’ in their interactions with challengers, those that are more 
‘open’ will attract less contention.  The quantitative analysis did find that targets that facilitate 
less do face more contention.  But the qualitative analysis suggests that the causal relationship 
may sometimes be reversed: some organizations are choosing their forms of action (contentious) 
before they choose their targets.  This complicated issue should be explored further in future 
research.   
Conclusion  
Overall, my qualitative data suggest that relational mechanisms are important in the organization 
of both contentious and conventional forms of collective action.  These mechanisms both operate 
independently and may intervene in the organization of collective action in ways not fully 
theorized by existing approaches.  
Mechanisms associated with organizational theories appear less often in interviews with 
contentious groups than with conventional ones.  Organizational theorists seem to be correct that 
large environmental groups are professionalized and this drives them to behave conventionally.  
There is also evidence that a portion of contentious groups are ideologically committed to direct 
action.  But on both sides, it also seems clear that groups are not wholly constrained by their 
resources, structures or ideologies.  Groups pool resources to overcome their limitations; 
organizational identities and strategies can be observed to be in flux during inter-organizational 
negotiations; and professionalized groups like FOE do sometimes change their strategies as a 
result of new information or influence.   
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My interview data seem to suggest that the effect of political opportunities is stronger on 
conventional groups than on contentious ones.  Conventional groups are literate in the political 
process of complex international institutions and try to evaluate opportunities systematically.  
They are at least in principle open to altering their tactics as the degree of ‘openness’ changes, 
although often they end up being captured by open institutional structures.   
But contentious groups are not as well-versed in the political process, and perceive 
opportunities in ways that differ systematically from conventional groups.  Contentious groups in 
my population are usually isolated from conventional groups and political institutions.  They 
systematically share information, analysis and strategic information only with one another in a 
way that shields them from a rational evaluation of opportunities and predisposes them towards 
more radical forms of action.  These groups make intentional decisions to form contentious 
enclaves which help them to maintain their radical political analysis and to promote their 
preferred tactics.  The next chapter will more fully develop the implications of this finding for 
European and international political institutions.   
Finally, the findings from the qualitative data lend validity to the correlations I find in the 
quantitative portion of this dissertation (See Appendix A for more information on data integration). 
Network ties seem to be important because organizations are supporting and influencing one 
another to use certain forms of action.  Many groups report that professionalization encourages 
moderation, but the fact that there are major exceptions (like FOE) suggests why variables 
measuring size of budget or institutional access are not significant.  Having a radical ideology is 
a strong predictor engaging in contentious action because a portion of eco-anarchist groups are 
constrained ideologically.  Changes in political opportunities are a significant predictor of 
contentious action because conventional groups tend to rationally evaluate political 
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opportunities.  But the fact that contentious groups ‘venue shop’ when they choose their targets 
makes the influence of targets on tactics less certain.   
This chapter illustrated the mechanisms that operate at the organizational-level when 
groups choose their forms of collective action.  The next chapter deals with a bigger question: 
why does it matter if collective action is contentious or conventional?  I argue that the emergence 
of contentious collective action – and its lack of connection to conventional advocacy – had 
important implications for the European and international policy-making process.  The next 
chapter develops this argument further.   
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CIVIL SOCIETY AND CLIMATE CHANGE GOVERNANCE 
Previous chapters established that a contentious repertoire of collective action emerged and 
spread among closely connected organizations in advance of the Copenhagen Climate Summit.  
This contentious activism reflected the development and diffusion of the climate justice 
movement and of its radical political analysis. At the same time, conventional groups mobilized 
tirelessly and used creative advocacy strategies in an effort to bring about an ambitious climate 
treaty.  This chapter tries to answer a broader question: why does it matter if collective action is 
contentious or conventional?   
At the most basic level, the spread of contentious protest holds the potential to turn 
violent: a contentious protest can easily turn into a riot when either police or demonstrators 
overreact.  This can cause injury, as in Gothenburg, or even death to participants, as in Genoa. 
More commonly, this leads to extensive property damage, which can cost cities and businesses 
tens of millions of dollars. The presence of contentious activism also makes protest policing 
more costly, and generates new risks for the host government, making it harder to find suitable 
venues for future international summits.  In Copenhagen, for example, the presence of 
contentious groups generated extensive costs to the city in order to employ additional police 
officers, pay for legal proceedings against demonstrators, defend against lawsuits by protesters, 
and to cover property damage to the city and local businesses.  Thus, overall, it is safe to say that 
contentious activism poses challenges that conventional tactics simply do not. 
But I also argue that the emergence of contentious climate change activism matters 
because it complicates our understanding of the role of civil society participation in global 
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environmental governance.  Civil society participation in international institutions – and in 
environmental governance in particular -- is often seen as a good by policy-makers and scholars 
alike for the integrative and legitimizing effect these civil society actors can produce in 
international institutions (e.g. Florini 2000; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Kohler-Koch and 
Rittenberger 2007; Reinicke 2000; Schmitter 2000; Sikkink 1999; Willets 1996). But my 
research suggests that when civil society groups are contentious and divided, this promise may 
not be fulfilled.   
The first section of this chapter develops this argument further as it relates to the 
international negotiations on climate change within the UNFCCC.  I argue that the mobilization 
of actors in Europe for the Copenhagen Summit had implications for global climate change 
politics and for the UNFCCC itself.  By using historical process-tracing, I argue that, in contrast 
to conventional climate change advocacy, contentious activism in Copenhagen may actually 
have undermined the consensus process within the UNFCCC by encouraging states to block the 
Copenhagen accord.  I also argue that the contentiousness of civil society in Copenhagen caused 
the UNFCCC to reform itself as an institution, and may shift from the relatively open political 
opportunity structure associated with the UN to a more closed style of politics more often 
associated with international financial institutions. 
The second section explores the implications of these developments for the study of the 
politics of the European Union.  In particular, I contest the view that civil society participation 
will necessarily serve as a motor of European integration (Haas 1958).  Based on the ‘two worlds 
of collective action’ I have documented with my network analysis and interview evidence, I 
argue that contentious participation reflects the development and diffusion of a politicized and 
highly critical view of European integration. Contentious participation is also transnational in 
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nature, but is aimed at discrediting the institutional politics of the European Union and slowing 
the integration process. This finding leads me to reconsider some of the foundational approaches 
to European integration.  It also suggest that the solution to the ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU 
institutions should be framed not in terms of increasing the volume of civil society participation, 
but by improving the ability of the European institutions to integrate fundamentally oppositional 
viewpoints. 
Finally, the findings of this study have implications for civil society groups themselves.  
One major finding is that the success or failure of group strategies is interdependent.  Contrary to 
the positive version of the ‘radical flank’ effect (Haines 1984), contentious groups actually 
undermined the success of conventional groups in Copenhagen.  And due to the institutional 
pressures in the climate change issue area, groups trying to broker the two sides were especially 
disadvantaged.  Network structure also has implications for the repression of civil society 
groups. Where there is division between radical and moderate groups, the spread of contentious 
tactics is more likely.  But at the same time, the relative isolation of these groups makes their 
repression potentially much easier to accomplish, posing a dilemma for those groups that are 
considering contention as a political strategy.   
Implications for Climate Change Governance 
Scholars have documented both growth in the number of environmental civil society groups 
working at the transnational level (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 11; Wiest and Smith 2010), and the 
regularization of their forms of participation within the UNFCCC since 1992 (Mori 2004).  This 
section highlights the ways in which the emergence of contentious activism in the arena of 
climate change governance complicates traditional scholarly understanding of the effect of civil 
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society participation.   In particular, the case of Copenhagen demonstrates how the overlap 
between radical social movements and state delegations can discourage consensus in such 
settings.   
Traditional Views of Participation 
Current scholarship and policy recommendations tend to assume that increased participation in 
transnational policy-making by civil society organizations will improve institutional functioning 
and enhance democratic legitimacy (e.g. Florini 2000; Reinicke 2000; United Nations 1992; 
Willets 1996). In this literature, participation is generally considered desirable because civil 
society actors perform five distinct functions:   
• Supplying Information: Civil society groups provide information to states, especially 
those with limited capacity (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 16; Stone 2000: 218).  
• Consulting with Institutions: Civil society groups fill a consultative role in global 
governance, representing the interests of their constituencies to policy makers and 
ultimately improving outputs (Mori 2004: 159; Princen and Finger 1994; Sharpf 1999).  
• Persuading States: Civil society groups can persuade states to support environmental 
norms, help overcome divides between states, and convince states to adopt international 
environmental treaties (Epstein 2006; Florini 2000: 10; Jakobsen 2000: 276; Keck and 
Sikkink 1998: 25; Princen and Finger 1994; Wapner, Ruiz and Falk 2000).   
• Providing Legitimacy: By virtue of their nature as ‘principled actors,’ the participation of 
civil society groups can provide legitimacy for the decisions taken in international 
institutions (Princen and Finger 1994; Willets 1982: 24).  
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• Supporting Implementation: These groups can provide monitoring for international 
treaties and support their implementation at the domestic level, providing a crucial link 
between global agreements and domestic politics (Asubel and Victor 1992; Scholte 2000: 
262; Susskind 1994) 
As a result of these expected benefits, not only do these scholars recommend that international 
institutions open to civil society organizations, but they actively encourage the participation of 
civil society groups as a means to improve global environmental governance.  In the field of 
environmental politics many high profile UN projects – including Agenda 21 and the Global 
Compact – aim to encourage civil society participation for exactly these reasons.   
Participation as a Double-Edged Sword 
My study of the UNFCCC meeting in Copenhagen suggests several ways in which the earlier 
literature on civil society participation needs to be amended and nuanced.     
Based on my case, I argue that participation can be a double-edged sword for global 
governance.  On the one hand, conventional actors can supply information, consult with 
institutions, persuade states, provide legitimacy and support implementation, just as these 
scholars expect.  But on the other hand, contentious participation by outsiders unconnected to 
institutional politics can have just the opposite effect.  When civil society is divided and some 
use contentious tactics – as it was in Copenhagen – it can actually undermine decision-making in 
international institutions.  This is because they can: 
• Politicize Debates: Divided groups can provide conflicting information to state actors, as 
well as politicize technocratic debates and make consensus less likely.   
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• Divide States: Radical groups can exacerbate divides between states, decreasing the 
likelihood of international action.   
• Create Security Concerns: Contentious groups create security concerns that lead to 
restrictions on participation, making consultation less likely and decreasing the stake of 
civil society groups in the implementation of any eventual agreement.   
• Challenge Legitimacy: Contentious groups challenge the legitimacy of international 
institutions, and undermine public and governmental perception of the effective 
functioning of these institutions.   
As a disclaimer, I would like to emphasize that my goal in this chapter is not to discredit or 
demonize contentious civil society groups.  Nor do I have a particular bias about whether 
conventional or contentious strategies are ultimately better from a democratic or environmental 
standpoint.  However, what I do wish to point out is that civil society groups can and do play 
very different roles in international environmental politics, some of which may be extremely 
challenging to states and international institutions.  Current scholarly literature tends to focus on 
the benefits of conventional participation, while not considering the potentially disruptive 
implications its contentious twin.  This chapter tries to balance the literature, by suggesting the 
ways in which contentious participation deviates from the expectations of most scholars.  My 
goal is to trace the implications of the emergence of contention for the international negotiations 
within the United Nations.  But of course, the politics of the UNFCCC are still unfolding, and the 
ultimate implications of these strategic choices on the part of civil society may still be unknown.   
At the same time, I do not argue that civil society actors are solely responsible for the 
political outcomes within the UNFCCC.  Obviously the lackluster conclusion in Copenhagen 
was driven by factors other than civil society activism - the gap between EU, US and Chinese 
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ambitions is usually cited as the prime culprit.  But I argue that the contentious and divided 
nature of civil society activism also contributed to the collapse of the Copenhagen negotiations, 
for reasons I will elaborate below through historical process tracing.  And as a result, I expect 
that in other cases in which civil society is divided between reformist insiders and radical 
outsiders, we may see similar effects on global governance.   
Civil Society and States 
It is often deceptive to talk about civil society actors and states as if they were distinct.  Civil 
society and state actors are often intimately intertwined in transnational governance. As Mitchell 
(1991: 77) puts it, the boundary of the state is “elusive, porous and mobile.” This porous 
relationship between some states and civil society makes untangling the influence of civil society 
on states more complex than is often acknowledged.77
First, when large states go to international climate negotiations, they bring with them 
teams of negotiators from foreign ministries and other relevant government bodies.  But many 
smaller countries with more limited capacity (in Eastern Europe, Africa and the small Island 
Nations, for example) often hire civil society representatives to be members of their official 
delegations at UN climate conferences.  These delegates play a dual role at these conferences, 
both taking the positions of their civil society groups to their governments and leaking 
information from the official process back to their own organizations.  In Europe, many 
governments in the new member states will employ NGO staff as part of their delegations, giving 
  I argue there are two main types of 
overlap between states and civil society that produce contrasting forms of influence.   
                                                          
77 Another source of confusion is that our traditional view of civil society as David battling the Goliath of states (e.g. 
Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002: 5; Willets 1996) is often factually incorrect. Big NGOs often have considerable 
resources to dedicate to these negotiations and frequently are better prepared and informed than national delegations 
of smaller states. 
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these individuals access to EU-level coordination.  Thus on some occasions, civil society actors 
are participating very directly in making foreign policy in the context of these negotiations.  
Second, some states in the UN process closely identify with grassroots social movements 
and contentious activism.  In particular, states in the ALBA alliance78
The complex linkages between some states and civil society mattered for the political 
process in Copenhagen two ways.  First, civil society activism raised the visibility of particular 
states within international negotiations.  In Copenhagen, this meant the small state of Tuvalu was 
elevated to the status of ‘cause célèbre’ due to its vulnerability and ties with conventional 
activists willing to publicize its position. Second, overlap with contentious actors caused some 
states to radicalize and sustain their critical positions within the UN.  At COP 15, the overlap 
between climate justice activists and the ALBA states particularly encouraged ALBA leaders to 
adopt the justice-based issue framing of the movement.   
 -- in particular Bolivia and 
Venezuela – typically offer their vigorous support to social movements and claim to act on 
behalf of ‘the peoples of the world.’  In many respects, states like Bolivia and Venezuela have 
more in common with grassroots anti-capitalist protesters than they do with most states in the 
UN, and they draw on these movements to promote the legitimacy of their claims.   
The radicalization of ALBA leaders in Copenhagen was especially important because the 
UNFCCC as an institution functions by consensus rules.  As Young (1994) argues, in situations 
in which consensus rules operate: 
The availability of arrangements that all participants can accept as equitable is necessary 
for institutional bargaining to succeed (109). 
                                                          
78 ALBA is comprised of: Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Honduras (which was not 
present in Copenhagen), Nicaragua, St. Vincent and Grenadines, and Venezuela. 
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Radical civil society groups deliberately tried to undermine consensus in the negotiations by 
politicizing debates and spreading ideas about ‘climate justice.’ As a result, the states that were 
targets of their outreach were less likely to perceive the talks as equitable, and more likely to 
block the eventual accord.  The next two sections illustrate this argument by drawing on two 
examples of different kinds of state-civil society linkages from the Copenhagen Summit: the 
Island nation of Tuvalu and the ALBA states.   
Civil Society Representing States: Tuvalu  
It was hard to attend COP 15 and not encounter the rallying cry “Save Tuvalu.” Because of its 
immense vulnerability to climate change, and despite its small size, Tuvalu79
                                                          
79 Tuvalu is a small island nation in the South Pacific with a population of approximately 12,000 people.  The nation 
is composed of nine low-lying coral atolls, and is generally considered the most vulnerable nation in the world to 
sea-level rise due to climate change.  Based on IPCC projections of sea level rise (IPCC 2007: 45), the islands of 
Tuvalu are expected to disappear within the next 50-100 years, and the government of Tuvalu has already begun a 
program to relocate its island’s residents overseas. See the official website: 
 is a prominent actor 
in the international climate change negotiations.  As the lead negotiator puts it, Tuvalu has 
become ‘the canary in the coal mine for climate change.’ This is no accident; other countries 
such as the Maldives are bigger than Tuvalu and almost equally as vulnerable. The prominence 
of Tuvalu was the result of a self-conscious effort on the part of the nation to engage in activism 
in order to attract attention to its plight. The major prong of Tuvalu’s strategy to blend diplomacy 
and activism was the decision of to hire a former Greenpeace Australia climate campaigner – Ian 
Fry – as the country’s lead negotiator at the UNFCCC.  Fry does not live in Tuvalu, but is known 
for passionate outbursts in the plenary sessions, as well as for maneuvering within official 
procedures in order to highlight the nation’s positions. 
www.tuvaluislands.com (accessed April 
2, 2011).   
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Tuvalu’s decision to link itself with the NGO community had a number of consequences.   
Most obviously, Tuvalu benefited from additional monetary and strategic resources which it 
desperately needed.80 For example, prior to Copenhagen, Greenpeace staff helped draft an 
ambitious climate treaty that was presented to the plenary as the official position of the Tuvalu 
government. As Tuvalu is also a member of the Alliance of Small Island States – the AOSIS 
group within the UNFCCC – the nation’s information and strategy was diffused to many small 
state actors.81
Moreover, Tuvalu became an iconic ‘victim’ of climate change that big NGOs were able 
to draw on in their activism.  For example, the GCCA and youth delegates engaged in several 
‘rapid response’ actions in Copenhagen to highlight the proposals of the government of Tuvalu 
and to support the nation’s progressive environmental positions.  As Kumi Naidoo, chair of 
Greenpeace International, describes the strategy:  
  
Inside the meetings, Greenpeace and its partners in the TckTckTck campaign have set up 
a rapid response process. For instance, on Wednesday, Tuvalu called for a suspension of 
the talks because they wanted leaders to discuss committing to a legally binding treaty 
with more ambitious emissions cuts and goals. They cited threats to Tuvalu’s people 
because of rising sea levels. The negotiations were actually suspended briefly. Within 
half an hour, our rapid response team mobilized 300 activists to stage a demonstration 
inside the convention center. They held banners with the slogan, "Tuvalu is the real deal," 
to support Tuvalu’s call for an ambitious climate deal. The story of that demonstration 
was covered on media channels around the globe. It put pressure on the negotiators” 
(Naidoo, quoted in Ostrander 2009). 
Greenpeace wasn’t alone in support of Tuvalu.  CAN was so enamored of the actions of 
Tuvalu in Copenhagen that the coalition voted to give the country its first ever “Ray of the Day 
                                                          
80 The total GDP of Tuvalu was approximately $29 million in 2009; Greenpeace International spent approximately 
the same amount (27 million Euros) on its climate and energy campaign alone in 2009.  See State Department 
country profile: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/16479.htm and Greenpeace International Annual Report 2009: 
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/publications/greenpeace/2010/Annual_Report_2009/A
R2009.pdf. (Accessed April 23, 2011).  
81 The AOSIS group was, however, often divided during Copenhagen due to the extreme political positioning of 
Tuvalu in comparison to the more moderate position of members like Singapore.   
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Award” for its progressive positions, a contrast to the state-shaming practice of awarding “Fossil 
of the Day Awards” to the most obstructionist states. These actions drew media attention to the 
plight of the nation, and may have helped it to gain standing in the negotiations.  As Fry noted in 
a published interview:  
[The activism in Copenhagen] helped our negotiating position… in highlighting the fact 
that our concerns couldn't just be swept under the carpet. There was a strong voice of 
civil society supportive of our concerns. (Fry, quoted in Block 2009).  
This is a perfect example of how NGO advocacy is supposed to work.  NGOs worked 
behind the scenes most of the time, feeding information and intelligence to the delegates, while 
occasionally attracting media when it would be beneficial.  State delegates ‘talked tough’ in the 
plenary, pushing other countries to more ambitious action.  However, as the talks progressed, this 
strategy began to backfire.  In the first week, Tuvalu seemed to benefit from the support of civil 
society and the attention of the media as it tried to push for more progressive outcomes.  But in 
the end, the government was sidelined in the official negotiating process because it became ‘too 
broad’ in its concerns.  As Fry notes again:  
But, of course, in the end we weren't brought to the table… the broad public viewpoint of 
civil society limited our input into the process… Protests, demonstrations, reflected a 
much broader concern about climate change than the Danish government was willing to 
acknowledge. They became too entwined in narrow political negotiations. (Fry, quoted in 
Block 2009) 
Despite this strong statement and tough negotiating all week, Tuvalu ultimately came 
under intense pressure to accept the conference agreement.  Late Friday night the COP president 
submitted the text for official adoption.  In the final hours, when it became clear that the non-
binding Copenhagen Accord was the only possible outcome, Tuvalu (contrary to much 
speculation) decided not to block consensus on the agreement, while strongly denouncing the 
weakness of the Accord and the negotiating process. 
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The relationship between NGOs and Tuvalu represented a sophisticated advocacy 
strategy that blurred the lines between state and conventional non-state actors.  It is also an 
example of how scholars typically imagine civil society activism to operate in global 
governance, although it did not ultimately succeed in producing the desired outcome.  But 
Tuvalu wasn’t the only state with ties to civil society.  The next section reveals remarkably 
different patterns of civil society-state collaboration, with dramatically different consequences.   
States Representing Civil Society: The ALBA Alliance 
Contentious civil society groups had different alliances with states in the UNFCCC negotiations.  
In particular, these contentious groups were closely aligned with the ALBA82
Deciding to support the radical states in the UNFCCC was a deliberate strategy on the 
part of the climate justice movement.  These activists hoped to replicate the experience of the 
1999 Seattle World Trade Organization meeting, in which outsider activist organizations were 
credited with supporting the dissent of developing country delegations participating in the talks 
(Edelman 2009).  As an early organizing document put it: 
 states during 
Copenhagen. From the founding of CJA, there was tension within the coalition about denouncing 
all state actors – mainly because many within the global justice movement in Europe look to the 
ALBA states, in particular Bolivia, as examples of legitimate governance.  In fact, the Reclaim 
Power action was specifically designed to highlight this nuanced political position of support for 
these states but overall distrust of the negotiations.   
                                                          
82 The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America [ALBA] is a coalition of states in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.  ALBA promotes the idea of social, economic and political integration among its members.   Only five 
ALBA countries (Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela) negotiate as a block within the UNFCCC, and 
these countries also participate in the coordination of the G77. Many of the ALBA leaders came to power on anti-
neoliberal platforms and with support of national social movements.  As a result, the often frame their actions in the 
international context as being about supporting ‘the people’ – meaning not only their domestic constituencies, but 
‘people’ from all over the world.   
 277 
 
In Seattle, we not only managed to shut down the conference by being on the streets, we 
also exacerbated the multiple conflicts that existed ‘on the inside’ between the 
negotiating governments… If we manage to do the same thing again... we would both be 
able to keep open the political space to discuss potential ‘solutions’ to climate change that 
go beyond the reigning, market-driven agenda (Muller 2008).   
This task was made easier because many of the ALBA delegations to the UNFCCC 
intentionally included a large number of social movement and indigenous participants.  As a 
result, these delegates were natural targets for the climate justice movement, many of whom 
decided to participate in the walkout as part of the Reclaim Power demonstration.  Not only did 
this demonstration include actual state delegates; it mobilized other civil society representatives 
who wanted to pressure heads of state.  As one participant from the Indigenous Environmental 
Network shouted upon leaving the conference center: 
We are here to support our brothers.  We are here to support Evo Morales, he is coming 
here today.  We are here to give him direction and to support Bolivia.83
ALBA leaders seemed to be listening.  In Copenhagen, these leaders actively consulted 
and coordinated with climate justice activists.  One example of this coordination was Evo 
Morales’ decision to spend a full day of his time in Copenhagen attending the Klimaforum, as 
opposed to the official UNFCCC conference.  At the Klimaforum, Morales held an ‘open forum’ 
where he sought advice from the social movements on what actions he should take in 
Copenhagen.  As he put it at this meeting: 
   
Politics is a science of serving the people. I live to serve the people. Participating in 
politics is part of assuring our dignity, our traditional way of life. It is my duty to take 
your message to the heads of state here. If I make a mistake, let me know so that I can 
rectify it.84
                                                          
83 Transcribed from video recording of the Reclaim Power! demonstration, December 16, 2009, available from 
Democracy Now! at: 
 
http://www.democracynow.org/2009/12/16/headlines#1 (accessed April 12, 2011).   
84 Transcribed from field notes from the Klimaforum open meeting with Evo Morales, December 17, 2009.   
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After this meeting, Morales offered to present the official declaration of the Klimaforum to the 
UNFCCC.  Although this never ended up happening (the UNFCCC Secretariat reportedly stated 
that the document was ‘lost’), it signals the extent of overlap and collaboration between the 
climate justice movement and the Bolivian state.   
The leaders of ALBA also held a public meeting in Copenhagen before the start of the 
high-level negotiating segment.  This event was held in a football stadium, and attracted 
approximately 4,000 participants.  The structure of the event involved the leaders first presenting 
their positions, followed by a question and answer period in which individuals could ask 
questions and make requests.   
In addition to increasing their efforts to coordinate with civil society, Copenhagen 
marked a shift in the public discourse of ALBA leaders on climate change.   While these states 
had always been anti-capitalist, their rhetoric in Poznan, the year before, had mostly aimed to 
point out the ‘limits to growth’ inherent in the capitalist system (see Stevenson 2011).  For 
example, a typical Bolivian intervention in Poznan sounded like the following:  
Competition of the capitalist system is destroying the planet… climate change has 
therefore become a business.  We need to discuss the structural causes of climate change, 
because for us what has failed here is this very model, and we want to live better.  This 
development model needs to be questioned.85
With the development of more contentious politics and activism in Copenhagen, the political 
positions of ALBA became more radical and specific, in two ways.  First, ALBA leaders began 
to directly adopt the ‘climate justice’ framing of the social movements in Copenhagen.  As Evo 
Morales put it in his floor speech:  
 
                                                          
85 Transcribed from video recording of Bolivian intervention in the Ad HocWorking Groups on Long Term 
Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA), December 3, 2008.  Available at: 
http://copportal1.man.poznan.pl/Archive.aspx?EventID=28&Lang=english (Accessed April 4, 2011).   
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Our proposal is to have this climate justice tribunal in the UN, to judge those who are 
responsible for destroying the earth... We are not going to resolve anything without the 
peoples of the earth.  Peoples of the earth you need to unite, to organize yourselves to 
defeat capitalism, and that is how we are going to save the Mother Earth (Evo Morales, 
Bolivia) 86
Second, these leaders increasingly began to draw on the protest movements as a source of 
legitimacy for their radical political positioning.  In doing so, they explicitly mentioned protests 
and climate justice slogans (e.g. “system change, not climate change”), and used them to support 
and justify their opposition to the UN process.  This was particularly true in Hugo Chavez’s floor 
speech:  
  
But there are lots of people outside too… there are a lot of protests in the Copenhagen 
streets.  I would like to say hello to all those people out there [applause]… we could say 
there’s a ghost running through the streets of Copenhagen, and I think that ghost is 
stalking us silently in this room... I was reading some signs out there is the street … one, 
for example, is ‘don’t change the climate, change the system.’ Don’t change the climate, 
change the system.  I take that; I take note of that.   Let’s change the system, and then we 
will begin to change the climate and save the world. [applause] (Hugo Chavez, 
Venezuela) 87
Other ALBA countries also adopted the rhetoric of the movement, and criticized the UNFCCC 
for its hard stance against civil society:  
 
I would like to associate myself with the protests and the demonstrations… we note with 
concern the exclusion of non-governmental organizations from this hall, and the clear 
repressive measures being used against demonstrators…  selfishness and the interests of 
developed countries in preserving an unjust and inequitable world order are preventing us 
from undertaking the changes that are demanded by present and future generations. 
(Esteban Lazo Hernández, Cuba) 88
This use of climate justice language by heads of state was new in Copenhagen, and 
promoted a perception of inequality in the talks.  Thus when it came time to debate the 
  
                                                          
86 Transcribed from video recording of UNFCCC floor speech December 17, 2009, available at:http://unfccc2.meta-
fusion.com/kongresse/cop15_hls/templ/play.php?id_kongresssession=4287 (Accessed April 12, 2011). 
87 Transcribed from video recording of UNFCCC floor speech December 18, 2009, available at:http://unfccc2.meta-
fusion.com/kongresse/cop15_hls/templ/play.php?id_kongresssession=4288 (Accessed April 12, 2011). 
88 Transcribed from video recording of UNFCCC floor speech December 17, 2009, available at:http://unfccc2.meta-
fusion.com/kongresse/cop15_hls/templ/play.php?id_kongresssession=4205 (Accessed April 12, 2011). 
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Copenhagen Accord, these leaders were already primed to see the negotiations through a justice 
angle.  The main opposition to the accord came from this radical alliance of states that had 
already been associated with the climate justice movement. In particular, Bolivia, Cuba, and 
Nicaragua spoke early and strongly against the Accord and the inequitable way in which it was 
brokered. 89
Thus although it is impossible to definitively establish, there is evidence to support the 
idea that radical activism encouraged some states to sustain their critical positions within the 
UNFCCC and to block the Copenhagen Accord (McGregor 2011).  Given that civil society is 
often viewed as having moral authority, calls by civil society for delegates to reject the 
Copenhagen Accord may have persuaded delegates (particularly in populist states) to radicalize 
their rhetoric and sustain their opposition.  The extensive overlap between the climate justice 
movement and the ALBA delegations makes this kind of influence is quite plausible, if 
impossible to definitively demonstrate.   
 These states were the ones mainly responsible for blocking the Copenhagen Accord 
from becoming an official decision of the UNFCCC.   
At the very least, it is clear that these delegates were listening to contentious activists and 
using their actions as a way to legitimize their political positions. This is very clear in the final 
statement put out by ALBA on the outcome of the Copenhagen Summit:   
Today more than ever, before the lamentable maneuvering that has been practiced in 
Copenhagen for petty economic interests, we reiterate that, “Don’t change the climate, 
change the system!”… We recall that while the conference failed in an irreversible way, 
the voices of the youth who know that the future is theirs, grows stronger. They strongly 
denounce the maneuvers of the developed countries and they know that the struggle will 
                                                          
89 Transcribed from video of speeches available from the UNFCCC at: http://www1.cop15.meta-
fusion.com/kongresse/cop15/templ/play.php?id_kongressmain=1&theme=unfccc&id_kongresssession=2755 and 
http://cop15.meta-fusion.com/kongresse/cop15/templ/play.php?id_kongresssession=2761&theme=unfccc (Accessed 
April 12, 2011). 
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continue. We join with them and their protests, and we salute and support them. The 
people must stay on their guard (ALBA 2009). 
After Copenhagen, these states also evaluated their actions by standards set by civil society 
groups.  The weak status of the Copenhagen Accord was represented as a ‘victory for the people’ 
by Morales, and at the same time was viewed as a ‘success’ by radical civil society actors who 
had publicly stated that ‘no deal is better than a bad deal.’90
I would say that Copenhagen is not a failure, it is a success for the people, and a failure 
for the developed governments. Because in December 2009, the developed countries tried 
to approve a document, and thanks to the struggle of you, the leaders of social 
movements of the world meeting in Copenhagen, along with presidents of some 
countries, we communicated the feeling of suffering of the peoples of the world. 
 As Morales put it:  
91
Thus not only was Copenhagen represented as a victory, but the alliance between these states and 
the climate justice movement was strengthened in ways that may have implications for future 
climate change negotiations.   
   
Legitimacy and Implementation 
Beyond influencing states, current scholarly literature argues that civil society actors will work to 
legitimize international institutions and to promote the implementation of environmental 
agreements. Again, my study suggests that the effect of contentious participation is more 
complicated.  The Copenhagen case shows that civil society actors can also work directly to 
delegitimize international institutions, and that contentious participation can lead to security 
restrictions that may indirectly contribute to an institutional loss of legitimacy.     
First, contentious actors in Copenhagen actively tried to delegitimize the summit with 
their actions, as the history of CJA illustrates.  And partially as a result of their radical tactics, 
                                                          
90 Meeting notes from CJA evaluation meeting, December 17-18, 2009.   
91 From speech by Evo Morales at the International Peoples Summit on Climate Change, Cochabamba, Bolivia, 
April 20, 2010.  Available in Spanish at: http://alainet.org/active/37560 (Accessed April 12, 2011).   
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security restrictions were put in place that limited the participation of civil society groups more 
generally.    Since civil society was not allowed to participate actively in the final days of the 
Summit, there was little chance for these actors to provide useful information and fill the 
consultative role that scholars and policy maker have come to expect them to fill.  
Second, climate justice activists not only worked to block the Copenhagen Accord, but 
also to delegitimize its implementation.  Some conventional organizations, following the lead of 
Obama, Yvo de Boer and Ban Ki-moon, were critical but accepting of the Accord as a 
‘meaningful’ document.   But climate justice groups took the opposite position, working 
publically to denounce the agreement and undermine its implementation.  The Friends of the 
Earth press release on the subject is typical of the ‘illegitimate’ position:  
 Countries seeking a just and effective solution to climate change should not sign this 
illegitimate and distracting 'Copenhagen Accord'… Developing countries have shown 
real leadership in Copenhagen and must not give up the UNFCCC for the 'Copenhagen 
Accord.'  
Perhaps because of this lackluster support for the agreement, parties to the UNFCCC 
have not seemed eager to register commitments under the Copenhagen Accord, making progress 
to date slow and weak (Doyle and Wynn 2010). Since civil society actors were not allowed to 
participate in developing the eventual Accord, we can reason that it also becomes less likely that 
they will have a stake in its implementation.  And as the next section will argue, after the failure 
to reach consensus on an outcome at COP 15, there seems to have developed a serious malaise 
around the institution itself and its ability to reach any eventual agreement, which resulted in 
renewed interest in alternative venues for climate change governance. 
Implications for the Institutional Politics of the UNFCCC 
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The move towards the use of contentious tactics by civil society organizations in Copenhagen 
has had important consequences for the UNFCCC as an institution.  This was particularly 
evident at COP 16 in Cancun a year later, when it seemed clear that the institution had modified 
in substantial ways to respond to the transformation in civil society groups. This section will 
outline those changes in terms of security reforms, procedures for dealing with civil society and 
the interest of parties in new venues for climate change policy-making.   
Security Reforms  
One clear outcome of the contentious activism in Copenhagen was that security around the 
conference became more strict and proactive in targeting potential threats.  This can be seen in 
the number of people arrested during the two week summit: Copenhagen police arrested over 
1,500 protesters in total, even though only a handful were ever charged. Authorities justified 
these arrests because there was a ‘fear of violence’ around the summit, and they argued, the 
preemptive action was necessary to prevent property damage and violence.   
Within the UNFCCC itself, there were important changes in the way UN security dealt 
with civil society groups.  Most notably, for the final few days of the conference when heads of 
state arrived, authorities decided to severely limit civil society participation.  For the final two 
days, civil society access was cut to merely 90 of the 20,000 participants registered.  Under this 
procedure, most delegations were granted passes for the second week based on a percentage of 
their registered delegation.  As an email from the UNFCCC Observer Organizations Liaison 
Team explained, “unexpected developments … compelled the secretariat to install a series of 
safety and security measures.” Thus the UNFCCC acknowledged that the restrictions were not 
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purely due to logistical problems with the small size of the venue (as some later claimed), but 
were also due to security concerns.   
In addition to these general restrictions, the UNFCCC completely removed the 
accreditation from specific groups as of the morning of the Reclaim Power Action.  The 
UNFCCC security targeted groups – like Friends of the Earth – that were believed to support 
Reclaim Power.  Leaders of FOE report in interviews that they were told that they were viewed 
as a threat in a security report, but the UN security declined to elaborate on why.92
These changes were not limited to Copenhagen.  Despite the almost complete absence of 
heads of states at the COP 16 in Cancun, security procedures were even stricter in this venue.  
While in Copenhagen ‘actions’ were permitted if cleared with the Secretariat, in Cancun the UN 
Security imposed a two day waiting period for any civil society action, effectively curtailing the 
ability of civil society to respond to events in the negotiations in a timely manner.  
 
In addition, in Cancun the UN Security was active in removing individuals who took part 
in protest actions.  Activists noted that they did this by either noting participant’s names from 
their badges or reviewing footage of protests and matching it with photos from the registration 
system.  One prominent indigenous activist described his suspension from the UNFCCC in this 
way:  
We took our delegation over to the U.N. forum and went through the security and swiped 
my—this card here. And all of a sudden, the whole computer started flashing red. I was 
suspended… So we found out that because yesterday we were talking yesterday after a 
press conference… after that, our youth went out, you know, demanding climate justice 
and to lift up all the issues that we’re addressing... So, of course, the media was asking, 
you know, what is the indigenous position on this? So I spoke, as well… And I didn’t 
                                                          
92 Transcribed from video footage of the Reclaim Power ! demonstration from Democracy Now! available at: 
http://www.democracynow.org/2009/12/16/climate_crackdown_un_bars_friends_of (Accessed April 12, 2011).  
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know there was anything that we were doing wrong at all. (Tom Goldtooth, Indigenous 
Environmental Network)93
The targeting of individuals is a new phenomenon in the security arrangements of the UNFCCC, 
which has typically relied on group-sanctioning policies. The extent to which this policy will be 
used on a permanent basis is still unknown.  However, one can reason that suspending 
individuals will give the UNFCCC more leverage in removing individual ‘troublemakers’ from 
the talks without having to justifying bans on entire organizations.  On the other hand, if the 
group sanctioning policy is weakened, organizations will have fewer incentives to rein in 
contentious individuals, potentially lowering the costs of individuals engaging in protest actions.   
 
Segregating Civil Society 
In Copenhagen, the UNFCCC was much criticized for excluding civil society from the 
conference.  In Cancun, it became clear that civil society would not be excluded, but that 
important reforms would be put in place to segregate civil society actors from the official 
negotiations.   
First, the official ‘civil society’ space was physically separated from the venue where 
negotiations between the parties were being held.  The ultimate effect was that travel between 
‘civil society’ events and the main plenary was time-consuming and unpleasant.  As Kumi 
Naidoo put it, the effects were virtually the same as in Copenhagen: 
Civil society is shut out.  I have met delegates who have said, ‘oh I would have loved to 
have come to that side meeting… but it takes me 45 minutes to get from here to there and 
                                                          
93 From interview transcript with Tom Goldtooth from Democracy Now!, December 9th, 2010, available at : 
http://www.democracynow.org/2010/12/9/prominent_indigenous_environmental_activist_blocked_from (Accessed 
April 12, 2011). 
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back.  So there is not real enabling environment created for civil society to have access to 
delegates and to convey our concerns and perspectives.94
Second, after Copenhagen there have been a number of discussions opened within the 
UNFCCC process on the role of civil society.  At COP 16, there was a particularly controversial 
discussion related to ‘enhancing the role of civil society observers’ within the Subsidiary Body 
on Implementation. The proposals suggested creating separate venues for civil society 
participation that would preclude the need for NGOs to participate in the COPs, and seemed 
aimed at reinforcing divisions between civil society and state delegates.  For example, one 
proposal in this body suggested establishing a pre-COP high-level NGO dialogue that would 
mandate venues for civil society participation that would be entirely separate from the COPs 
themselves. This proposal seemed to have the support of some parties, although NGOs delegates 
strongly objected on the grounds that this would ‘tokenize’ their participation under the guise of 
‘enhanced participation.’
  
95
Overall, in Cancun a number of state delegations adopted a more vocally skeptical 
position on the role of civil society.  Taken together, this change and the modification of security 
procedures suggest that after Copenhagen the UNFCCC may be gradually moving towards the 
more closed model of civil society participation generally associated with international financial 
institutions (Schnable and Scholte 2002), and away from the open style generally associated with 
the United Nations.  However, since global climate change negotiations are ongoing, future 
research will be needed to track the evolution of the UNFCCC in response to the emergence of 
contention.   
  
                                                          
94 Transcribed from interview with Kumi Naidoo, from Democracy Now! available at: 
http://www.democracynow.org/2010/12/13/groups_protest_un_climate_summit_for (Accessed April 12, 2011).  
95 See, for example, the Climate Action Network’s series of ECO articles from COP 16, available at: 
http://www.climatenetwork.org/event/cop-16-cancun (Accessed July 19, 2011).   
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Seeking New Venues  
After Copenhagen, there was a serious malaise among leaders and commentators about the 
UNFCCC as an institution for solving the climate crisis (e.g. Friedman 2009).  Much of the 
discontent focused on the fact that the consensus rules of the UNFCCC allow small activist states 
– like Bolivia and Venezuela – to block agreement between other parties.  Given the immense 
political divides that were evident in Copenhagen, the ability of the institution to produce 
valuable outcomes was greatly questioned in the months following COP 15.   
This weariness about the UNFCCC led many observers and participants to begin eyeing 
alternative institutions for making climate change policy (see Keohane and Victor 2011).  For 
example, in the months following Copenhagen it seemed as though President Obama was 
interested in reopening the Bush administration’s Major Economies Forum, which in many ways 
is similar to the Copenhagen Accord in its reliance on voluntary pledges.96
Climate justice activists also began to focus on alternative venues after the failure of 
Copenhagen.  For example, at the invitation of Evo Morales, approximately 17,000 climate 
justice activists participated in a ‘World People’s Summit on Climate Change’ in Cochabamba, 
Bolivia in April, 2010 (Friends of the Earth International 2010).  This summit produced a 
Peoples’ Declaration that many within the movement saw as their answer to the Copenhagen 
Accord.   
  At the same time, 
many moderate NGOs became convinced that the only way to force a global agreement was to 
work more at the national level to change public opinion and domestic state positions.   
                                                          
96 The MEF and the Copenhagen Accord differ in that the latter in not restricted to only big polluters, and is 
generally seen to represent a good faith effort to reduce emissions.   
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Despite this serious pessimism, the UNFCCC seemed to function slightly better in 
Cancun than in Copenhagen.  One indication of this improvement was the ability of the highly 
divided plenary to arrive at agreement on a set of decisions to advance of the negotiations.  
However, the main reason for this outcome is that the Chair of the final session in Cancun moved 
away from a strict definition of what constitutes ‘consensus’ within the institution – a decision 
that many in the plenary (and in NGOs) applauded.  But the Bolivian delegation complained that 
the Chair was very aggressive in gaveling over their objections, thus claiming consensus when it 
did not exist (Freidman 2010). At the Bangkok inter-sessional meeting of the UNFCCC in April 
2011, ALBA countries joined with the G77 to demand that this not happen again, and to revisit 
the decisions of Cancun.  So while this procedural change in the UNFCCC might not be lasting, 
it is clear that the redefining of consensus to exclude ‘radical’ actors would make policy-making 
within this institution less unwieldy and make the institutions more attractive to larger states.  
However, this improved efficiency in policy-making in the UNFCCC may come at the expense 
of the institution’s reputation with smaller states in the process.  
Implications for EU Politics 
Contentious European groups did not only work to undermine the UNFCCC process – they also 
targeted their actions at their own leaders and at the institutions of the European Union.  In this 
way, the case I have documented has important implications for politics in the European Union.  
Much like scholars of global governance, EU scholars tend to hold a high opinion of civil society 
because of the ‘integrative’ effects its participation is expected to generate.  But recent examples 
of contentious civil society participation suggest that EU issues are becoming much more 
‘politicized’ (Zürn 2004), and civil society groups are mobilizing much more contentious 
participation (Imig and Tarrow 2001; Uba and Uggla 2011).   
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I suggest that the implications of civil society spillover in a politicized EU may be more 
complex than scholars of European integration originally imagined.  By building on recent 
literature such as Hooghe and Marks’ (2010) work on politicization in EU politics, della Porta 
and Caini’s (2007) work on ‘Europeanization from below’, and Balme and Chabanet’s (2008) 
work on ‘autonomized spheres of action’ I suggest the contentious activism I document in the 
issue area of climate change reflects a new form of contentious and highly critical European 
activism that may also exist in other issues areas.  Moreover, this contentious activism remains 
largely unconnected to institutional politics.  As a result, it represents a new kind of contentious 
‘spillover’ that holds the potential to actually slow the pace or even change the direction of the 
integration process.  
European Civil Society and Politicization 
From a neofunctionalist perspective, the participation of collective actors in European politics 
should be one of the motors of integration in the absence of direct ‘citizen’ participation.  As 
Haas remarked in The Uniting of Europe, “perhaps the chief finding is that group pressure will 
spillover into the federal sphere and thereby add to the integrative pressure” (Haas 1958: xiii). 
For Haas, this ‘spillover’ of civil society would result in attitude changes of the actors involved, 
and would eventually generate loyalty to the new, more efficient polity and increase pressure for 
further integration (Haas 1958: 287).  
When neofunctionalists discussed the spillover of ‘pressure’ to the European level, they 
generally meant the use of conventional forms of action.  In general, scholars have assumed that 
European integration has benefited from a ‘permissive consensus’ and a low level of public 
contestation on European issues (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970).  The few scholars that have 
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considered the question of contentious participation, have conclude that it will either be 
irrelevant or supportive of further integration (Haas 1958: 526; Schmitter 1969: 166). 
The political processes that Haas and other early EU theorists described are 
overwhelming elite-driven and conventional.  And as a result, this literature often seems out of 
touch with the latest developments in EU politics.  Responding to recent political changes, 
scholars have documented the ‘politicization’ and increased contentiousness of the politics of the 
European Union (Imig and Tarrow 2001; Hooghe and Marks 2010; Uba and Uggla 2010).  In 
this more ‘politicized’ setting, EU issues are not only the focus of debate by elites, but also by 
mass publics that sometimes behave contentiously.  As Hooghe and Marks summarize:  
A brake on European integration has been imposed not because people have changed 
their minds, but because, on a range of vital issues, legitimate decision making has 
shifted from an insulated elite to mass politics (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 13). 
 
Following this approach, I argue that contrary to the ‘integrative effects’ 
neofunctionalists expect to result from spillover of conventional participation, the spillover of 
contentious participation can sometimes slow the pace or even change the direction the 
integration process.  This is because in a politicized setting, civil society groups can and do 
mobilize citizens transnationally in opposition to the expansion of EU competencies, as the next 
section will explain.   
Two Types of Spillover 
My research about climate change activism has documented both contentious and conventional 
participation in EU-level climate change politics.  Despite operating against a common political 
background, the ‘two worlds of European collective action’ I have described in previous chapters 
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represent different types of civil society spillovers to the European level: one from the national 
politics to European politics, and the other from global politics to European politics.  Thus the 
pathways by which organizations become involved in politics at the European-level do not 
necessarily represent the same kind of functionally-oriented spillovers that neofunctionalists 
imagined.   
The history of CAN clearly exactly illustrates the kind of spillover Haas and others had in 
mind: the gradual transnationalization of political advocacy as a result of the shift in political 
authority to the EU level.  Most CAN groups worked on domestic issues and gradually began to 
realize they need to also work at the European level.  And when they do so, their spillover into 
EU politics is conventional and supportive of further integration.   
But my study also documents another kind of Europeanization that follows a different 
process. The history of CJA illustrates the ‘spillover’ of activism from global justice politics to 
European politics.  In particular, groups within CJA came to apply their criticisms learned in the 
global justice movement to the European institutions.  As a result, these institutions were deeply 
distrusted.  As a representative of one of the founding organizations put it to me:  
[JH: Do you ever think about targeting your actions at the EU?] R: Why do you keep 
talking about the EU? The EU is just a bunch of old guys in suits shaking hands inside 
glass palaces.  They aren’t going to help us (Interview 8, KlimaX Denmark).  
As one summed up his group’s position on the EU: 
After there were ‘3 Nos’ the EU moved on with what they’re calling the Lisbon Treaty 
process anyways.  This made it very clear how un-democratic it all is.  How much it’s all 
about existing power structures, corporate lobbying, trade and commercial interests.  In 
general, it’s about the interests of a few and not of the majority… (Interview 77, Climate 
Justice Caravan). 
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CJA itself was a self-described “de facto European organization with strongly globalist 
impulses” (Interview 84, Climate Justice Action).  As another explained it, “the coalition is 
mostly European, but the sense of globality is what encourages the mobilization” (Interview 48, 
FOE France).  Many of these groups were accustomed to working on global-level issues before, 
and as a result of contact with those in CJA, began to develop stronger anti-EU critiques.     
This process closely resembles what della Porta and Caini have called a ‘Europeanization 
from below’ (della Porta and Caini 2007).  This is particular true as concerns the development of 
the European Social Forum [ESF].  The ESF itself is a regional version of the World Social 
Forum.  And it was also an important organizing venue for CJA outreach in advance of 
Copenhagen.  At the ESF there was about a dozen panels organized on climate change issues 
(European Social Forum, Document 7).  The high level of importance given to this issue was 
clear from the final declaration made in this venue:  
We, the European social movements gathering in Malmö, have committed on a common 
agenda in the way to lead the fight for "another Europe" and Europe based on the 
people’s rights… We call for a global day of action on climate on December 6th during 
the Poznan summit in Poznan itself and all other the world. We are calling for a massive 
international mobilisation next year to make the critical Kopenhagen talks in December 
2009 [sic] (ESF 2008).  
Contentious, Critical European-Level Activism 
My research in the issue area of climate change reflects the broader development of a strand of 
contentious and highly critical European-level activism.  To generalize, in the last ten years there 
has emerged a completely different sphere of European organizing that is often oppositional to 
the EU project (see, for example, the declaration of the European Social Forum, Document 7).  
Groups in this sphere oppose the European Union on the grounds that it is based on neoliberal 
principles.  But not all of these groups oppose regional integration in principle; they would like 
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to see integration reformed so that it involves ‘positive integration’ in terms of social and 
environmental justice, not only ‘negative integration’ in terms of removing  barriers to trade.   
This leftist opposition to European integration has recently been showing its strength, and 
has shown that civil society protest can in fact slow regional integration.  One key example is the 
opposition mobilized by many global justice groups before the EU Constitutional referendum in 
2005.  Another example is the massive mobilization against the Bolkestein services directive, 
which ultimately led to the serious revision of the directive before its adoption in 2006 (Parks 
2009).  But this study also documents a further mutation of this anti-EU strand of mobilization in 
the issue area of climate change. Not only did the climate justice mobilizations in Europe take on 
an anti-EU character; there was also significant overlap between the organizations supporting 
these demonstrations and organizations promoting a critical view of European integration. As 
one described his organization’s history:     
We also lead a movement against the Europe of Maastricht.  This is a movement to 
struggle against the neoliberal push inside the European Union.  And really we are one of 
the few environmental organizations in Europe who had a strong stand against the 
European Union.  So not only about some of the expressions or some of the politics, but 
against the European Union as a political project… Because from a fundamental point of 
view that will worsen the environmental situation, not only in Europe but worldwide.  
Because there is no ‘just change this paragraph, just change this article.’ From a 
fundamental point of view, this is the wrong way.  So we did a lot of campaigning to fight 
the unsustainable, and un-social European Union. (Interview 81, Ecologistas en Acción) 
Through their actions, many of the most active organizations in CJA were explicitly trying 
to discredit EU climate change policy.  For example, ‘climate justice’ was a key discussion at the 
Attac European Strategy Meeting in September 2009, when the organization decided to mobilize 
for Copenhagen and against the EU’s carbon market proposals (Interview 44, Attac France). 
Another example of this strategy was implemented by the ‘Seattle to Brussels Network’ – a 
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coalition of organizations that opposes the EU’s ‘corporate-oriented trade policies.’ One activist 
affiliated with this coalition described its strategy for Copenhagen like this: 
We want to try to have discussions with people in the negotiations – Friends of the Earth, 
La Via Campesina, Focus on the Global South, and the Third World Network to get a 
clear picture of what is going on.  But we also want to try to hold discussions with 
governments from the South, mostly Bolivia and Ecuador.  It is our goal to put these 
people in touch with the media, in order to show to show that there are alternatives to the 
European proposals, which are based on nothing but illusions. (Interview 45, Initiatives 
Pour un Autre Monde) 
These groups brought their broader anti-EU critique to the issue of climate change.  And they 
aimed their actions towards undermining the legitimacy of European climate policy, and the 
neoliberal integration process more generally, while at the same time mobilizing transnationally 
within the boundaries of the EU.   
Consequences for European Integration 
The distinctiveness of these two types of spillover and their political content has two 
consequences for the development of European politics.  First, different pathways demonstrate 
different types of transnational socialization.  Civil society organizations are often supported by 
EU institutions because they offer channels for individuals to participate in the development of 
EU policy (Greenwood 2007: 347).  Scholars have documented the importance of transnational 
interaction among individuals in producing a ‘European identity’ (e.g. Fligstein 2008).  But in 
the world of climate change politics, the mainstream European NGOs tend not to be participatory 
enough to really socialize their members (Sudbery 2003; Warleigh 2001: 623).  As one staff 
member describes it: 
Obviously we would like to get citizens involved in our work.  But this is difficult – we 
simply don’t have the resources to do this kind of thing.  And our first priority has to be 
working for what is good for the environment.  And of course, protecting the climate is 
also good for citizens.  So we mostly rely on our member [organizations] to involve 
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represent their members, and we concentrate our actions on the policy process. (Interview 
30, Climate Action Network Europe)  
On the contrary, events like the ESF or the CJA meetings are highly participatory, and may offer 
much more opportunity to socialize participants.   However, the kind of socialization these 
individuals receive would be more likely to reproduce the highly critical takes on European 
integration than it would be to support the integration process as it is.   
Second, the spread of highly critical views of the integration process and EU policy 
among these organizations is partially due to their almost total lack of connection to institutional 
politics in the EU and the world of reform-oriented NGOs.  Because of the distinctiveness of 
these pathways and the lack of contact between organizations on different sides of the network, 
contentious and conventional groups rarely meet, although they work in the same issue area, 
sometimes even in the same cities.   
Again, my findings about activism on the issue of climate change likely represent broader 
trends in the development of EU politics.  In this way, my study reinforces the conclusions of 
Balme and Chabanet (2008):  
Two relatively autonomized spheres of action are tending to take shape, one emphasizing 
lobbying of European Institutions, and the other looking to more reactive, protest-based 
forms of intervention at the national level (177)… This tendency towards the 
fragmentation of spheres of action doubtless fuels feelings of Euroskepticism and 
reinforces the idea that EU Institutions are out of touch with citizen concerns (186)  
Thus I argue, contrary to Haas and other EU scholars, that the spillover of civil society into 
contentious European collective action can actually have negative implications for climate policy 
and for the integration process when it is not linked to the institutional representation of civil 
society in the European institutions.  I suspect that these ‘fragmented spheres of action’ may 
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represent an emerging pattern of contestation on important issues in a politicized EU, and thus 
should be the subject of future research.   
Rethinking Democratic Deficit 
The ‘democratic deficit’ in EU politics is a concept mainly invoked to suggest that the EU 
institutions are too far removed from direct representation and the participation of ordinary 
citizens.  It has not only been a topic of debate in scholarly circles (Kohler-Koch and 
Rittenberger 2007) but also an important motivation for institutional reform within the European 
Union itself.97
My network analysis in Chapter Three showed that there are clearly two worlds of 
European collective action.  But what drives the segmentation in European civil society 
networks? I suggest ‘fragmented spheres’ are the result of a strong tendency in the European 
institutions towards emphasizing the ‘participation’ of (conventional) civil society actors by 
channeling certain groups into the policy-making process while de-emphasizing or ignoring the 
voices of other (contentious) actors.    Thus I argue that democratic deficit is not only about lack 
of participation; it is about the disjuncture between these two spheres.  And as a result, the 
remedy is more complex.  The findings of this study suggest that the problem of ‘democratic 
deficit’ in European policy-making (Kohler-Koch and Rittenberger 2007) may be broader and 
more difficult to solve than scholars have typically imagined. 
 
Participants in contentious climate change politics in Europe don’t tend to hold very high 
opinions of the EU, as I have previously noted.   But it’s not simply that these groups are 
opposed to EU policy – they feel that the European institutions systematically disregard them 
                                                          
97 One of the motivations of the constitutional project of the EU was to reduce the democratic deficit.  The 
Commission’s White Paper of Governance (2001) also responds to this debate.   
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and marginalize their voices.  This is particularly true for organizations that try also to participate 
in Brussels politics, but hold more radical political views.  For example, a representative from La 
Via Campesina Europe described to me how the problem his organization faces is not simply a 
lack of representation, but a lack of being heard:  
Well, we have an office in Brussels, and we do participate in some of the consultative 
groups within the European Commission…  But on most of these, we have only one seat, 
whereas the other farmers’ association has fifteen...  the space for our organization and 
for NGOs is very limited.  And it’s not just that.  I think our voice is very marginalized in 
comparison to the bigger organizations, and it seems like we’re not really being listened 
to (Interview 82, La Via Campesina Europe).   
Other organizations that tried to participate in EU politics from a more radical perspective 
echoed this sentiment:   
We don’t really participate in EU ‘consultations’ [gestures air quotes].  What we want is 
to participate in discussions with people from the Commission and from the Parliament.  
But this is very difficult – they are not open to our kinds of discussions.  I think this 
demonstrates that there is no real process of participation: the consultations are small, 
they are limited, and there is no real influence, they are not legally binding.  For example, 
we tried to participate in the European consultations of GMO foods.  We gave our input, 
but this was our experience – very frustrating in general.  They don’t want to talk to 
people like us, and they don’t want to talk the way we do.  And this made us think that 
you can’t reform the EU from the inside – the EU is not reformable.  What we need is a 
total alternative (Inteview 81, Ecologistas en Acción).  
From this perspective, the democratic deficit in the EU isn’t about a lack of participation: 
it is more broadly about the institution’s inability to integrate more critical perspectives on the 
European project.  As a result, the ‘consultative’ role of civil society – in which civil society 
organizations serve to represent the interests of affected parties to policy-makers – is not 
necessarily being fulfilled in EU policy-making, even in the context of increased participation.  
Thus the remedy to the democratic deficit cannot be to simply channel resources to more civil 
society groups through the traditional channels of the European Commission.  It which will not 
help to address the development of highly critical views of EU politics in this alternative sphere.  
 298 
 
I suggest that in the context of politicization, the European Institutions will need to work more 
on integrating conflictual viewpoints in order to overcome the true democratic deficit, which is a 
much more difficult task.  
Implications for Civil Society  
As the previous chapters illustrated, contentious and contained activism have very different 
organizational origins.  The network analysis of this study reveals the coordination that underlies 
civil society activism.  This chapter aims to show how the overall structure of relations among 
civil society groups can influence the success of different groups within the network.     
My case particularly illustrates how the success or failure of civil society strategies is 
interdependent (See Whittier 2004).  Contrary to the often invoked positive version of the 
‘radical flank effect’ (Gamson 1975; Haines 1984; Jenkins and Eckert 1986), conventional 
groups in Copenhagen were actually undermined by the presence of more radical actors (Gupta 
2002).  Groups that did try to broker the divide between conventional and contentious groups 
were particularly penalized.  These findings suggest that civil society groups have to consider the 
strategies of other groups when considering the best course of action for themselves.    
Finally, I also argue that network structure also has implications for the repression of 
civil society.   Specifically, while the lack of connection between the two sides of network I 
documented did facilitate the quick diffusion of contentious tactics, it also made repression of 
contentious actors much easier, posing a dilemma for groups interested in promoting contentious 
activism.   
Conventional Groups 
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Reformed-oriented, conventional groups were the big losers in Copenhagen, despite their tireless 
efforts to support the adoption of an ambitious treaty.  Not only did the final agreement differ 
dramatically from their stated preferences, but these groups were also excluded from the 
negotiations to an unprecedented extent.   
Without the ability to enter the negotiations, these groups were side-lined in their 
lobbying and media work, and felt that they had little ability to influence the negotiations.   As 
one observer (correctly) noted at a CAN meeting,‘there were fewer civil society observers at the 
UNFCCC on the final days in Copenhagen than there were at the WTO ministerial in 1996.’  But 
nevertheless, these groups did not radicalize their actions once restrictions to the venue were 
implemented, and instead continued their contained forms of activism to the best of their ability 
from a secondary space. The political outcome of COP 15 was a bitter disappointment to groups 
who had spent years developing careful plans to push delegates towards a more ambitious 
conclusion.98
In addition, because of the divisions within civil society, civil society groups as a whole 
in Copenhagen never developed a common issue framing or message to present to the news 
media and to official delegates.  This division within civil society was picked up in newspaper 
reports, which often focused on the in-fighting between organizations rather than the substantive 
issues at stake.  Many conventional groups reported that the lack of unity in Copenhagen made it 
more difficult for organizations to get out their messages on climate change. 
 
The results of Copenhagen lead to a serious process of re-examination of the goals and 
functioning of CAN.  In particular, it seemed clear after Copenhagen that CAN would have to 
                                                          
98 The CAN publication ECO traces the reaction of these NGOs throughout this time period.  It can be accessed 
online at: http://www.climatenetwork.org/eco-newsletters [Accessed January 31, 2011].   
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come up with a better response to critiques from more radical groups and the presence of 
contentious activism.  However, this process will likely be difficult, as tensions within the 
coalition make radical change difficult to achieve without the support of the large organizations, 
as Chapter Five elaborated.   
Contentious Groups  
Contentious groups tended to see Copenhagen as a moderate success.  First, many of the more 
radical, abolitionist groups were not affected by the restriction to the venue (they didn’t want to 
go in anyway) and were pleased to see that the negotiations fell apart.  These groups had little 
faith in the UNFCCC to solve the climate crisis, and they had planned their actions to exacerbate 
internal divisions in the negotiations. At the very least, many felt that the collapse of the 
negotiations in Copenhagen reinforced their argument that the UNFCCC is an institution beyond 
reform. As one stated in a Reclaim Power evaluation meeting: 
Logistically and strategically a lot of things could have been better, but politically and 
mediatically [sic] we achieved our goals. 
These activists focused most of their self-criticism on their interaction with the police. 
One main reason for this was that many participants in protests were arrested in Copenhagen, 
and groups felt that this could have been avoided if they had been better prepared.  Many of 
these organizations did, however, express satisfaction that they had reached out to new allies and 
felt that Copenhagen was useful for building trust for future mobilizations.     
Overall, it seems clear that the actions of contentious organizations in Copenhagen were 
moderately successful by their own standards, and were damaging to conventional organizations. 
This finding contradicts the idea that the emergence of a ‘radical flank’ usually benefits 
moderates (Haines 1984; Jenkins and Eckert).  But as Gupta (2010) argues, for the positive 
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radical flank effect to obtain, authorities must make a differentiated response between radicals 
and moderates -- something that did not seem to always happen in Copenhagen, especially as 
regards access to the UN venue.  As a result of a security strategy that severely limited access to 
all groups for the final two days, conventional groups were particularly undermined by the 
presence of radical activism in Copenhagen.   
Perils of Brokerage 
The experience of Friends of the Earth International exemplifies how organizations that sought 
to play ‘brokers’ between contentious and conventional groups – such as Friends of the Earth -- 
were particularly disadvantaged in Copenhagen.  Most scholarly network theory predicts that 
network brokers hold privileged positions in networks, which should allow them access to 
informational resources from both of the network components (Burt 1976).  FOE’s expectation 
was that being the broker would bring it new advantages.   However, this strategy backfired, 
causing FOE to lose credibility with moderates, radicals and institutional actors.   
First, because of its structure as a major international NGO that receives government 
funding, FOE-I leaders believe they could not be associated with any protests that might turn 
violent.  Therefore, while FOE-I representatives did attend early meetings of CJA, the 
organization was not able to join the protest coalition that sponsored Reclaim Power, thus 
limiting its influence within this coalition.  At the same time, because it dropped out of CAN, it 
did not have access to the lobbying information developed by this coalition. Thus the 
organization tried to play the role of broker between the two sides, but ultimately lost its 
credibility with both moderates and radicals and became more isolated.   
In addition, in the process of building ties with radicals, FOE-I damaged its credibility 
with the UNFCCC.  This culminated in FOE-I being entirely excluded from the UNFCCC venue 
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by order of the Secretariat for the final three days.  It is reasonable to assume that the FOE-I 
exclusion was due to its loose affiliation with CJA, and the Secretariat’s fear that the 
organization would disrupt or endanger the proceedings.  All FOE-I representatives had their 
official accreditation withdrawn and were unable to engage in insider activities.99  FOE-I 
representatives staged a sit-in in the lobby to protest their exclusion, but to no avail. When Yvo 
de Boer, Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC came out to explain that he was “between a rock 
and a hard place” FOE representatives interrupted him with shouts of “open the door de Boer” 
and “liar!” prompting him to walk out on discussions.100
The FOE-I example demonstrates the extent to which the two worlds of insider and 
outsider collective action are likely to remain mutually exclusive.  Because individuals are 
accredited only as members of groups, and group sanctioning rules still apply, organizations 
have to keep a tight rein on their individual delegates or else the entire group risks exclusion. 
These rules mean that ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ strategies generally can’t be used in combination 
in the context of global climate change politics.  And when groups deviate, the effects can be 
long-lasting.  Its poor relationship with the UNFCC Secretariat is one very plausible reason why 
FOE-I decided to dedicate more resource in 2010 in Cancun to outsider actions, and did not even 
sponsor a booth in the NGO exhibit hall.   
  In many ways FOE-I had the worst of 
both worlds: it was neither able to play the insider role, nor did it participate fully in the outsider 
protest.     
The FOE-I experience also demonstrates why merger is not a likely outcome in a 
segmented network like the one in Copenhagen: brokerage does not pay.   This is particularly 
                                                          
99 In contrast, other international NGOs such as Greenpeace, WWF and Oxfam were still permitted to send a few 
essential delegates to the two final days of COP 15.   
100 Transcribed from video footage available from the WWF channel on You Tube at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Hbg9qSMzfc&feature=player_embedded# (Accessed April 12, 2011).  
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true where strict institutional rules govern organizational behavior and stark tactical divides 
exist. Those organizations that chose protest have to stick with it; and those that lobbied in the 
past risk institutional sanctions if they deviate.  Thus my results suggest that divided networks 
may remain a common feature in future climate change negotiations. 
Network Structure and Repression  
The structure of relations between civil society organizations in Copenhagen also had 
implications for the repressive strategies used against them.  As the first half of this dissertation 
showed, the segmentation of the network into two components meant that contentious groups 
were relatively isolated from conventional groups and that contentious behavior spread quickly 
among them as a result of their ties.   
But the relative isolation of the contentious groups also means that they are especially 
vulnerable to repression.  Theoretically, if contentious groups had been more actively targeted at 
the beginning of this study, the spread of contention could have been halted without mass arrests.  
In practice, UN Security in Copenhagen acted with an intuitive network sensibility by cutting off 
the Friend of the Earth – the bridge from the conventional to the contentious actors.  My research 
suggests that just as this type of network easily spreads contention, it is also easily decapitated by 
authorities.  Since contentious actors are not shielded by ‘good guys’ it is less problematic to 
repress them without incurring legitimacy costs.  This poses a dilemma to groups that are 
interested in spreading contentious tactics.  On the one hand, segmented networks are good for 
diffusing new tactics.  But on the other hand, segmented networks are more easily repressed, 
making the use of these tactics more costly.   
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My research also suggests, contrary to what political process theory might predict, that 
international institutions have little control over the degree of contention they face. The 
UNFCCC – being an open institution to civil society participation – still became the object of 
contentious collective action when a group of organizations decided to use repertoires developed 
in another movement target the issue of climate change.  Since my research shows that these 
contentious groups do not respond to political opportunities as often as do conventional groups 
(Chapter Seven), it is unlikely that ‘opening up’ to civil society will reduce contention, as is 
commonly assumed.   
In this way, this study suggests that civil society does possess independent agency from 
states and international institutions in the first place.  But on the other hand, the use of 
contentious tactics can create repressive environments that make it harder to repeat this strategy, 
constraining their use in later phases of advocacy (McAdam 1983).  
Conclusion  
The findings of this Chapter are relevant for three groups of scholars.  First, for social movement 
scholars, my research suggests the utility of further considering how the tactics of groups interact 
in determining group-level success.  In Copenhagen, conventional groups were particularly 
undermined by the presence of more radical actors, who attracted media attention, generated 
conflicting political analysis, and whose actions lead to the introduction of security restrictions 
that particularly affected groups wanting to act as ‘insiders.’  As a result, I suggest that more 
research should be done to move beyond static studies of the effectiveness of group-level tactics 
(e.g. Gamson 1975) and move towards a framework to consider how group success can be the 
product of tactical interaction.   
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Second, the Copenhagen case offers a number of lessons for scholars interested in the 
politics of civil society participation in international institutions.  First, I demonstrate in my 
analysis that civil society is not monolithic; analyzing divisions within civil society is an 
important part of explaining political outcomes.  Despite the fact that the analysis is based on 
only one case, I suspect that the divides I find in my study – reformist vs. abolitionist and 
conventional vs. contentious – likely exist in other issue areas.  I suggest that future studies 
might apply this perspective to different issue areas and institutions in order to examine how 
common these types of division are in transnational activism, and whether they generate similar 
political outcomes in different contexts.   
Finally, this chapter suggests that scholars of international environmental politics may 
benefit from examining the history of contestation around global neoliberalism. While 
transgressive protest is new in the institutional context of the UNFCCC, it has been a common 
feature in decision-making around international financial institutions for more than a decade.  I 
argue that the emergence of transgressive activism has prompted the UNFCCC to reexamine the 
ways in which it deals with civil society.  As a result, future work should be done to compare 
transformations within the UNFCCC after Copenhagen to reforms that have taken place in other 
international institutions that have faced transgressive protest.  This comparative work would 
extend our understanding of the ways in which civil society participation can influence the 
development, functioning, and reform of international institutions.   
 
 
  
 306 
 
CONCLUSION 
The introduction to the first part of this dissertation highlighted three very different forms of 
action – an open letter, a mini refugee camp installation, and a blockade – that all occurred in 
Brussels on the same day.  The introduction to the second part highlighted two very different 
kinds of meetings that both took place on the same day within a few hours of one another in 
Copenhagen.  As the astute reader will have guessed, these examples are linked.  The kinds of 
meetings an organization attends are indicative of the kinds of ties it has with other groups. And 
this dissertation argues that an organization’s pattern of ties with other organizations has a large 
influence on its tactical choices.   
I find that organizations tend to harmonize their forms of collective action with those of 
their peers.  This is because organizations share information and resources with one another, and 
also because they influence one another’s decisions.  Thus, being connected to one world or the 
other can generate the very different kinds of collective action.  Thus the first goal of this project 
has been to explain the variation in the forms of action groups used when they sponsored 
collective action on climate change in the period of 2008-2009.   
My work also highlights the emergence of a new form of radical, contentious climate 
change politics.  Prior to the start of this study, the vast majority of participation in EU and 
international climate change policy-making was conventional in form and reformist in its aims.  I 
document the emergence and diffusion of a new phenomenon in climate change politics.  As a 
result of the entrance of new actors into this sphere, climate change has gone from being an issue 
framed primarily in terms of scientific problems to an issue framed in terms of justice and equity.  
I argue that this has important implications for transnational climate change governance and the 
institutional functioning of the UNFCCC.  But the full implications of the politicization of 
 307 
 
climate change politics are not yet know, and the evolution of the UNFCCC as an institution is 
still ongoing.  In this respect, the changes I document to date may or may not represent the 
longer-term trends, and should be the subject of future research.   
Without extensively summarizing my findings, this conclusion will accomplish two main 
tasks.  First, I will briefly highlight the implications of this study for scholars of social 
movements, the European Union and global environmental politics.  Second, I will reflect on the 
strengths and limitations of this study, and conclude by proposing directions for future research.   
Networks and Collective Action  
The findings of my study have three main implications for scholars of social movements:  
Networks both facilitate and constrain protest.  My study shows that network ties affect the 
choice of action forms, but that the character of that influence differs depending on where the 
organization is located in the network.  Thus, groups tend to harmonize with closely connected 
organizations, but some ties encourage groups to radicalize, while others encourage groups to 
moderate.   
Previous research has found that inter-organizational, inter-associational, and inter-
personal networks are important factors in the mobilization of protest (See Diani and McAdam 
2004; McAdam and Paulsen 1993).  But this study highlights that the effect of networks is more 
variable.  One of the major reasons I arrive at different conclusions than previous research is that 
I have employed a somewhat unusual research design.  Previous research has tended to look 
backwards from cases of successful protest mobilization and identified the presence of networks 
as a key mobilizing structure (but see Osa 2004; Gould 1995).  If I applied a similar research 
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design to my study of the Copenhagen summit, for example, I could only agree that the creation 
of the Climate Justice Action network was essential in propelling protest around COP 15. 
But my project takes a broader view than this. One of the explicit goals of this study is to 
identify the complete field of organizations working on climate change and to analyze their 
decision-making.  Because of this different research design, I am able to make the claim that 
while some portions of the network, like CJA, facilitate protest, other portions of the networks, 
like CAN, discourage it.  By focusing on the full range of organizations and tactics, I am able to 
document and explain both the diffusion and non-diffusion of protest through a paired 
comparison of the contentious and conventional groups (Chapters Five and Six).   
Networks are built, not found. Related to this first point, social movement scholars often study 
inter-organizational (or ‘inter-associational’) networks as mobilizing structures (McAdam, 
McCarthy and Zald 1996).  In doing so, there is a tendency in this literature to treat networks as 
objective structural factors.  This research shows how networks are intentionally constructed by 
individuals and organizations with very specific mobilization purposes in mind.  It also 
highlights that it is not the presence of absence of networks that matters, but the structure of 
network ties between organizations.   
This study particularly emphasizes the importance of issue framing in creating coalitions, 
and in turn, structuring networks.  The development and diffusion of the ‘climate justice’ issue 
frame was essential in creating the basis for bridging the global justice movement and the 
existing radical climate change organizations.  Once these organizations built CJA, this coalition 
became an essential venue for inter-organizational learning and influence (Wang and Soule 
2011).   
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Not only was the network purposely constructed, but its structure had important 
consequences.  The radical coalition did not emerge in a void – the creation of CJA complicated 
the structure of the inter-organizational network and challenged the pre-existing CAN coalition.  
The consequences of the strict segmentation were that conventional groups were undermined by 
the contentious newcomers in ways that neither side fully anticipated.  This finding suggests that 
more research should be done on: a) the creation of coalitions and the networks they are 
imbedded; and b) the effect of different network structures on the overall effectiveness of actors 
working within them.   
Network ties affect tactical choices in civil society organizations. This study particularly 
emphasizes the importance of a relational approach to collective action.  In many ways, the 
relational approach specifies and integrates elements already present in other theories more than 
it challenges their findings.  For example, the relational approach draws on the original insight in 
political process theory that political opportunities have to be perceived in order for them to 
affect choice of tactics (McAdam 1999: x).  Similarly, it highlights the resource mobilization 
insight that it is not individually held but collectively mobilized resources that matter for 
generating collective action (Edwards and McCarthy 2004: 116).   
But where the relational approach does have an advantage is that it is able to systematize 
these insights in ways that explain existing contradictions in the two traditional approaches.  
While resource mobilization and political process theorists recognize the importance of 
information sharing and resource pooling, for example, they have not usually tried to 
systematically measure and incorporate these elements.  A relational network approach does 
better by paying explicit attention to inter-organizational ties, and how they influence the 
mobilization of collective action. 
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One big puzzle that this dissertation is able to explain that traditional approaches cannot 
explain is why civil society organizations with the same targets, working in the same place, at the 
same time, would choose to use such different forms of action.  Put another way, why do some 
groups choose to protest when opportunities are open?  Why do others lobby when opportunities 
are closed?  My approach emphasizes that these groups aren’t just bad at reading opportunities – 
they get information from one another in ways that systematically distort the appearance of the 
political system and increases the perceived desirability of certain tactical forms.  I also 
emphasize that a lot of organizational traits aren’t all that important once the relational ties of a 
group are also accounted for.   
This is particularly true for contentious groups.  In many ways, groups engaging in 
protest on climate change in the EU would seem to be an obvious example of ‘ignoring 
opportunities’ for conventional action.  What allows them to overcome structural incentives and 
sustain their resistance?  My study suggests that these organizations – like centuries of radicals 
before them – construct networks in insular enclaves that shield them from the effects of 
dominant political structures and help them to overcome their individual limitations.  In this way, 
their relationships with one another allow them to generate contentiousness under unfavorable 
circumstances.   But this strategy has several built-in limitations.  First, organizations existing in 
insular enclaves can easily spread their radicalism, but they are also easy targets of repression.  
Second, they may be less likely to innovate on their political positions or tactics without contact 
with those outside their enclave.   
The political implications of this finding are clear.  Because contentious groups shield 
themselves from political opportunities and pool resources to overcome their limitations, the 
spread of contentiousness among them is probably beyond the control of states unless it can be 
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stopped early.  And typical institutional strategies, such as ‘opening up’ to civil society (as 
practiced in the EU and UN) are unlikely to be effective in the context of segmented and 
contentious network structures, where insiders and outsiders rarely meet.   
Civil Society Spillover(s) in EU Politics  
My findings also have two main implications for scholars of the European Union:  
Contentious participation can have negative implications for the integration process.  My study 
documents the mobilization of contentious European level collective action on climate change.  
This form of contentious participation exists uneasily alongside the tried-and-true conventional 
advocacy strategies used by civil society groups in Brussels, and is not well-documented in 
existing scholarly literature.  Moreover, the qualitative component of this dissertation puts flesh 
on the bones of my quantitative analysis by allowing me to make the argument that the political 
content, not just the form, of these actions is anti-EU.    
Contentious participation at the European-level is a relatively new phenomenon, and as 
Hooghe and Marks (2010) argue, is an indicator that the political project of the European Union 
has transitioned into a period of intense politicization.  And whereas the ‘spillover’ of civil 
society participation into EU politics in previous time periods may have been a motor of 
integration (Haas 1958), ‘spillover’ in a politicized period can also have negative implications 
for integration.   
My work highlights that there are two distinct kinds of spillover that have different 
political implications.  On the one hand, long-time civil society groups have gradually come to 
transnationalize their interests as the decision-making competencies of the EU have expanded.  
On the other hand, the integration process itself has triggered another unexpected kind of 
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contentious spillover.  In response to the growth of competencies at the EU-level, as well as 
social and educational integration, civil society groups have started to build a separate 
contentious sphere of action that is highly critical of the EU.  This sphere of organizing is evident 
at events like the European Social Forum, but can also be mobilized around important moments 
of decision-making, such as opposition to the constitutional referenda or the Bolkestein services 
directive.   
The existence of a critical sphere would not be so troublesome if it were not for the fact 
that it is almost wholly separate from the conventional advocacy taking place in Brussels.  My 
study is unique in that it is able to document the overwhelming segregation of groups into one 
kind of spillover or the other.  As such, it is clear evidence of the kinds of “fragmented spheres 
of action” that worry Balme and Chabanet (2008).  And because outsider groups are not 
connected to the European Institutions, their contention represents a truly oppositional strand of 
European politics that cannot easily be channeled into existing institutions.  
Overcoming the democratic deficit will require recognizing the role of public contestation. 
Scholars of the European Union are greatly concerned about the legitimacy of the European 
Institutions and their potential ‘democratic deficit.’  As a result, EU reformers frequently propose 
increased ‘participation’ by civil society as a remedy (Héritier 1999; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 
2007; Lord and Beetham 2001; Schmitter 2000; Smismans 2006; Wessels 1999).  But I argue 
that further encouraging the participation of conventional groups will not solve the problem of 
democratic deficit, as these groups remain fundamentally divided from contentious and highly 
critical elements.   
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The European institutions as they currently exist are committed to civil society 
participation, but unable to respond to fundamentally oppositional and contestatory viewpoints.  
In other words, the institutions of the EU need to catch up with the politicization of EU politics.  
Not only do scholars need to pay more explicit attention to the increasingly important 
phenomenon of contentious EU-level collective action, but more work is needed to elaborate on 
what mechanisms might allow the institutions to further their democratic evolution.       
Civil Society Participation in Climate Change Governance 
This study also raises two issues that are important for the study of international environmental 
politics:  
State and non-state actors overlap in ways that are politically meaningful. Scholars commonly 
conceive of ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ actors as conceptually distinct.  But in the context of climate 
change negotiations, state and non-state actors frequently overlap. This is both because states 
often accredit individual representatives of civil society organizations as members of their 
delegation, and because state representatives sometimes take part in civil society activities.  The 
blurring of boundaries between state and non-state actors in particularly evident in examining 
small states that benefit from the resources of large civil society groups, or in looking at the role 
of states with radical political positioning and their support for civil society groups.   
Linkages between states and civil society take two main forms.  Sometimes, as in the 
case of Tuvalu, civil society groups represent states, and take up their cause in ways that elevate 
the status of the state in the negotiations.  Other times, as in the case of ALBA, state actors offer 
to represent the interests of non-state actors inside the formal negotiations. I argue that because 
of these linkages, civil society groups can have influence on the outcome of negotiations through 
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these state channels.  However, because of the nature of decision-making in foreign policy, this 
is extremely difficult to definitively establish.  I suggest that my account is a reasonable 
interpretation, and that at minimum, my results suggest a potentially interesting avenue for future 
research within the domain of international environmental negotiations.   
Contentious civil society participation can politicize policy-making in ways that make consensus 
more difficult. The emergence of the climate justice movement did not only propagate the use of 
radical tactics in the context of the UNFCCC.  It also diffused the ‘climate justice’ issue frame to 
both civil society groups and state actors.  The climate justice frame was a departure from the 
scientific issue framing commonly used by NGOs prior to COP 14 in Bali.  As such, it 
significantly politicized the negotiations in ways that made broad mobilization possible and 
consensus less likely.    
Previous scholars of international environmental negotiations have emphasized that 
perceptions of equity among parties are essential when consensus rules operate (Young 1994: 
109).  The climate justice movement targeted its activities at undermining perceptions of equity 
among parties in Copenhagen.  Although it was certainly not the only factor, I argue that the 
participation of contentious actors in Copenhagen actually undermined the development of a 
binding climate treaty at COP 15.  In this way, I offer a critique of an earlier body of scholarly 
literature that suggest an overly optimistic interpretation of the likely effects of civil society 
participation (Florini 2000; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Princen and Finger 1994; Wapner, Ruiz and 
Falk 2000; Willets 1982).  I also suggest that scholars of global environmental politics have a lot 
to learn from the history of contention around international financial institutions, which have 
faced contention for over a decade.   
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My analysis suggests that contentious participation can cause institutional failure, and 
over the long-term, institutional reform.  But it is of course important to note that contentious 
forms of participation can also emerge in the first place as a response to institutional failure.  I 
suspect that institutional shortcomings generate protest, which then generates further institutional 
failures, and then eventually leads to reform.  But not all the consequences of Copenhagen are 
yet known, and as a result, I hope that this topic will be an important subject of future research.   
Reflections on the Research   
This section attempts to reflect on the strengths and limitations of this research project.  I think 
this project benefits from an unusual research design and a novel theoretical perspective.  I am 
able to draw on an unusual amount of qualitative and quantitative data.  I took particular care to 
collect longitudinal data on the characteristics of actors, their ties, and their political context, 
which allows me to make a careful effort at evaluating my hypothesis and a range of alternative 
hypotheses.  My immersion in these two worlds of collective action also provided me with 
unusually detailed insight into the mechanisms by which network ties affect action forms, and of 
the inter-group dynamics that produce conventional or contentious forms of action.  The careful 
design of the project means that the two types of data complement one another in ways that 
should increase confidence in my central findings.   
But like all research projects, this study also has a number of limitations.  I would point 
to three in particular.  First, despite my best intentions, the study cannot exclude the possibility 
that organizations are self-selecting into network ties as comprehensively as I would like.  While 
my statistical analysis controls for a number of factors that we expect to influence choice of 
action forms, and the random intercepts model suggests there is little inter-cluster variation, 
further analysis should be done on the self-selection problem.  In future research I may consider 
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collecting data on organizations from 2007 in order to model the co-evolution of network ties 
and forms of actions in a longitudinal setting.   
Second, the study is relatively weak in its measurement of group-level success.  While I 
have done my best to evaluate the success of conventional and contentious groups according to 
their own stated objectives, using the self-evaluations of groups themselves or expert evaluations 
would provide better insight into this question.  Finally, I have measured my variables in ways 
that simplify the analysis, but may limit its sophistication.  Most notably, I have chosen to 
measure my dependent variable as dichotomous – conventional or contentious – where it could 
be done as a scale variable measuring degree of contentiousness. I have also measured only 
international political opportunities, ignoring the interaction between domestic and international 
opportunity structures.  Both of these limitations can be potentially overcome in future analysis.   
There are several questions that emerge from my study that are beyond the immediate 
scope of my research.  First, my network analysis uses event co-sponsorship as a measure of ties 
in the inter-organizational network.  But recognizing the multiplexity of network relations, it 
would be interesting to explore how other kinds of ties – friendship among individual activists, 
overlapping membership between organizations, or staff turnover between groups, for example – 
might or might not overlap with the event co-sponsorship network.   
Second, I acknowledge that there are three elements of the study that may affect its 
generalizability: the time period, the European location, and the issue focus on climate change.  
First, in line with the expectations of previous scholars (Imig and Tarrow 2001; Uba and Uggla 
2001), I suspect that my findings about the emergence of contentious European-level collective 
action reflect political developments since the early 2000s.  Second, the findings are ‘European’ 
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in a few respects.  In particular, the development of the European Union and its program of 
support for conventional and moderate civil society groups create unique institutional incentives 
for moderation that do not exist to the same degree in other settings (for example, in Latin 
America).  In addition, the strength and persistence of the global justice movement in the 
European context (della Porta 2007) created fertile ground for the development of the climate 
justice movement in this time period.  Where the global justice movement was weaker at this 
time, such as in the United States (Hadden and Tarrow 2007), this process would have been 
much more difficult.   
Finally, I do suspect that my findings are generalizable beyond the issue area of climate 
change. Segmented networks are likely to emerge in the context of politicized issues where strict 
institutional rules channel groups into one type of collective action or the other.  Because this is 
increasingly becoming the case in a variety of issue areas within the European Union and in 
global politics (e.g. trade issues, labor rights, global financial regulation), we may see similar 
outcomes to those we saw in Copenhagen on a more regular basis.  I think that my findings about 
the influence of network ties on tactical decision-making in civil society organizations are likely 
to hold in a wide number of settings, and particularly in the context of transnational organizing 
around international summits, where the construction of coalitions is particularly important.  But 
naturally, at this point these claims are mostly speculative. Future research should be done in 
different issues areas, around different international institutions, and in different time periods to 
establish whether the perspective I develop here will be useful in other settings.                                                         
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APPENDIX A 
RESEACH METHODS 
Data Collection and Coding Procedures 
This Appendix describes in more detail the data collection and coding procedures I employ in 
this dissertation.  In the first section I describe and provide examples of the collection and coding 
of the event and organizational attribute data.  In the second section I describe how this data is 
transformed into a 2-mode network of organizations and their events, and then subsequently 
reduced to two 1-mode actor-by-actor and event-by-event networks.  In a third section I describe 
the selection of the interview sample and the techniques I employ for qualitative data collection.   
Event Data Collection 
In order to gather systematic data on European collective action [ECA] on climate change, I 
conducted an electronic search on a variety of media outlets to indentify relevant events.  
Newspaper reports are frequently used in the tradition of protest event analysis in order to gather 
systematic information about the volume, timing and characteristics of contentious collective 
action (Koopmans and Rucht 2002; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1989; Tilly 1995).  My study uses a 
slightly modified protest event analysis approach.  First, I want to measure the broadest possible 
spectrum of collective action, not just political protest.  Second, I try to identify collective action 
that takes place at the European level, which is a challenge because media in Europe are still 
largely nationally rooted.  Given these two obstacles, I decided to rely on a combination of press 
sources with different target audiences and specialties rather than one single source.   
I searched using two separate sets of terms: a) (EU or EC or Europe*) AND (climate 
change or global warming); and b) (climate change or global warming) AND (protest* or strike* 
or demonstration*), for the dates January 1, 2008-December 31, 2009.  The second search was 
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added to capture collective action on climate change that may have a European mobilization 
dimension, without having the EU as a direct target.   
From the returned items, I selected those that involved any sort of collective action. In 
both searches, articles had to be sorted by hand according to two criteria: a) the action had to be a 
‘European collective action’; and b) it had to involve a civil society organization. An action 
qualified as a ‘European collective action’ if it target the European institutions and/or if it 
involved the use of transnational European coalitions to target national states or other actors.   I 
use the term ‘civil society’ loosely to denote a ‘self-organized citizenry’ that includes European 
social movements, trade unions and non-governmental organizations but excludes state or 
corporate actors (Emirbayer and Sheller 1999; Edwards, Foley and Diani 2001).  For my 
analysis, this includes organizations that make “public interest claims” and “pursue social 
change” (Andrews and Edwards 2004:486).  Though I require that such organizations must be 
sufficiently institutionalized to publically sponsor collective actions, I do not make an a priori 
distinction between ‘NGOs’ and ‘social movements.’ 
These search terms returned 11,588 hits for the years 2008-2009, from which 371 (3.2%) 
involved a relevant collective action, resulting in the selection 371 reports of 262 unique events.  
These searches were conducted on the Reuters newswire (general and EU), the Financial Times, 
and the wire services stories of the Associate Press Worldstream, the Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 
and Agence France Presse.  In addition, I searched the online archive of Euractiv.com for stories 
about (“climate change” or “global warming”) and read the entirety of the Indymedia Climate 
and the Rising Tide news for the same time period.    
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Once I selected the relevant event sample, these events were coded as being either 
contentious or conventional and taking place at the European Insititutions or in the member 
states.  Table A.1 details this procedure.  I follow the approach outlined in “Codebook for the 
Analysis of Political Mobilisation and Communication in European Public Spheres,” developed 
by Ruud Koopmans (2002), as well as the approach used for the DEMOS project (2007).    
Table A.1: Code Book for Event Data  
Variable Name Description 
“Contentious” Includes: public assembly, march, demonstration (legal and non-violent), 
vigil/picket, illegal demonstration (if non-violent), boycott, strike, self-
mutilation (e.g., hunger strike, suicide), blockade, occupation, 
disturbance of meetings, symbolic confrontation (e.g., farmers dumping 
animal dung in front of a government building),  threats (e.g., bomb 
threat), symbolic violence (e.g., burning puppets or flags, throwing eggs 
or paint), limited destruction of property (e.g., breaking windows), 
sabotage, violent demonstration (violence initiated by protestors), arson 
and bomb attacks, and other severe destruction of property, arson and 
bomb attacks against people (incl. inhabited buildings), physical 
violence against people (fights, brawls, etc.). Each day of protest is 
counted as a separate event.  
“Conventional” Includes: press conference/release, public speech, (public) letter, 
newspaper article, book, research report, leaflet, etc., presentation of 
survey/poll result, publicity campaign (incl. advertising), 
conferences/meetings/assemblies, other ‘petitioning,’ petition/signature 
collection, letter campaigning. Individual interviews with civil society 
leaders were not counted as collective actions.  
“EU Institutions” Actions taken at the European Commission, Parliament, Council or 
Court of Justice (Brussels, Strasbourg, Luxembourg).   
“Member States”  Actions taken in one or more of the member states of the EU.   
“European Level” ‘European level’ as those that target the European institutions and/or 
those that involve the use of transnational European coalitions to target 
national states or other actors.  
“Civil Society Organizations”  I use the term ‘civil society’ loosely to denote a ‘self-organized 
citizenry’ that includes European social movements, trade unions and 
non-governmental organizations but excludes state or corporate actors 
(Emirbayer and Sheller 1999; Edwards, Foley and Diani 2001).  For my 
analysis, this includes organizations that make “public interest claims” 
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and “pursue social change” (Andrews and Edwards 2004:486).  Though 
I require that such organizations must be sufficiently institutionalized to 
publically sponsor collective actions, I do not make an a priori 
distinction between ‘NGOs’ and ‘social movements.’  
 
Scholars working with newspaper data point to two potential sources of bias: selection 
bias and description bias (Earl et al 2004; McCarthy et al 1999).  Because I code only ‘hard 
facts’ about the action (e.g. place, time and form) I expect description bias to be less of an issue 
for my study (Koopmans and Rucht 2002: 237).   I rely on additional research procedures to 
identify sponsors (see below), also limiting potential description biases associated with press 
sources reporting only the most established actors.   
Selection bias is a more serious issue for this study.  In my data collection procedures I 
try to be as comprehensive as possible by: a) combining on a number of different sources; b) not 
using indexes or ‘headline only’ searches; and c) not sampling from press sources.  All of these 
methods are frequently used in studies using newspaper data, and while sometimes necessary 
given time or resource constraints, can introduce biases in terms of the types of events likely to 
be selected.   
Regardless of the search criteria used, selection bias can occur because newspapers do 
not report all of the events that actually occur.  My use of a broad selection of press sources in a 
reaction to this concern.  However, I am still concerned about two possible sources of bias in the 
data.  
First, because the search was conducted in English, it may increase the number of events 
in my sample that take place in the United Kingdom. I tried to correct for this geographical bias 
by including a broad selection of sources, including the Associate Press Worldstream, Agence 
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France Press and Deutsche Presse-Agentur databases (in translation), and the Reuters newswire 
(general and EU). The UK was in fact the third most common location for events in my sample 
(after Belgium and Denmark).  But the extent to which this reflects a bias in the data collection is 
difficult to ascertain because the UK is also an important country for innovative climate change 
organizing.   
Second, some may be concerned that my use of alternative media may introduce a bias in 
favor of contentious events.  However, my evaluation of these press sources shows that the 
extent of this bias is probably not extensive.  For example, a comparison between my database 
and the Reuters newswire used in the Imig and Tarrow (2001) and Uba and Uggla (2010) studies 
shows very little difference in the percentage of contentious events reported or in the location of 
these events.  Table A.2 reports the number and percentage of contentious actions and those 
taking place at the European Institutions (labeled ‘EU’) by press source for the period of 2008-
2009.   
Table A.2: European Collective Actions on Climate Change by Press Source, 2008-2009 
Press Source Reports Contentious % EU % 
Agence France Presse 55 32 58 19 35 
Associated Press Worldstream 47 14 30 24 51 
Deutsche Presse-Agentur 32 14 44 13 41 
Euractiv.com 84 3 4 75 89 
Financial Times 36 13 36 18 50 
Indymedia Climate 18 13 72 1 6 
Reuters Newswire 88 28 32 48 55 
Rising Tide News 11 9 82 1 10 
TOTAL 371 126 34 199 54 
 
In general, I expect my press source data to capture an exceptionally large portion of the 
collective action being organized on the issue of climate change.  While I cannot completely 
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eliminate the problem of selection bias, there is no reason to believe that the nature of this bias 
changes over the time period of the study.  Thus, even from a conservative standpoint, we should 
be confident in the over-time trends reported in the data.   
Organizational Data Collection  
From the returned news items I was able to create a database of reported ECA.  I then conducted 
document research on each event, seeking out copies of joint press releases, lists of 
organizational event sponsors, and other primary source material.   These documents were 
obtained via two routes.  If specific organizations were identified, I sought out copies of the 
relevant documents on their websites.  When news reports were not specific enough, I conducted 
a search of different email list serves to which I was subscribed during the period of 2007-2009.   
  From this document analysis, I was able to gather more complete information on which 
organizations sponsored which collective actions.  This stage of data collection was essential to 
gathering accurate network data, as I found that newspaper articles were often inaccurate or 
incomplete in their reporting of organizations.  
Two Simple Examples  
Though the procedures may sound complex, it was fairly easy to implement systematically, as 
two examples will illustrate.  To take a simple case, my broad search returned the following 
news items from the Deutsche Presse-Agentur:  
Figure A.1: Deutsche Presse-Agentur Excerpt 
Deutsche Presse-Agentur 
 
December 12, 2008 Friday 3:55 PM EST  
 
2ND ROUNDUP: EU leaders approve climate change laws 
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SECTION: POLITICS 
 
LENGTH: 346 words 
 
[Excerpted] … “This is a dark day for European climate policy.  European heads of state and 
government have reneged on their promises and turned their backs on global efforts to fight 
climate change,” said major environmental pressure groups, including Greenpeace and WWF.  
 
 
I selected this article for further analysis because it named two prominent civil society groups, 
and mentioned an action targeted towards the European institutions.  However, press sources 
often do a poor job reporting the organizations involved in collective actions.  To correct for this, 
I obtained and filed the following press release from the WWF EPO website:  
Figure A.2: Joint NGO Press Release on EU Climate Policy 
 
    
  
 
 
Press Release 
 
12 December 2008  
For immediate release 
 
Visit the Time to Lead website 
 
Back 
Shame on EU 'leaders' 
Call on the European Parliament to reject today's deal on effort sharing  
Brussels, Belgium/Poznan, Poland - Today's agreement by EU leaders on the most contentious 
aspects of the EU's planned response to climate change, known as the climate and energy 
package, has been condemned as a failure by Climate Action Network Europe, Friends of the 
Earth Europe, Greenpeace, Oxfam and WWF. 
Climate Action Network Europe, Friends of the Earth Europe, Greenpeace, Oxfam and 
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WWF said: "This is a dark day for European climate policy. European heads of state 
and government have reneged on their promises and turned their backs on global 
efforts to fight climate change.  
*** 
For more information:  
In Poznan:  
Joris den Blanken, Greenpeace EU climate and energy policy director, Tel: +48 500 878 481  
Magda Stoczkiewicz, director, Friends of the Earth Europe 
Phil Bloomer, senior executive, Oxfam International, +48 728 637857  
Tomas Wyns, climate policy officer CAN Europe, Tel: +32 (0) 4 95 1222 42  
Matthias Duwe, director, Climate Action Network Europe, +32 494 525 762  
In Brussels:  
Esther Bollendorff, Campaigner, Friends of the Earth Europe 
Douwe Buzeman, Oxfam's EU Climate Change & EU Development Policy Adviser, +32 (0)2 
502 9803  
Delia Villagrasa, Senior Advisor, WWF European Policy Office, Tel: +32 486 440 223  
 
 
Analysis of the actual press release referred to in the newspaper article shows that this action 
actually involved coordination between five organizations: Friends of the Earth Europe, WWF 
EPO, CAN Europe, Greenpeace EU Unit and Oxfam International.  
Another news report for Euractiv.com reported that a new report highlighted the massive 
health savings of strict climate change policy.  Since the article mentioned a coalition of civil 
society actors and the European Institutions, I also selected this article for further research:   
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Figure A.3: Eurativ Press Excerpt  
 
Because the news report was fairly specific, I was able to obtain a copy of the report fairly easily, 
and to verify that it was sponsored by the organizations named in the article.   
Figure A.4: Joint NGO Report on Health Benefits of Climate Policy 
  
 
…  
 
Excerpted From: 
http://assets.panda.org/downloads/co_benefits_to_health_report__september_2008.pdf  
 
Study highlights 'massive health savings' of stricter climate policies [fr] [de] 
Published: 02 October 2008 
 
Source: Euractiv 
The EU could save up to €25 billion every year by introducing more ambitious climate 
policies, according to a new study by health and environment NGOs. 
Raising the EU's 2020 target for greenhouse gas emission cuts from 20 to 30% would increase 
health savings by as much as 48%, or €6.5 to 25 billion each year, according to the report, 
which was commissioned by the Health and Environment Alliance (HEAL), Climate Action 
Network Europe (CAN-E) and WWF. Moreover, the benefits would accrue year on year. 
… 
Excerpted from: http://www.euractiv.com/en/health/study-highlights-massive-health-savings-
stricter-climate-policies/article-175970 
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In some cases, news reports were less specific about the sponsors of collective actions.  
In these cases, I wasn’t able to search organizational websites.  Instead, I conducted a search of 
different email list serves to which I was subscribed during the period of 2007-2009.  
Organizations often use these lists to publicize their actions, and since I knew the dates on which 
they occurred, I could usually obtain primary source documents via this route.  Finally, when all 
else failed, I was able to call on my contacts from within the world of climate change organizing 
in Europe to help me identify the relevant organizations and in a few cases provide me with non-
public documents.  Their insight, combined with my extensive knowledge of the field, meant that 
I was able to obtain the necessary primary source documents for every event in my sample.   
Attribute Data Collection 
In addition to knowing the organizational sponsors of particular events, my statistical analysis 
requires knowing key attributes of these organizations.  In order to gather this information, I 
systematically coded the websites of organizations that appeared in my sample.  In most 
instances, this information was available publicly or through the internet archive 
(www.archive.org).  In a few instances, I needed to collect this information over the phone or by 
requesting annual reports.  In addition, I gathered data about whether an organization received 
EU funding from institutional records of the European Commission and Parliament.   
For my analysis I collected data on five important organizations attributes: whether the 
organizational had a radical ideology, whether it received EU funding, whether it had an 
organizational structure that accommodates individual members, the number of full-time staff it 
employed in 2009, and its age in 2009.  Table A.3 details this coding procedure.  
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Table A.3: Organizational Attribute Code Book 
Variable Description 
Radical Ideology Yes = 1.  Coded for the presence of anti-capitalist or anti-
systemic ideology on the organization’s website.   
Receives EU Funding Yes=1.  Based on coding of whether the organization appears in 
the register of the European Commission and the European 
Parliament as receiving funding for the year 2009.   
Has Individual Members Yes=1.  Based on the coding of websites and organizational 
charters to see if the organization permits individuals to join as 
members.   
Number of Full-Time Staff Number of full-time staff employed by the organization in 2009. 
Based on website coding.  
Age Age of the organization in 2009 (i.e. 2009 - founding date). 
Based on website coding. 
 
Network Data and Analysis 
Once I had the records of events, sponsors, and their attributes, I was able to use this data to 
construct a 2-mode network.  This consists of a matrix in which actors are arrayed on the X axis 
and events on the Y axis.  So for the two events from the previous example, the matrix would 
look like this:  
Table A.4: Sample Two-Mode Data Structure 
 
FOE-E 
Greenpeace 
EU CAN-E WWF EPO 
Oxfam 
International HEAL 
Event 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Event 2 0 0 1 1 0 1 
 
When displayed graphically, the network looks like the one below.  In this network, the 
organizations are the blue squares and the events are the red circles.  If an organization (square) 
is joined to a circle, it means that that organization sponsored that event.   
 
 
 329 
 
Figure A.5: Visualization of the Sample Two-Mode Network 
 
2-mode network analysis can yield important insights about collective action and its 
sponsors.  But a number of the questions relevant to this dissertation concern the structure of 
relationships between actors.  In order to address these questions, the 2-mode network has to be 
transformed into a 1-mode network.  This was done through the cross-product method, in which 
each entry of the row for actor A is multiplied times the same entry for actor B, and then the 
results are summed.  The result is a ‘1’ if both actors were sponsors of the event, and the sum 
across events gives the total number of events the actors have in common.  This is procedure is 
simple to implement using computer software: in this project I mainly use the UCINET package, 
although I also employ Pajek and PNET for certain tasks.  When the 2-mode actor-by-event 
matrix is transformed in a 1-mode actor-by-actor matrix, it looks like this:  
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Table A.5: Sample One-Mode Data Structure 
 
FOE-E 
Greenpeace 
EU CAN-E WWF EPO 
Oxfam 
International HEAL 
FOE-E 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Greenpeace EU 1 1 1 1 1 0 
CAN-E 1 1 2 2 1 1 
WWF EPO 1 1 2 2 1 1 
Oxfam International 1 1 1 1 1 0 
HEAL 0 0 1 1 0 1 
 
The resulting matrix is weighted because organizations can sponsor more than one event together 
(CAN-E and WWF EPO sponsor two events in our example).  Values on the diagonal are 
discarded because it does not mean anything for an organization to sponsor something with 
itself.  This resulting matrix can be represented graphically in the following figure:  
Figure A.6: Visualization of the Sample One-Mode Network  
 
Interpreting this figure requires knowing that the ties (lines) between the organizations 
(squares) represent event co-sponsorship.  Thus in some ways interpreting the 1-mode figure is 
more complex than the 2-mode.  The overall structure suggests a clique of the 5 major Brussels-
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based NGOs, which less frequently collaborate with HEAL.  But the significance of this 
structure is based on our understanding of the relationship represented here: what does it mean to 
‘co-sponsor’ an event?  Does this suggest that organizations share information, strategies and 
potentially influence one another?  Or does it mean that mean simply that organizations sign on 
to public statements on which one another’s names appear?   
In order to know the significance of these relationships, this dissertation also draws on a 
large number of interviews and extensive participant observation in these organizations and their 
coalitions.  These qualitative data suggest that ‘co-sponsorship’ can reasonably be assumed to 
indicate a working relationship between two organizations.   
Qualitative Data Collection 
For this project I also collected extensive qualitative data.  This section describes in detail the 
procedures I used to conduct organizational interviews.  I also briefly describe the procedures by 
which I obtained other types of qualitative data, including field notes, emails, and documents.   
Interview Sample 
The main goal of the interview data collection was to gather additional qualitative data at the 
organizational level to confirm the operation of relational processes in organizational decision-
making.  I used a stratified sampling procedure in order to select organizations from the 
population for interviews. Specifically, I computed the 2-mode degree centrality score for each 
organization based on its position in the 2008 network.101
                                                          
101 The degree centrality of a node is the number of edges incident upon it.  So in this case, it is the number of events 
an organization sponsored, normalized against the maximum possible score in an equivalently sized fully connected 
two-mode network. Degree centrality measures the overall activity level of the organization, which is desirable 
given the goals of this study.  This measure is highly correlated with other measures of centrality, including 
betweeness centrality (.88) and Eigen centrality (.93) (See Borgatti and Everett 1997).   
  From this, I divided organizations into 
groups based on their centrality score.  I created three different groups: a ‘core’ group for 
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organizations scoring .029 and above (20 organizations); and ‘semi-periphery’ for organizations 
scoring .019-.029 (13 organizations); and a periphery consisting of those organizations scoring 
less than .019 (95 organizations).102
In total, I conducted interviews with 50 organizations.  Given the long time frame of the 
study and my extensive follow-up, my response rate to interview requests was 94%, with 
organizations in the periphery being slightly less likely to respond to interview requests.  In total, 
I interviewed 39% of organizations in the population.  However, I interviewed 100% of the most 
active organizations, 85% of those in the semi-periphery and 20% of those in the periphery.  Put 
another way, because I selected organizations that sponsored the highest number of events, I 
interviewed at least one organizational sponsor for 87% of the events in my dataset.  Thus I am 
confident that while I have not covered the entire organizational population, I have a fairly good 
sense of the organizational processes that are generating the events in my quantitative data.   
 I selected all of the organizations from the core and semi-
periphery for the interview sample.  I then selected a random sample of organizations from the 
periphery, resulting in 20 additional organizations.   
Questionnaire and Coding 
Once I had identified my sample, I conducted semi-structured interviews with representatives of 
the organizations.  Typically this was either the head of the organization, the person in charge of 
the climate campaign, or a long-time activist familiar with the climate work of the organization.  
Where organizations were decentralized in their decision-making or there had been recent turn 
over in staff, I sometimes conducted more than one interview with the same organization.  This 
resulted in over eighty total interviews.   
                                                          
102 Note that this distribution of activity among organizations roughly follows a power law. 
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I utilized a standardized questionnaire for my organizational interviews, as shown in 
Table A.4.  The interviews involved both structured questions (“how many staff members does 
your organization have”) and more open-ended questions (“describe the actions your 
organization is involved in”).  Interviews ranged between 30 minutes and 3 hours, but typically 
lasted for about one hour.  Most of the time was spent on the “Action Forms” and “Networks” 
sections.  Interviews were generally recorded and transcribed, except where participants 
requested that they not be, as was more typical in contentious groups (especially those involved 
in illegal actions).  In those cases, I took notes by hand and wrote up a transcript to the best of 
my recollection immediately afterwards.  Participants in the interviews were guaranteed that 
their identity would be kept confidential, but were informed that I intended to associate their 
responses with the name of their organization. 
Table A.6: Interview Guide 
Contesting Climate Change in the European Union 
Interview Guide 
 
PARTICIPANT BACKGROUND 
1. What is your experience working on climate change issues? What positions have you held in 
the past?  
2. What position do you hold now? For how long?  
 
ORGANIZATION INFO, RESOURCES, FRAMING 
1. Approximately when was the organization founded? 
2. What issues do you focus on?  Do you have any particular mission or ideology? Has this 
changed over time? 
3. Does your organization have an office?  Staff members? How many?  
4. What is the structure of decision-making? Is there a president or director? Is there a charter or 
constitution?  
5. What is the organizational structure?  Does the organization have members (individual or 
organizations)? How do members join? Who can participate?  
6. How is the organization funded?  
7. Describe how your organization views the causes of and solutions to the climate crisis.   
8. Does your organization consider itself ‘European’? Why or why not?  
 
VENUES AND POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES 
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1. Does your organization target the UN? The EU? National governments? Local governments? 
Corporations? How do you decide? How much time do you spend on each?  
2. Does your organization try to directly influence governing bodies? Participate in formal 
consultations or government events?  
3. Does your organization have direct contact with decision makers? How frequently? Is this 
effective?  
 
ACTION FORMS 
1. What kinds of actions is your organization typically involved in?  Describe a few.  How were 
they planned?  Who was involved? What resources were needed to make it happen?  How were 
partners selected? How were strategies formed?  Who made the final decision? What were the 
goals?  What was the outcome?  Were you satisfied with the process?  [Is this event typical?]  
2. Does your organization engage in lobbying?  Why or why not?  What percentage of the time? 
3. Does your organization engage in protest? Why or why not? What percentage of the time? 
4. Have your organization’s tactics changed over time? 
5. Does your organization change tactics when it tries to influence different actors? 
6. Does your organization change tactics when it works with different partners? 
7. Does any other organization provide a good example for you in terms of successful actions 
and strategies?  
 
NETWORKS 
1. Can you name the top 5 civil society organizations that your organization regularly works 
with? What about the top 5 with whom you share information on a regular basis? Are there any 
organizations with whom you purposely do not work?  
2. Does your organization belong to any coalitions?  How did you decide to join?  What has 
been the effect of joining?  
3. How do you pick your partners? 
4. Who do you think are the most important civil society actors working on climate change in 
Europe? 
5.  Does your organization work with any of these organizations?  
 
Greenpeace EU Unit; World Wildlife Federation EU Office; Friends of the Earth 
Europe; 
Transport and Environment; Climate Action Network Europe; Camp for Climate 
Action; 
Oxfam Europe; Earth First!; Rising Tide; Campaign Against Climate Change; CJA; 
Greenpeace International 
 
6. Has your organization participated in any of the following events?  
UNFCCC Climate COPs; European Social Forum; Global Day of Climate Action; G8 or 
Global Summit Protests; Climate Camps; European Summit Protests 
 
CONCLUSION 
1. What are your future plans for the organization? 
2. Is there anything you’d like to add?  
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I coded the interview transcripts using the software program Atlas.ti.  In my coding, I 
looked for patterns in the ways that organizations described their decision-making about tactics.  
I had previously identified mechanisms in scholarly literature that I expected might operate 
within these organizations (see Chapter 7), but I also coded inductively, keeping an eye open for 
unexpected processes that might emerge from the data.  This coding allows me to discuss the 
relatively frequency of different process in organizational decision-making, as well as to draw on 
illustrative examples of each mechanism.   
Observations, Emails and Documents  
In addition to the interviews, I also collected three other types of qualitative data.  First, I was 
invited to attend a number of intra-organizational and coalitional meetings during the time period 
of this study (see the Data Appendix for a list).  I wrote up my observations of these meetings as 
field notes.  These observations have especially informed Chapters 5 and 6 of this dissertation.   
In particular, I attended many of the meetings of Climate Justice Action and the Climate 
Action Network from September 2008-December 2009.  In the case of CAN, I was given 
complete access to the coalition and its staff, but was asked to respect the confidentiality 
agreement in place within the coalition.  My observations with CAN particularly inform my 
understanding of how CAN operates, and of the UNFCCC and EU political processes.  
Attending these meetings also introduced me to the important individuals and organizations 
working in this sphere of advocacy.  But I do not report directly on these meetings unless they 
have been discussed with my in on-the-record interviews.  In the case of Climate Justice Action, 
I was allowed to observe and write about the coalition provided that I did something useful 
(usually washing dishes) and did not identify people at meetings by their name or by 
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organization.  Thus due to my agreement with participants, I am able to discuss the internal 
functioning of CJA in much more detail than CAN.   
Because of my relationship with each of these coalitions, I was also subscribed to a 
number of internal email list-serves during this time period.  In particular, I was subscribed to the 
private internal list-serves of CAN Europe and CAN International, as well as to those public lists 
of CJA and CJN.  During the time period of this study, I collected over 10,000 emails through 
these channels, which kept me exceptionally well-informed about the political process and the 
workings of these coalitions.   
Finally, I gathered hundreds of coalitional and organizational documents during my field 
work.  I particularly I sought out organizational documents that described internal work 
procedures or decision-making processes. I employ these documents to better inform my case 
studies and as a check on the validity of my interview data.   The Data Appendix gives a selected 
description of the documents I consulted when writing this dissertation.  
Data Integration 
This study employs a nested mixed methods strategy.  Nested designs collect qualitative 
and quantitative data in sequence, and assign them equal priority.  Common applications of this 
design include using case study methods to explain patterns of correlation observed in large-N 
studies (Lieberman 2003: 33). Since in my nested design the methods are used equally but 
sequentially, I have to take extreme care to in order to deal with the potential for ‘travelling 
errors’ in sequential research designs (Rohlfing 2008).  One way I try to reduce the likelihood of 
traveling errors and selection bias, is that I select organizations selected for interviews on the 
basis of random stratified sampling, not along the logic of qualitative, purposive sampling 
 337 
 
(Fearon and Laitin 2008). The addition of the qualitative data sources allowed me to identify 
mechanisms of resource pooling, information sharing and peer influence as important pathways 
by which organizational choice of action forms is related to the choice of their peers.  However, 
if I had not found qualitative evidence of the operation of relational mechanisms, I would have 
had to be much more skeptical of the results of the quantitative portion.
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APPENDIX B 
 QUALITATIVE DATA SOURCES 
B.1 Organizational and Inter-Organizational Observations Conducted by the Author 
ID Organization Name Activity Type Date Location 
1 Climate Justice Action Strategy Meeting Sep-08 
Copenhagen, 
Denmark 
2 European Social Forum Radical Assembly  Information and Outreach meeting Sep-08 
Malmö, 
Sweden 
3 CAN-E, Greenpeace EU, FOE-E, WWF EPO European Parliament Lobbying Sep-08 
Brussels, 
Belgium 
3 CAN-E General Assembly Oct-08 
Brussels, 
Belgium 
5 CAN-E, Greenpeace EU, FOE-E, WWF EPO EU Commission Stakeholder Conference Oct-08 
Brussels, 
Belgium 
6 CAN International Daily Strategy and Coordination Sessions Dec-09 
Poznan, 
Poland 
7 CAN-E, Greenpeace EU, FOE-E, WWF EPO Daily Strategy Sessions, EU Delegate Lobbying Dec-08 
Poznan, 
Poland 
8 Climate Justice Action Outreach and Strategy meeting Dec-08 
Poznan, 
Poland 
9 Campaign Against Climate Change Demonstration and March Dec-08 
Poznan, 
Poland 
10 Climate Camp UK National Gathering  Jan-09 Oxford, UK 
11 CAN-E  General Assembly Apr-09 
Brussels, 
Belgium 
12 Climate Camp UK London Climate Camp, Copenhagen Strategy Meeting Aug-09 London, UK 
14 CAN-E General Assembly Oct-09 
Brussels, 
Belgium 
15 FOE-Flanders International Day of Climate Action [Flashmob] Oct-09 
Brussels, 
Belgium 
15 WWF EPO International Day of Climate Action [Dance Party] Oct-09 
Brussels, 
Belgium 
 339 
 
17 Climate Camp France National Gathering/Assembly  Nov-09 Paris, France 
18 Attac France Climate Information Meeting and Debate Nov-09 Paris, France 
19 CAN-E European Parliament Copenhagen Briefing Nov-09 
Brussels, 
Belgium 
20 Dutch CJA Information Meeting Nov-09 
Amsterdam, 
Netherlands 
21 Climate Justice Caravan Outreach Tour Dec-09 
Copenhagen, 
Denmark 
22 CAN-E, Greenpeace EU, FOE-E, WWF EPO Daily Strategy Sessions, EU Delegate Lobbying Dec-09 
Copenhagen, 
Denmark 
23 CAN International Daily Strategy and Coordination Sessions Dec-09 
Copenhagen, 
Denmark 
24 Climate Justice Now! Daily Strategy and Coordination Sessions Dec-09 
Copenhagen, 
Denmark 
25 Climate Justice Action Strategy, Action, Evaluation and Spokes Council Meetings Dec-09 
Copenhagen, 
Denmark 
26 Friends of the Earth International  Human Flood Demonstration Dec-09 
Copenhagen, 
Denmark 
27 Global Campaign for Climate Action Demonstration and March  Dec-09 
Copenhagen, 
Denmark 
28 KlimaForum Alternative Summit and Workshops Dec-09 
Copenhagen, 
Denmark 
29 Climate Justice Action-Climate Justice Now! Reclaim Power! And Peoples Assembly Dec-09 
Copenhagen, 
Denmark 
0 Climate Justice Action Prisoners Solidarity Demonstration Dec-09 
Copenhagen, 
Denmark 
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B.2 Organizational Interviews Conducted by the Author 
I
D Organization Name Date Location 
1 Greenpeace European Unit Jul-07 Brussels, Belgium 
2 Climate Action Network Europe Jul-07 Brussels, Belgium 
3 European Environmental Bureau Jul-07 Brussels, Belgium 
4 European Commission - DG Environment Jul-07 Brussels, Belgium 
5 European Trade Union Confederation Apr-08 Brussels, Belgium 
6 European Parliament - Environment Committee Apr-08 Brussels, Belgium 
7 Climate Action Network Europe Sep-08 Brussels, Belgium 
8 KlimaX Denmark Sep-08 Copenhagen, Denmark 
9 Young Friends of the Earth Europe Sep-08 Copenhagen, Denmark 
10 Friends of the Earth International Sep-08 Copenhagen, Denmark 
11 KlimaX Denmark Sep-08 Malmö, Sweden 
12 Klimataktion Sweden Sep-08 Malmö, Sweden 
13 Friends of the Earth Europe Oct-08 Brussels, Belgium 
14 Greenpeace European Unit Oct-08 Brussels, Belgium 
15 World Wildlife Federation European Policy Office Oct-08 Brussels, Belgium 
16 Transport and Environment Europe Oct-08 Brussels, Belgium 
17 Oxfam International Nov-08 Brussels, Belgium 
18 Climate Action Network Europe Dec-08 Poznan, Poland 
19 Earth First! UK Dec-08 Poznan, Poland 
20 Global Campaign Against Climate Change Dec-08 Poznan, Poland 
21 Greenpeace International Dec-08 Poznan, Poland 
22 Camp for Climate Action UK Jan-09 London, England 
23 Rising Tide Jan-09 London, England 
24 Global Campaign Against Climate Change Jan-09 London, England 
25 European Commission - DG Environment Apr-09 Brussels, Belgium 
26 European Parliament - Environment Committee Apr-09 Brussels, Belgium 
27 European Council - Environment Committee Apr-09 Brussels, Belgium 
28 Friends of the Earth Europe May-09 Brussels, Belgium 
29 World Wildlife Federation European Policy Office May-09 Brussels, Belgium 
30 Climate Action Network Europe May-09 Brussels, Belgium 
31 Oxfam International May-09 Brussels, Belgium 
32 WWF UK Aug-09 London, England 
33 Climate Camp UK Aug-09 London, England 
34 Climate Camp UK Aug-09 London, England 
35 Plane Stupid Aug-09 London, England 
36 People and Planet Aug-09 London, England 
37 Greenpeace UK Aug-09 London, England 
38 Oxfam GB Aug-09 Oxford, England 
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39 Global Campaign for Climate Action  Aug-09 Oxford, England 
40 Royal Society for the Protection of Birds Aug-09 London, England 
41 Climate Action Network Europe Sep-09 Brussels, Belgium 
42 European Environmental Bureau Sep-09 Brussels, Belgium 
43 EU Delegation to the UNFCCC Sep-09 Brussels, Belgium 
44 Attac France Oct-09 Paris, France 
45 Initiatives Pour un Autre Monde Oct-09 Paris, France 
46 Espaces Karl Marx Oct-09 Paris, France 
47 Avenir Climat Oct-09 Paris, France 
48 Les Amis de la Terre [FOE France] Oct-09 Paris, France 
49 Reseau d'Action Climat France  Oct-09 Paris, France 
50 Climate Camp France Oct-09 Paris, France 
51 Climate Camp France Oct-09 Paris, France 
52 WWF France Oct-09 Video Skype 
53 Climate Camp Belgium/Netherlands Nov-09 Antwerp, Belgium 
54 European Youth for Action Nov-09 Amsterdam, Netherlands 
55 Climate Camp Belgium/Netherlands Nov-09 Amsterdam, Netherlands 
56 The Transnational Institute Nov-09 Amsterdam, Netherlands 
57 Earth First! Belgium/Netherlands Nov-09 Amsterdam, Netherlands 
58 Friends of the Earth Netherlands Nov-09 Amsterdam, Netherlands 
59 Friends of the Earth Denmark Nov-09 Phone 
60 Transport and Environment Europe Nov-09 Brussels, Belgium 
61 Via Campesina Europe Nov-09 Brussels, Belgium 
62 World Wildlife Federation European Policy Office Nov-09 Brussels, Belgium 
63 Climate Camp Germany Dec-09 Copenhagen, Denmark 
64 Climate Camp Germany Dec-09 Copenhagen, Denmark 
65 Climate Justice Fast Dec-09 Copenhagen, Denmark 
66 Friends of the Earth UK Dec-09 Copenhagen, Denmark 
67 Klima Allianz Dec-09 Copenhagen, Denmark 
68 Grupo de Reflexion Rural Dec-09 Copenhagen, Denmark 
69 Friends of the Earth Sweden Dec-09 Copenhagen, Denmark 
70 Klimaforum Dec-09 Copenhagen, Denmark 
71 Polish Ecological Club Dec-09 Copenhagen, Denmark 
72 Polish Green Network  Dec-09 Copenhagen, Denmark 
73 Wetlands International Dec-09 Copenhagen, Denmark 
74 Danish 92 Group Dec-09 Copenhagen, Denmark 
75 Greenpeace Italy Dec-09 Phone 
76 Global Campaign for Climate Action  Dec-09 Copenhagen, Denmark 
77 Climate Justice Caravan Dec-09 Copenhagen, Denmark 
78 Peoples’ Global Action Dec-09 Copenhagen, Denmark 
79 Climate Justice Action Dec-09 Copenhagen, Denmark 
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80 Climate Justice Now!  Dec-09 Copenhagen, Denmark 
81 Ecologistas en Accion Dec-09 Copenhagen, Denmark 
82 La Via Campesina Dec-09 Copenhagen, Denmark 
83 Greenpeace Nordic Dec-09 Phone 
84 Climate Justice Action Jan-10 Video Skype 
85 Klimaforum Jan-10 Phone  
86 Rising Tide UK Jan-10 Phone 
87 Friends of the Earth Germany Jan-10 Phone 
 
B.3 Selected Internal and Public Organizational Documents Consulted by the Author 
ID Organization Name Document Description Date 
1 Durban Group "Durban Declaration on Carbon Trading" Oct-04 
2 Unsigned (UK Eco-
anarchist) 
“Direct Action: A Handbook” Sep-05 
3 Climate Justice Now! “CJN! Founding Press Release” Dec-07 
4 Earth First! UK Newsletter: "Action Update" Feb-08 
5 Turbulence Magazine Turbulence: Ideas for the Future - Summer 2008 Jul-08 
6 Climate Justice Action Minutes from: "International Climate Meeting: Building 
the Movement for COP 15" 
Sep-08 
7 European Social Forum Program of ESF 2008 Sep-08 
8 ESF 2008 Action 
Network 
Newspaper: "From Thoughts to Action" Sep-08 
9 European Social Forum "Abstract of Outcomes from the ESF Climate Assembly" Sep-08 
10 Campaign Against 
Climate Change 
Minutes from: "Annual General Meeting 2008" Oct-08 
11 Climate Justice Action Email Discussion: “Insider-Outsider Strategy” Oct-08 
12 Friends of the Earth 
International 
Email: "Message from FoEI please forward to CAN-
talk" 
Nov-08 
13 CAN International Daily ECO Newsletters for COP 14 Dec-08 
14 Climate Justice Action Minutes from: "Outreach Meetings, Poznan Poland" Dec-08 
15 Campaign Against 
Climate Change 
Flyer: Global Day of Action on Climate Change" Dec-08 
16 Avaaz.org Flyer: "Warsaw Manifestation: Merkel & Tusk: Don't 
Let Coal Kill the Climate" 
Dec-08 
17 CAN Europe "CAN-Europe Strategic Work Priorities from 2009-
2012" 
Jan-09 
18 CAN Europe Email Discussion: "Climate NGOs 'bureaucratised', says 
de Boer" 
Jan-09 
19 Camp for Climate Action 
UK 
Minutes: "National Gathering" Jan-09 
20 German Network for COP 
15 
"A Critical Letter on Action Concepts" Feb-09 
21 CAN Europe "2009 Strategy and Timeline" Feb-09 
22 CAN Europe Minutes from: "General Assembly" Feb-09 
23 CAN Europe and GCCA "Draft NGO Strategy" Mar-09 
24 Global Climate Campaign Annual Newsletter Mar-09 
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25 Climate Justice Action "Handbook for March Meeting" Mar-09 
26 Climate Justice Action Minutes from: "Second International Mobilization 
Meeting" 
Mar-09 
27 Rising Tide Newsletter: "Why Take Direct Action?" Mar-09 
28 Climate Camp UK Newspaper: "The Copenhagen UN Climate Talks: Deal 
or No Deal?" 
Mar-09 
29 Climate Justice Action Minutes from: "June International Mobilization 
Meeting" 
Jun-09 
30 FOE Sweden, KlimaX, 
Klimaforum 
Email Exchange: "What can the history of environmental 
and climate negotiations tell us?" 
Jul-09 
31 Camp for Climate Action 
UK 
"Handbook: Camp for Climate Action 2009" Aug-09 
32 Camp for Climate Action 
BE-NL 
"Climate Camp BE-NL Booklet"  Aug-09 
33 Friends of the Earth 
International 
Email: "Managing Concerns About 'Violent Protest'” Sep-09 
34 GCCA and CAN Europe Minutes: "EU Strategy Meeting" Sep-09 
35 Climate Justice Action "Handbook for 6th International CJA Meeting" Oct-09 
36 Climate Justice Action Minutes from: "6th International CJA Meeting" Oct-09 
37 Climate Justice Action, 
FOE Sweden, 
Klimaforum 
Email Exchange: "Clarification on the Reclaim Power 
Action" 
Oct-09 
38 Climate Collective Minutes: "Logistics, Budget and Strategy" Nov-09 
39 Friends of the Earth 
International 
Member Handbook: "Activist Guide to Copenhagen" Nov-09 
40 Greenpeace International Member Handbook: "Greenpeace Guide to COP 15" Dec-09 
41 CAN International Member Handbook: "Guide to Copenhagen December 
2009" 
Dec-09 
42 CAN International "Fair, Ambitious and Binding: Essentials for a 
Successful Climate Deal" 
Dec-09 
43 Climate Justice Now! Call and Signatories: "Climate Change Urgency, Social 
Justice" 
Dec-09 
44 Climate Justice Action Minutes from: "7th CJA Meeting" Dec-09 
45 Climate Justice Action Minutes from: "Reclaim Power! Working Group 
Meeting" 
Dec-09 
46 CAN International Minutes from: "CAN International Strategy Weekend" Dec-09 
47 Climate Collective "Action Guide to COP 15" Dec-09 
48 X-Y Solidarity Fund "Why Climate Change is Not an Environmental Issue" Dec-09 
49 CAN International Daily ECO Newsletters for COP 15 Dec-09 
50 CAN International Drafts and Final Version of ECO Article on Carbon 
Markets 
Dec-09 
51 Klimaforum Program for Peoples' Climate Summit Dec-09 
52 La Via Campesina Flyer: "Join the Mobilisations With La Via Campesina!" Dec-09 
53 Campaign Against 
Climate Change 
Flyer: "Invitation to Day of Mass Climate Action in 
Copenhagen, December 12th 2009" 
Dec-09 
54 GCCA Flyer: "People First, Planet First, A Family-Friendly 
Climate Walk" 
Dec-09 
55 Climate Justice Action Statement: "A Call to Action - Reclaim Power!" Dec-09 
56 Climate Justice Action Flyer: "Are you going to walk out on the 16th?" Dec-09 
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57 Climate Justice Action Minutes: "Short summary of results of blue block 
meeting " 
Dec-09 
58 CAN International Email Discussion: "NGO - Non Access!" Dec-09 
59 Klimaforum Drafts and Final Version of Klimaforum09 Declaration Dec-09 
60 FOE Sweden, 
Klimaforum 
Email: "Nordic Notes on Climate Justice and ESF" Jan-10 
61 RAC France Report: "Copenhague: face à l’immobilisme politique, 
l’élan citoyen ?" 
Jan-10 
62 YUNGO  Report: "Youth @ COP 15" Jan-10 
63 Climate Justice Action Discussion Paper: "What Does Climate Justice Mean in 
Europe?" 
Feb-10 
64 CAN International Minutes from: "Strategic Planning Retreat"  Apr-10 
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